ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS.

VOL. II.

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ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS,

COMPRISING HIS

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F. R. S. and S. A. London; F. R. S. Edinburgh; and Hiſtoriographer to his Majeſty for Scotland.

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222. — 8 of the note, *for* συςαςεως *read* συςασεως
247. — 15. *for* rites *read* rights
269. — 4 of the note, *for* κατασκευης *read* κατασκευων
329. — 3 of the note, *for* ηττης *read* ἥττης
401. in note, *for* ϐϐλειτικϐ *read* ϐϐλευτικϐ

THE

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book embraces three fubjects, the nobleft and moft interefting that civil fcience can boaft: the origin of fociety and government; the diftinction of ranks in a commonwealth; and a comparifon of the beft plans of political economy. On each of thefe topics I fhall offer a few remarks, not with the prefumption of interpofing my own judgment, but with the hope of juftifying or illuftrating the decifions of my Author.

In explaining the origin of political fociety, Ariftotle writes neither the fatire nor the panegyric of human nature; which, by writers of lefs wifdom than fancy, have been alternately fubftituted for plain hiftory. In this, as in all other inquiries, his firft queftion is, what are the phænomena? His fecond, what is the analogy of nature? Building on thefe foundations, he

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he concludes that both ſociety and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to ſcatter its ſeeds. Neither the cunning cowardly principles aſſerted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections eſpouſed by Shafteſbury and Hutcheſon, ought, according to our author's notions, to be involved in the ſolution of the preſent queſtion: ſince the firſt political ſocieties are as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of moral determination [a], as the inſtinctive actions of plants and inſects, tending to the preſervation of their reſpective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own [b], even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the moſt conſummate wiſdom.

Government, then, is cöeval with ſociety, and ſociety with men. Both are the works of nature; and therefore, in explaining their origin, there cannot be the ſmalleſt ground for the fanciful ſuppoſition of engagements and contracts, independently of which the great modern antagoniſt of Ariſtotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding: "The original compact, which begins and actually conſtitutes any political ſociety, is nothing but the conſent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into ſuch a ſociety. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world [c]." From this maxim, which is perpetually inculcated in Locke's two treatiſes on government, is fairly deducible the unalienable right of mankind to be *ſelf-governed*; that is, to be their own legiſlators, and their own directors; or, if they find it inconvenient to aſſume the adminiſtration of

[a] See vol. i. p. 109. & ſeq.; and p. 285. & ſeq. [b] Ibid.

[c] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185. Edit. of 1714.

affairs in their own perfons, to appoint reprefentatives who may exercife a delegated fovereignty, effentially and unalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence refults the new unalienable right of all mankind to be fairly reprefented, a right with which each individual was invefted from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the leaft notion of the thing[d]. From this right to fair reprefentation, there follows, by neceffary confequence, the right of univerfal fuffrage, univerfal eligibility, and the univerfal and juft preponderancy of majorities in all cafes whatever.

Such is the boafted and fpecious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux[e], continued in thofe of our Price[f] and our Prieftley[g], and carried to the utmoft extravagance in thofe of (I wifh not to fay our) Rouffeau[h], Paine[i], and the innumerable pamphleteers whofe writings occafioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions.

[d] According to the fyftem of Locke and his followers, reprefentatives are appointed by the people to exercife in their ftead, political functions which the people have a right to exercife in their own perfons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the people; and to the people, their conftituents, they always are refponfible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the firft or principal author. But reprefentatives, in the ufual and legal acceptation of the word in the Englifh conftitution, meant, and ftill means, perfons in virtue of their election exercifing political functions, which the people had not a right to exercife in their own perfons, and fo little refponfible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their inftructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with reprefentation in the ufual and only practical fenfe of the word will be fhewn hereafter.

[e] See his Cafe of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113, and again p. 169. "I have no other notion of flavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not confent."

[f] Obfervations on Civil Liberty, &c.

[g] Effay on the firft Principles of Government.

[h] Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique.

[i] Rights of Man, &c.

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Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumſtances of the times, have produced, and are ſtill producing, the moſt extraordinary effects; by arming the paſſions of the multitude with principle, fortifying them by argument, and thereby ſtirring into action thoſe diſcordant elements which naturally lurk in the boſom of every community. It is not conſiſtent with my deſign, in defending the tenets of my author, to anſwer his political adverſaries with declamation and obloquy, (a raſh and dangerous attempt! ſince the voice of the multitude will always be the loudeſt and the ſtrongeſt,) but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great maſter Locke be itſelf founded in truth. To prove that government is merely a matter of conſent, he aſſumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy; what he calls a ſtate of nature, which he defines to be "men living together according to reaſon, without a common ſuperior on earth with authority to judge between them [k]." But he himſelf ſeems aware that this ſuppoſed natural ſtate of man is a ſtate in which man never yet was found; and in which, if by violence thruſt, he could not for a ſingle day remain. Locke, I ſay, ſaw the difficulty, which, inſtead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. "Where are there," he aſks, "or ever were there, any men in ſuch a ſtate of nature [l]?" He anſwers, "that ſince all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in a ſtate of nature, 'tis plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that ſtate [m]." But this, I affirm, is not to anſwer the propoſed queſtion; for princes and rulers of independent ſtates do not live together, nor aſſociate and "herd," as he himſelf expreſſes it, in the ſame ſociety. If they did ſo,

[k] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164. [l] Ibid. p. 162. [m] Ibid.

they

they could not fubfift without government: for government and fociety are things abfolutely infeparable; they commence together; they grow up together; they are both of them equally natural; and fo indiffolubly united, that the deftruction of the one is neceffarily accompanied by the deftruction of the other. This is the true fenfe of Ariftotle as underftood and expreffed by an illuftrious defender of juft government and genuine liberty. "As we ufe and exercife our bodily members, before we underftand the ends and purpofes of this exercife, fo it is by Nature herfelf, that we are united and affociated into political fociety [n]."

Locke, who fo feverely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, fo unjuftly arraigns what is called Ariftotle's Metaphyfics, appears to have equally miftaken his Politics. Had he underftood [o] that invaluable work, this idol of modern philofophers, and efpecially of modern politicians, would not, probably, (fince he was a man of great worth as well as of great wifdom,) have produced a theory of government totally impoffible in practice; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and

[n] Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priufquam dedicimus cujus ea utilitatis cauffa habeamus, fic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem conjuncti & confociati fumus. De Fin. Bon. & Mal. l. iii. c. xx. Conf. de Officiis, l. i. c. xvi. & feq. Cicero does not fay "communitatem" fimply, but "civilem communitatem," which agrees with Ariftotle's definition of man, ζῶον πολιτικὸν, not merely a herding, but a political animal. See the fame doctrine in Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh.

[o] Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had afked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. "To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke obferves, "the foundation fhould be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil fociety, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the feveral fpecies of it. Ariftotle is allowed a mafter in this fcience, and few enter into this confideration of government without reading his Politics." How honourable a teftimony!

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fedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all hiftory, no political fabric ever yet was reared; or if it were to be reared, could ever poffibly be preferved [p]. The neglect or mif-apprehenfion of fome of the moft important parts of the Stagirite's writings is indeed moft deeply to be lamented. Of the many thoufand authors who have copied or commented his logic, the far greater number omit his interefting chapters on language; deeming the confideration of words below the dignity of philofophers. His profound obfervations concerning the nature and conftitution of a family have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analyfis of language has been proved in the prefent work to be the fole foundation of logic, fo his analyfis of a family, and his explanation of the caufes through which its elements naturally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to difcern the analagous principles (principles continually infifted on by himfelf) which have raifed and upheld the great edifice of civil fociety; "which is not a mafs but a fyftem, and which, like every fyftem, implies a diftinction of parts; with many moral as well as phyfical differences, relative and reciprocal; the powers and perfections of one part fupplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dignity, is an attempt not lefs abfurd than that of compofing a piece of mufic from one and the fame note [q].

A difficult queftion follows, how far focial inequality, whether civil or domeftic, may be allowed to extend? It is with a trembling hand that I touch the delicate fubject of flavery; an undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmoft confidence in the humanity as well as in the judgment of

[p] Ariftot. Polit. paffim. [q] Ibid.

my

my author. Firft of all, Ariftotle exprefsly condemns the cruel practice prevalent in his own days of enflaving prifoners of war[r]: fecondly, he declares, in the moft explicit terms, all flaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are fitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he obferves, muft in all cafes be limited by their capacities for receiving them; and thefe capacities are themfelves limited by the exigencies and neceffities of our prefent imperfect condition. The helpleffnefs of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and the urgencies attending mankind in every ftage of their exiftence on earth, render it indifpenfably neceffary that a great proportion of the fpecies fhould be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the ftrenuous exertions of productive induftry, and the petty tafks of domeftic drudgery. Nature, therefore, in whofe plan and intention the fyftem of fociety precedes and takes place of the parts of which it is compofed, has varioufly organifed and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without fetting other bounds to this variety, than are impofed by the good of the whole fyftem, of which individuals are not independent units, but conftituent elements. According to this plan or intention, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the wideft of all difcriminations, and the loweft of all occu-

[r] Locke fays on this fubject, " There is another fort of fervants, which by a peculiar name we call flaves, who, being captives taken in a juft war, are by the rights of nature fubjected to the abfolute dominion and arbitrary power of their mafters. Thefe men, having, as I fay, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and loft their eftates, and being in a ftate of flavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that ftate be confidered as any part of civil fociety." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 181.—We fhould imagine that the *liberal* Locke and the *flavifh* Ariftotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and principles.

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pations, domeftic fervitude, " a fpecies of labour not employed in production, but totally confumed in ufe;" becaufe folely but not unprofitably fpent in promoting the eafe and accommodation of life. In the relation of mafter and fervant, the good of the mafter may indeed be the primary object; but the benefit of the fervant or flave is alfo a neceffary refult; fince he only is naturally and juftly a flave, whofe powers are competent to mere bodily labour; who is capable of liftening to reafon, but incapable of exercifing that fovereign faculty; and whofe weaknefs and fhort-fightednefs are fo great, that it is fafer for him to be guided or governed through life by the prudence of another. But, let it always be remembered—" that one clafs of men ought to have the qualifications requifite for mafters, before another can either fitly or ufefully be employed as flaves." Government, then, not only civil but domeftic, is a moft ferious duty, a moft facred truft; a truft, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the fuppofed unalienable rights of all men to be felf-governed [s]. Thofe rights, and

[s] Politics would not be a fcience, unlefs it contained truths, abfolute, univerfal, and unalterable. One of thefe is that in the text; becaufe effentially fpringing from the nature of fociety and of man. Another univerfal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From thefe two premifes, it neceffarily follows, that this main end never can be effectuated on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without fuppofing all fovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to fhare) may, under many given circumftances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large a controul in the government. This controul in all large communities can only be conveniently exercifed either by particular magiftrates, or by reprefentative affemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any neceffary connection with the origin of government (fo far from being its *only juft principle*) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be fhewn hereafter that affemblies elected by the people to provide for their interefts, and thence called their reprefentatives,

and thoſe only, are unalienable, which it is impoſſible for one perſon to exerciſe for another: and to maintain thoſe to be natural and unalienable rights, which the perſons ſuppoſed to be inveſted with them, can never poſſibly exerciſe, conſiſtently either with their own ſafety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature; of which it is the primary and unalterable law, that forecaſt ſhould direct improvidence, reaſon controul paſſion, wiſdom command folly. I now proceed to examine Ariſtotle's reflections on political economy, which are not leſs adverſe than his miſunderſtood and misſtated vindication of ſlavery itſelf, both to the theories long prevalent, and to others which have begun recently to prevail among the civiliſed nations of modern Europe.

The northern conquerors, who invaded and deſolated the Roman empire, long diſdained to produce by ſlow induſtry, what they gloried in raviſhing by ſudden violence. War was their delight and their trade. They ſubſiſted by rapine; and therefore cared not how far they were excelled by others in peaceful and productive arts; while gold, and all that it can purchaſe, might be conquered by iron. But the ſpoils of rapacity having ſupplied them with the inſtruments of luxury, they began to reliſh the pleaſures of repoſe; and inſtead of courting new dangers abroad, to imitate at home thoſe objects and conveniencies which, though they had not the genius to

tives, are not ſo new in the world as is commonly imagined. In ſome republics we ſhall ſee a double row of delegates, repreſentatives of repreſentatives; in others, we ſhall find repreſentation and taxation regarded as correlatives; and even in ſome democracies, we ſhall meet with perſons elected by the people, and repreſenting them in the moſt uſeful ſenſe of the word, "that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wiſe and good, would act for themſelves."

 invent,

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invent, they gradually acquired the tafte to approve, the vanity to difplay, and the defire to accumulate. Manufactures then were eftablifhed: navigation was exercifed for the purpofe not only of war but of traffic: an extenfive commerce was introduced; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpofe of all thofe operations, was to augment in each country the quantity of gold and filver; fince, with thofe precious metals, all other coveted objects might ufually be procured. The bufinefs of each individual merchant is to get money; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reafonably have any other end in view. This falfe principle was regarded as the bafis of all found political arithmetic; and the moft conclufive reafoning of Ariftotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have fufficed to prove, that national wealth confifted not in gold and filver, had not the ruined ftate of Spain confirmed experimentally the fame important truth.

For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations confifts in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknowledge alfo, with him, that the precious metals, in contradiftinction to other ufeful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of ferving as the fitteft inftruments of exchange, and the moft accurate meafures of value; but that the quantity or number in which they ought to be defired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other meafures or inftruments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and operations which they are employed to anfwer or effect [1]. Yet, while they

[1] It is worthy of remark that Locke is one of the moft ftrenuous afferters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he confiders "as the moft folid and fubftantial

they reafon thus juftly refpecting gold and filver, the fame writers have not fufficient enlargement of mind to generalife the theorem, and to perceive with our author, that property itfelf is as much an inftrument as money, though ferving for a far more complicated purpofe; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpofe requires, the furplus will be at beft ufelefs, moft commonly pernicious; will inflame defire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and produce that long train of diforders, which made our philofopher declare, "that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Ifles, unlefs their virtue kept pace with their external profperity, muft inevitably become the moft miferable of all mankind." In the fafhionable fyftems of modern politicians, national wealth is confidered as fynonimous with national profperity. To the increafe of productive induftry, and the augmentation of public revenue, health, education, and morals, are facrificed without apology and without remorfe; fince that trade is univerfally held to be the beft, which produces moft money with the leaft labour. But according to Ariftotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the ftatefman's care, but the effect which the producing of that work naturally operates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praifes of agriculture and a country life, our author's fentiments, and even expreffions, have been faithfully and generally copied by the moft judicious writers of antiquity; many of whom mark, with as much reprobation as Ariftotle himfelf,

ftantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy." See the paffage quoted and refuted in Smith's Wealth of Nations, v. ii. p. 140. 8vo. edit. It is time that, with regard to fubjects ftill more important, men fhould return from the fchool of Locke to that of Ariftotle.

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himfelf, that fpecies of traffic cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain; fince fuch a traffic, univerfally diffufed among a people, has a tendency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their principles, to make them value as ends, things only ufeful as means; and to debafe and corrupt every part of their character; becaufe wherever wealth is the primary object of purfuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal fource of enjoyment. In agriculture and pafturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the induftry of man. They are, of all occupations, the moft beneficial and moft neceffary, as well as the moft agreeable and moft falutary; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmeft and happieft temperament of the mind and body: and the property acquired by them is intrinfically more valuable, becaufe effentially more ufeful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewife maintains, that thofe natural and primeval purfuits are of all the leaft likely to engender floth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices; and that nations of hufbandmen, in particular, afford materials fufceptible of the beft political form, and the leaft difpofed to difturb, by fedition, any moderately good government under which it is their lot to live. In confideration of fo many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the moft favoured branch of national induftry; an opinion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by falfe fyftem, could venture to contradict. Yet, how far other methods of accumulating ftock, befide thofe propofed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or difcouraged and rejected, muft depend on circumftances and events, the force of which the philofopher's experience could not fupply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From

the

the artifices and ſhifts which he explains, (and he is the only writer that explains them,) as practiſed by the republics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpoſe of raiſing money, it was impoſſible for him to conjecture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical government ſhould attain ſuch ſtability as rendered the public revenues a ſafe mortgage to creditors; that the immenſe debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by intereſting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of conſtituted authorities, to augment that facility itſelf, and thereby ſtill farther to accumulate the national debt; for diſcharging the intereſt of which, heavy taxes muſt neceſſarily, but not altogether unprofitably be levied, ſince they would, in ſome meaſure, repay, in public ſecurity, the burdens which they impoſe on perſonal labour, or rather the ſums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot poſſibly be raiſed, except in countries flouriſhing in ſuch reſources as agriculture and paſturage alone were never yet able to afford; reſources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained, on the other, by the powers of national induſtry, aſſiſted and multiplied by the moſt complicated machinery, and an endleſs ſubdiviſion of allotted taſks; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterouſly, becauſe each has but one, and that a ſmall part, to perform; while the diligence of all is perpetually ſtimulated by the bait of gain, ſupplied from the exhauſtleſs fund of an enlightened commercial ſpirit, as extenſive as the world, and as enterpriſing as thoſe renowned adventurers who diſcovered and explored its remoteſt regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy propoſed by Ariſtotle be in itſelf

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itfelf preferable to that which fome modern nations purfue. Nations, circumftanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but muft principally depend for fupplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better fyftem is now no longer in their power: the queftion of expediency has ceafed: they muft obey neceffity [u].

This feems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial fyftem of economy; a fyftem which has often been defended by very inconclufive arguments. "Public wealth and profperity," Mr. Hume obferves, "is the end of all our wifhes;" and this wealth or profperity, both he and his follower, Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful induftry; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may

[u] It is not difficult to explain why the doctrines of fpeculative politicians refpecting the wealth and economy of nations, fhould alfo differ fo materially from the theory propofed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who fubdued the Roman empire, every thing moft valuable and moft interefting is connected with the improvement of arts, and confequent extenfion of commerce; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engroffed whole provinces, diffipated the fuperfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle fervants and worthlefs dependants, ever ready to gratify the wildeft and wickedeft of their paffions; to abet their infolence, to uphold their haughtinefs, to encourage and fecond their violence and rapacity; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed ariftocracies, formed the worft fpecies of oligarchy; an oligarchy confifting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of each individual lord over his refpective vaffals and retainers. In fuch a condition of fociety the expenfive allurements of luxury, produced by what Ariftotle condemns as over-refinement in arts and manufactures, had the moft direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themfelves; to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to beftow confideration on the many. This particular cafe has been, by a very ufual fallacy in reafoning, converted into a general political theorem.

may produce as much food as will maintain many [x]. But this aſſertion is not true in the acceptation in which it muſt be taken, in order to recommend the commercial ſyſtem above the agricultural. In agriculture, as we above obſerved, nature operates in concert with man; and though one family co-operating with nature, may, in a given piece of ground, produce as much food as will ſerve ſix, yet ſix families labouring the ſame ground, will not reap a proportional increaſe; and twenty families labouring the ſame ground, may find it barely ſufficient to ſupply their own nouriſhment. The more that the land is laboured, it will be the more productive; and the more fitly and fairly it is divided [y], it will (other circumſtances remaining the ſame) be the more laboured; and the ſame country or iſland will thus maintain the greater proportion of inhabitants employed in that kind of work, which, according to Ariſtotle, is the moſt favourable to health, morals, good government, the unfolding of intellectual as well as corporeal powers, and the attainment of that meaſure of happineſs which the general maſs of mankind can ever hope to reach.

[x] Hume's Eſſays, vol. i. Refinement of Arts; and Smith's Wealth of Nations, paſſim.

[y] Does our author, therefore, propoſe an Agrarian law? No; he knew better. The ſecond book of his Politics is, of all works ever written, the beſt adapted to prove to levellers themſelves, that the meaſures from which they expect ſo much good, would, if carried into execution, infallibly terminate in their own ruin and that of the community.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Nature and end of a Commonwealth.—Analyfis thereof.—Monarchy the firft form of government.—Domeftic œconomy.—Slavery.—Accumulation of ftock.—Riches, real and artificial.—Commerce.—Money.—Manufactures.—Monopolies.—Women.—Children.—Slaves.—Connection between domeftic and political œconomy.

BOOK I. Chap. 1.

Nature and end of a common-wealth.

EVERY political fociety forms, it is plain, a fort of community or partnerfhip, inftituted for the benefit of the partners. Utility [z] is the end and aim of every fuch inftitution; and the greateft and moft extenfive utility is the aim of that great affociation,

[z] The firft fentence of the Politics may be tranflated literally thus: "Since we fee that every commonwealth is a partnerfhip, and that every partnerfhip is eftablifhed for the fake of fome good, (good, real or apparent, being the caufe of all human action,) it is plain that all partnerfhips have good for their end and aim; and efpecially, that the fovereign good muft be the aim of that fovereign partnerfhip, which comprehends all the reft, and which is known by the name of a commonwealth, or of political fociety." The word utility in the text is therefore taken in its moft extenfive fignification; utility in the ftrict fenfe, conftituting but one branch, and that the loweft of το αγαθον. See the Ethics, l. i. & x. paffim. Plato ufes the word utility nearly in the modern fenfe. καλλιϛα γαρ δη τυτο και λεγεται και λελεξεται, ὁτι το μεν ωφελιμον καλον, το δε ϐλαϐερον αισχρον, Plato de Repub. l. v. p. 655. Edit. Ficin. "This is moft excellently faid, and will ever continue to be faid, that whatever is ufeful is honourable, and whatever is hurtful is fhameful." In the Gorgias, p. 324. το καλον is analyfed into pleafure and utility; a fyftem revived by Mr. Hume in his Inquiry into the Principles of Morals. In both thefe fignifications "utility" is different from το χρησιμον, denoting what is good or defirable, not in itfelf, but as ufeful or fubfervient to fome defirable purpofe.

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ciation, comprehending all the reft, and known by the name of a commonwealth [a].

A commonwealth is not to be confounded with a family, as if a large family were nothing different from a fmall commonwealth; nor ought we, as too many do, to confound the functions of kings and magiftrates with thofe of fuperintendants [b] or mafters. Magiftrates rule by an eftablifhed rotation; kings reign for life [c]; and confidered in reference to the number of thofe

[a] As I fhall frequently have occafion to ufe the words republic and commonwealth, the fignification of which has been of late years ftrangely altered, I cannot better explain Ariftotle's meaning of thofe terms than in the words of Cicero. "Refpublica res eft populi, cum bene et jufte geritur," &c. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people, when it is well and rightly adminiftered, whether by a fingle prince, by a fmall body of nobles, or by the people at large. But injuftice converts the nobles into a faction; the prince, into a tyrant; the people, into tyrants. In all thefe cafes alike, the republic is not only corrupted, but annihilated; fince that cannot be called the wealth of the people which is adminiftered by a faction or a tyrant; nor can that multitude be called the people, which is not affociated on principles of juftice and public utility." Fragm. de Republic. l. iii. Alluding to the fenfe above given to the word "commonwealth," James I. faid to his Parliament in 1603, "I will ever prefer the weal of the public and of the whole *commonwealth* to any particular and private ends of mine."

[b] The οικονομος was a perfon appointed by rich men to manage their domeftic concerns, and particularly to fuperintend and direct the labour of their flaves. When the δεσποτης, or mafter, was a poor man, he performed the office of οικονομος himfelf; for this reafon Ariftotle fays, διον, αν μεν ολιγων δεσποτην· αν δε πλειονων, οικονομον. "As if there were no other diftinction between a mafter and a fuperintendant, but that the former had the government of a few, and the latter of more."

[c] The original fays, όταν μεν αυτος εφεστηκη, βασιλικον· όταν δε κατα λογους της επιστημης της τοιαυτης, κατα μερος αρχων και αρχομενος, πολιτικον. The Latin tranflators all miftake the paffage, "Effe quidem regem, fi ipfe præfit," &c. But Ariftotle fays, "when the fame perfon perpetually prefides, the government is regal; it is, on the other hand, republican when power changes from one hand to another, and the citizens rule by vicarious fucceffion, according to the eftablifhed principles of focial arrangement." What thefe principles

thofe fubject to their authority, the jurifdiction of fuperintendants is commonly more extenfive than that of mafters or fathers, and always more limited than that of magiftrates and kings. Thefe, however, are but accidental diftinctions; others, more invariable and more fcientific, will refult from analyfing (according to our ufual mode of inveftigation) that complex object, a commonwealth, into its conftituent elements; thofe fimple and ultimate principles, that admit not of farther refolution.

Analyfis of political fociety.

In this analyfis, we fhall proceed moft fatisfactorily [d] by viewing fociety in its growth. Thofe parts or elements, then, will naturally force themfelves into union, which cannot continue feparately to exift. The neceffity of perpetuating the fpecies, forms the combining principle between males and females; a principle independent of choice or defign, and alike incident to animals and to plants, which are all naturally [e] impelled to propagate their refpective kinds. The fame imperious neceffity which compels affociation, naturally [f] produces government. Communities could not fubfift without forefight to difcern,

ciples are, we fhall afterwards fee. It is fufficient at prefent to obferve that they are totally incompatible with the new-fangled doctrines concerning univerfal fuffrage and the right of majorities. The learned reader will perceive that I have here changed the order of the words, the better to exprefs the fenfe. The fignificant brevity of the Greek particles knit firmly together diftant claufes and fentences. But their force could only be expreffed in other languages by tirefome circumlocutions.

[d] Ariftotle fays, "in this, as in other inquiries, we fhould fpeculate moft fuccefsfully, could we contemplate fociety in its formation or genefis." This is that comprehenfive and fublime analyfis which Ariftotle has applied with fuch unremitting patience to the moft important fubjects of philofophy; and which is well illuftrated in mathematics by the learned Barrow in his Geometrical Lectures; the principles of which probably laid the foundation of Newton's great difcoveries.

[e] See Analyfis, p. 109. [f] Ibid.

diſcern, as well as exertion to effectuate the meaſures requiſite for their ſafety. Men capable of diſcerning thoſe meaſures, are made for authority; and men merely capable of effectuating them by bodily labour, are made for obedience; but if ſafety be their common concern, the good of the governors muſt correſpond with the good of the governed, and the intereſt of the ſervant muſt coincide with the intereſt of the maſter.

Why women and ſlaves are confounded by barbarians.

It is found by experience, that thoſe inſtruments are the moſt perfect, which are each of them contrived for its ſpecific uſe. Slaves and women, though confounded in one maſs by barbarians, are therefore naturally different; for nature works not after the niggardly faſhion of Delphic cutlers [g], who ſhape the ſame knife for various and often diſſimilar offices; and if women are by barbarians reduced to the level of ſlaves, it is becauſe barbarians themſelves have never yet riſen to the rank of men, that is, of men fit to govern; wherefore the poets ſay, "'Tis right the Greeks ſhould govern the barbarians."

Origin and progreſs of ſociety.

Of the aſſociations abovementioned, that of a family is the firſt in its origin. "A houſe, a wife, and a labouring ox," theſe, together with the huſband or maſter, form the elements of the firſt community; for a poor man muſt be contented with a labouring ox inſtead of a ſlave. This primary aſſociation founded on daily exigency, Charondas [h] diſtinguiſhes by a word denoting thoſe fed from the ſame board, and Epimenides [i] deſcribes

[g] Delphi, as the ſeat of the oracle, being continually frequented by ſtrangers, exhibited a perpetual fair or market, where each cuſtomer might be ſupplied with wares agreeable to his taſte, and ſuitable to his purſe. Hiſtory of Greece, vol. i. c. v.

[h] Commonly reputed the legiſlator of Thurii, anciently Sybaris. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 485. Edit. Weſſeling. He is mentioned afterwards by Ariſtotle. The ſublime preface to his laws is contained in Stobæus. Serm. 42. p. 289.

[i] Probably in that work of his mentioned by Laertius, and entitled Περι της εν Κρητη πολιτειας.

defcribes it by a word denoting thofe warmed at the fame hearth.

Next in order follows the affociation of a canton or village, founded indeed on utility, but not on daily exigency, and moft naturally formed by colonization from the firft houfe or family. Such a community therefore is juftly expreffed by a word denoting thofe nourifhed from the fame milk. It is the affociation of kinfmen under the authority of their common progenitor, whofe jurifdiction flowly extends with the gradual multiplication of his family [k]. Cities therefore were firft fubject to kings; and to fome kind of monarchy, many nations have invariably adhered; for all of them have grown to their prefent magnitude from feeble colonies or fcattered tribes, originally fubfifting under patriarchal government, in which (according to the poet),

Why monarchy was the firft form of government.

"Each ruled his race, his neighbour not his care [l]."

That

πολιτειας. On the government of Crete. Apuleius fays he was Pythagoras's mafter, and Plato relates that he came to Athens ten years before the battle of Marathon, or five hundred years before Chrift. (Plato de Legibus, l. i.) According to Plutarch (in Solon.), Cicero (de Divin. i. 18.), Paufanias (Attic.), Epimenides had made a journey from Crete to Athens near a century before that period, and had prepared the way, by his expiations and predictions, for Solon's legiflation. He is believed to have lived above 150 years (Corfin. Faft. Attic.). The catalogue of the works afcribed to him, particularly of his theological and myftical poems, is given by Fabricius, t. i. p. 37. & feq.

[k] The judicious Polybius agrees with Ariftotle in maintaining that government is the work of nature, and that monarchy is the firft kind of government. πρωτη μεν ακατασκευως και φυσικως συνισταται μοναρχια. "Firft of all comes monarchy, which is eftablifhed by the bare work of nature, independently of any preparation or defign." Polyb. l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh. It is worthy of remark, that in the age of Polybius, Ariftotle's opinions were only known by tradition; his works, as we have had occafion to relate, ftill remained unpublifhed. Polybius therefore was not acquainted with Ariftotle's Politics, the perufal of which would have enabled him to avoid feveral errors into which he has fallen in his fixth book.

[l] Odyffey, ix. 115.

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That this is not a fiction, but an hiftorical fact, is attefted by that univerfal confent which has tranferred monarchy from earth to heaven. All nations believe the gods to be governed by a king; for men who have made the gods after their own image [m], are ever hafty in afcribing to thefe celeftial beings, human manners and human inftitutions.

Chap. 2.

A commonwealth congenial to the focial nature of man;

The union of various villages forms, at length, a city or commonwealth, that finifhed fabric of fociety reaching, as near as may be, the bound of perfectnefs; felf-fufficient and complete, conftituted for fafety, and productive of happinefs. A commonwealth is not lefs congenial to human nature than the affociation of a family or village. It is the goal to which all preceding affociations tend; their natural refult, and their higheft maturity; and the perfection of civil fociety, being the matured ftate of man, is like the perfection of every other progreffive object, that ftage of his exiftence which peculiarly afcertains, characterizes, and effentiates his nature [n]. Whoever, therefore, is unfit to live in a commonwealth, is above or below humanity.

"Curfed is the man and void of law and right,
"Unworthy property, unworthy light [o]."

Such

[m] Εν ανδρων, εν θεων γενος
Εκ μιας δε πνιομεν ματρος αμφοτεροι.

"The fame is the race of men and gods; both of us received animation from the fame mother." Pind. Nem. Ode i. v. 1. The fame doctrine had prevailed, at leaft, from the time of Hefiod's Theogonia.

[n] The word is fometimes ufed in the fame fenfe by the Roman writers. Thus Tacitus alluding to the dark and livid colour of the Britifh pearls, which rendered them a lefs tempting prize to the avarice of the Romans (Vid. Sueton. in Jul. Cæfar, c. xlvii.), fays, "Ego facilius crediderim, naturam margaritis deeffe quam nobis avariciam." Tacit. in Agricol. c. 12.

[o] Iliad ix. v. 64.

Such a wretch can only delight in carnage, a folitary and ravenous vulture; but man delights in fociety far more than do bees or herds[p]; fince nature, which never works in vain, diftinguifhes him by the power of fpeech, not merely to fignify his pains and pleafures, a purpofe limiting the vocal communications of other animals, but to defcribe his advantages and inconveniences, to explain his rights and wrongs.

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and the caufe of his virtues and perfections.

A participation in rights and advantages forms the bond of political fociety; an inftitution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from whom it is conftituted[q]. What

[p] While tranflating this chapter I happened to look into an agreeable compilement, intitled, The Philofophy of Natural Hiftory, and read the following paffage: "Some writers, as Ariftotle and a few moderns, implicit followers of his opinions, deny that man is naturally a gregarious or affociating animal. To render this notion confiftent with the actual and univerfal ftate of human nature, thefe authors have recourfe to puerile conceits and queftionable facts, which it would be fruitlefs to relate." Smellie's Philofophy of Natural Hiftory, c. xvi. p. 415. Who thofe followers of Ariftotle are, I know not; but if any fuch there be, how unworthily has that philofopher been treated by his difciples as well as by his detractors!

[q] Ariftotle's words are, ὅτι μεν ουν ἡ πολις φυσει προτερον η εκαστος, δηλον· ει γαρ μη αυταρκης ἑκαστος χωρισθεις, ὁμοιως τοις αλλοις μερεσι ἑξει προς το ὁλον. "That a commonwealth is prior by nature to each individual citizen, is plain; for if each individual, when feparated, is incapable of fupplying his own wants, it is evident that he muft bear the fame relation to the community, as other parts bear to the whole or fyftem to which they appertain." Nature, our author obferves, has always fome end in view, and always employs the beft means for attaining it. "This end or purpofe is the firft thing in the intention of Nature, though fhe is often obliged to effect it by a long fucceffion of intermediate operations, each of which, except the laft of all, is both means and end, means with regard to that which follows, and end with regard to that which precedes it. Thus Nature, or rather the God of nature, willed the exiftence of fuch a creature as man, whofe characteriftic diftinction fhould confift in his perfectibility, or his capacity of being difciplined from a mere animal or favage, into a moral and intellectual being. But man is only to be difciplined by civil fociety; and civil fociety requires, for its materials, the fmaller

affociations

What members are to the body, citizens are to the commonwealth. The hand or foot, when feparated from the body, retains indeed its name, but totally changes its nature, becaufe it is completely diverted of its ufes and of its powers. In the fame manner a citizen is a conftituent part of a whole or fyftem [r], which invefts him with powers and qualifies him for functions for which, in his individual capacity, he is totally unfit; and independently of which fyftem, he might fubfift indeed as a folitary

affociations of tribes and families. Thefe laft again refolve themfelves into individuals, diftinguifhed by the relative appellations of hufband and wife, father and fon, mafter and fervant, and conftituting the elements of families." Ariftotle here fpeaks as if civil fociety itfelf, confidered as a whole or fyftem, complete in all its parts or members, perfect, happy, and felf-fufficient, formed the end for which man was created. But in the twelfth book of his Metaphyfics, in the feven laft chapters of the third book of his Treatife De Anima, and even in his Ethics to Nichomachus, l. x. c. viii. he intimates that man has a ftill higher deftination than that of acting his part well in political fociety. Plato, in his Thæatetus, had faid, "That the main object of human purfuit ought to be ὁμοιωσις τῳ θεω κατα το δυνατον. ὁμοιωσις δε, δικαιον και ὁσιον μετα φρονησεως γενεσθαι. "a refembling God as much as poffible; and to refemble God is to imitate his juftice, his holinefs, and wifdom." Ariftotle holds the fame doctrine in the paffages above alluded to; maintaining, however, that the moral virtues may be ultimately refolved into the intellectual; or, in other words, that wifdom and goodnefs, though they do not keep pace in every ftep of their progrefs, yet finally coincide.

[r] The maxim that citizens are parts of the community had long been confidered as a practical principle, and had become a fruitful fource of laws in the republics of Greece. The wretch guilty of fuicide was punifhed with infamy, as robbing the ftate of a member [1]. The ftate refented injuries done to individuals, as inflicted on itfelf. Infults offered to women, children, or even to flaves, might be refented, profecuted, and punifhed by every citizen [2]: admirable inftitutions, Plutarch obferves, for preventing wrongs; the whole community warmly fympathifing with the indignant feelings of the fufferers [3]. Turpitude, or bafenefs, alone diffolved the connection between a citizen and his country. He who committed actions unworthy of a man, was diverted of his political rights, and fevered from the community, as a gangrened member which might infect and deftroy the fyftem [4].

[1] Ariftot. Ethic. paffim. [2] Demofthen. in Mid. p. 610. [3] Plutarch in Solon, p. 88. [4] Idem ibid.

folitary favage, but could never attain that improved and happy ftate to which his progreffive nature invariably tends. He, therefore, who firft collected focieties, was the greateft benefactor to mankind. Perfected by the offices and duties of focial life, man is the beft, but rude and undifciplined, he is the very worft of animals. For nothing is more deteftable than armed improbity; and man is armed with craft and courage, which, untamed by juftice, he will moft wickedly pervert, and become at once the moft impious and the fierceft of monfters; the moft abominable in gluttony, the moft fhamelefs in venery. But juftice is the fundamental virtue of political fociety, fince the order of fociety cannot be maintained without law, and laws are inftituted to declare what is juft.

Chap. 3.

The nature and branches of domeftic œconomy.

Cities or commonwealths are compofed of families; and the management of a family is properly termed œconomy. A family, to be complete, muft confift of freemen and flaves [s]; and as every complex object naturally refolves itfelf into fimple elements, we muft confider the elements of a family:—the mafter and fervant, the hufband and wife, the father and children; what all of thefe are in themfelves, and what are the relations which they naturally and properly bear to each other [t]. We fhall then confider the acquifition of property and the accumulation of ftock, which

[s] This founds harfh; but hear him to the end.

[t] The relations of authority and fubjection fubfifting between the mafter and fervant were expreffed in the Greek by the fubftantives δεσποτεια and δουλεια. But the analogous relations fubfifting between the hufband and wife, the father and children, had not in Greek, Ariftotle obferves, any appropriate names. He therefore denotes them by the adjectives ἡ γαμικη (conjugalis focietas) and ἡ τεκνοποιητη; which latter, in chapter twelfth of this Book, he calls πατρικη, to which joining αρχη, we fhall have the patria poteftas of the Romans.

which by fome is treated as a branch, and by others as the moft important branch, of œconomy. Let us begin then by examining the relation of mafter and fervant; and by inveftigating the nature of fervitude itfelf, endeavour to form more falutary and more correct notions on this fubject than thofe which generally prevail. By fome writers, that part of œconomy employed in the management of flaves has been dignified with the name of fcience; by others, flavery is confidered as an inftitution altogether unnatural, refulting from the cruel maxims of war. Liberty, they affert, is the great law of nature[1], which acknowledges not any difference between the flave and the mafter; flavery therefore is unjuft, being founded on violence.

The nature of domeftic flavery.

It is the bufinefs, then, of œconomy to procure the comfortable fubfiftence of a family; and all arts and employments require proper inftruments for effecting their refpective ends. Of thefe inftruments, fome are inanimate, and others are endowed with life. The failor, as well as the helm, are inftruments of navigation; fince they are moved and impelled by the will of the pilate, for effecting the purpofe of his art. Under this afpect, any piece of property may be confidered in relation to the art of œconomy. It is an inftrument to be moved and employed for the purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence. Property at large, therefore, is merely an accumulation of many fuch inftruments; and even a flave is, in this view, a moveable inftrument, endowed with life, which, impelled by the will of another, communicates motion to other inftruments lefs excel-

lent

[1] The Scholiaft on Ariftotle's Rhetoric has preferved a faying to this purpofe of Alcidamas, the fcholar of Gorgias of Leontium (See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 337.): Ελευθερους αφηκε παντας θεος· ουδενα δουλον ἡ φυσις πεποιηκε. "All come free from the hands of God; Nature has made no man a flave."

lent than himfelf. The ftatues of Dedalus, and the tripods of Vulcan, moved, we are told, fpontaneoufly.

> "Wondrous to tell, inftinct with fpirit roll'd
> "From place to place, around the bleft abodes,
> "Self-moved, obedient to the beck of Gods[u]."

Did this ufually happen, did the fhuttle thus weave, and the ftrings of the harp thus play, the artift would not need the affiftance of workmen, nor the mafter require the labour of flaves.

Among the various inftruments fubfervient to the comfort of human life, there is this material diftinction; that the work performed by one clafs, confifts in production; and the work performed by another, is totally confumed in ufe. A fhuttle produces a web; a couch, or a fuit of clothes, produce nothing; they refpectively afford, however, the convenience of wearing the one, and of repofing on the other. As ufe and production are things fpecifically different, the objects or inftruments that are relative to the one muft, with refpect to their ends and purpofes, be effentially different from thofe relative to the other. A domeftic flave is relative to ufe; his labour is totally confumed in promoting the eafe of his mafter. He is merely the poffeffion and property, or, as it were, the feparable part of that mafter; and every part, whether feparable or infeparable, is to be ufed and employed, not according to its own intereft or caprice, but in fubferviency to the general good, and fuitably to reafon. It is to be regarded merely in relation to that whole or fyftem to which it appertains. A flave is fimply the property of his mafter; but the mafter ftands in many other relations befide

[u] Iliad viii.

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beſide that of proprietor of his ſlave. Such is the nature and the function of ſervitude. We proceed to examine whether this inſtitution be wiſe and juſt.

The analogy of nature evinces ſlavery to be juſt and uſeful.

To determine this queſtion, it will be ſufficient to contemplate the ordinary courſe of nature, and to deduce from our obſervations clear inferences of reaſon. Government and ſubjection, then, are things uſeful and neceſſary; they prevail every where, in animated as well as in brute matter; from their firſt origin, ſome natures are formed to command, and others to obey; the kinds of government and ſubjection varying with the differences of their objects, but all equally uſeful for their reſpective ends; and thoſe kinds the beſt and moſt excellent, from which the beſt and moſt excellent conſequences reſult. In every compoſition whoſe parts are harmoniſed into any regular whole, the neceſſity of government and ſubjection evidently appears, whether this whole or ſyſtem be continuous or diſcrete, animated or lifeleſs; for even in muſic, there is a certain principle of rule and ſubordination: but ſuch ſpeculations are perhaps foreign to the preſent ſubject. In compoſitions endowed with life, it is the province of mind to command, and the province of matter to obey. Man conſiſts of ſoul and body, and in all men rightly conſtituted, the ſoul commands the body; although ſome men are ſo groſsly depraved, that in them the body ſeems to command the ſoul. But here the order of nature is perverted.

In the human conſtitution, therefore, mind governs matter abſolutely and deſpotically; but reaſon governs appetite with a far more limited ſway; ſtill, however, it governs like a juſt and lawful prince, and the little community of man is thus held together and ſuſtained; whereas, were the ſubordinate parts to

uſurp

usurp authority, or even to assert equality, all would speedily be undone, and the system would fall in ruins.

The same observations apply to the various tribes of animals, which rise above each other in excellence, in proportion to their tameness and docility; and which are all of them benefited by their subjection to man, because this is conducive to their safety. In the different sexes also, we see the male formed for government, and the female for submission; and a principle prevailing thus universally in every region of nature, cannot but apply to an institution so natural as is that of political society.

What are the requisites which fit men for servitude.

Those men, therefore, whose powers are chiefly confined to the body, and whose principal excellence consists in affording bodily service; those, I say, are naturally slaves, because it is their interest to be so. They can obey reason, though they are unable to exercise it; and though different from tame animals, who are disciplined by means merely of their sensations and appetites, they perform nearly the same tasks, and become the property of other men, because their own safety requires it.

In conformity with these observations, Nature, we see, has variously moulded the human frame: some are strongly built, and firmly compacted; others erect and graceful, unfit for toil and drudgery, but capable of sustaining honourably the offices of war and peace. This, however, holds not universally; for a servile mind is often lodged in a graceful person; and we have often found bodies formed for servitude, animated by the souls of freemen. Yet the distinction itself is not frivolous; for were part of the human race to be arrayed in that splendor of beauty which beams from the statues of the gods, universal consent would acknowledge the rest of mankind naturally formed to be their slaves.

The

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The difference of minds, though lefs obvious, is far more characteriftic and more important; whence we may conclude that flavery is founded both on utility and juftice [x].

Chap. 4.

The mif-takes on this fubject caufed by

This decifion, however, has been arraigned with confiderable plaufibility: for flavery may be taken in two fenfes, in one of which he is a flave who fubmits to the law of war, commanding the vanquifhed to become the property of the victors [y]. This

[x] Ariftotle founds flavery on different principles from thofe affigned by Juftinian, which have been univerfally followed by one party, and univerfally controverted by another, fince the time of that Emperor, or rather fince the Roman jurifprudence became a fafhionable ftudy. Servi aut fiunt aut nafcuntur; fiunt jure gentium aut jure civili; nafcuntur ex ancillis noftris. Inft. i. 3. 4. According to Juftinian, therefore, there are three origins of the right of flavery: The law of nations; the civil law; and birth, that is, defcent from fervile parents. By the law of nations, a conqueror was thought entitled to kill his enemy, and having fpared his life, might afterwards deal with him as he pleafed, and therefore reduce him into flavery. This, indeed, was the practice of ancient nations; but the practice, how univerfal foever among them, was abufively termed a law, fince irreconcileable with juftice. In war the victor has not any right to kill his enemy but in cafes of abfolute neceffity, for felf-defence; and there is a clear proof that this neceffity did not exift, when, inftead of killing him, he made him prifoner. Even the right of killing would not infer the right of enflaving; fince to many flavery may be worfe than death. Juftinian fays, fecondly, that flavery may begin "jure civili," when one man fells himfelf to another. But every fale implies a price, a quid pro quo; whereas in the cafe of ftrict flavery, the feller gives every thing; life, liberty, property; and the buyer gives nothing. Of what validity then, fays Judge Blackftone, can a fale be which deftroys the principles on which all fales are founded? Laftly, as to flaves by birth, it is plain that this foundation of flavery refts on the two former, and muft fall with them. If neither captivity nor fale can enflave the parent, much lefs can they enflave the offspring. See Blackftone's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 424. Ariftotle, as we fhall fee, might, confiftently with his principles, have fubfcribed to the liberal conclufions of this excellent author.

[y] Ariftotle fays, ὁ γαρ νομος ὁμολογια τις εϛι εν ᾡ τα κατα πολεμον κρατȣμενα των κρατȣντων ειναι. "That law is a certain agreement, according to which all belonging to the vanquifhed becomes the property of the victors." This was univerfally the law of nations in Ariftotle's time; a law which his humanity abhorred, and his courage arraigned.

Inftead

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confounding the kinds of flavery.

This is acknowledged to be law; but the law itfelf is accufed of iniquity[z], and impeached, like the orators of Athens who have perfuaded the affembly to pafs unjuft decrees. On this fubject, wife men hold different opinions, proceeding from the different views which they take of the queftion. Some confider fuperiority as the proof of virtue, becaufe it is its natural effect; and affert that it is juft, the victors fhould be mafters of the vanquifhed, as being their fuperiors, and therefore their betters; while others deny the force of this argument, maintaining that nothing can be truly juft, which is inconfiftent with humanity[a]. Superiority in war, they fay, cannot furely be a proof of juftice, fince wars are often unjuftly undertaken, and fuccefsfully, though wickedly, carried on and concluded. It is harfh, befides, to affert that he ought to be a flave who is unfit for fervitude; and that perfons of illuftrious birth or illuftrious merit are rendered flaves by falling into the hands of an enemy. To avoid this confequence, the advocates for fubjecting the vanquifhed to the victors, propofe limiting this law to the cafe of Barbarians vanquifhed by Greeks; for the nobility of Barbarians is confined to their refpective countries, but the nobility of Greece is as extenfive as the world. But in this mode of reafoning, they abandon their own doctrine, and acknowledge the principle which we have above eftablifhed, that flavery adheres to the character itfelf, is independent of accident, and that fome

Inftead of being accufed of abetting the harfh law of flavery, he ought rather to be refpected for deftroying the falfe foundations on which this law was eftablifhed.

[z] The orator, who had perfuaded the Athenian affembly to pafs an unjuft or a bad law, was impeached by the γραφη παρανομων. Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. 32.

[a] The text is corrupt. The word is ευνοια; and on the margin ευνομια. I conjecture the true reading is επιεικεια, equity; that is, humanity moderating ftrict juftice, the juftice founded on law.

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ſome are every where ſlaves, and others, like the Helen of Theodectes [b], are every where free;

"Sprung from the immortal gods, on either ſide,
"Who dares reproach me with the name of ſlave?"

Such, indeed, ſeems to be the intention of Nature, who, as ſhe produces man from man, and beaſt from beaſt, wiſhes likewiſe to generate illuſtrious deſcendants from illuſtrious anceſtors; but here Nature often fails in accompliſhing her own purpoſes [c].

Differences of the two kinds of ſlavery.

There are, thus, two kinds of ſlavery, the one founded on nature, the other eſtabliſhed by law, or rather produced by violence. The firſt kind can only take place when the maſter is as fit to command as the ſlave to obey. It is then profitable both to the ſlave and the maſter; whoſe intereſts, rightly underſtood, become as inſeparable as the intereſts of ſoul and body. This communion of intereſts naturally engenders mutual goodwill [d]; but in the ſlavery contrary to nature, occaſioned by war, and

[b] A native of Phaſelis in Lycia, the ſcholar of Plato and Iſocrates, author of fifty tragedies, and of the Art of Rhetoric in verſe. See Fabricius, l. ii. c. 19. & l. iii. c. 10. Cicero, Athenæus, and Suidas ſay, that he was a ſcholar of Ariſtotle's. The remains of his works conſiſt in a few ſhort fragments.

[c] See Analyſis, vol. i. p. 110.

[d] The author adviſes maſters to ſecure the fidelity of ſlaves by the pledges of wives and children, and to indulge them with the enjoyment of feſtivals and diverſions, of which their condition ſtands more in need than that of freemen. De Cura Rei Familiaris, l. i. c. v. p. 494. In moſt countries of Greece, ſlaves, indeed, were merely the loweſt claſs of inhabitants, a ſort of ſervants for life, and not always for life, ſince they were entitled on many particular grounds to demand their freedom, and even to recover it by purchaſe, if frugal in the management of their peculium, or ſeparate property. Comp. Plato de Legibus, l. vi. Ariſtoph. in Ran. v. 706. Terent. Phorm. act i. ſc. 1. Xenoph. de Repub. Athen. The Athenian ſlaves, when harſhly treated by their maſters, found an aſylum from cruelty in the temple of Theſeus, and were allowed to paſs into the ſervice of another

and created by force, ſlaves and maſters muſt always be hoſtile to each other.

Different kinds of ſubordination founded in nature.

The principles above eſtabliſhed ſhew, that a diverſity in the nature and relations of things neceſſarily occaſions various kinds of ſubordination. According to the differences of thoſe ſubjected to its authority, government, therefore, is found to vary, to be more or leſs abſolute, and, as it were, to fluctuate between monarchy and liberty; monarchy, where one man rules always, and ſometimes abſolutely; liberty, where different men hold the offices of magiſtracy by vicarious ſucceſſion: but the management of a houſehold muſt always be of the firſt kind, and entruſted to one only, if we wiſh it to be well regulated.

Peculiarity of the relation between maſter and ſlave.

A maſter poſſeſſes a property in his ſlaves, and a right to employ their induſtry; yet it is not from his particular ſkill in directing this induſtry that he derives his authority. This authority is founded on the general ſuperiority of his character; ſince it is their reſpective qualities and characters that claſs mankind under the different denominations of freemen or ſlaves. Did the government of a houſehold conſiſt, as ſome writers have imagined, in any particular ſkill or craft, this ſkill or craft muſt evidently be relative to the labour required, and the

another maſter leſs tyrannical. Demoſth. in Mid. Plutarch de Superſtit. Demoſthenes having cited a law which forbade the ſtriking of a ſlave, proceeds thus: "You hear, Athenians, the humanity of the law, which prevents the offering inſult even to a ſlave. What, in the name of the Gods! do you think would be the ſentiments of thoſe nations, from whom ſlaves are purchaſed into Greece, ſhould they be told that there were certain Greeks, men ſo gentle and humane, that notwithſtanding the accumulated injuries received from Barbarians, and a natural and hereditary enmity to their race, yet did not allow their countrymen to be ill-treated even in ſervitude, but had enacted a law expreſsly prohibiting inſults to ſlaves, and had puniſhed the violators of this law by death? Demoſth. Adverſ. Mideam. p. 392.

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the fervices exacted. At Syracufe there lived a man who exercifed for hire the trade of teaching the various branches of domeftic fervitude; which are recommended by different degrees of neceffity or utility, but which are all of them too mean and fordid to be underftood by mafters of families; whofe proper function contains in it nothing very deep or myfterious, fince its fole requifite is, that the mafter know how to command, what the flave knows how to perform. Mafters unwilling to ftoop to fuch petty cares employ a fuperintendant, who manages their houfehold, while they themfelves cultivate the liberal arts; plunge into politics, or purfue philofophy.

Chap. 5.

Of the accumulation of ftock in general.

Slaves form the moft valuable, indeed, but not the only kind of ftock. Of the accumulation of ftock in general, we proceed now to treat. Firft of all, is the art of accumulation the fame thing with œconomics, or merely fomething fubfervient to this fcience; and if merely fubfervient, is it in the manner that the trade of fhuttle-making is fubfervient to that of weaving, or as the art of founding brafs is fubfervient to the art of fculpture? for fhuttles are the *inftruments* of weaving, but brafs fupplies the *materials* of fculpture. To accumulate ftock, is to provide whatever is thought neceffary for the purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence; but œconomy confifts in employing or managing the neceffaries thus provided, in the manner beft adapted to the attainment of the end in view. As the arts of accumulation and of œconomy cannot therefore be the fame, let us confider whether the former be a branch of the latter; and there being many kinds of ftock or riches, let us begin with examining the ftock fupplied by agriculture, or, in general, the art of providing food, the great and principal want of all mankind.

It

The different modes of procuring the neceſſaries of life.

It is chiefly this want, and the various means employed for ſupplying it, that produces the wide variety of manners and modes of life, in men and animals. By the conſtitution of nature, different animals delight in different kinds of food; ſome delight in herbs, others in fleſh, while a third claſs ſeek nouriſhment from both; and in ſubſervience to the facility of acquiring ſuch food as is agreeable to their reſpective natures, ſome animals are ſolitary, and others are gregarious. The life of man is wonderfully diverſified by the ſame circumſtance, and of all *his* modes of life, the paſtoral is the moſt ſimple, the moſt eaſy, and the moſt indolent. Poſſeſſing a ſort of living farm ſpontaneouſly productive, the ſhepherd roams at large with his herds, which ſupply him with all the neceſſaries of ſubſiſtence, independently of any labour on his part, but the pleaſing care of conducting them to freſh paſtures. Another part of the human ſpecies reſembles, in its mode of life, the various animals of prey, and ſubſiſts by hunting and fiſhing, by war and robbery; but far the greateſt proportion of mankind derives ſubſiſtence from the earth, and its cultivated fruits. Such, then, are the different forms of human life, all reſulting from the different contrivances for procuring or producing food. Commerce, indeed, produces nothing; but it exchanges and diſtributes, as conveniency requires, the objects and commodities already produced and accumulated. A commercial ſtate of ſociety, therefore, preſuppoſes a ſuperabundance of productive induſtry. It is founded on the primary modes of acquiring the neceſſaries of life, which we have above enumerated; and which, ſeldom exiſting apart, are variouſly combined and blended, hunting and war often ſupplying the deficiencies of paſturage and agriculture.

BOOK I.

Diftinction between real and artificial riches. The right of property founded in nature.

One kind of property, a property in the provifions neceffary for life, is vifibly eftablifhed by Nature herfelf, who fupplies all animals, at their birth, with neceffary food, and afterwards furnifhes them with the means of procuring it. When the young are feparated from the parent in the form of eggs or worms, thefe organized germs contain in themfelves the materials of their firft nourifhment; in viviparous animals, thefe materials are fupplied by the teeming breafts of the mother. In their advancement to maturity, none of the living tribes are abandoned by the kind care of Nature. Herbs and plants are copioufly furnifhed for the ufe of animals; and animals themfelves for the various exigencies of man; almoft all of them fupplying him with food, while the tame ferves him as inftruments of induftry, and the wild furnifh him with ufeful articles of clothing, and innumerable other conveniencies.

A property in things neceffary for fubfiftence being eftablifhed by Nature, the means of acquiring this property muft be natural and juft. Hunting, therefore, is entitled to thefe epithets; and war, which is a fpecies of hunting, and which may be juftly employed againft wild animals, and favage men, who fpurn fervitude, though incapable of freedom. The arts of acquiring this property are effential to every community, whether civil or domeftic. They fupply that genuine wealth, the accumulation of which ferves as the inftrument productive of comfortable fubfiftence, not that factitious riches ftigmatized by Solon—

"No bounds to riches ever were affigned."

To real and natural riches bounds have always been affigned; fince, like all other inftruments, they are limited, both in magnitude and number, by the ends for which they ferve, and the effects

effects which they are intended to produce. But that factitious wealth which is often confounded with them, is indeed boundless, and will appear necessarily to be so, when we have investigated its nature.

BOOK I.

Chap. 6.

The nature of commerce, its different kinds.

First of all, then, it is to be observed that every piece of property may be employed for two distinct purposes, the purpose of use, and the purpose of exchange. A pair of shoes may be worn, or they may be sold. This second purpose, though it is not the original and proper end for which shoes were made, is founded on a principle both natural and necessary, the disposition to truck and barter, by which men part with their superfluities, in order to supply their deficiencies. In the community of a family, there is not any room even for barter, because this community is so close and so intimate, that all kinds of property are considered as common stock. But when men separate, at a distance, in scattered families, the varieties of local situation, and innumerable other circumstances, must introduce that kind of exchange or barter, which we still see practised among primitive and simple nations, who truck wine for corn, and any one commodity of which they have too much, for another of which they are in want. This first and natural mode of exchange gave occasion to a second far more refined and more artificial. The goods necessary to man, as the instruments of comfortable subsistence, were found not to be (many of them at least) either of easy conveyance, or of constant use. The best, perhaps the only, markets, however, often lay at a distance. It became necessary, therefore, to think of certain commodities, easily manageable and safely transportable, and of which the uses are so general and so numerous, that they ensured the certainty of always obtaining for them the articles wanted in exchange.

The use of money, on what principles founded.

BOOK I. change. The metals, particularly iron and ſilver and ſeveral others, exactly correſpond to this deſcription. They were employed, therefore, by general agreement as the ordinary ſtandard of value[e], and the common meaſure of exchange; being

[e] The ſubject of money is treated above, vol. i. p. 269. & ſeq. In that paſſage compared with the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 165, we find the fundamental principles of the modern œconomiſts. In both chapters the author is treating of commutative juſtice; which, as he clearly ſhews, always depends on the equality of ratios, and therefore implies four terms; namely, two perſons and two things, or two works; in the exchange of which, "he who has laboured much, receives much; and he who has laboured little, receives but little:" τον μεν πολλα πεποιηκοτα πολλα λαμβανειν, τον δε ολιγα πεποιηκοτα, ολιγα λαμβανειν. But different quantities of labour are, like other cauſes, beſt known and aſcertained by their effects; that is, by the works which they produce; works ſo complex and ſo diſſimilar that their relative values to each other can only be appreciated by the means of a common meaſure. The circumſtances mentioned in the text as belonging excluſively to the precious metals, point them out as the fitteſt of all objects for ſupplying this function, and meaſuring the exchangeable value of all other commodities, which being all commenſurable with money, are thus rendered commenſurate with each other. But even the metals are not correct meaſures, (γινεται ΠΩΣ μετρον,) ſince they themſelves vary in value in proportion to their plenty or ſcarcity, the more or leſs labour requiſite for procuring them, compared with that requiſite for procuring other objects of deſire, and a variety of other circumſtances, all expreſſed by the word χρεια; the deſire of poſſeſſing, and the difficulty of acquiring them. It is this varying relation which regulates the price or exchangeable value of things; and beſide this, no other ſtandard can ever poſſibly be diſcovered. Had Monteſquieu (Eſprit des Loix, b. xxii. c. i. & ſeq.) and Hume (Eſſay on the Balance of Trade) paid due attention to our author's principles concerning money, they would not have fallen into the error of maintaining that the introduction of paper currency diminiſhed the exchangeable value of gold and ſilver exactly in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. Dr. Smith, who has ably refuted this doctrine (Wealth of Nations, v. i. b. ii. c. ii.), falls into the contrary error, when he aſſerts (p. 298.) that paper currency has not any effect in lowering the value of gold and ſilver: which value, he thinks, depends entirely "upon the proportion between the quantity of labour neceſſary to bring a certain quantity of gold and ſilver to market, and that neceſſary to bring thither a certain quantity of any other ſort of commodities." It may be anſwered, that the introduction of paper currency ſupplying, or at leaſt diminiſhing

being themfelves eftimated, at firft, by their bulk and weight; and afterwards ftamped, in order to fave the trouble of meafuring and weighing them. BOOK I.

The

diminifhing one of the ufes of gold and filver, namely, that of circulating commodities, renders thofe metals lefs requifite for that fpecific purpofe, lefs objects of defire, and therefore cheaper. In other words, it muft diminifh the exchangeable value of all the precious metals which have been accumulated by the labour of hundreds of ages. This, I fay, it muft do, other circumftances remaining the fame, precifely for the fame reafon that the introduction of glafs veffels and of paftes has diminifhed the exchangeable value of gems and diamonds. But as the precious metals have many and various ufes, none of which, befides that of ferving as a meafure, can be fupplied by paper currency, their exchangeable value will not be diminifhed in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. One ufe of an object may be totally deftroyed; and, notwithftanding this, the other ufes for which it ferves, may ftill entitle it to great value in exchange. Paper currency, indeed, lowers the precious metals on the whole, but lowers them on the whole by diminifhing one only of their ufes. Were this adventitious ufe of them, as Ariftotle obferves, entirely fet afide by that kind of tacit convention which eftablifhed it, they would ftill bear a great price on account of their many natural excellencies. The agreeable and ufeful properties of the metals, their brilliancy, durability, divifibility, &c. which recommend them peculiarly as a *meafure*, render them alfo a *pledge*; and their exchangeable value is, according to Ariftotle, more invariable than that of any other commodity (fee above, vol. i. p. 271.). Dr. Smith, b. i. c. v. p. 51. on the contrary, maintains "that the exchangeable value of corn varies lefs, from century to century, than that of gold and filver." *Ibid.* The difcovery, indeed, of the New World lowered exceedingly the exchangeable value of the precious metals in much lefs than a century; but this particular cafe ought not to be converted into a general theorem. In purfuance of his notion of the greater ftability in the exchangeable value of corn, than in that of gold and filver, Dr. Smith obferves, "that every other commodity will at any particular time purchafe a greater or fmaller quantity of labour, in proportion to the quantity of fubfiftence which it can purchafe at that time. A rent, therefore, referved in corn, is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchafe. But a rent referved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchafe, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchafed by any particular quantity of that commodity." *Ibid.* p. 53. The variations in the quantity of corn that can be purchafed by

gold

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Their abufe introduces artificial traffic; not for accommodation, but for gain.

The metals thus ftamped are called money; and the invention of money neceffarily precedes that artificial traffic, of which the main object is not comfort, but gain. To get money is the bufinefs of the merchant; with him wealth and money are fynonymous; and to heap up money is in his mind to acquire all worldly advantages. By feveral œconomical writers, this opinion of the merchant is treated with contempt, and confidered as mere dotage. They deride the notion of that being the moft fubftantial or only wealth which, to him who fhould accumulate it in the greateft quantity, would only realize the fable of Midas, and thereby expofe him to the danger of perifhing through hunger. Money, properly fo called, they obferve, is founded merely on convention; its currency and value depending on the mutable wills of men, which may with inconftancy abolifh what they have capricioufly eftablifhed. Such reafoners, therefore, recommend the acquifition of a wealth more abfolute and independent; and think the productive arts by which fuch wealth is accumulated[f], far more deferving of attention than

gold or filver, are occafioned by the plenty or fcarcity of corn, or by the plenty or fcarcity of the precious metals; but far more frequently by the former circumftances than by the latter. The plenty of corn, or the little labour with which corn may be brought to market, diminifhes its exchangeable value with regard to all other commodities, as well as with regard to gold and filver. When the rent is referved in the precious metals, its exchangeable value, therefore, at different times, that is, the quantity of other commodities, or of the labour producing them, which this rent can at thofe different times purchafe or command, will not be at all affected by the variation in the money prices of corn; becaufe this variation, refulting from the plenty or fcarcity of corn, enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of all other commodities precifely in the fame proportion as it enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of gold and filver. The money price of corn was higher in the laft century than in the prefent; yet the money price of labour was lower in that century than in the prefent.

[f] On the fubject of political œconomy, and particularly on this fubject of money, Ariftotle's

than exchange or traffic, efpecially than that kind of traffic of which money is the end and object as well as the element and principle; a traffic ultimately centering in the augmentation of factitious riches, applicable to no other ufe than that of indefinitely multiplying themfelves.

Of traffic.

Of fuch factitious riches, the defire, as Solon faid, muft neceffarily be boundlefs; the blindnefs of avarice miftaking for an object agreeable in itfelf, and as fuch indefinitely defireable, that which is barely an inftrument, and of which the defire ought to be ftrictly limited by the purpofes which it is fitted to ferve. There is a limit, therefore, to accumulation for provifion, but none to accumulation for gain.

Its abufe.

Yet the providence of a good mafter of a family, as well as the avarice of a merchant, is often ftrenuoufly employed in the purfuit of getting money; and when their activity has acquired it,

The confufion thereby occafioned.

Ariftotle's opinions are totally different from thofe of Child, Mun, and particularly of Locke, who is by many regarded as his greateft metaphyfical rival. Locke, as quoted by Doctor Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 140. remarks a diftinction between money and other moveable goods. "All other moveable goods," he fays, "are of fo confumable a nature, that the wealth which confifts in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year, may, without any exportation, but merely by their own wafte and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a fteady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wafted or confumed." Gold and filver are, therefore, according to him, the moft folid and fubftantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply thofe metals ought, he thinks, upon that account to be the great object of its political œconomy. The poverty and mifery of Spain and Portugal notwithftanding all their gold and filver, and the riches and happinefs of England, a commercial country, without mines, as well as the riches and happinefs of Switzerland, an agricultural and paftoral country, which difdains working its mines, more ftrongly fortify Ariftotle's conclufions, than a thoufand finefpun arguments of the French œconomifts.

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it, their fimilar exigencies frequently compel them to ufe and employ it exactly in the fame manner. But the merchant, if faithful to his principles, always employs his money reluctantly for any other purpofe than that of augmenting itfelf. Yet, political writers, deceived by an agreement in accidental purfuit and occafional application, confound the endlefs drudgery of commerce with the falutary duties of œconomy, and regard the accumulation of wealth as the main bufinefs of both. At the name of money, they recall all thofe deceitful enjoyments of pride and voluptuoufnefs which it is fitted to procure, and in which, wifhing for ever immoderately to indulge, they cannot fail inordinately to defire that which promifes to gratify their inordinate paffions. If money is not to be obtained by traffic, the purpofe for which it was firft inftituted, men thus minded will have recourfe for obtaining it, to other arts and other contrivances; proftituting even fkill and courage in this mean and mercenary fervice. Victory over the enemies of his country forms the proper ambition of a general; the health of his patients ought to be the main purfuit of a phyfician; yet how many military and how many medical men have no other end in view but that of gratifying their fenfelefs, becaufe unbounded, rapacity?

We thus fee that there are two modes of accumulating ftock; the one natural, productive, and ftrictly pertaining to œconomy, becaufe effential to the purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence; the other neither natural nor productive, and nowife pertaining to œconomy; and as juftly blameable as the other is highly laudable. When we fpeak, however, of any kind of human induftry as productive, we mean not that in the ftrict fenfe of the word it really produces any thing, but only that it

felects and arranges the gifts of Nature, fuitably to the exigencies and demands of human life. The manufacturer makes not the wool, but the cloth; and for the food of animals, Nature, at their firft formation, provides a fuperabundance of thofe elements from which they are conftituted, and with the fame bounty copioufly furnifhes the materials of their future fubfiftence.

The function of the ftatefman refpecting health.

A queftion here arifes, why the art of procuring fubfiftence and accommodation, any more than the art of procuring health, fhould be regarded as a branch of œconomy? We fay, that both of them appertain to œconomy, political as well as domeftic. The ftatefman and the phyfician, however, do not exercife the fame talents, the one in providing for the health of his fellow-citizens, the other in providing for the health of his patients. The bufinefs of the former confifts in general fuperintendance; that of the latter in minute and particular detail; and in the fame manner the function of the ftatefman, refpecting the provifion for comfortable fubfiftence and accommodation, is totally different from the fubfervient offices of the labourer and manufacturer.

Ufury.

We have reprobated that fpecies of artificial traffic which adds nothing to the common ftock, but only enriches one man or one nation at the expence of another; and which, being fubfervient to no ufeful purpofe, terminates in no definite end. But of all modes of accumulation, the worft, and moft unnatural, is ufury. This is the utmoft corruption of artificial degeneracy, ftanding in the fame relation to commerce, that commerce does to œconomy. By commerce, money is perverted from the purpofe of exchange to that of gain; ftill, however, this gain is obtained by the mutual transfer of different

 objects;

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objects; but usury by transferring merely the same object from one hand to another, generates money from money; and the interest thus generated is therefore called "offspring," as being precisely of the same nature, and of the same specific substance with that from which it proceeds.

The theory of œconomy applied to practice. The chief branches of husbandry.

Having thus explained the theory of œconomy, we now proceed to the practice; observing that, as the theory is a liberal study, the practice is a necessary occupation. Whoever, therefore, would surely and honourably augment his substance, must acquire an experimental knowledge, first, of the various kinds of cattle, particularly horses, oxen, and sheep; he must examine their many and excellent qualities and uses, all subservient to the purposes of human life; he must consider and compare their respective advantages in their relations to each other, as well as to the local circumstances in which he happens to be placed. Having provided himself with cattle, which are the living instruments of agriculture, he will next direct his attention to this most useful art; distributing the labour of his household as circumstances require, among the various branches of tillage and plantation; without neglecting those advantages which offer themselves spontaneously from bees, birds, and fishes.

Other modes of accumulation.

Such are the first and most natural contrivances for augmenting our substance. Exchange or traffic follows next. Of this the most conspicuous kind is that carried on by means of ships or waggons, by adventurous navigators, or stationary storekeepers; whose employments differ greatly in this, that some yield most profit, and others afford most security. To commerce, strictly so called, we have already referred that mode of accumulation named usury; and under the same head may be

classed

claffed the letting to hire that labour or that fkill of which we have the command; from which, blended with that mode of accumulation firft mentioned, refult many mixed modes, as the various kinds of mining and quarrying; in all which human labour is exchanged for things fruitlefs and lifelefs, yet many of them highly ufeful. To enter into a more minute detail of the various modes of productive induftry might indeed be ufeful, but certainly would be tirefome. It may be obferved in general, that all fuch occupations partake the more of art, the lefs they are dependent on fortune. Thofe of them are vile and fordid, which hurt the health or deform the body; thofe are truly fervile, which may be exercifed by the corporeal powers alone; and thofe are the meaneft and moft contemptible, which require not any vigorous exertion of either mind or body. Chares of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have exhaufted the fubject of agriculture, having treated both of planting and tillage. Other arts have been explained by other authors, to whofe writings thofe curious after fuch knowledge may have recourfe.

Monopolies.

Perfons eager for wealth may collect likewife and imitate, with much advantage to themfelves, the dextrous contrivances by which other men have obtained great and fudden opulence[g]. Such, for inftance, is the honeft artifice afcribed to the

[g] In a copious, but corrupt and mutilated fragment of Ariftotle's, intitled οικονομικων το β, "the Second Book of Oeconomics," we find intermixed with the juft principles of political œconomy, the greateft part of thofe financial tricks which have been revived, and fo often repeated in modern times: the debafement of the coin; not paper, indeed, but iron currency and credit; venality of juftice; mortgaging the revenues; and innumerable contrivances, by which the republics and petty princes of Lower Afia impoverifhed and ruined their fubjects. Ariftotle does not explain thefe dangerous artifices with a view to recommend them (for he begins by declaring the only fair and certain means

BOOK I.

Exemplified by Thales of Miletus.

the invention of Thales the Milefian. The poverty of this great philofoper was thought to upbraid his ftudies, as ferving no gainful, and therefore no ufeful purpofe. But Thales, by his fkill in meteorology, contrived to wipe off the reproach; for as this fcience enabled him to forefee that next feafon there would be an extraordinary crop of olives, he hired in the winter all the oil preffes in Chios and Miletus, employing his little fortune in giving earneft to their refpective proprietors. When the gathering feafon approached, and the olives were feen loading the branches, all men wifhed to provide oil preffes at the fame time, and fuddenly. But Thales, being mafter of the whole number, let them feparately at a high price, and thereby accumulating vaft wealth, proved that philofophers might be rich if they pleafed, but that riches were not the object of their purfuit.

The contrivance of Thales confifted in procuring for himfelf a monopoly; which, in general, is a gainful project, and as fuch has fometimes been employed by fovereign ftates, when diftreffed for want of money.

By a Syracufan banker.

In the time of Dionyfius, a banker in Sicily bought up all the corn, and without greatly raifing the price of that article, fold it to foreign merchants at the profit of fifty talents. Dionyfius, when apprifed of this tranfaction, allowed the monopolift to retain his profit, but banifhed him from Syracufe, as employing

means of augmenting domeftic and national wealth, "produce much and confume little"); neither does he defcribe fuch unwarrantable political fleights (as has been fufpected of Machiavel) with a defign to fatirize and difgrace thofe concerned in them. He treats the matter merely as an abftract queftion of political fcience. You wifh to get wealth—Thus, and thus, may it be obtained: but take care; you will acquire it at too dear a rate (as I have proved in innumerable parts of my works) if you purchafe it by any kind of difhonefty.

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employing a mode of accumulation inconſiſtent with the public intereſt. Yet the knowledge of this, and ſuch like contrivances, may often prove uſeful both to families and to ſtates, particularly to the latter; wherefore ſome ſtateſmen conſider the art of improving the public revenues as the only object worthy of their ſtudy.

Chap. 8.

Analogy between the three branches of œconomics and the three forms of government.

The three branches of œconomics, or domeſtic œconomy, may be illuſtrated by the three forms of government. A maſter commands his ſlaves like an abſolute monarch; a father rules his children like a king; a huſband governs his wife like a republican magiſtrate. The principle on which the maſter's authority is founded, has been explained above: that of the huſband reſults from the natural pre-eminence of males; and that of the father, from the natural ſuperiority of manly age to unripe youth. In republics, indeed, which aim at equality, the citizens govern by vicarious ſucceſſion: yet thoſe who happen to be in office wear a peculiar dreſs; the language uſed to them is reſpectful; they are diſtinguiſhed by appropriate honours; honours paid, indeed, not to themſelves, but (as happened to the laver of Amaſis [h]) to the ſituation which they hold, and to the functions which they perform. The authority of a huſband,

[h] Amaſis was a man of low extraction, but diſtinguiſhed merit, who having gained the favour of Apries king of Egypt, found means to ſucceed to his maſter's throne. The meanneſs of his birth expoſing him to the contempt of his ſubjects, he converted a golden baſon in which he uſed to waſh his feet, into the ſtatue of a divinity, which he erected in one of the moſt conſpicuous places of his capital. The ſuperſtitious Egyptians flocked to worſhip the image. Amaſis told them that the object of their veneration had once been nothing better than a vile utenſil. It is the ſame caſe with myſelf; I was once a plebeian, but am now your king; take care, therefore, to yield to me the reſpect due to the ſituation which I now hold. Comp. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. 68. Athen. Deipnoſoph. l. xv. p. 680.

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husband, therefore, over his wife, is precisely that of a magistrate over his fellow-citizens, but of a magistrate always remaining in office. The authority of fathers, founded on seniority and cemented by affection, resembles that of kings; and Homer justly characterizes the regal dignity of Jupiter, in addressing him as the father of gods and men. For kings ought to differ from their subjects, not in kind, but in perfection; and this is precisely the difference between the father and his children.

Relative importance of these branches.

It is manifest, from the observations already made, that the objects of political œconomy rise above each other in dignity; that men are more important than mere property; that the statesman ought to bestow more attention in exciting the virtues of the former, than in augmenting the mass of the latter; but that the discipline and improvement of freemen chiefly merits his most serious regard. And here a doubt occurs, whether a slave can be said to partake of any other virtue than merely the power of performing bodily service. If he is endowed with temperance, courage, and justice, wherein does he differ from a freeman? If he is entirely incapable of such excellencies, how can he be called a man? The same difficulty presents itself respecting women and children, whether the several virtues can be fairly ascribed to them or not? Can a woman be dignified with the epithets of temperate, courageous, or just? Can such virtues, or their contrary vices, belong to a boy? In one word, can that which is formed for subjection, exercise virtue in the same sense with that which is formed for government; or if we admit the affirmative, why is the one entitled to command, and the other bound to obey?

Difficulties respecting the virtues and duties of slaves, children, and women.

General solution of these difficulties.

This difficulty cannot be solved by saying, that both of them partake of virtue, but partake of it in different measures; for

command

command and obedience are things *ſpecifically* different, not merely different in degree or in quantity. And yet it ſounds harſh, to allow virtue to one claſs of mankind, and to deny it to another. If he, who is unadorned by wiſdom and juſtice, cannot poſſibly be a good maſter, is it poſſible for him, who is debaſed by profligacy and cowardice, to be a good ſervant? It is manifeſt, therefore, that certain virtues muſt be aſcribed to both, but virtues as eſſentially different, as are the natures and perfections of thoſe by whom they are reſpectively cultivated. Steadily to purſue a virtuous courſe of life, implies the habitual preference of this kind of life to every other. But every act of preference implies deſire and compariſon; and every act of virtuous preference implies propriety in the deſire, and accuracy in the compariſon[a]. Both circumſtances muſt concur to produce virtuous determinations; and this concurrence cannot uniformly or ſteadily take place but in minds duly exerciſed, and highly perfected. In ſlaves, the faculties of deliberation and reſolution may be conſidered as little better than null; in women they are weak and dependent; in children they are unripe and defective.

Reſpecting women.

Of each claſs of mankind the virtues muſt be relative to their powers, and ought to be competent to their offices. The man fit to command may be compared with the architect, who adjuſts the plan and directs its execution. *His* ſkill muſt extend to every part of the work; *that* of his workmen is limited by their reſpective taſks. In the work of government, reaſon is the architect; it is the part of reaſon to command, and the duty of weakneſs and of paſſion to obey. Thus the various diſtinctions of mankind neceſſarily diſcriminate

[a] See vol. i. p. 289.

BOOK I. minate their virtues. Self-command in a woman is not the ſame thing with ſelf-command in a man. The juſtice and courage of the two ſexes do not, as Socrates[1] thought, coincide; and were we to enumerate, after the example of Gorgias, each particular excellence, inſtead of contenting ourſelves with vague definitions of virtue in general, we ſhould clearly perceive that what the poet ſays concerning ſilence, is univerſally applicable to all qualities whatever.

> "In woman, ſilence is an ornament,
> But the ſame ſilence adds no grace to man."

There is not any quality ornamental in the one ſex, which, if exhibited preciſely in the ſame degree, would be graceful in the other.

Children. Children, we have obſerved, are unripe and imperfect; their virtues, therefore, are to be conſidered not merely as relative to their actual ſtate, but principally in reference to that maturity and perfection to which nature has deſtined them. They are diligently and modeſtly to hearken to their teachers, and obſequiouſly to obey their directors; the premature affectation of manhood would diſqualify them from ever acquiring manly virtues.

Slaves. From the deſcription that we have given of ſlaves, it is plain that the catalogue of their perſonal excellencies is not extenſive. Extreme timidity, or exceſſive profligacy, is totally incompatible with their duties. To theſe duties they muſt carefully be trained by the maſter himſelf, and not by the overſeer who aſſigns to them their reſpective taſks, and who teaches them ſkilfully to perform their ſervile employments. It is falſe that ſlaves are to be governed merely by fear. They are capable of liſtening to reaſon, though naturally unable to exerciſe its energies.

Our

[1] Apud. Platon. in Republ.

Difference between mechanics and ſlaves.

Our ſlaves, therefore, are to be admoniſhed, inſtructed, and diſciplined not leſs than our children. A doubt here occurs, whether the virtues of artiſans ought to coincide with thoſe of ſlaves? The ſame vices of idleneſs and intemperance often prove alike ruinous to both theſe claſſes of men. Yet there ſubſiſts between them this material difference. He who is properly a ſlave, is ſuch habitually and permanently through the imbecility of his nature. His ſervitude is perpetual and complete. The mean mechanic, on the contrary, ſubmits to the tireſome drudgery of diſtorting, painful, and unwholeſome labour; but he encounters theſe hardſhips for the ſake of performing a particular taſk, which is accompliſhed in a limited time. His virtues, therefore, ought to coincide with thoſe of ſlaves, in as far only as he partakes of a ſervile condition.

The connection between domeſtic and political œconomy.

In every treatiſe of Politics, it is neceſſary carefully to examine the relative duties of huſbands and wives, fathers and children [k]. Theſe, we have ſaid, are the elements of families, and families are the elements of ſtates; and, as in every ſyſtem the parts ought to conſpire by their reſpective excellencies to promote the perfection and harmony of the whole, ſo the principles and habits of women and children muſt be faſhioned by

[k] There remains but imperfect fragments of Ariſtotle's Firſt Book of Œconomics; in which he treats of women, children, and ſlaves. See Ariſtotle, edit. Du Vall. p. 492. & ſeq. The defect may be partly ſupplied by the remains of the Pythagoreans preſerved in Stobæus, and by the fifth book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, intitled, De Adminiſtratione Domeſtica. Ariſtotle, doubtleſs, treated the ſubject more ſcientifically than his predeceſſors; ſince he made the rules of domeſtic œconomy depend on the nature and object of the national policy. Such were his juſt and extenſive views, that, as Strabo obſerves (l. xiii. p. 608.), his works, even when imperfect, taught profound and practical knowledge, in oppoſition to ſhadowy embelliſhments and ſcholaſtic trifling.

by the intereſt of that government, to the ſafety and happineſs of which they are alike eſſential; women forming the one half of the preſent, and children affording the ſole hope of the future generation. In conformity to the plan of the community, individuals, we ſay, are to be educated; and in ſubſerviency to this great and general object, all their particular virtues muſt be moulded [l]. The nature of political ſociety and the forms of civil government muſt, therefore, be clearly underſtood, before we can explain and aſcertain the fluctuating and dependent rules of domeſtic diſcipline [m]. We now enter on this vaſt ſubject, beginning with the important queſtion, which form of government is the beſt.

[l] Ariſtotle gives the reaſon, την δε του μερους προς την του όλου δει βλεπειν αρετην. "The virtue of the part muſt always bear a reference to the virtue of the whole." The continual referring of particular truths to general maxims has an air of pedantry in modern languages. It certainly is uſeleſs, where the particular truth is as evident as the general one. But the diſlike or diſguſt which it excites ariſes from this, that the ſchoolmen adopted many maxims that were falſe or obſcure, and the pedantry of theſe ſcholaſtics has been long held in juſt contempt.

[m] The relation between government and education, and the ſubſerviency of the latter to the former, were ſtrongly expreſſed by Pythagoras. Being aſked by a certain Xenophilus, How he might beſt educate his ſon, he replied, Send him to live in a well regulated ſtate. Diogen. Laert. viii. 16.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Second Book, we fee the intellectual exertions of the deepeft thinker of antiquity ftrenuoufly exerted in folving the moft important political queftion that can poffibly be agitated. With affectionate refpect for his mafter Plato, but with ftill greater veneration for truth, our author examines and refutes his ingenious, but fanciful opinions concerning the beft form of government; and in detecting the errors of that admired philofopher, as well as in expofing the dangerous fyftems of polity recommended by Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus, he arraigns by anticipation the extravagancies that have been propofed, approved, and many of them in our own days carried into execution. From the fpeculations of mere theory, he paffes to thofe plans of legiflation which have actually been eftablifhed in the world; collected from the defcription of upwards of two hundred commonwealths; and prefenting, when his work was entire, the moft valuable feries of political experiments that ever was exhibited. But concerning the republics of Afia and Magna Græcia, as well as thofe of Africa and Gaul, we muft now be contented to gather our information from mutilated or doubtful fragments. Yet

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Yet let us rather congratulate ourfelves on the riches which remain, than peevifhly regret loffes which cannot poffibly be repaired [a]. In the Book before us, we have the refult and general conclufion of all our author's comparifons and reflections; which is, that the inftitutions of Crete, Sparta, and Carthage, though far from being perfect in theory, were the beft and wifeft that ever were carried into practice. In thefe governments, therefore, we may contemplate the term and limit of the civil wifdom of antiquity. With them, each nation may compare its domeftic polity; and each individual may be contented, if the conftitution under which he lives, can ftand in honourable competition with thofe boafted models [b]. To fatisfy his mind completely, the reader muft himfelf make the comparifon: and the Englifh reader will finifh this ufeful tafk, cherifhing his country, and bleffing the memory of his anceftors.

Ariftotle is the only writer that defcribes with fulnefs and accuracy the commonwealth of Carthage. He does more; he predicts her melancholy fate, and points out the lurking feeds of her decay and ruin, even during the moft vigorous period of her health and profperity. But befides the malignant poifon which deftroyed that republic, there was a deep and radical error in the conftitution of all thofe denominated the *free ftates* of antiquity; an error which our author in fome paffages hints

[a] Fabricius, vol. ii. p. 196. & feq. gives a copious lift of the commonwealths defcribed by Ariftotle. Cicero fays, that this indefatigable author "explained the inftitutions, manners, and difcipline of almoft all the republics of Greeks and Barbarians." Omnium fere civitatum non Græciæ folum, fed etiam Barbariæ mores inftituta ac difciplinas expofuerat. De Fin. l. v. c. 4.

[b] The objection arifing from the fuppofed ignorance of the ancients with refpect to reprefentative government, will be anfwered in the fequel. It will be fhewn that the Greeks were acquainted with reprefentation in the ufual and practical fenfe of that word.

hints at, but which he no where completely explains. This evil confifted in the faulty conftruction of what is now called the executive power; which, inftead of being fovereign, permanent, and indivifible, was exercifed by affemblies and fenates, or by them delegated to an almoft indefinite number of mutually independent minifters and generals. The deplorable effects of this arrangement, with regard to liberty as well as juftice, I endeavoured twenty years ago fully to illuftrate from ancient hiftory; and as the obfervations then made could not be influenced by the events which have fince happened in Europe, and the actually fubfifting ftate of public affairs, I think it better to tranfcribe a few paffages from the work alluded to, than to repeat the fame opinions in other words. "In confidering the nature and tendency of any government, there are two principal queftions to be refolved; how far it protects the lives and liberties and properties of individuals, and what duties it requires them to perform in return for this protection? Both queftions are eafily anfwered with regard to the ftates of Greece; they required every thing, and they performed almoft nothing. Such a political arrangement gave extraordinary energy to their military enterprifes [e]; and this, if it may be confidered as a good effect, was the principal advantage with which their plan of

[e] "Such nations," Ariftotle obferves, "fhine in war; in peace they ruft with their fwords." This truth ftrongly impreffed the author's mind, while it was yet a queftion of political expediency, what means fhould be ufed for avoiding a defperate conflict with a people, whofe ambition under defpotifm, firft fubjected their neighbours to the neceffity of keeping on foot mercenary ftanding armies; and whofe more dangerous ambition under democracy, was likely to fubject them to the ftill harder neceffity of becoming armed nations. The lively and profound fenfe which he thought it his duty to exprefs of the military energy of democracy, was ftrangely miftaken and grofsly mifreprefented, by *fome perfons* or *perfon*, who, at the time alluded to, affected to treat all thofe as enemies to peace at home, who were anxioufly zealous for peace abroad.

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of policy was attended. The ſtate enjoyed an abſolute command over the perſonal ſervices and the wealth of its ſubjects; and could on every occaſion call forth their moſt ſtrenuous exertions. The authority exerciſed over the rich and the poor was equally unlimited. But the condition of the former ſeemed peculiarly unhappy, becauſe their eſtates, as well as their perſonal ſervices, might always be required of them; and, without danger of inevitable deſtruction to their owners, could not poſſibly be withheld. They not only ſupplied the whole expence of the navy, but furniſhed ſuch extraordinary contributions as any ſudden emergency demanded. In all the following pleadings, there is ſcarcely one example of a rich man venturing to appear at the bar of the public, without being able to prove that he had expended the beſt part of his fortune in the ſervice of the community. But this was a matter of neceſſity, not of choice. For the Greeks were tyrants in one capacity, and ſlaves in another; and that impervious line which ought to be drawn between the exerciſe of power in the ſovereign, and the enjoyment of liberty in the people, was a ſecret undiſcovered in Greece, and is ſtill concealed from every country but our own [d]."

"But the Athenian inſtitutions, diſtreſſing as they were to individuals, who loudly complained of their injuſtice, yet enabled the republic to exert itſelf with vigour againſt its foreign and domeſtic enemies. The exorbitant and uncontrolled juriſdiction, aſſumed by the Grecian ſtates over their colonies and allies, tended ſtill farther to promote the ſame end. The enormous exactions of the Athenians from their tributary iſles, as well as the heavy taxes which they impoſed on their Aſiatic

[d] Introduction to the Orations of Lyſias, &c. p. 17.

Aſiatic colonies, have been already deſcribed. Sparta exerciſed, in this reſpect, an authority equally tremendous. In the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, that republic demanded from her colonies in Italy and Sicily, five hundred ſhips, and large contributions in money; and during the courſe of the ſame war, ſhe made many ſimilar applications, which were ſeldom ineffectual. But it is not from particular acts of extreme rigour and ſeverity, that we muſt appreciate the intolerable ſervitude of the countries which had the misfortune to become ſubject to thoſe ambitious republics. While human nature continues the ſame, the right to exerciſe power will always be attended with a ſtrong propenſity to abuſe it. Unleſs this dangerous prerogative, on the one hand, be balanced by the invaluable privilege of defending liberty on the other; unleſs the line of ſeparation between theſe two be boldly marked and accurately defined; unleſs the intereſts of that part of the conſtitution which tends to corruption, be invariably reſiſted by thoſe of the generous portion which ſuſtains its political life; it is of little conſequence, whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thouſand. In both caſes alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law [e]. It ſhall be proved that the inſtitutions of thoſe ancient republics, as well as

[e] To ſee clearly the cauſe of the peculiar evils inherent in all kinds of popular aſſemblies veſted with government, we muſt have recourſe to the trite proverb, "Set a beggar on horſeback," &c. Men not uſed to power are the moſt likely to abuſe it; and when this power centers in one aſſembly, however conſtituted, it is found by univerſal experience, that the majority will for ever tyrannize over the minority; and will execute its unjuſt and wild reſolutions more zealouſly and more ardently, exactly in proportion to the oppoſition which it has encountered. In its ungovernable career, the obſtacles which could not check and reſiſt, will wonderfully encreaſe and accelerate its headlong impetuoſity.

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as the manners refulting from them, both of which have been injudicioufly extolled by many learned men, approach nearer to Oriental defpotifm and the manners refulting from it, than can well be imagined. The principal difference between the citizens of the one and the flaves of the other is, that a greater number of the former might expect at fome future time to inflict the fame calamities which they had previoufly fuffered. But between the foreign dependancies of republican and defpotic ftates, there is no diftinction whatever. The moft rapacious Turkifh governor, armed with all the tremendous power of his mafter, never acted with more cruelty and injuftice, than did the magiftrates of the Athenian republic under the fanction of popular decrees [f]."

Thefe obfervations are confirmed by the juft theory of political arrangements, and illuftrated by the moft extenfive furvey of thofe denominated free ftates, both ancient and modern. In every well-regulated community, the people ought to have a control in the government, but ought not to adminifter it; for power vefted in the people at large, or in an affembly delegated by them, muft, in nations ordinarily circumftanced [g], neceffarily degenerate into the tyranny of a faction. Difcontent, fedition, confpiracy, and revolution, form the miferable train of confequences; pourtrayed in characters of blood in the melancholy annals of republican hiftory [h].

The

[f] Introduction to Lyfias, p. 18.

[g] What the *extraordinary* circumftances are which alter the nature of republicanifm, will appear in the progrefs of this work.

[h] I atteft not only the republics of Greece, but the Italian republics of the middle age, whofe tumultuary tranfactions and fanguinary revolutions crowd the defultory pages of Machiavel, Guicchiardin, Nerli, Varqui, Malavolti, Ghirardacci, Fiora-

vanti,

The evil is not accidental, it ſprings from a perennial ſource. With the conſtituent elements of every commonwealth, naturally grow up two parties, diſtinguiſhed by different names in different countries, but whoſe eſſential characteriſtics are uniform and unalterable. The nobles and the people, the rich and the poor, will always reſpectively entertain many particular views, and always allow themſelves to be governed by many ſeemingly incompatible intereſts. When theſe jarring orders are united in one ſovereign aſſembly, whichever party prevails, the majority will tyrannize over the minority, and tyrannize the more outrageouſly, becauſe the ſame perſons who have made unjuſt decrees, are inveſted with the aweful power of carrying them cruelly into execution. Even in the wildeſt democracies ſuch a monſtrous arrangement never was durable [i]. But its continuance, however ſhort, was long enough to be feared and deteſted; ſince to whichever ſide the balance inclined, either the weight of authority degenerated into deſpotiſm [k], or the flame of liberty blazed into conflagration [l]. As

vanti, Portenarli, &c. As a modern Italian writer obſerves, "Theſe republics were all of them expoſed to almoſt daily revolutions, and ſeldom did the ſyſtem of adminiſtration continue a whole year the ſame." Denina's Revolutions, &c. c. v. ſect. 10.

[i] It ſeldom happened, in the republics either of ancient Greece or of modern Italy, that the whole exerciſe of government was veſted in one council, in one aſſembly, or in the committees of either; but as the legiſlative body, whether ſenate or people, itſelf governed by the capricious will of a tyrannical majority, directed and controlled the exerciſe of all executive and judiciary functions, the matter was not much mended; ſince all power proceeded from one centre, and flowed from one ſource, a power unbalanced and unreſponſible, and therefore, as Ariſtotle obſerves, not made for man.

[k] The moſt prominent examples are the tyranny of the four hundred, and afterwards of the thirty, at Athens. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxi. & xxiv. Likewiſe the tyranny of the Decemvirs at Rome. T. Liv. l. iii. c. 32. & ſeq.

[l] All republican hiſtories abound with examples of this kind. Thoſe of Athens and Florence contain little elſe for near a century preceding what is called the extinction of their liberties.

As by univerfal confent, therefore, all legiflators or reformers of free ftates divided the fovereignty between the two orders, convened in diftinct chambers; the one forming a fenate to deliberate and propofe; the other, an affembly of the people to approve and confirm. This, doubtlefs, is one great point gained: the two fovereign chambers ferve to check each other; the one divides and the other choofes [m]; and while each refts fatisfied with its prefcribed fhare of power, their meafures will be harmonious, and their government will be happy. But the paffions of men, as our author frequently obferves, are indefinite and infatiable; and fcarcely a fingle example occurs in hiftory, of either a fovereign fenate or a fovereign affembly, which did not frequently abufe its power, and continually endeavour to aggrandize it. How is this evil to be remedied? What authority is to be interpofed between contending factions? What hand is fit to hold the balance, and to render the energy of law fuperior to the violence of party rage? Ariftotle will tell us "that the middle ranks muft be encreafed and magnified; that veneration for the conftitutional laws muft be infpired; in fine, that a king muft be eftablifhed, whofe office is a pledge and fecurity, that the few fhall not be plundered and oppreffed, nor the many infulted and enflaved." In proportion to the degree in which thefe advices have been complied with, free ftates have flourifhed. Even the republican Machiavel will vouch, that the commonwealths of the middle age never enjoyed

[m] In this, according to Harrington, confifts the whole myftery of government; "a myftery brought unto light by two filly girls. For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them; Divide, fays one unto the other, and I will choofe; or let me divide, and you fhall choofe." Oceana, p. 13. edit. 1656.

joyed any tolerable meafure of profperity or tranquillity, when the factions of the nobles and the people were not reftrained by the authority of fome virtuous, prudent, and powerful citizen [n]. Into this form, of two deliberative affemblies with an executive magiftrate at their head, all the moft renowned republics, both of ancient and modern times, have fhewn a continual tendency to throw themfelves; and that independently of contrivance and theory, or rather in oppofition to them; fo true it is, that "government," to ufe the words of Ariftotle, "is the work of nature; and all good government, the refult of time and experience."

But innumerable obftacles, both without and within, prevented free ftates from attaining the juft perfection of political arrangement. The republics of antiquity were too jealous of liberty to entruft the executive magiftracy with fuch a fhare in the legiflature as is effential to its own defence. The archon, the conful, the fuffetes, the king, or by whatever other name

[n] L. iv. fub. init. Machiavel has branded with indelible impreffions of indignation and contempt, the inftitutions and governments of modern Italy. Their hiftory is not, however, he obferves, without its ufe. "E fe nel defcribere le cofe feguite in quefto guafto mondo, non fi narrera, ò fortezza di foldato, ò virtu di capitano, ò amore verfo la patria di cittadino, fi vedra con quali inganni, con quali aftutie et arti, i principi, i foldati, i capi delle republiche per mantenerfi quella riputatione che non havevano meritata, fi governavano. Il que fara forfe non meno utile che fi fiano l'antiche cofe a conofcere; perche fe quelli i liberali animi a fequitarle accendono, quefte a fuggirle & fpegnerle accenderanno." L. v. Delle Hiftorie, fub init. "In defcribing the tranfactions of this degenerate country, I fhall not have to fpeak of the bravery of foldiers, the fkill of generals, the patriotifm of citizens; but there will be frequent occafion to recount the flights and artifices by which thofe who were at the head of civil and military affairs, kept poffeffion of that confideration to which they were by no means entitled. The exploits of antiquity fire noble minds with the defire of imitating them; the tranfactions of a recent date, will fire the noble minded among pofterity with a defire to avoid and fpurn fuch ignominious examples."

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name the firft magiftrate was diftinguifhed, judged caufes in perfon, and commanded armies in perfon; his power did not confift in appointing thofe by whom caufes were judged or armies commanded. In confequence of thefe unfavourable arrangements, the wife and equitable adminiftration of the laws depended on the inftability of perfonal character, not on the foundnefs of the conftitution; and difcontent with the adminiftration, naturally produced a revolution in the government. Among the modern nations which conquered and divided the weftern provinces of the Roman empire, the nature of the kingly office came to be better underftood; but as their kings were entrufted with the uncontrolled command of armies continually augmented through the fear or jealoufy of ambitious, and often hoftile neighbours, it was eafy for fucceffions of fuch kings to overawe both nobles and people by the right of the fword, and to unite in their own perfons the fupreme legiflative with the executive power. In Great Britain alone, whofe infular fituation rendered the public fafety dependent on that kind of national force which is moft formidable to enemies abroad, but which can never be conveniently employed as an inftrument for deftroying liberty at home, the progrefs towards the higheft perfection of political arrangement was left free and unincumbered; unchecked by the timid jealoufies of the people, unobftructed by the overwhelming power of the prince °. Two legiflative affemblies, the one popular, the other arifto-

° In populous countries, the encroachments of power cannot be regularly refifted by the people collectively. The people, therefore, muft act by their delegates. But thefe delegates will uniformly and heartily unite with the general mafs of the community, in maintaining equal laws and public liberty, when they are thoroughly convinced that the power which they reftrain can never become their own. Hence the fingular advantage of an indivifible and fovereign executive, whofe functions can be legally

ariſtocratical; the former entruſted with the control of the national purſe and the inqueſt of public grievances; the latter judges in matters of impeachment by the Commons; but both orders or aſſemblies totally deprived of all conſtitutional means of hurting each other, ſince the exerciſe of government centers in one ſovereign magiſtrate, defended by a negative on the paſſing of laws, and inveſted with the whole prerogative of naming thoſe by whom they are carried into execution.—This diſtribution of power, the reſult of experience operating on fortunate circumſtances, is the nobleſt contrivance that ever was deviſed for killing thoſe ſeeds of ſedition which lurk in the boſom of every commonwealth; for enſuring the continuance of equal and uſeful laws; and for rendering the juſt authority of thoſe laws prevalent over the blind fury of contending factions. Other modes of polity have ſucceeded in countries peculiarly circumſtanced; but this applies univerſally; and free ſtates have flouriſhed in peace and proſperity, exactly in proportion[p] to their approximation to this perfect model.

It

legally exerciſed only by reſponſible miniſters; and hence the wonderful ſtability of the Britiſh conſtitution; a ſtability (humanly ſpeaking) unalterable, becauſe founded on the indelible and beſt underſtood intereſts of men, the cleareſt dictates of reaſon, and the warmeſt paſſions of the heart.

p *Other circumſtances being the ſame*; words which ought always to be underſtood in ſuch general propoſitions. The nature of the country, exacting induſtry and frugality, conſpiried with the authority of the Stadtholder in giving proſperity to the Netherlands. The United States of America owe their happineſs, under their preſent executive, not merely to the great perſonal weight of their preſident, but to their extenſive poſſeſſions, offering the ſtrongeſt incitements to agriculture, to the enjoyments and virtues of domeſtic life, and to the improvement of their private fortunes; all which circumſtances have a tendency to render men eaſily governable. Theſe republics, as well as the Swiſs Cantons and their allies, preſent, doubtleſs (I ſhould ſpeak of Holland in the paſt tenſe), a picture of more tranquillity and ſtability than did moſt ſtates of ancient Greece, or the Italian republics of the middle age; and that not merely in conſequence of their political arrangements, but of many other cauſes, both moral and phyſical.

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It has been the fashion, however, of late years to maintain that the misfortunes of the Greek commonwealths did not originate in the source above explained, but in the general ignorance of all the free states of antiquity with regard to representative government, the highest improvement of republicanism. As this doctrine is very sedulously inculcated on both sides of the Atlantic, by those who having overturned their own hereditary constitutions, are desirous of encouraging other nations to imitate their example, it may not be improper to examine how far such assertions are warranted by history; especially as the examination will serve to illustrate several of our author's remarks in the following Books of his Politics. That the Greeks were totally unacquainted with representative government, can not be maintained by any who have the least tincture of learning. I need not mention the Amphictyonic council[q], and the Achæan league[r], both of which representative bodies I have described in another place. But I may observe, as a fact less generally attended to, that in the commonwealth of Mantinæa, persons chosen from the people at large[s] were invested with the power of naming the magistrates. In this Arcadian republic, there was not only representation simply, but a double row of representatives; delegates of delegates; and it is not reasonable to conjecture that an arrangement so obvious should have remained undiscovered among a cluster of free states, where all sorts of propositions

[q] Compare the History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. p. 107. & seq. and vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 467.

[r] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 14.

[s] Aristot. Polit. l. vi. c. iv. The author mentions other republics on the same plan, particularly that of Telecles the Milesian; and in his Fourth Book, where he treats of the sovereignty in a state, maintains that elective, as well as deliberative assemblies, should consist of only a part of the citizens, acting for the whole by an established rotation.

fitions were made, and all kinds of experiments were tried; where nothing was rejected which had not been previoufly refuted; and where inftitutions, feemingly the moft unpromifing, were condemned or approved in proportion only to the mifchief or benefit vifibly manifeft in their effects. This is fo true, that the fuppofed modern maxims, refpecting reprefentation and taxation, were held and practifed by the Lycians; a people not obfcure nor inconfiderable, but eminently illuftrious both in war and peace, from the earlieft to the lateft period of their hiftory. The Lycians inhabited the fouthern coaft of the Afiatic peninfula, and were furrounded by the territories of Carian, Pamphylian, and Cilician pirates; wretches who deformed thofe feas by their rapacity and cruelty, and whofe cities were marts of booty and flavery, particularly of captives, born free, reduced into inextricable bondage[t]. The Lycians alone difdained this abominable traffic; and though they often commanded the fea even to the coaft of Italy, yet they never were convicted or even accufed of facrificing honour to gain[u]. Their equity and innocence protected them againft the juft vengeance which often fell on their neighbours from the Syrian and the Roman power. From the age of Homer to that of Brutus[x] and Caffius, they continued to flourifh under their hereditary inftitutions in domeftic tranquillity and national independence. Within a circular peninfula, nearly an hundred miles in diameter, and with upwards of one hundred and feventy miles

[t] Strabo, l. xiv. p. 664 & 665. from which this account of the Lycians is almoft wholly copied.

[u] Idem ibid.

[x] See in Plutarch's life of Brutus, and in Appian (De Bell. Civil. l. iv. p. 633, & feq.), the memorable refiftance of Xanthus and Patara to Brutus.

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miles of fea-coaft, Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, with three equal, and feventeen inferior cities, formed from time immemorial a federal and reprefentative government. The national convention or congrefs confifted of deputies from the feveral members of the union; the greateft cities having three votes; the middling, two; and the fmalleft only one vote in the election of magiftrates and all public concerns. In the fame proportion they paid taxes and incurred other public burdens; their taxation and reprefentation being regarded by them as correlatives[y]. They had one common archon or ftadtholder[z], whofe office became in later times elective, but which may be conjectured, from the analogy of their hiftory with that of their European brethren, to have been anciently hereditary[a].

In

[y] αναλογοι δε και τας εισφορας εισφερουσι, και τας αλλας λειτουργιας. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 665.

[z] λυκιαρχης. Ibid.

[a] The Lycians were a happy people. Did they owe their happinefs to their reprefentative government? Hiftory will fhew us that they owed it to their virtuous manners, which could alone render that government either beneficial or permanent. In confirmation of this, the following ftatement of facts may be given. Among the Gothic conquerors of the Roman empire, elective princes having gradually raifed themfelves to the rank of hereditary kings, their jealoufy of the nobility naturally led them to protect, encourage, and infenfibly to exalt to power, the induftrious and peaceful inhabitants of towns and cities; of whofe participation in the legiflature, the firft clear evidence that occurs in the hiftory of France is the reign of Philip le Bel in 1301. In 1484, Charles VIII. fummoned deputies from the country, from which time the States General, confifting of three independent chambers, each of which had a negative on the proceedings of the other two, were appointed in the manner feemingly the beft adapted to unite the whole wifdom and patriotifm, as well as to collect the real fenfe of the nation. The inhabitants of each parifh fent deputies to the jurifdictions; and thefe deputies again fent the perfons deemed beft qualified to reprefent them in the States General. There were thus two orders of deputies; or deputies of deputies, an inftitution which Mr. Hume (Idea of a perfect Commonwealth) propofes as the higheft improvement in reprefentative government; and which, Dr. Price (fee Appendix to his Sermon on the French Revolution) greatly extols the *French republic* for being

In examining the other Greek republics, we ſhall find that power exerciſed by delegation formed a leading feature in every one of them. Athens itſelf, which became the moſt democratical of them all, was in its beſt times a government of repreſentation as well as of rotation; and in reading its laws, we ſhall be often tempted to believe that we are peruſing the code of a certain modern repreſentative democracy. In the former commonwealth, which from the time of Theſeus breathed a peculiar ſpirit of freedom, the comitia or ordinary aſſemblies of the people were not ſummoned as at Rome by a conſul, nor by any analogous magiſtrate, as in many neighbouring Greek ſtates. At Athens the political machine moved, as it were, ſpontaneouſly, with the revolution of the ſeaſons. The aſtronomer Meton, who reformed the calendar ten years before the Peloponneſian war, regulated the commencement of the Athenian year by the firſt new moon after the ſummer ſolſtice[b]. The year was divided into twelve months, conſiſting of twenty-nine, and of thirty days, alternately; and each month was divided into three decades[c]. On the days immediately preceding the firſt decade of

being *the firſt ſtate* to carry into execution. Notwithſtanding all this, the States General of France contributed nothing to the benefit of that country. The aſſembly of 1484 was diſgraced by multiplied quarrels among the chambers. The five aſſemblies which followed, exhibited alternate ſcenes of civil diſcord and ſanguinary ſuperſtition. The States were ſummoned for the laſt time in 1614; and this aſſembly, like moſt of the preceding ones, broke up as abruptly as it had deliberated uſeleſsly. Eſſais Hiſtoriques ſur les Commices de Rome, les Etats Generaux de France, & le Parlement d'Angleterre, v. ii. p. 189, & ſeq.

[b] Conf. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 186. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 96. Liban. Argum. in Demoſt. Orat. in Androt.

[c] Julius Pollux, &c. apud Potter. Antiq. v. i. p. 26.

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of the firft month, called Hecatombaion, in allufion to the numerous facrifices by which it was diftinguifhed, the Athenians from the wards in the city, and the diftricts in the country, amounting collectively to one hundred and feventy-four in number [d], affembled in the public market-place of the capital, in order to elect the fenate, the archons, and other annual magiftrates. For the purpofe of conducting thefe elections, as well as other public matters, with the greater regularity and expedition, the people voted by divifions, called tribes; which were four in the time of Solon, but raifed to ten by Clifthenes [e], who reftored the republic after the expulfion of Hippias. From perfons properly qualified [f] in point of age, character, and fortune, each of the ten tribes chofe by lot fifty fenators, who formed collectively the fenate of the five hundred for the fucceeding year. To the fenate thus conftituted, another body was aggregated [g], to fupply the place of thofe fenators who might be removed by death, or difmiffed for malverfation in office. The whole fenators, actual and fupplemental, were divided into ten claffes, reprefenting the ten tribes; each of which enjoyed prefidency in rotation [h]. The order of this pre-eminence was alfo determined by lot. The fifty prefiding fenators were entitled the Prytanes; the hall in which they affembled and dined, the Prytaneum; and the period of thirty-five days, during which they held their dignity, was called a Prytany [i]. This period was divided into five weeks; and the fifty Prytanes into five companies, each confifting of ten perfons, and each prefiding in the fenate

during

[d] Strabo, l. ix. p. 396.

[e] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xiii.

[f] Lyfias adverf. Philon.

[g] Harpocrat. in Επιλαχοντες.

[h] Suidas in Πρυταν. Liban. Argument. in Androt.

[i] Pollux. l. viii. c. 15. Demofth. de Corona.

during its respective week[k]. From these presidents of presidents, a single person was chosen by lot to preside in the senate for a single day, during which he was entrusted with the command of the citadel, the key of the treasury, and the custody of the public seal of the commonwealth[l]. The nine other tribes attained the honour of the Prytany, each in the order which had been established by lot; and their presiding companies, as well as the president himself, were appointed precisely in the manner above described[m]. With this representative body, Solon lodged the most important branches of sovereignty. The senate convened daily[n]: it prepared all matters of deliberation for the popular assembly[o]; no measure could be lawfully enforced by the people which had not been previously approved by the senate[p]; and the senate, independently of the people, made laws which had force for a year, that is, during the period of its own existence[q]. The presidents of the senate also presided in the popular assembly; summoned its extraordinary meetings by their authority; put the question to a vote; collected the suffrages; and having declared the will of the majority, dissolved the assembly[r]. The senate, therefore, enjoyed the principal share in the *legislative and executive* powers of government; but the judicature was merely a temporary commission, exercised by juries chosen by lot from the people at large[s]. These juries were directed in their proceedings by the nine

[k] Liban. Argument. in Demosth. Androt.

[l] Suidas in Επις.

[m] Suidas & Harpocrat. in Προεδροι & Επιστατai.

[n] Petit. Leg. Attic. 183.

[o] Harpocrat. in Προβελ. Demosth. in Leptin.

[p] Idem ibid. & Plutarch in Solon.

[q] Plut. ibid. & Demosth. in Aristocrat.

[r] Æschin. de Falsa Legation. & Aristophan. Concionatric.

[s] Plutarch in Solon. Demosth. in Aristogeit.

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nine archons[t], who were annually appointed at the ſame time with the ſenate, and from perſons of the ſame deſcription with thoſe qualified to ſit in that council[u]. In the ſtated aſſemblies held at the end of every year, and commonly during the laſt four days of it, the people alſo appointed the military commanders, the ſurveyors of roads and buildings, the commiſſaries and controllers of accounts, and a variety of other officers; each department of office commonly containing ten citizens, that the ten tribes might be reſpectively repreſented, each by one of its own members[x].

Solon could not foreſee the events which deſtroyed this political arrangement. He foreſaw, however, that it was extremely liable to deſtruction. He was fully apprized of the danger of tyranny, by which the republic was firſt aſſailed[y], and of the danger of democracy, by which it was finally ruined[z]. The regulations which he eſtabliſhed were admirably calculated to prevent both thoſe evils. I ſhall not here dwell on the judicious plan of public education which he preſcribed and enforced[a], or on the admired authority of the Areopagus, which he extended or confirmed[b]; inſtitutions reſpectively adapted to maintain the equality of freedom on the one hand, and to uphold a fair and moderate ariſtocracy on the other. This ariſtocracy was ſtill farther ſtrengthened by the laws regulating the mode of proceeding in the popular aſſem-bly,

[t] Ulpian in Demoſth. adverſus Midiam. Demoſth. in Neær. Pollux. l. viii. c. ix.

[u] Pollux. l. viii. c. vi. Æſchin. in Cteſiph. Pelit. de Leg. Attic. p. 237.

[x] Compar. Æſchin. in Cteſiph. p. 429. and p. 432. Harpocrat. in λογιϛαι. Pollux l. viii. c. ix.

[y] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii.

[z] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xiii.

[a] Ibid.

[b] Ibid. & Iſocrat. Areopagit.

bly, which fubjected to a rigorous perquifition the lives and characters and qualifications of the orators entitled to addrefs the people [c], and which gave a legal precedency in every debate to thofe fpeakers who had paft their fiftieth year [d]. But thefe wife regulations, all breathing the fame fpirit, were unable to refift the ftorms by which a republic enriched by commerce and elated by conqueft muft ever neceffarily be affailed. They could not prevent the multitude affembled in a large and luxurious city from yielding to the perfidious voice of demagogues, while they encouraged the people at large to become managers of their own affairs [e]; to act on every occafion as their own minifters; and thereby to deftroy that line of diftinction between the fovereign and the fubject, on the unalterable continuance of which the ftability of good government will ever moft firmly reft, under every fluctuation of external circumftances, of profperity or adverfity, fimplicity or refinement.

[c] Æfchin. in Timarch. Suidas & Harpocrateon in ῥητορων γραφη.

[d] Æfchin. ibid. [e] Demofth. paffim.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Plato's republic.—Community of wives, children, and goods.—Nature and neceſſity of ſeparate property.—Plato's books of laws examined.—Schemes for equalizing property.—Their futility.—Hippodamus.—His ideal republic.—Arguments in favour of political innovation.—Stronger arguments againſt it.—The Spartan government.—The Cretan.—The Carthaginian.—The Athenian.—Zaleucus.—Charondas.—Philolaus.—Dioiles.—Phaleas.—Pittacus.—Androgamas.

BOOK II. Chap. 1.

The ſubject, and the end or purpoſe of this inquiry.

IN order to diſcover and aſcertain that form of ſociety under which thoſe would prefer to live, who were at liberty to chooſe a mode of civil exiſtence completely agreeable to their wiſh, we muſt not only conſider the moſt admired political inſtitutions that have actually prevailed in the world, but likewiſe examine thoſe imaginary plans of perfect governments, which fancy has deviſed, and which philoſophy has highly approved. Such an examination will enable us to determine the hitherto undefined limits of juſtice and utility, in matters of ſociety and government; and will thus reſcue the preſent work from the reproach of being undertaken for the unworthy purpoſes of oſtentation or cenſure [a].

Every

[a] σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων. I reſolve the firſt word into the two motives by which the ſophiſts were uſually actuated.

BOOK II.

To what objects the partnerfhip of a commonwealth ought to extend,

Every commonwealth being, as we have faid, a partnerfhip, it follows, that in every commonwealth men muft be partners in fome things or in all [b]. Some things they muft poffefs in common, fince the community could not otherwife fubfift. The advantageous fituation of the capital and of the territory is neceffarily a part of the common ftock; and all men who inhabit the fame city and country muft breathe the fame air, and enjoy the fame climate. A queftion therefore arifes, how far this community ought to extend? Whether the partnerfhip of a commonwealth has its defined limits? Or whether, as Socrates maintains in the republic of Plato, all things ought to be common, wives, children, and poffeffions?

This extraordinary innovation, which is fo different from every thing that has hitherto prevailed in the world, is attended with innumerable difficulties. Were it reduced into practice, we deny that this novelty would anfwer the purpofe which its author means it fhould ferve; we deny likewife, that this purpofe, which Socrates fays fhould be the end and aim of every commonwealth, is in itfelf defirable.

Plato's opinion refuted.

According to this philofopher, the main object of legiflation is to promote the union of the citizens, "to unite them as much

[b] Ariftotle's divifion is threefold. He fays, it is neceffary that the citizens fhould enjoy all things in common; or nothing in common; or fome things in common, and other things not. But he immediately adds, that the fecond branch of the divifion is impoffible, fince, if nothing were common, a republic would not be what he has defined it, a community or partnerfhip. In compliance with the general rules which he lays down concerning divifion, he introduces a part or member, which the nature and definition of the particular fubject of inveftigation obliges him immediately to reject. The inventor of method could fcarcely be held guilty of pedantry in exemplifying his own rules: his fcholaftic imitators indeed are frequently liable to this reproach; but even the pedantry of method is feldom a very grievous fault when real inftruction is the aim.

much as poſſible; and to reduce them, as nearly as may be, from many to one." Yet it is plain, that this project of uniting, when carried beyond certain limits, would totally deſtroy the community, reducing a commonwealth to a family, and a family to an individual [c]. But a commonwealth muſt, from its nature, conſiſt not only of many individuals, but of individuals differently endowed, and differently employed [d]. It is not an alliance in war, operating by the mere ſtrength of numbers; it is not a nation living in ſcattered families, remote, detached; and, in civil concerns, totally unimportant to each other. But it is a ſociety of men united by their mutual exigencies, and their reſpective acquirements; ſo that the very circumſtance itſelf which, in one ſenſe, unites a city, that is, harmoniſes it into one body or ſyſtem, neceſſarily infers a multiplicity of wants, a diverſity of talents, and a diſtinction of property. The reciprocation of good offices, reſulting from all theſe varieties, upholds ſtates;

By the nature of political ſociety.

[c] Vid. Platon. de Republic. l. v. paſſim. Ariſtotle's reaſonings never ſeem to us leſs worthy of himſelf than when he combats the exceptionable doctrines of his maſter; not that he does not ſufficiently refute them, but becauſe he refutes at too great length, extravagancies that neither merit nor require ſuch patience of examination, and ſuch perſeverance of oppoſition. Yet to the contemporaries and immediate ſucceſſors of Ariſtotle, the paſſages which to us appear tireſome and frigid, probably ranked among the moſt intereſting parts of his work. Such was the great fame of Plato, juſtly earned by the ſublimity and truth of many of his doctrines; and even by his paradoxes themſelves, ſo naturally introduced, ſo ingeniouſly ſupported, with ſuch power of arrangement, and ſuch charms of ſtyle, that under his plaſtic art, the moſt ſhapeleſs crudities received form, beauty, and brilliancy. That fanciful writer became a philoſopher by choice, but always remained what he had been originally, a poet by nature; and like men of a ſimilar ſtamp in modern times, often perplexed thoſe ſciences which he ſought to adorn.

[d] This doctrine is beautifully illuſtrated by the greateſt of all ſyſtems in the Treatiſe de Mundo. Ariſtot. p. 608, & ſeq.

BOOK II. ftates[e]; and the more numerous are the varieties that within certain limits prevail, the more completely will that purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence be obtained, for which civil fociety was inftituted[f].

In

[e] Ariftotle here refers to his Treatifes on Ethics, in which he has explained with great accuracy the doctrine of juftice, both moral and political. See vol. i. from p. 257 to p. 284. Comp. Ethic. Eudem. b. iv. from beginning to end. Magna Moral. b. i. c. 34. In purfuing his firft comparifon of government to a partnerfhip in trade, he obferves, that it is eafy to regulate the fhares of the profit by thofe of the capital. But when the greater fkill or the greater labour of one partner is to be fet in oppofition to the greater capital of another, the diftribution of profits then becomes more difficult; the matter, however, may, for the moft part, be pretty accurately adjufted. But in the great partnerfhip of civil fociety, how many intricate proportions are to be unravelled, before the jarring elements of birth, wealth, talents, induftry, can be harmonized into any lafting fyftem of equitable policy? This, however, muft be done, not indeed with fcientific accuracy, but according to thofe liberal principles of moral geometry, which are the only rules that the practice of civil life either requires or admits. When this great work is effected, and the interefts of the many are thus reconciled with the fair pretenfions of the few, diftributive or political juftice will then have performed its office; and room will be left for the impartial exercife of juftice, commutative or corrective; which is to be regulated not by geometrical analogy, but by the fimpler kind, called arithmetical (ου κατα την αναλογιαν εκεινην αλλα κατα την αριθμητικην.); in which the terms of any numerical feries increafe or decreafe by a fixed and given difference. This, therefore, according to Ariftotle, is the only kind of juftice and the only kind of virtue which admits of precife and definite rules; for as in any feries of terms in arithmetical proportion, the common difference always remains the fame, whatever be the terms, fo in commutative or corrective juftice, whatever be the quality or the merits of the perfons concerned, the contracts and the injuries defined by law are confidered as things fixed and invariable, and having fixed and invariable equivalents. See vol. i. p. 265, & feq.

[f] δει μεν γαρ ειναι πως μιαν, και την οικιαν και την πολιν, αλλα ου παντως· εστι γαρ ὡς ουκ εσται προιουσα πολις, εστι δ' ὡς εσται μεν, εγγυς δ' ουσα του μη πολις ειναι, εσται χειρων πολις. Literally, "both a family and a commonwealth ought to be in *fome* refpects one; but not in all. For a commonwealth, when it attains perfect unity, ceafes to be a commonwealth, and as it approximates this ultimate limit, it will continually become a worfe commonwealth than it was." The thought is finely illuftrated by Cicero, "Ut in fidibus ac tibiis, atque cantu ipfo ac vocibus, concentus eft quidam tenendus ex diftinctis fonis, quem

immutatam

BOOK II.

Reafon why the great principle of the divifion of labour cannot be applied to government.

In proportion as labour is divided, arts are perfected; and the various branches of induftry are all of them beft cultivated, when the fame individual is ftrictly confined to the fame branch of art. In matters of civil government, the fame principle is applicable; but juftice prohibits, that, in fuch matters, this principle fhould always be actually applied. In fome communities the citizens are fo nearly equal in merit[s], that it would be highly unjuft that one portion of the ftate fhould be continually debarred from offices of magiftracy; it would be equally unjuft that another portion fhould exclufively appropriate them. Whether government be a good or a bad thing, it is fair that men of equal abilities and virtues fhould equally fhare in it; that they fhould receive the advantage of it as their right, or bear the burden of it as their duty. But as they cannot all of them exercife magiftracy at once, it is neceffary

immutatam ac difcrepantem aures eruditæ ferre non poffunt; ifque concentus ex diffimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens: fic ex fummis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus, ut fonis, moderata ratione civitas confenfu diffimillimorum concinit; & quæ harmonia a muficis dicitur in cantu, ea eft in civitate concordia." "Concord in ftates is like harmony in mufic. The one refults from the differences and relations of diftinct and moft diffimilar founds; the other, from the diftinction of ranks among the citizens; the high, the low, and the middle order, which is interpofed between them." We fhall learn from Ariftotle, that it is this middle order which binds and cements the political edifice. Men of this clafs underftand better than any other, how to deal with the multitude. They have many interefts in common with both of the extremes; their fuperiors, and their inferiors. Whence Ariftotle maintains, that thofe ftates are the beft and happieft, and moft fecure, where the middle ranks moft abound.

s This is here the force of the word φυσις. "They have fo equally attained the perfections of their nature." See vol. i. p. 22. This equality among the citizens implies the famenefs of education and purfuits, as our author afterwards explains; and, therefore, infers that the arts of productive induftry fhould be exercifed, and the exigencies of bodily accommodation fhould be fupplied, by thofe who are not citizens.

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neceſſary that they ſhould govern by vicarious ſucceſſion, each ruling and ſubmitting in his turn, and thus aſſuming and laying down ſuch important prerogatives, as render them, in their civil capacities, at different times, altogether different men.

Chap. 2.

Arguments againſt the community of wives and children.

Should we allow the propriety of the end at which Socrates thinks that every legiſlation ought to aim, yet we could not admire the propriety of the means by which he thinks this end is likely to be attained. For this purpoſe, he propoſes the abolition of the diſtinction "mine and thine," and maintains that the citizens of his ſuppoſed commonwealth would be perfectly unanimous, if all of them could apply the word "mine" in ſpeaking of the ſame objects. In this remark there is an evident fallacy. The word "all" may be taken diſtributively, or collectively; if taken diſtributively, it is plain, that on the ſuppoſition of the community of goods, the word "mine" could not be applied by any body; no *one* of the citizens could juſtly ſay this is my wife, my ſon, or my property; and though all collectively might, indeed, ſay ſo, yet their doing this would not be found conducive to concord.

Farther, that which is a common concern is very generally neglected. The energies of man are excited by that which depends on himſelf alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, it is with reluctance that he employs ſuch a degree of attention and activity, as even his own intereſt requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care; and as other men prove equally negligent with himſelf, the common intereſt is univerſally abandoned. Thoſe families, beſides, are commonly the worſt ſerved, in which the domeſtics are the moſt numerous. In a commonwealth where each father had a

thouſand

thoufand fons, and each fon a thoufand fathers, it is plain that neither fathers nor fons would be very zealous in performing their relative duties; and the condition of a nephew[h] would be more eligible under an ordinary government, than that of a fon in Plato's republic.

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In the interior parts of Africa, geographers tell us that women are common, but that each man appropriates the children which moft refemble himfelf. Among quadrupeds, fome females have been obferved to bring forth young wonderfully refembling their fathers. The famous mare of Pharfalus was fo remarkable for this property, that fhe was called "The juft." It will be impoffible, therefore, to hinder men from forming conjectures, grounded on refemblance[i] and other circumftances, that certain children are their's; and thefe conjectures, though attended with the uneafinefs of anxious doubt, will not prevent the partialities of parental affection. The uncertainty, alfo, will produce many evils in its turn; it will multiply and embitter crimes; raillery and reproach will be converted into irreverence and impiety; love will often degenerate into inceft, and murder into parricide; and when fuch abominations happen, men who are ignorant of the enormity of their crimes, becaufe ignorant that they were committed againft their kindred, will often neglect performing the ceremonies appointed by religion for expiating their unnatural wickednefs[k].

Concord,

[h] The Greek word more commonly means a coufin-german. The Romans faid, "ne fis mihi patruus:" ufing the word uncle metaphorically, for a fevere reprover, and a morofe guardian.

[i] Nicolaus Damafcenus apud Stobæum, ferm. 42. p. 291., mentions a people called Limyrnii, among whom wives were common; and children alfo, until their fixth year; at which age they were affigned, after a public examination, to thofe of the men whom they moft refembled.

[k] See Ethics, l. ix. c. 6.

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Concord, doubtlefs, forms the happinefs of ftates; but this community of wives and children would totally deftroy that affection on which concord is founded. As a drop of honey is diffipated and loft in a pail of water, fo the fweet affection of love would totally perifh through too extenfive a diffufion; for two circumftances are requifite to maintain and invigorate this affection, that the objects of it be in themfelves lovely, and that they be peculiarly recommended to our love. The community of wives and children, were it in any cafe to be adopted, might, therefore, be more advantageoufly eftablifhed with regard to the peafants, whom Plato has appointed to labour and to obey, than with regard to the military clafs, whom he has appointed to legiflate and to govern. By deftroying all affection among the peafants, it would prevent their confpiring againft their mafters [1].

Chap. 3.

Arguments againft the community of goods.

The community of property, depending on different principles, merits a feparate confideration. Among fome barbarous nations the lands are feparately cultivated, but the fruits of them are promifcuoufly confumed. Among others, the lands are common, and cultivated by the conjunct labour of the community; but each family appropriates its fhare of their fruits. Where the peafants form a diftinct but dependent clafs, the community of lands will be liberated from feveral of its inconveniences. The martial lords of the foil, as in that cafe none of them would have any labour to beftow, could not quarrel

[1] Some fentences are omitted in this chapter, either as containing repetitions, or as relating to the fubject of Greek love; a perverfion of fentiment to which Ariftotle, of all the philofophers of his age, fhews himfelf the moft decided and moft zealous adverfary. None of them, indeed, as has been erroneoufly fuppofed, patronize fuch an abominable degeneracy; but Ariftotle alone, in his moral and political writings, uniformly treats the fubject with that marked reprobation which became a philofopher fuperior to the prejudices and fafhions of his own times.

quarrel with each other about proportioning the fruits of their induftry to the quantity of their refpective exertions. But fhould the proprietors themfelves cultivate with their own hands their common property, innumerable jealoufies would immediately fpring up, as fatal experience proves almoft always to happen among thofe connected in too clofe a communion of life, the partners in a voyage or a journey, who difpute for ftraws with each other; and as a mafter is moft quarrelfome with thofe fervants who are moft frequently in his way, being employed in attendance on his perfon.

The ufeful and practical community of goods.

The ufeful and practical community of goods, a community that will neither engender animofity nor check induftry, muft refult from the falutary difcipline of laws, and the fkilful application of early and affiduous culture. According to the proverb, "all things are common among friends:" we muft imitate, extend, and, if poffible, carry to perfection, the plans of thofe legiflators who have in any meafure fucceeded in producing this defirable effect. At Sparta, the eftablifhment of property does not hinder the free communication of many of the benefits which it confers. The flaves of the Lacedæmonians, their horfes, their dogs, their carriages [m], are all at the fervice of any citizen who has occafion to employ them; goods are appropriated, but their ufes are freely communicated; and this double advantage is the natural refult of a wife legiflation.

Contrafted with the fanciful fpeculations of Plato.

Socrates's community of goods would deftroy the delightful pleafure which arifes from faying "this field is mine." This pleafure,

[m] ἐφόδια, viatica, things neceffary for a journey, which Aretinus tranflates vehicula, without authority indeed, as to the interpretation of the word, but confiftently enough with the fenfe of the paffage. Vid. Xenoph. &c. Republ. Laced. & Plutarch. in Lycurg.

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pleaſure, indeed, proceeds from ſelf-love, but a ſelf-love that is natural and juſt; and as different from ſelfiſhneſs, as a virtuous and proper affection is different from a vicious and blamable exceſs. Deprived of ſeparate property, we ſhould be deprived of a pleaſure belonging to it ſtill more delightful; the pleaſure of beſtowing it on our friends, on our companions, and even on deſerving ſtrangers [n]. Deſtroy wedlock, and what room will be left for the virtue of chaſtity? Deſtroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality?

The diſtinction of property infers its unequal diſtribution.

Yet the ſyſtem of Socrates carries with it at firſt ſight a ſpecious ſhew of humanity, becauſe our attention is withdrawn from its emptineſs, and forcibly arreſted by the evils actually exiſting in ſociety; law-ſuits, perjury, clamorous reproach, and mean adulation, all of which are charged on the unequal diſtribution of property, but which are all more juſtly chargeable on human villany. The illuſion is ſupported by a falſe compariſon. We compare the diſputes occaſioned by ſeparate property, which is of great amount, with thoſe occaſioned by common property, which is of little value; not reflecting that the quantities of both ought to be fairly eſtimated, and that the proportion being thus rightly ſtated, we ſhould find the evils reſulting from common property, to be the greater of the two.

The neceſſity of this illuſtrated by muſic.

A falſe principle deceived Socrates; he took for granted that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate; whereas, in reality, this union carried beyond certain limits, would prove the deſtruction of the commonwealth; and the nearer it approximates to its deſtruction, the commonwealth becomes the worſe. Symphony is good, and metre is good; but ſymphony is deſtroyed when it changes into ſameneſs of

[n] ξένοι, foreigners connected with us by the ties of hoſpitality

of tone, and metre is deftroyed when it changes into famenefs of time[o].

The impracticability of Plato's community.

Amidft the innumerable experiments that have been made in matters of government, the fyftem of Socrates would undoubtedly have been earlier invented, and fubmitted with other fchemes of innovation to a fair trial, had it appeared to be in any degree practicable. If tried by the teft of experiment, its infufficiency would manifeftly fhew itfelf. The uniting principles in ftates are,——laws, education, manners, and a congeniality of fentiments and affections produced by the intercourfe of life, and cemented by mutual good offices[p]. But this intercourfe and thefe offices imply the ufual inftitutions of wards, diftricts, and common tables; to which, had Socrates confined himfelf, his plan of legiflation would have wanted novelty; fince, even in relieving his firft clafs from the labour and cares of agriculture, he would only have propofed what the Lacedæmonians had previoufly enacted[q].

Imperfectly explained by himfelf.

The remaining parts of his plan, Socrates does not clearly explain. We are not informed whether the community of wives and poffeffions is to extend to the peafants. If it does, wherein will they differ from the military? and how can they be kept in obedience, unlefs, like the Cretan flaves, they be prohibited the ufe of arms, and forbidden the gymnaftic exercifes? Yet, if the peafants are not comprehended in the new regu-

[o] This juft comparifon fhould have occurred to the fancy of a lively nation, when they were exhorted to embrace the wild defign of forming a commonwealth from one element.

[p] See vol. i. p. 376, & feq.

[q] ὁπερ και νυν Λακεδαιμονιοι ποιειν επιχειρουσι, which the Lacedæmonians are now attempting to do. Ariftotle fpeaks as if they had never completely effected their purpofe. The order of the fentences is, in this paragraph, fomewhat altered; and the words fometimes paraphrafed, the better to exprefs the fenfe.

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Difficulties refpecting his peafants,

regulations, Socrates, who allows them the rank of citizens, will have two republics in the fame territory, differing in laws and inftitutions, eternally at variance with each other, and in one of which all thofe diforders will prevail which are found in other ftates. The peafants, individually or collectively, are however to be mafters of the foil, provided they pay to the military a due proportion of its fruits; a degree of independence that would engender infolence, and render them more formidable to the government than the Penefts of Theffaly and the Helots of Sparta [p]. Again, if lands are property, but women common, will the women manage houfes in which they have no feparate intereft, with the fame attention that the men cultivate their own fields? The example of inferior animals does not prove that men and women ought to exercife the fame employments, becaufe no animal but man is acquainted with the benefits refulting from the mutual exchange of the fruits of labour [q]; and the œconomy refulting from appropriate tafks is peculiar to the human race.

and women.

His diftribution of ranks

Socrates divides his commonwealth into two orders, that of foldiers, and that of peafants; but whether the peafants are occafionally to bear arms, or whether they are ever to be entrufted with any fhare in the government, he does not determine. The wives of the foldiers, that is, the women who are common to this clafs, are to be trained to the gymnaftic exercifes as well as their hufbands; they are not only to participate in the

[p] The Penefts (fo called from their poverty) were the defcendants of the neighbouring nations conquered and enflaved by the Theffalians, and moft commonly employed in cultivating the lands of their fevere mafters. In their employments, their numbers, and their continual difpofition to revolt, they agreed with the Lacedæmonian Helots. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 157, & paffim.

[q] See above, p. 38.

the military games of their country, but to fuftain the laborious duties and real dangers of the field. Though the military forms a privileged order, yet only a portion of this military is to be invefted with the powers of deliberation and final refolution; in other words, a fmall body of men are to be the fovereigns of the ftate; and it fhould feem as if thofe fovereigns were to reign for life; for Socrates informs us, that the divinity infufes into fome men, even at their birth, a portion of intellectual gold; into others, a portion of intellectual filver; but that the third clafs, the peafants and artificers, are compofed of brafs and iron. Thefe golden men, therefore, are, according to Socrates, to be perpetual magiftrates; but, under fuch an arrangement, can it be expected that a high-minded people, with arms in their hands, fhould be reftrained from fedition?

unfit for attaining the end of political fociety.

Though exempted from this evil, even the governing part of the city, fubjected to fo many privations and bound to fo many hard duties, would not deferve the epithet of happy; and if happinefs does not belong to them, can we expect to find it among the peafants and mechanics? Socrates, indeed, fays, that it is the bufinefs of a legiflator to confult, not the good of any particular clafs of men, but that of the whole ftate; he forgets that the happinefs of a ftate is to be meafured by the common ftandard of happinefs of the individuals compofing it; for happinefs is not like an *even* number that may be compofed of parts which are *odd*.

Chap. 4.

Examination of Plato's books of laws.

In his books of laws which were written afterwards, Plato intended to delineate a more practicable fcheme of government. Yet even thefe laws he gradually bends to his favourite fyftem; and except in the articles of the community of wives and

BOOK II. poffeffions, and of the public tables deftined for the women, his two republics nearly agree in form, though they differ in magnitude; the firft containing one thoufand, and the fecond five thoufand men bearing arms. All the difcourfes of Socrates, doubtlefs, difcover great freedom of thought, and much patience of inveftigation; they are diftinguifhed by novelty, ingenuity, and elegance; but that all his obfervations fhould be juft, is more than could be expected from man. Five thoufand foldiers confined to the bufinefs of war, and cultivating no one kind of productive induftry, would, with their due proportion of wives, children, and domeftics, require for their comfortable fubfiftence the plains of Babylon, or fome other country equally extenfive [q]. Suppofitions, though arbitrary, ought not to be impoffible.

Socrates

[q] The purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence for which commonwealths are inftituted, requiring a minute fubdivifion of labour, Ariftotle fays, that in this particular view, the more populous is the community, its end will be the more completely attained. But the conveniencies and accommodations, furnifhed by the mutual exchange of labour and its fruits, are not the only ingredients of comfortable fubfiftence; education, morals, and other elements, conftituting national felicity, fet bounds to that populoufnefs which the mere traffic of conveniencies would leave unlimited. It is thus, in general, that the degree in which one political advantage can be attained, is limited by a regard to other advantages which muft not be neglected; and to compare and reconcile them with each other, to compenfate inequalities and to adjuft contrarieties, is the great duty of the ftatefman. All things confidered, he declares in favour of what would be now deemed a very fmall commonwealth, confifting of 15,000 or 20,000 citizens (which muft provide for defence, by confederating with other ftates formed on a fimilar plan); and he fays, that the third or fourth part of this community could not fubfift in arms and idlenefs, unlefs the territory was very extenfive. Experience juftifies this remark. Political writers fay, that fcarcely one man in a hundred, and certainly not one in fifty, can in modern times be maintained as a foldier without the gradual depopulation of their refpective communities. Yet how great is the difproportion between a fourth and a fiftieth? and how fcantily are modern foldiers provided for, in comparifon with the foldiers of antiquity?

Socrates does not fay that his foldiers are to fubfift comfortably, but temperately; this is ill expreffed, for men may fubfift temperately, but wretchedly [r]. He fays, that laws ought to be relative to the country, and to the men of that country; he ought to have added, "and to the furrounding nations." The provifions for defenfive war, at leaft [s], ought not to be omitted in any wife plan of legiflation.

His equalization of landed property, imperfect without concomitant regulations.

In his fecond republic he equalizes eftates, but leaves population unlimited; faying, that deaths and barrennefs are found by experience to keep the populoufnefs of moft countries, at different periods, nearly on the fame level. But under ordinary governments, increafe of population would only occafion a greater fubdivifion of landed property; whereas in Plato's republic, the fupernumeraries would be altogether deftitute of eftates; becaufe the lands being already reduced to equal, and, as it were, elementary parts, would be incapable of farther partition. In all countries the juft proportion between wealth and populoufnefs ought to be an object of the moft ferious attention. Neglect in this particular produces that poverty which is the mother of villany and fedition. In the laws of Pheidon of Corinth, one of the moft ancient writers on the fubject of politics, a regulation is introduced directly the reverfe of Plato's; Pheidon limits population, but does not equalize poffeffions; the relative advantages of either plan we fhall afterwards examine.

Imperfection of his conftitutional regulations.

In Plato's fecond republic, the characters of men fit for office are very imperfectly defcribed by faying, that in the compo-

[r] The author adds, "liberally and luxurioufly." The adjuncts, "liberally and foberly" muft be united in order to exprefs ζῆν εὖ.

[s] Ariftotle, as we fhall fee hereafter, juftifies even offenfive war in certain cafes.

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composition of a commonwealth, the governors should be as different from the governed, as, in the composition of a web, the warp is from the woof. In point of wealth his citizens are divided into four classes, of which the first is to be four times as rich as the last. Having thus permitted the unequal accumulation of personals, why does he so nicely limit the acquisition of landed property? To each family he assigns two houses, a present as inconvenient as it is expensive. The general scheme of his commonwealth is to be neither democratical nor oligarchical, but a mixture of both forms; since all the citizens capable of purchasing heavy armour are to be entitled to a share in the government; a regulation which excludes only the meanest portion of the lowest class. This mixed form of policy is well adapted to common use, but if Plato meant it as the best possible system, next to that of his philosophical commonwealth, he probably rates it too highly; many will prefer to it the government of Sparta, and other systems of policy more strictly formed on the aristocratic model.

Judgment in favour of mixed government.

Some men are of opinion that the best government must be compounded of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. On this account they highly commend the institutions of Sparta, which admit of a king, of a senate, and of the democratical power of the Ephori, who are chosen by and from the people. Others regard the power of the Ephori as too arbitrary and tyrannical; and think that whatever is democratical at Sparta, results, not from its political constitution, but from its customs and manners; the common and frugal tables; the public and uniform education; the daily commerce of life, and the habitual interchange of good offices among persons of all ranks.

In

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In Plato's ſecond commonwealth there is not any mixture of monarchy, it conſiſts of democracy and oligarchy, but contains moſt of oligarchy; and yet he ſays, inconſiſtently enough, that the beſt government is compoſed of democracy and tyranny[t], which two corruptions can hardly be honoured with the name of governments, or if ſo called, muſt ſurely be held the very worſt of all.

Particularly with regard to elections.

That Plato's ſecond commonwealth inclines moſt to oligarchy, is evident from the laws reſpecting the appointment of the magiſtrates. This appointment is partly by ſuffrage, partly by lot; the former of which is conformable to oligarchy, the latter to democracy. This mixed mode of appointment is, therefore,

[t] Plato does not ſay tyranny, but monarchy. The paſſage alluded to is in the Sixth Book of his Laws, p. 858. edit. Ficin. I had often read it without conſidering it as liable to the objection ſtated in the text, becauſe I never doubted that there was an error of the preſs, *viz.* μοναρχικης inſtead of αριστοκρατικης. In the ſenſe in which the paſſage is taken by Ariſtotle, it is not only inconſiſtent with the context, but with the whole tenor of Plato's political writings; decidedly and uniformly hoſtile to arbitrary power, whether monarchical or democratical. See his Republic, book i. p. 582. edit. Ficin. The difficulty may, however, be removed without correcting the text, if we ſuppoſe that Plato conſiders monarchy as the limit of ariſtocracy, as democracy is of republicaniſm. Abſolute monarchy and perfect democracy are two extremes, and good government lies between them. When a republic expands into democracy, it ceaſes to be a republic; when an ariſtocracy contracts into a monarchy, it ceaſes to be an ariſtocracy. Republics and ariſtocracies, as both Plato and Ariſtotle ſhew, have reſpectively a tendency to this expanſion and contraction, which may be conſidered as their ultimate limits; or two contrary extremes, by the due blending of which juſt government is produced. In conformity with this, ſee what is ſaid of the twofold juſtice and twofold equality; the one conſiſting in ſameneſs of meaſure, weight, and number, which is eaſily recognized; the other hardly diſcernible by man, though approved by the judgment of God himſelf; and, as far as it prevails in this lower world, the ſource of happineſs to individuals and communities. The reaſon is given, τῳ μεν γαρ μειζονι πλειω, τῳ δ' ελαττονι σμικροτερα νεμει, μετρια διδουσα προς την αυτων φυσιν εκατερῳ; "for it attributes to the greater more, and to the leſſer leſs, aſſigning to each what is commenſurate to its reſpective nature." De Legib. l. vi. p. 859.

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therefore, conformable to a mixture of thofe two forms. But that the rich fhould be compelled, under a forfeit, to attend the affemblies for electing magiftrates, and for other public duties, while the attendance of the poor is optional, is a regulation highly favourable to oligarchy. The lower claffes will frequently neglect attendance, and the public affairs will thus devolve exclufively on the more wealthy portion of the community. In conftituting the fenate, candidates are to be named from the four claffes of the citizens at large. But the two lower claffes are not bound to attend at the naming of candidates from men of their own order. From candidates thus named the fenate is, by a new election, to be conftituted; but this fucceffion of elections, in which the magiftrates are chofen from candidates previoufly named, is always a dangerous expedient, fince it expofes the government to be ufurped by a combination of artful men, who need not be very numerous. Such is Plato's fecond republic, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, as will evidently appear when we have examined more accurately the polity compounded of thofe two forms [t].

Chap. 5.

Concerning other fchemes of ideal commonwealths.

Other fchemes of ideal commonwealths have been delineated by philofophers and politicians, and alfo by men entitled to neither appellation; all of which fchemes approach much nearer to fuch governments as have actually prevailed in the world, than do the two republics of Plato. In none of the political models propofed by other writers do we read any thing concerning the community of wives, the community of goods, or common tables deftined for the women. They begin their codes of legiflation by inftitutions more neceffary and more practicable.

To

[t] The text is confufed and corrupt. I have given to it the order and the fenfe feemingly moft confiftent with other parts of the work.

To fome writers nothing appears of fo much confequence as the fkilful regulation of property; becaufe it is this much-coveted object that gives birth to moft difputes and moft feditions. Phaleas of Chalcedon [u] was the firft who propofed, as a moft falutary inftitution, the equalizing of wealth among the citizens; a thing, he thinks, eafily eftablifhed in new fettlements; and which, he fays, might eafily be introduced into old countries by one fimple law, commanding the rich always to give marriage portions with their daughters, but never to receive any; and the poor always to receive, but never to give them. Plato in his laws, on the contrary, allows the inequality of fortunes within certain limits; permitting, as we before obferved, the citizens of the firft clafs to be four times as rich as thofe of the laft. Whoever would regulate the extent of fortunes, muft alfo regulate the increafe of families. If children multiply beyond the means of fupporting them, the intention of the law will be fruftrated, and families will be fuddenly reduced from opulence to beggary; a revolution always dangerous to public tranquillity.

Phaleas's plan for equalizing property.

Its inconveniences.

That a certain degree of equalization of property tends to ftrengthen the bands of fociety, efcaped not the fagacity of ancient legiflators. In legiflating for Athens, Solon acknowledged the

Other fchemes of a fimilar nature.

[u] Neither of this Phaleas, nor of Pheidon mentioned above, have we any notices but thofe left by Ariftotle. Chriftopher Hendreich (De Repub. Carthagin. p. 166, & p. 239) makes Phaleas a Carthaginian: he was the lawgiver of Chalcedon, a city on the Thracian Bofporus, oppofite to Byzantium, or Conftantinople, and built feventeen years before it. Chalcedon was called in derifion "the city of the blind," becaufe its founders, overlooking the noble fituation on which Conftantinople now ftands, had chofen one greatly inferior to it. Plin. v. 32. Tacitus, xii. 62. A legiflator, fix centuries before Chrift, equalizing fortunes on the eaftern coaft of the Bofporus—how ftrange a contraft with the laws now prevalent there!

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the influence of this principle [x]. The early inftitutions of feveral republics both limit the acquifition, and prohibit, under certain circumftances, the fale, of lands. In Locris a citizen cannot difpofe of his eftate, unlefs he can make it appear that he is reduced to this neceffity by fome unmerited and manifeft calamity. The alienation of ancient inheritances in Leucas prepared the way for a revolution in the government; and offices of magiftracy no longer requiring a fixed qualification in point of fortune, the mixed form of policy gradually degenerated into nearly a fimple democracy. But equality itfelf is not a thing univerfally defirable; for fhares may be all equal, and yet all too great if they fofter floth and luxury; they may be all equal, and yet all too fmall if they engender wretchednefs. Mediocrity, therefore, ought to be the aim of legiflation; but this object will be better attained by moderating paffion than by levelling property.

Their futility.

Phaleas, indeed, propofes not only to equalize poffeffions, but to render education uniform. He does not explain, however, wherein this uniform education is to confift. The citizens may be all educated alike, and all of them ill educated, if care be not taken early to fubdue in them the miferable paffions of avarice and ambition.

The real caufes of civil diforders.

Difcontents arife not merely from the inequality of poffeffions, but from the equality of honours. The multitude complain

[x] Solon allowed a brother to marry his fifter on the father's fide, but not his fifter uterine; becaufe by marrying the latter he might have increafed the eftate which defcended to him from his father, by that which came from the firft hufband of his mother; and thus in his own perfon have accummulated two inheritances. Comp. Plutarch in Themift. p. 128. Petit. Leg. Attic. p. 480. and Montefquieu Efprit de Loix, l. v. c. 5. Several other of Solon's laws breathe the fame fpirit. Conf. Plutarch in Solon, p. 89. Demofth. in Macart. p. 1036. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 441—444.

complain that property is unjuftly, becaufe unequally, diftributed; men of fuperior merit or fuperior pretenfions complain that honours are unjuftly, if equally, diftributed; and that

"The good and worthlefs find their meed the fame [y]."

The bare neceffaries of life, food and fuel, cloaths to cover our nakednefs, and a home to fhelter us from the ftorm, comforts which it is pretended the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injuftice. The greateft crimes are committed for none of thofe things, but for obtaining or fecuring the objects of ill-regulated defires, and fenfelefs, becaufe infatiable paffions; and fometimes for acquiring objects of tafte and elegance, from which we expect to derive pleafure unmixed with pain, pure, unfading, and independent enjoyment. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themfelves with blood; and ftates decree the moft illuftrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an ufurper [z]. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is ufeful, therefore, againft the leaft and moft inconfiderable only of the three evils which difturb fociety; evils, for each of which there is an appropriate remedy; fubfiftence infured by induftry, for the firft; an education infpiring the habit of moderation and felf-command, for the fecond; and for the third, the attractive, rational, and uncloying charms of philofophy; in the ftudy and practice of which men will find a delight, and the only

Their remedies.

[y] Iliad ix. Achilles fpeaks to Ulyffes.

[z] The word τυραννος properly denotes him who has acquired the fovereignty of a ftate formerly free. With whatever moderation he might exercife his power, he was called τυραννος from the manner by which he obtained it. But Ariftotle here means the tyrannical abufer of ufurped power.

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only delight not liable to contingencies, round and complete in itfelf, and as ftable as it is independent.

The proper limits of national wealth.

In delineating the fcheme of his republic, Phaleas has confined his attention to matters of domeftic policy. He has not inquired, though the inquiry was neceffary, how the national force is to be raifed or fupported. Money, or its equivalents, are effential in war as well as in peace. Phaleas has not endeavoured to afcertain the extent of the national wealth. Yet there are certain limits within which it ought to be confined; its immoderate magnitude might tempt the rapacity or provoke the invafion of greater powers; but it ought to be fufficiently confiderable to enable us to meet our equals with confidence; and even to teach our fuperiors that they may probably lofe more by conteft than they are likely to gain by victory. When Autaphradates prepared to befiege Atarneus [a], Eubulus, the mafter of that city, defired him to calculate how much time would be wafted in the fiege, and how much money would in that time be expended; obferving that for a lefs fum he would probably be willing to fell the place. Autaphradates calculated, reflected, and defifted from the fiege.

Inefficacy and imperfection of laws equalizing wealth.

The equalization of fortunes may have fome flight tendency to ftifle animofity and to prevent diffenfion. But its effect is always inconfiderable, and often doubtful; fince thofe who think themfelves entitled to fuperiority will not patiently brook equality. To ftand on a level with the multitude is not their

proper

[a] See above, p. 7, & p. 11. and Paufanias, b. iv. c. 35. This place had fallen to decay in Pliny's time, though ftill renowned for precious ftones as clear as cryftal. "Cepionides in Æolidis Atarne quondam oppido, nunc pago nafcuntur." Plin. N. H. v. 30. Conf. xxxvii. 10.

proper place; and to acquire their due elevation, they will confpire together and fubvert the commonwealth. The wickednefs of man is boundlefs: it feems at firft as if a trifle would content him, but his paffions invigorate by gratification; always indulged, always craving, and continually preying on him who feeds them. This evil cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables, of which laft Phaleas has omitted to fpeak. It can be cured only by that falutary difcipline which will make one part of the community delight in doing juftice, and by that found policy which will prevent the remaining part from committing with impunity any ferious wrong; for the majority of mankind will always be the fport of their own headftrong paffions; and though they ought to be treated with equity and humanity, muft be habitually overawed by authority, and feafonably reftrained by power. Phaleas's republic will be but a fmall one if mechanics and artificers be debarred from all fhare in the government. The inftitutions of Epidamnus [b] refpecting the lower ranks, and thofe eftablifhed on the fame fubject by Diophantus at Athens, are worthy of imitation. Such are the merits and the defects of the republic of Phaleas.

Chap. 6.

The ideal republic of Hippodamus an architect of Miletus.

Hippodamus, the fon of Euryphon, a Milefian, and by profeffion an architect, gained celebrity in his own art by conftructing the Piræus at Athens, and by improving the method of diftributing ftreets, and planning cities. His love of diftinction expofed him to the reproach of vanity; and many afcribed to affectation

[b] See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 375. and vol. ii. p. 185. The lower claffes in Epidamnus as well as in Athens, though not public flaves as in Laconia and Theffaly, were much employed in what Ariftotle confiders as fervile tafks, becaufe performed by the exertions of mere bodily labour; particularly in building, mining, and other public works.

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affectation his magnificent drefs, his flowing locks, and the warm mantle which he wore, even during the heat of fummer. Hippodamus was ambitious of reaching eminence in all kinds of knowledge, and is the firft author who, without any practice in affairs, wrote a treatife concerning the beft form of government. His republic confifted of ten thoufand men, divided into the three claffes of artificers, hufbandmen, and foldiers. The territory he likewife divides into three portions; the facred, deftined for the various exigencies of the public worfhip; the common, to be cultivated for the common benefit of the foldiers; and the private, to be feparately appropriated by the hufbandmen. His laws alfo were divided into three kinds, becaufe he thought there were only three forts of injuries; infults, damages, and death. He inftituted a court of appeal, compofed of felect fenators. Sentence, he thought, ought not to be paffed by votes or ballot; but that each judge fhould be furnifhed with a tablet, on which he fhould write guilty, if he fimply condemned; and which he fhould leave unwritten, if he fimply acquitted; but on which, if he found the defendant in fome meafure guilty, but not to the full extent of the indictment, he fhould mark this difference, ftating how much the culprit fhould pay, or what punifhment he fhould fuffer. As the law formerly ftood, Hippodamus obferved, that in all cafes requiring this diftinction, the judge, who was bound by oath to obferve juftice in his decifions, muft commit perjury whenever he either fimply and pofitively condemned, or fimply and pofitively acquitted. Hippodamus alfo eftablifhed a law in favour of thofe whofe inventions tended to improve the conftitution of the commonwealth; they were to be diftinguifhed by peculiar honours;

The new laws.

and

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and the children of thofe who fell in battle were to be maintained and educated at the public expence. This laft regulation, firft introduced by the architect of Miletus, has been adopted by Athens and other cities. According to his plan of policy, the magiftrates were all of them to be elected by the free and impartial fuffrages of their fellow-citizens, confifting of the three claffes of men abovementioned: the concerns of the ftate, the affairs of ftrangers, the care and management of orphans, formed the three important objects entrufted to their adminiftration.

Examination of his republic.

Such are the leading features of the republic of Hippodamus. In examining this republic, the firft difficulty that occurs refpects his divifion of the citizens. The hufbandmen, the artificers, and the foldiers, are all of them to be members of the ftate; but the hufbandmen deftitute of arms, the artificers deftitute of both lands and arms, will maintain a very unequal conflict with the foldiers, if thefe laft fhould be tempted to enflave them. An affociation of men, fo unequally treated by the legiflator, muft continually tend to diffolution. The great executive magiftracies, together with every office of military command, devolve of courfe on the foldiers. Can the two remaining claffes be expected to wifh the continuance of a government, from whofe honours and emoluments they are for ever to be excluded? A revolution, therefore, muft fpeedily take place, unlefs the military be more powerful than both the hufbandmen and the artificers united; and if they actually be fo, of what fignification is it, that thefe degraded claffes are fummoned to give their votes at elections, and mocked with the appellation of citizens? Artificers, fubfifting by the fruits of their own labour, are effential to the exiftence of every city or community. But the clafs of hufbandmen, as regulated by

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Hippodamus, by what tie of utility are they linked to the ftate? The common lands might be cultivated by the military themfelves, which would deftroy the diftinction between the foldiers and the peafants. They might be cultivated by men deftitute of private eftates; and this would form a fourth clafs, diftinct from the hufbandmen of Hippodamus; who, by a moft awkward regulation, are to labour one diftrict, confifting of their private eftates, for their own maintenance; and another, confifting of the common lands, for the maintenance of the military; a moft ufelefs diftinction of property, and moft abfurd partition of employment, by which much valuable time would be loft, and much unneceffary expence incurred.

Of his judicial regulations.

The judicial regulations of Hippodamus are not lefs blameable, fince their direct tendency is to convert judges into arbiters, and thereby to arm them with an arbitrary power of decifion, which can never be expedient to the parties, unlefs it be fpecially granted, and voluntarily entrufted. In matters fubmitted to arbitration, communication of fentiment and difcuffion of opinion is not only allowed but required. In courts of juftice, moft legiflators have ftrictly prohibited both; commanding each judge fimply to condemn or fimply to acquit, as his own reafon directs. By the innovations of Hippodamus, legal proceedings would be involved in inextricable confufion. The defendant might be ordered by one judge to pay twenty minæ; by another, more; and by a third, lefs; each might differ from every other; and all from the plaintiff. The fentence would be thus fplit into fuch a multitude of parts as it would be difficult to collect, and impoffible to unite; and all thefe difficulties would be created and encountered, in order to obviate an imaginary inconvenience; for it is falfe that the

judge

judge is perjured, who ſimply acquits a party ſued for twenty minæ, although he may believe that he really owes half that ſum. The judge would, on the contrary, be perjured, if he did not acquit him; and in all ſimilar caſes, the fault lies not in the law or in the judge, but in the libel and in the plaintiff, whoſe caſe is not juſtly ſtated, and whoſe action is not fairly brought.

His law in favour of political improvements.

The law in favour of thoſe whoſe inventions tend to improve the conſtitution of the commonwealth, is more ſpecious than ſolid. Bearing beauty on its ſurface [c], it is fraught with perſecution, innovation, and ſedition. It is the opinion of many, that ancient laws, which are good, are preferable to new ones, though better; and that a moderately wiſe conſtitution of government ought never to be altered. Upon this delicate ſubject, the following obſervations may deſerve attention. The advocates for alteration and improvement obſerve, that the gymnaſtic exerciſes and medicine, as well as all other arts and faculties, have been carried to their actual ſtate of perfection by repeated trials and reiterated efforts. If legiſlation be a ſcience or an art, muſt it not partake of the ſame nature, and follow the ſame progreſs with all other arts and ſciences, which being founded on obſervation, have been reared, extended, and perfected by experiment and reflection? That it does partake of the ſame progreſs, civil hiſtory affords the moſt convincing proofs. What can be more rude, what more barbarous, than the

Arguments in favour of political innovation.

[c] Ariſtotle's expreſſion is remarkable; ευοφθαλμον ακουσαι: the firſt word, denoting what is pleaſing to the eye, had come to denote what is agreeable in general; and thence joined with ακουσαι, "what is pleaſing to hear."

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the ancient laws of the Greeks, when they frequented the public places with ſwords by their ſides; and bought and ſold their women like cattle in a market? In thoſe ſtates which have adhered too ſcrupulouſly to their hereditary uſages, what groſſneſs, iniquity, and cruelty every where prevail? At Cumæ, a man may be convicted and puniſhed as a murderer, on the evidence of the kindred of him who proſecutes for the murder. It is not for what is ancient, but for what is uſeful, that men of ſenſe ought to contend; and whatever is diſtinguiſhed by the former quality, cannot be expected to poſſeſs much of the latter. The ancient inhabitants of the world, whether produced by the genial power of the earth [d], or ſaved from the ruins of ſome dreadful cataſtrophe, muſt have been degraded by weakneſs of underſtanding, and diſgraced by unruly ſtrength of paſſion. The inſtitutions aſcribed to the earth-born giants are not, ſurely, worthy of being followed with reſpectful deference. But innovations, were it deſirable to prevent them, are not, however, to be prevented: they are neceſſary and inevitable. Written laws, with whatever comprehenſiveneſs and preciſion they may be penned, cannot expreſs all that variety of caſes to which, and which only, they may with juſtice be applied. Rights are to be maintained, wrongs to be prevented, and therefore laws are made. Theſe laws are general; exceptions to them occur; new exceptions multiply; and the number and importance of the exceptions at length produce new laws far more equitable than thoſe which had previouſly been eſtabliſhed.

Formidable

[d] Ariſtotle is here ſpeaking as an advocate; and in ſtating the arguments in favour of innovation, does not, therefore, think it neceſſary to adhere to the eſtabliſhed tenets of his philoſophy. See Analyſis, p. 117.

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Stronger arguments againft it.

Formidable as thefe arguments feem, they may be oppofed by others of not lefs weight: arguments which prove that even the ruft of government is to be refpected, and that its fabric is never to be touched but with a fearful and trembling hand. When the evil of perfevering in hereditary inftitutions is fmall, it ought always to be endured, becaufe the evil of departing from them is certainly very great. Slight imperfections, therefore, whether in the laws themfelves, or in thofe who adminifter and execute the laws, ought always to be overlooked, becaufe they cannot be corrected without occafioning a much greater mifchief, and tending to weaken that reverence which the fafety of all governments requires that the citizens at large fhould entertain, cultivate, and cherifh for the hereditary inftitutions of their country. The comparifon drawn from the improvement of arts, does not apply to the amendment of laws. To change or improve an art, and to alter or amend a law, are things as diffimilar in their operation as different in their tendency: for laws operate as practical principles of moral action[e]; and, like all the rules of morality, derive their force

[e] The Stagirite's argument againft innovation does not apply to that kind of it propofed by Lord Bacon, namely the imitating that great innovator Time, whofe operations are fo flow and fkilful, that they elude the fenfes and efcape obfervation, "Novator maximus, tempus; quid ni igitur tempus imitemur?" and again, "Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes ita infinuat, ut fenfus fallant?" That great man concludes with Ariftotle, "It is improper to try new experiments in the political body, unlefs the neceffity be urgent, or the utility evident. Great care muft be taken that the defire of reformation may occafion the change, and not the defire of the change plead for the reformation. Again, let all novelty, though it cannot, perhaps, be rejected, yet be held fufpected. And laftly, as the Scripture directs, let us ftand upon the old paths, and fee and afk for the good way and walk therein." Political Effays, Effay xi. It is worthy of remark, that Bacon lived in the age of reformation in religion, and was himfelf a great reformer in philofophy. He combated

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force and efficacy, as even the name imports, from the cuſtomary repetition of habitual acts, and the ſlow operation of time. Every alteration of the laws therefore tends to ſubvert that authority on which the perſuaſive energy of all laws is founded; to abridge, weaken, and deſtroy the power of law itſelf[f]. Though innovation in general ſhould not be univerſally

bated ſucceſsfully the pretended philoſophy of Ariſtotle, which was certainly far worſe than no philoſophy at all; but his diſlike to the diſtorted ſhadow made him think, at leaſt ſpeak, too diſreſpectfully of the ſubſtance. Whoever has read only the works of Bacon, is not a competent judge; but whoever has read the works both of Bacon and of Ariſtotle, will be ready to acknowledge that the former is wanting in gratitude to an author whom he is continually arraigning, and continually copying. Yet Lord Bacon is not altogether without excuſe: in his time the pretended authority of Ariſtotle enthralled the human mind. In the preſent age, that illuſtrious modern might, conſiſtently with his *principles*, greatly vary his *conduct*; and exaggerate the merit of the Stagirite, in the ſame ſpirit, and with the ſame views, which made him formerly depreciate his fame.

[f] Notwithſtanding this deciſion of Ariſtotle's, a learned modern writer obſerves; " As to the perpetuating their inſtitutions and rendering them immutable, this entered not into the intention of the old Grecian legiſlation. A ſyſtem of immutable and irrevocable laws might indeed be the barbarous project of eaſtern policy; but the Grecian legiſlators were too well experienced in the nature of mankind, the genius of ſociety, and the ceaſeleſs viciſſitude of human things, ever to dream of ſo ridiculous a deſign." Warburton's Divine Legation of Moſes, b. ii. ſect. 3. This is expreſſed too ſtrongly and too abſolutely. Not to mention the example of Lycurgus, (ſee Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. 3,) which Warburton indeed admits as an exception, but ſays that Lycurgus was ſingle in the ridiculous attempt of making his laws perpetual; a whole volume might be written to prove Ariſtotle's deciſion conformable to the general voice of poets, orators, hiſtorians, and legiſlators. Δει δε και τυς νομυς της πατριδος καθαπερ τινας δευτερυς θευς συντηρειν. " That we ought to maintain the laws of our country, and reſpect them as certain ſecondary divinities." Stobæus, ſerm. xxxviii. p. 229. Such is the general corollary reſulting from the political writings of Grecian antiquity; a corollary adopted by Cicero[3], their beſt interpreter, De Legibus; and ſuch is the doctrine maintained by Demoſthenes himſelf, when ſpeaking to the Athenians, whoſe decrees, governed by wild demagogues, were as variable as the Euripus. See his Oration

[3] Debet enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas, ut æterna ſit. Fragm. de Legibus, l. iii.

fally reprobated, yet various queftions would arife, on what occafions it is warrantable. The difference of manners, governments, and of men, by whom alterations are propofed, and by whom they are to be conducted, will produce very complicated and almoft innumerable queftions; the folution of which we fhall defer to a more feafonable opportunity. BOOK II.

In

tion againft Timocrates, particularly the laft pages. In the fame Oration (p. 480, ex edit. Wolf.) there is a paffage worthy of remark. "I am inclined, citizen judges, to explain to you how the Locrians make laws. You will not fuffer any detriment by hearing this example; an example of the mode of legiflation in a well-regulated ftate. The Locrians are fo firmly perfuaded that it is their duty to uphold their ancient laws, and to defend them againft the intereft or caprice of innovators, that whoever propofes a new law, does it with a halter about his neck. Should the law be approved, the propofer departs unhurt; but fhould his law be rejected, he is ftrangled in his own halter. This falutary inftitution proves an effectual check to innovation; and the Locrians ftrictly obferve their ancient laws; infomuch, that in a great length of time only one fingle law has been altered. The old law ordained, that whoever ftruck out the eye of another, fhould lofe one of his own eyes; a punifhment which did not admit of any pecuniary commutation, but was to be rigoroufly inflicted. A man with only one eye, being threatened by his adverfary with the lofs of the fingle eye he had, and thinking life infupportable under the calamity of blindnefs, ventured to propofe this alteration of the law; 'That he who ftruck out the eye of a perfon who had but one, fhould be deprived of both his own eyes, fo that the punifhment might be equal to the crime.' The amendment was approved; and this is faid to have been the only alteration in the Locrian law, in the fpace of more than two hundred years. But your demagogues, citizen judges, make new laws, folely for their own convenience, almoft every month: if you do not punifh them, the people at large will foon be enflaved by thefe wild beafts." ȣκ αν φθανοι το πληθος τετοις τοις θηριοις δȣλευον. As the law mentioned by Demofthenes is afcribed to Zaleucus (Ζαλευκον ος νομοθετησε τον καινον εισοισοντα νομον βροχον περικειμενον, &c. Stobæus, p. 229. ferm. xxxviii.) the Locrians here fpoken of muft be the Locri Epizephyrij; fo called from their territory near the promontory Zephyrium, at the fouthern extremity of Italy. Pindar calls them Zephyrian Locrians, in his fhort and pithy panegyric:

Νεμει γαρ ατρεκεια πολιν Λοκρων
Ζεφυριων, μελει δε τοισι Καλλιοπα
Και χαλκεος Αρης.

"Juftice

BOOK II. Chap. 7.

Obfervations preparatory to an examination of the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian re-

In examining the Spartan, the Cretan, or indeed any fyftem of laws, two queftions ought chiefly to fix our attention. The firft queftion is, Whether thefe laws be calculated to promote the beft interefts of mankind? The fecond, Whether they be calculated to promote thofe interefts which, under particular circumftances, the legiflator takes to be the beft: in other words, whether the inftitutions which we examine be confiftent with the moft defirable and moft perfect model of civil polity; or whether they be confiftent with what the lawgiver, all things confidered, deems the government moft fuitable to thofe for whom he legiflates? In every well-regulated commonwealth, it is agreed that all thofe citizens who have any fhare in the public adminiftration, fhould enjoy leifure for attending to this important concern. But how fuch leifure may beft be obtained, is not eafy to determine.

Difficulties in regulating the peafants.

The Penefts have often with arms affailed the Theffalians; and the Helots, the Spartans; and thofe degraded orders of peafants live as it were in continual ambufh, watching the moment to retaliate thofe injuries which they have indignantly fuffered from men whofe leifure refults only from their own toil.

Why they are lefs feditious in Crete than in Theffaly, &c.

The Cretan peafants have never difcovered the fame fpirit of fedition; becaufe the cities of Crete being all of them fupported by the labour of fervile ruftics, it could not be the intereft of any one ftate to teach the flaves

" Juftice governs the republic of the Zephyrian Locrians; who cultivate, with equal fuccefs, arts and arms." The law concerning the halter, which Stobæus refers to Zeleucus, is numbered by Diodorus Siculus among the laws of Charondas. But the fame writer tells us, that Charondas borrowed moft of his laws from former codes. Diodor. xii. 79. p. 485. It is probable therefore that the principle of refifting innovation once prevailed at Thurij, as well as in the republic of the Locri Epizephyrij; though hiftory indicates that it was far lefs rigidly adhered to in the former republic, which was difturbed by frequent revolutions. Ephor. apud Strabon. p. 260.

ſlaves of its neighbours to rebel, ſince every neighbour, who happened to be hoſtile, would conſtantly enjoy an opportunity of retorting the injury. But the Argives, Arcadians, and Meſſenians, ſubſiſting chiefly by their own labour, and waging eternal wars with Sparta, always endeavoured to divide and divert the enemy's force, by ſtirring the Helots to rebellion; and the Peneſts firſt revolted from the Theſſalians, during the wars of the latter with the Acheans, Perræbians, and Magneſians. In the treatment of ſlaves and peaſants, it is difficult to hit the middle point between the extremes of indulgence and harſhneſs; indulgence that is productive of inſolence, and harſhneſs that is repaid with hatred. But either extreme is highly inconſiſtent with the proper management of thoſe lower claſſes, who form as it were the arms of the community.

Lycurgus's faulty indulgence to women.

Nothing proves more ruinous to a ſtate than the defective education of the women; ſince wherever the inſtitutions reſpecting one half of the community are faulty, the corruptions of that half will gradually taint the whole. The undiſciplined manners of the Spartan women are inconſiſtent with every wiſe plan of legiſlation, and totally adverſe to the principal aim of Lycurgus; who, exacting the moſt rigid temperance in his men, with a view to harden them to fortitude, has granted every indulgence to his women, and thereby corrupted them with licentiouſneſs. In a nation of ſoldiers, the errors in female education, and the vicious paſſions reſulting from that fatal ſource, are doubly prejudicial; for the poet had ſurveyed life and manners with diſcernment who firſt coupled Mars and Venus; all martial nations being immoderately amorous, and therefore particularly obnoxious to the undue influence, or rather the dominion, of women; with

 the

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the exception however of the Celts [g], and if there be any other people who openly prefer unnatural love. It is of little confequence whether women rule the ftate, or men, governed by women, rule it in fubfervience to female paffions. During the invafion of the Thebans, the Spartan women [h], inftead of rendering thofe fervices which women on fimilar occafions have often performed, caufed more evil than even the arms of the enemy; and avarice muft always domineer wherever women bear fway.

Whence it arofe.

The incongruous regulations refpecting the two fexes in Sparta proceeded from a natural caufe. The fevere duties of the field had prepared the men for fubmiffion to civil difcipline; but the women, untamed and turbulent, fpurned the yoke of legiflation. The fault, therefore, is chargeable on themfelves, rather than on Lycurgus. But we are not now inquiring who is to blame, but what is blamable?

Faulty regulations refpecting property.

The unequal diftribution of property forms another material defect in the Spartan government. Lycurgus prohibited the acquifition of lands by purchafe, but fet no bounds to their tranfmiffion and accumulation by gifts and teftaments. Landed property therefore has been engroffed by a few; and if the whole territory were divided into five equal portions, not lefs than two of thefe portions would be found vefted in women; fuch is the improvidence of the laws refpecting fucceffion, the enormity of dowers, and the extravagance of marriage fettlements!

Their ill effects.

The natural effect of fuch faulty regulations is to diminifh the populoufnefs of the country, which fcarcely contains the twentieth part of the inhabitants which it is capable of fupplying

[g] Vid. Athenæum, l. xiii. c. 27.

[h] See the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. iii. p. 394.

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plying with fubfiftence, or the twentieth part of the thirty thoufand heavy-armed men, and fifteen hundred cavalry, which it was thought able to fend into the field. One great evil refulting from this diminution of people was fatally experienced when the fingle defeat at Leuctra reduced this ancient kingdom to the brink of ruin. It is reported that the kings preceding Lycurgus fupplied the wafte of the natives in war, by alluring foreigners into the country; and that the Spartans alone amounted to ten thoufand men bearing arms. Without examining this report we may affirm, that the ftrength derived from numbers will be better and more fafely promoted by levelling the exceffive inequalities of property. Lycurgus, however, certainly wifhed to increafe the ftrength of the ftate, when he enacted, that the man who had *three* fons fhould be exempted from the night watch, and that he who had four fhould enjoy a complete immunity from all public burdens. But this regulation evidently clafhes with the preceding, fince, under a faulty diftribution of property, an increafe of populoufnefs is only an augmentation of mifery.

Advantages and inconveniencies attending the Ephori.

The popular part of the conftitution of Sparta, refiding in the Ephori, is liable to many objections; though invefted with the moft awful powers, the Ephori or infpectors muft all of them be chofen indifcriminately from the multitude, and often from thofe of the loweft and pooreft clafs. The decifions of fuch men ought not to be arbitrary or final. Their corruption has been fhamefully manifeft on many former occafions[1]; and in a very recent tranfaction, their venality, refulting from their poverty, had well nigh ruined the commonwealth. Their authority, too, is exorbitant and tyrannical; even the kings

[1] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 61.

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[k] Ariftotle applies the fame epithet, a few fentences below, to the election of the fenate; but omits telling us wherein this puerility confifted. The defect is fupplied by Plutarch, in the life of Lycurgus; who relates, "That the affembly of the people having convened in the market-place, a certain number of felect perfons were confined in a neighbouring edifice; where, without the poffibility of feeing or being feen by the affembly, they could only hear its fhouts. The candidates for the fenate then marched through the middle of the affembly, one after the other, in the order determined by lot. As each candidate paffed in review, the people teftified their favour by acclamation; while the imprifoned judges marked on tablets the loudnefs and frequency of the fhouts, without knowing to which of the candidates they belonged. He who was honoured by the moft frequent repetition of the loudeft fhouts, was declared fenator." Our author juftly condemns this mode of election as childifh, fince the Lacedæmonians,

ordinary mode of life, are totally inconfiftent with the fpirit of Lycurgus's legiflation. Severity of manners carried to the extremes of harfhnefs and rigour is the prevailing feature of his policy; but while the reft of the citizens fnatch only by ftealth even the moft lawful pleafures, the Ephori are abfurdly indulged in the unbounded gratification of all their paffions.

Imperfections of the fenate.

The conftitution of the Spartan fenate labours under many defects; when the legiflator enacted that the members of this council fhould hold their office for life, he did not confider that the underftanding[l] grows old as well as the body. The great and uncontroverted powers vefted in the fenate might be fafely entrufted to confummate wifdom and perfect virtue: but the Spartan fenators have been feduced by partiality, and often corrupted by bribes. Their malverfations therefore ought to be reftrained by the regular operation of a law, compelling them at ftated times to give an account of their adminiftration; as their undue exercife of power is but imperfectly checked by being occafionally obnoxious to the wild tyranny of the Ephori. Their mode of election is puerile[m]; and that none fhould be admitted into the fenate, but thofe who canvafs for that honour, tends to excite and invigorate that impudence of felfifh ambition which occafions half the

nians, like children unable to count, contented themfelves with probability in a matter where, by telling the votes, abfolute certainty might have been attained. This mode of election was alfo well calculated to gratify the fraudulent defigns of the judges; for when they happened to have an undue partiality for any of the candidates, they might guefs, from his general character, with what kind of fhouts he was likely to be received; and, in oppofition to truth, declare the acclamations in his favour the loudeft and moft frequent. Vid. Thucydid. l. i. p. 58. edit. Francfort, 1594.

[l] See Analyfis, p. 50, & feq. [m] See note k.

the wickednefs of mankind, and which is imprudently inflamed by the inftitutions of Lycurgus.

Of the two kings of Sparta.

Whether the office of king be at all ufeful in a republican government, fhall be examined hereafter. In whatever manner that queftion may be determined, it is plain that this office ought to be the reward of tried and approved merit; fince the inftitutions of Sparta have not been found capable of forming men, recommended by the accidental circumftance of birth, worthy of filling a throne. The legiflator, indeed, vifibly defpaired of perfecting his fellow-citizens in virtue, fince he condefcended to derive affiftance from their paffions and their vices. Men at variance with each other are confidered as the fitteft perfons to be joined in the fame important commiffions; and the fafety of the ftate is thought to have no fmall dependence on the diffenfion of the kings.

Of the Phiditia, or common tables.

The Phiditia, or public tables, are ill inftituted, for thofe only can frequent them who are capable of bearing their fair proportion of the expence. At Crete the expence of the public tables is fupplied by the ftate, and even the pooreft citizens may enjoy them; but as managed at Sparta, the Phiditia have weakened the democratical part of the conftitution, which they were intended to ftrengthen and uphold.

Of the high admiral.

The extraordinary powers granted to the high admiral of the republic have been juftly condemned by feveral writers. The two kings are the perpetual and hereditary commanders of the army; but the high admiral is vefted with fuch unbounded authority in naval affairs as renders him a fort of third king in the country, whofe ambition has often fhaken and almoft rent afunder the community.

Plato's

Lycurgus's undue predilection for war.

Plato's obfervation is juft, that the laws of Lycurgus are well adapted to the affairs of war, but to them only; Sparta therefore has been faved by her wars, and ruined by her victories, which fhe knew not how to improve or to enjoy: her citizens thought rightly and wifely, that virtue was better fitted than vice for acquiring conqueft and dominion; they thought erroneoufly and abfurdly, that thefe effects of virtue were more valuable than the caufe.

The irregular collection of the Spartan revenue.

At Sparta the ftate is poor, and the revenues ill levied, for the wide extent of territory renders the citizens negligent in mutually exacting their reciprocal contributions. The poverty and difintereftednefs of the public thus forms a ftriking contraft with the wealth and avarice of individuals. But enough concerning the Spartan government, of which we have now enumerated the moft material defects.

Chap. 8.

The government of Crete.

The civil polity of Crete nearly refembles that of Sparta, in fome parts not inferior to it, but in general worfe arranged and lefs polifhed; the Spartan government being later in its formation, and an improvement on the conftitution of Crete, which Lycurgus took for his model. During the travels of that lawgiver, after he ceafed to be guardian to king Charilaus, the ifland of Crete, recommended by its ancient connection with his mother country, chiefly attracted his regard, and long challenged his refidence; for Lyctos was a colony of Lacedæmon, and the fettlers in that diftrict conformed to the laws fubfifting in other parts of the ifland, which have continued to prevail to this day as firft eftablifhed by the elder Minos.

Advantageous pofition of that ifland.

Crete, rifing in the midft of the Mediterranean fea, projecting towards Peleponnefus on one fide, and on the other advancing towards Rhodes and Triopium on the coaft of Afia, is formed as it were by nature for holding the naval empire of Greece,

which

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which is every where a maritime country; Minos induftrioufly availed himfelf of this advantageous fituation, conquered fome of the iflands, colonized others, and died at Camicus in his unfortunate expedition againft Sicily.

Agreement in the Spartan and Cretan inftitutions.

There is a ftriking analogy, we have faid, between the Cretan and Spartan inftitutions: the territory of Laconia is cultivated for the benefit of the public by the fubordinate clafs of Helots; the territory of Crete is cultivated for the fame purpofe by fervile ruftics denominated Periæci, becaufe inhabiting the dependent villages fcattered over the territory, and furrounding their refpective capitals. The inftitution of common tables prevails in both countries; and thefe tables, at which the men only affemble, and which are now from their parfimony called Phiditia at Sparta, were anciently called in that country Andria, or tables appropriated to the male fex; a term by which they are ftill diftinguifhed in Crete, in which ifland the cuftom took birth. The fenate of Sparta correfponds to the fenate in Crete, and the five Ephori in the one country bear a near affinity to the ten Cofmï of the other. The Cretan armies too were originally commanded by kings; but the power of the kings, which confifted, as at Sparta, in their being the hereditary generals of the commonwealth, has devolved on the Cofmï; who, together with the fenate, have a negative before debate on the deliberations of the popular affembly, compofed of the whole body of the citizens.

The clubs or public tables better regulated at Crete than in Sparta.

The public tables, we have faid, are better conftituted in Crete than in Sparta; in the latter country each meffmate muft provide his fhare of the entertainment, and when he ceafes to make this provifion, his right of commenfality is immediately at an end. At Crete, on the other hand, the corn and cattle, the

the produce of the common lands, and the contributions levied on the Periæci, or peafants, are divided into two great fhares; the firft of which is appropriated to temples, facrifices, and other objects appertaining to religion and the public fervice; the fecond is deftined for the fupply of the *Andreia*, or common-tables, and for affording food to perfons of either fex and of all ages in the country. The Cretan legiflator has fome fine fpeculations on the fubject of fpare diet and frugality; and employs, for maintaining the due proportion of citizens and fubfiftence, fome extraordinary regulations, the merits of which, we fhall take another opportunity to difcufs.

The bad regulation of the Cofmi and fenate.

The office of the Cofmï at Crete labours under all the inconveniences which were found to refult from that of the Ephori at Sparta. There is not any ftandard of merit by which perfons foliciting either of thofe high offices muft, before their election, be examined and tried; and as the Cofmï can only be chofen from a certain number of families, the moft illuftrious in the ifland, the honours conferred on them are invidious and dangerous, and have a tendency to excite the greater difcontent in the multitude, fince thofe alone who have difcharged the office of the Cofmï can be elected into the fenate, in which they keep their feats for life, neither controulable in their decifions as judges, nor refponfible for their adminiftration as ftatefmen. That the people have hitherto endured this unequal diftribution of power, affords not any argument by which its policy can be defended; for the infular fituation of Crete cuts off communication with ftrangers, and prevents *their* interference by intrigue and bribery, which, whenever it finds room to operate, always proves dangerous to an unjuft and partial government. But the

The evils therefrom refulting.

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The remedy applied worſe than the evil.

remedy employed againſt this evil is ſtill worſe than the evil itſelf; ſince it controls by violence what might be ſubjected to law. The offended citizens conſpire againſt the obnoxious magiſtrate; and ſometimes by themſelves alone, ſometimes with the aſſiſtance of his colleagues, drive him from the community; unleſs he avoids this diſgraceful extremity by ſeaſonably abdicating his office.

The turbulence of the Cretan nobles.

Crete, which is ſometimes ſhaken by the mutinous ſpirit of the people, has been ſtill more fatally convulſed by the turbulence of the nobles, who diſdaining the authority of government, aſſemble their partiſans, levy war againſt the magiſtrates and againſt each other, and for a while rend aſunder all thoſe bands by which communities are upheld and cemented. Men, both willing and able to inflict ſuch dreadful calamities, muſt long ere now have totally ruined their country, had not the ſafety of Crete, as we before ſaid, been wonderfully protected by the ineſtimable advantages of its inſular ſituation; which, by excluding the dangerous interference of ſtrangers, long rendered the fidelity of the Periæci a ſtriking contraſt to the fickleneſs of the Helots. But foreign war having recently invaded the iſland, expoſes the nakedneſs of Crete, and evinces the debility of its government.

Chap. 9.

Excellence of the Carthaginian conſtitution.

The inſtitutions of the Carthaginians have been the ſubject of much commendation; and, when compared with the rudeneſs and coarſeneſs viſible in other ſtates, the refinement of Carthaginian polity, doubtleſs, merits applauſe; particularly thoſe inſtitutions which are analogous to the laws of Lycurgus; for the three conſtitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage bear much reſemblance to each other; they are extremely diſſimilar to all other governments; and all three have adopted many maxims that

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that are wife, and many regulations that are falutary. The excellence of the Carthaginian government is evinced by one fingle reflection. Though its origin remounts to a very ancient date, and though for many centuries it has contained within its bofom a numerous and a free people, yet Carthage has never, to the prefent day, experienced any one fedition worthy of record, nor has it ever endured for a moment the cruel yoke of a tyrant. The common tables at Carthage are analogous to thofe of Crete and Sparta: the council of the Hundred and Four in the firft mentioned country, refembles the magiftracy of the Spartan Ephori; except that the Carthaginian Ephori, or infpectors, are chofen with nicer difcrimination: both nations acknowledge the experienced wifdom of fenates; and both fubmit to the authority of kings, limited in peace, fupreme in the field. But the ftrong claim of merit is preferred to all other confiderations in afcertaining the title to the Carthaginian throne [m]; for weak or worthlefs men intrufted with much power, cannot fail to do much harm; a maxim often exemplified in the kings of Sparta.

The corruptions introduced into the Carthaginian government.

The Carthaginian, as well as the Cretan and Spartan governments, whether by fubfequent and unneceffary additions, or in virtue of the primary regulations by which they were refpectively conftituted, have all of them degenerated from that moft perfect form of commonwealth, which we call by way of eminence

[m] The author obferves, that kings, meaning thereby fuch republican magiftrates as the Suffetes of Carthage and the Kings of Sparta, ought not to be chofen from ordinary families, nor from ordinary individuals of thofe families; and that pre-eminence of perfonal merit fhould take place of feniority. What is faid of ordinary families, μητε τȣτο το τυχον, bears a reference to the opinion of the Greeks concerning the pre-eminence of particular races. See the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii & iii.

eminence the republic; in which popular and ariſtocratic powers are harmoniouſly blended into one equitable ſyſtem of polity, benefiting all, and doing injury to none. Of the corruptions thus introduced into the Carthaginian government, ſome have a tendency to relax the republic into a democracy; and others have a tendency to narrow the ariſtocracy into an oligarchy. To the former kind we may refer that inſtitution which, when the kings and ſenators do not exactly coincide in opinion, ſubmits every matter of debate to the diſcuſſion and final determination of the people; to the latter, we muſt refer the extraordinary powers of the council of Five, a council ſelf-elected and immortal; and which alſo elects the Ephori, or ſupreme magiſtrates of the people. In the preference of ſuffrage to lot, and in ſerving the public without fee or reward, the Carthaginians ſeem to reſpect the ariſtocratic model. But the conſtitution of the judiciary power is highly oligarchical [n], the whole

[n] Nothing can be more intereſting than Ariſtotle's account of the Carthaginian government; ſince the misfortunes, which his ſagacity foreſaw, are deſcribed in hiſtory; his prophecies being exactly fulfilled. Two centuries after Ariſtotle's time, Livy obſerves, "Judicum ordo Carthagine ea tempeſtate dominabatur; eò maxime quod iidem perpetui judices erant. Res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum poteſtate erat. Qui unum ejus ordinis, idem omnes adverſos habebat." "The judiciary order at that time were tyrants in Carthage; and chiefly becauſe their juriſdiction was perpetual. The eſtate, the character, and the life of each individual was entirely in their hands. Whoever incurred the diſpleaſure of a ſingle judge, had the whole body for his enemies." Lib. xxxiii. c. xlvi. It is here worthy of remark, that Livy's language tends to convey a falſe notion of the Carthaginian government. There was no judiciary order in Carthage, as in ſeveral of the Greek republics, and likewiſe in Rome, where the judges were appointed, in ſome ages of the commonwealth, from the ſenators, and in others from the knights. In Carthage, on the other hand, Ariſtotle expreſsly tells us that none but the actual magiſtrates were allowed to exerciſe the judiciary function. The political hiſtory of Carthage remains ſtill to be written; for the Roman writers univerſally miſrepreſent the inſtitutions of that country through ignorance

whole of that power being vefted in one court, which tries all kinds of caufes, and decides all of them without appeal. Yet that which has principally tended to convert the republic into an oligarchy, is an opinion ftrongly impreffed on the nation at large, that in recommending to office, opulence ought to concur with merit; fo that as virtue or merit forms the principle of an ariftocracy, and wealth of an oligarchy, the government of Carthage will conftitute a third and mixed kind of civil polity, blending in equal proportions the principles of ariftocracy and oligarchy, of which it is compounded.

Occafioned chiefly by the undue preponderance of wealth over greater political advantages.

Wealth muft be poffeffed before leifure can be obtained; and until leifure is obtained, office ought not to be courted; fince he who is oppreffed by private concerns, cannot be expected to manage public affairs, either wifely or faithfully. But the legiflator and conftitution are in fault, if men eminent for abilities and virtues, whether in public or private ftations, be ever difgraced by unfeemly poverty, or ever prevented by meaner cares from exercifing their powers, and benefiting their country. In the diftribution of honours, to prefer wealth to virtue, is to vilify and debafe thofe honours themfelves; it is to corrupt and degrade thofe who wear them. The evil is deep and univerfal; for fuch as the heads [a] of the community are,

Reflections on this fubject.

ignorance or prejudice; and by beftowing Roman appellations on Carthaginian magiftrates, lead the reader to fuppofe much greater analogy than really fubfifted between two ftates, founded on the moft diffimilar principles, and actuated by the moft oppofite views. But into this extenfive and important fubject it would be improper here to enter, becaufe I fhall have occafion fully to difcufs it in my Hiftory of the Macedonian Empire; of which I have written the firft volume, and collected materials for the fecond.

[a] Ariftotle fays, that whatever feems eftimable to the heads of the community, the ame will be efteemed by the reft of the citizens. Cicero has admirably tranflated, generalifed,

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are, fuch muft the people at large fpeedily become. No ariftocracy can be fafe, which does not prefer perfonal merit to all other diftinctions; for he who by wealth obtains office, will endeavour by office to augment wealth; and if poverty intrufted with authority be liable, even in honeft minds, to the fufpicion of facrificing duty to gain, it is abfurd to expect that corruption, armed with power, will refufe to repair lofs, and to compenfate by rapacity the expences of bribery [p].

The dangerous accumulation of office,

The Carthaginian government acts unwifely in accumulating too many offices in the fame hands. The example of well-organized

generalifed, and expanded the reflection. "Nec enim tantum mali eft peccare principes (quanquam eft magnum hoc per fe ipfum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum exiftunt. Nam licet videre, fi velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualefcunque fummi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuiffe; quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo fecuturam. Idque haud paulo eft verius, quam quod Platoni noftro placet, qui muficorum cantibus ait mutatis, mutari civitatum ftatus. Ego autem nobilium vita vectuque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciofius de republica merentur vitiofi principes, quod non folum vitia concipiunt ipfi, fed infundant in civitatem; neque folum obfunt, quod ipfi corrumpuntur, plufque exemplo quam peccato nocent." De Legibus, l. iii. c. xiv. "The vices and crimes of the nobility, though great evils in themfelves, are rendered ftill greater, becaufe they will always be the objects of general imitation. The experience of hiftory teaches, that, in point of morals, fuch as have been the leading men of a ftate, fuch alfo has been the ftate itfelf; and that whatever alteration has taken place in the manners of the great, a fimilar alteration has followed in thofe of the people at large. This truth is far better afcertained than the obfervation of Plato, that the character of a nation changes, by changing the ftyle of its mufic. But I affert, that it changes by changing the lives and behaviour of the Great. Wherefore profligate princes and profligate leaders are fo much the more punifhable than other men, becaufe they are not only vitious in themfelves, but infufe their vices into the public; and becaufe whatever mifchief refults from their crimes, ftill greater refults from their example."

[p] Livy fpeaks as if Ariftotle's prophecy had been before his eyes, when he relates the facts by which it was accomplifhed. "Vectigalia publica prædæ ac divifui principum quibufdam ac magiftratibus erant." And again, "Tum vero ifti, quos paverat per aliquot annos publicus peculatus, velut bonis ereptis, non furto eorum manibus extorto, infenfi & irati, Romanos in Annibalem inftigabant." Liv. l. xxxiii. c. xlvi and xlvii.

ganized armies ſhews the ineſtimable benefits reſulting from the nice partition of duty, and the innumerable gradations of authority. The more minutely labour of every kind is ſubdivided, the more perfectly, and the more promptly, each man will perform his aſſigned taſk; and that government only is firmly ſupported which aſſociates many deſerving citizens to its functions and its honours. The conduct of the Carthaginians is preciſely the reverſe; and this conduct has produced a deep and permanent diſeaſe in the conſtitution, which the magiſtrates have hitherto palliated by a temporary and precarious remedy. As the national proſperity of Carthage has long continued in an advancing ſtate, the principal families have been enabled to maintain their odious monopoly of government, by employing thoſe moſt inclined and moſt able to ſubvert it, in the numerous and increaſing dependencies of their empire. But the ſucceſs of this remedy requires the co-operation of fortune; both its cauſe and effects are barely external. A good conſtitution ſhould be found within [q]. Such are the excellencies, and ſuch the imperfections, of the governments of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; which, in compariſon with moſt others, have been juſtly celebrated.

palliated in Carthage by a temporary and precarious remedy.

Of the writers on the ſubject of politics, ſome have confined themſelves merely to theory; others have illuſtrated theory by practice, and aſſiſted in their own or in foreign countries, in the adminiſtration of thoſe governments which they had deviſed and eſtabliſhed, or of thoſe laws which they had contrived and enacted.

Chap. 10.

The conſtitution of Athens.

[q] Theſe obſervations are worthy of the moſt ſerious attention. When a nation is advancing in wealth and greatneſs, the moſt dangerous maladies, exiſting only in an indolent ſtate, may long lie altogether concealed. The firſt ſhock of adverſity reveals the fatal ſecret; but then, perhaps, it is no longer time to attempt the radical cure.

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enacted. The principal doctrines of merely ſpeculative politicians we have already examined; we have likewiſe deſcribed the practical ſyſtem of Lycurgus; and now proceed to explain the legiſlation of Solon, who is celebrated as the reſtorer of the hereditary freedom of Athens, and as the deliverer of the people from the yoke of an intemperate and cruel oligarchy. In the conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Solon, his admirers obſerve, that the jarring intereſts of hoſtile orders are ſkilfully harmoniſed into one equitable ſyſtem, juſtly formed, and nicely balanced, by the oligarchy of the Areopagus, which is perpetual; the ariſtocracy of the Archons, who are elective; and the democracy of the courts of judicature, whoſe members are appointed indiſcriminately from all the citizens by lot. Solon, it is probable, did not firſt introduce, but ſimply receive and approve, the perpetuity of the Areopagus, and the election of the Archons: but he invented and eſtabliſhed the popular conſtitution of the judiciary power; a conſtitution, which ſome writers have branded as introductory to the confuſion and tyranny of a wild democracy. Maſters of the courts of juſtice, and conſequently of the lives and fortunes of all ranks of men in the ſtate, the people have drained and exhauſted every ſource of authority, not flowing from themſelves.

Cauſes of its degeneracy.

Pericles, with the aſſiſtance of Ephialtes, abridged the power of the Areopagus; the ſame Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, ſtill farther debaſed the compoſition, and increaſed the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles left imperfect, ſucceeding demagogues ſupplied; and one democratical regulation ſtill followed another, until the government aſſumed its preſent form, or rather exhibited its preſent deformity.

deformity. Yet this fatal refult is not imputable to Solon [r], but rather chargeable on fortune. The naval victories of Athens, in the Perfian war, fwelled the infolence of the populace, who, headed by orators more infolent than themfelves, arrogated all authority to their own order, and ufurped the government. Solon juftly intrufted the multitude with the power of electing the magiftrates, and with that of taking an account of their adminiftration; powers which cannot eafily be withheld from the people without degrading them into flaves, or converting them into enemies. But all the executive offices of government were confined to men of the three firft claffes: the *Thetes*, confifting of labourers and mechanics, and forming the moft numerous portion of the community, were totally excluded from every employment requiring either coolnefs of temper or quicknefs of underftanding.

The legiflations of Zaleucus and Charondas.

Zaleucus legiflated for the weftern Locrians; and Charondas, a native of Catana in Sicily, gave laws, not only to his own citizens, but to the other Ionic communities fcattered over Sicily and Italy. Some writers trace up to Onomacritus the inftitutions of thofe legiflators, relating that Onomacritus failed to Crete to learn the art of divination; that he became famous as a lawgiver; that Thales was his companion, and Lycurgus the fcholar of Thales, Zaleucus the fcholar of Lycurgus, and Charondas the fcholar of Zaleucus: but this order of fucceffion is not juftified by chronology.

Of Philolaus.

Philolaus, a native of Corinth, and defcended from the illuftrious family of the Bacchiadæ, who long governed that city, gave laws to the Thebans. Philolaus was the friend of Diocles,

r See the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, paffim. particularly vol. ii. c. xiii.

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Diocles, likewife a Corinthian, who gained the Olympic prize, and who fled from his native city, as detefting the inceftuous paffion of his mother Halcyoné. Diocles fixed his refidence in Thebes; the affectionate Philolaus foon followed him thither; in that city they lived and died; and there, the monuments of thefe two friends are ftill fhewn to ftrangers, difpofed in fuch fituations as render them fully confpicuous to each other, that of Philolaus alfo enjoying a view of Corinth, but that of Diocles concealing from the fight both that city and its territory, as if he wifhed to banifh from his eyes objects only calculated to recall the fad memory of his domeftic calamity. Philolaus having thus fixed his abode in Thebes, propofed various laws for the benefit of that republic; particularly the law of adoption, contrived for perpetuating the ancient families, and for preferving a due proportion between the number of landholders, and the number of fhares or lots, into which the territory was divided. Charondas inftituted a new action [1] againft the odious crimes of calumny

[1] The name of this action, as Bentley proves, was επισκηψις, which took place when a man, caft in a trial by falfe teftimony, entered his plea to have another trial to prove the witneffes perjured. It is mentioned by Demofthenes more than once, and by Lyfias contra Pandionem. See Differtation upon Phalaris, p. 368. Bentley fays, "that Diodorus tells us from his copy of Charondas's laws that he had πολλα ιδια, many things peculiar, and reckons up half a fcore of them; and yet the fingle thing obferved by Ariftotle does not appear among them." In this Bentley is miftaken; for the peculiarity of Charondas's law againft perjured calumniators appears in Diodorus, and makes a great figure there.—His words follow, Τȣς δ' επι συκοφαντιᾳ καταγνωσθεντας προσεταξε περιπατειν εστεφανωμενȣς μυρικῃ, ὁπως εν πασι τοις πολιταις πρωτειον της πονηριας περιπεποιημενοι· διο και τινας επι τȣτῳ τῳ εγκληματι καταδικασθεντας, το μεγεθος της ὑβρεως ȣκ ενεγκοντας, ἑκȣσιως ἑαυτȣς εκ τȣ ζην μεταςησαι. ȣ συντελεσθεντος, εφυγαδευθη πας εκ της πολεως ὁ συκοφαντειν ειωθως, και το πολιτευμα μακαριον ειχε βιον της τοιαυτης κακιας απηλλαγμενον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 486. "He commanded thofe convicted of calumny to go about crowned with tamarifk, that they might appear to all the citizens to have attained the laft ftage of wickednefs; therefore fome of thofe convicted of this crime, incapable of fupporting

calumny and perjury; and his laws furpafs, in elegancy and in accuracy, even the juridical compofitions of the prefent day. Phaleas diftinguifhed himfelf by equalizing property; and Plato by appointing common tables for women; and by propofing among men, the community of wives, children, and goods. His lefs extravagant novelties are, that children fhould be taught to ufe both hands with equal dexterity, and that a perfon bound to the obfervance of perfect fobriety fhould prefide in companies affembled for convivial merriment. The laws of Draco[t] were remarkable for nothing but their exceffive and undiftinguifhing feverity. Pittacus[u] did not delineate any new fcheme of policy, but eftablifhed feveral new laws, of which one peculiar to himfelf is, that offences committed by perfons intoxicated, fhould be punifhed with double rigour; a law founded rather on inflexible utility, which confiders how evils may be prevented, than on merciful juftice, which examines what offences ought to be pardoned[x]. Androgamas, a native of

fupporting the weight of infamy, voluntarily deftroyed themfelves; in confequence of which examples, calumny totally difappeared, and the ftate thenceforth fubfifted happily, being divorced from fuch a mifchief." The word tamarifk is in the original μυρικη, myrice, of which Pliny fays, "Myricen in Italia quam alii tamaricen vocant, cujus infelicia ligna appellamus. Solitaria circum faxa aquofa, qua in domum illata, difficiles partus fieri produnt, mortefque miferas." Plin. Nat. Hift. xii. 21. This unhappy and unaufpicious plant, creeping folitary amidft watery rocks, was a fit decoration for an outcaft of fociety, a wretch fhunned and detefted. To how many expreffive cuftoms of antiquity do we ftill want a key?

[t] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 105. [u] Ibid. vol. . p. 225.

[x] Both Plato and Ariftotle are more indulgent in the article of wine, than the more ancient philofophers and legiflators. A law of Zaleucus is preferved in Athenæus, l. x. p. 226. and commented in Elian, Var. Hift. ii. 37. which treats the drinking of pure wine

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of Rhegium, gave laws to Chalcis in Thrace; his code is moſt ample on the ſubjects of heireſſes and of murders; but is not diſtinguiſhed by any peculiarity worthy of record. Let this much ſuffice concerning plans of policy and laws, which either authority has eſtabliſhed, or ſpeculation deviſed.

wine with Mahommedan ſeverity, ει τις ακρατον επιε, μη προσταξαντος ιατρε θεραπειας ἱνεκα, θανατος ην ἡ ζημια.—" Whoever drinks pure wine, except for the ſake of health, and by the preſcription of a phyſician, let him be puniſhed by death."

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

APPENDIX TO BOOK II.

IN my endeavour to illuftrate various fubjects treated in this Book, I frequently had occafion to allude to the Italian republics of the middle age; which exhibited a faint and rude picture of the polities of ancient Greece. Of all thefe republics, there is one, and only one, ftill fubfifting on the ancient model. This fmall but precious remain of former, and by fome thought better times, I endeavoured from careful obfervation to delineate upwards of twenty years ago, in an article [a] firft made public in 1795, and fince that time frequently reprinted. But the intimate connexion of that juvenile performance with the fubject of the prefent Book of Ariftotle's Politics, has fuggefted the propriety of giving here an enlarged edition of it, enriched and confirmed by original documents, extracted, through the intereft of Sir John Cox Hippefley, from the fecret archives of the republic, and moft obligingly communicated to me by Sir John Macpherfon.

"At the diftance of twelve miles from Rimini and the Hadriatic Sea, we beheld a cloud-capt mountain, fteep, rugged, and inhofpitable, yet to Britons, whofe affection for their own happy

[a] Given as an extract from my manufcript travels in that agreeable work, intitled, "Anecdotes of fome diftinguifhed Perfons chiefly of the prefent and two preceding Centuries."

APPEND. TO BOOK II. happy iſland cheriſhed even the fainteſt image of congenial liberty, more attractive and more engaging than all the gay luxuriance of Tuſcan [b] plains. A black expanſion of vapour partly concealed from our view the territory of what the Greeks would have called a nation, ſeldom viſited by ſtrangers, though aſſuredly moſt deſerving of that honour. Liberty brightens and fertilizes the craggy rocks of St. Marino; and inſtead of paradiſes inhabited by devils, (for thus the recollection or ſuppoſition of better times indignantly characteriſes the countries through which we had juſt travelled,) this little ſtate, we were told, would exhibit rugged hills and ſavage precipices cultivated and adorned by the ſtubborn induſtry of free men, who labour with alacrity, becauſe they reap with ſecurity. We panted at the thoughts of taking a nearer ſurvey of this political wonder, and were impatient to leave Rimini; but the country adjacent to that city was deluged with rain; the rivers continued to overflow; horſes could not ſafely clamber over rocks; and Rimini could not furniſh us with mules. But they are delicate travellers whom ſuch puny difficulties could reſtrain from viſiting this illuſtrious mountain, where Liberty, herſelf a mountain goddeſs, has upwards of twelve centuries fixed her rural throne. Careleſs of mules, or horſes, or carriages, to which laſt the republic of St. Marino is at all times inacceſſible, we adopted

[b] "The epithet Tuſcan is juſtified by the authority of Polybius, l. ii. c. 14. and c. 17. He deſcribes that extenſive plain bounded by the Alps, the Apennines, and the Hadriatic, and alſo the plains about Nola and Capua, called the Phlegræan Fields, as anciently inhabited by the Tuſcans. The territory of this people, he ſays, formed incomparably the fineſt portion of Europe. Before Polybius wrote his Hiſtory, the dominion of the Tuſcans had contracted to a narrow ſpan; and according to the ſaying of the modern Italians, while the Pope poſſeſſes the marrow, the Great Duke of Tuſcany has now only the bones, of Italy."

adopted a mode of travelling which in a country where pomp is immoderately ſtudied, becauſe wealth is too indiſcriminately prized, might poſſibly have excluded unknown wanderers from the proud manſions of nobles and princes, the palaces of biſhops, and the vineas of cardinals, but which, we rightly conjectured, would recommend us as welcome gueſts to the citizens of St. Marino, whoſe own manlineſs of character muſt approve the congenial hardihood of humble pedeſtrians.

"The diſtance from Rimini to the Borgo, or ſuburbs of St. Marino, for the città, or city, ſtands half a mile higher on the hill, is computed at only ten Italian miles. But the badneſs of the weather and of the roads would have increaſed the tediouſneſs of our fatiguing journey, had not our fancies been amuſed by the appearance and converſation of ſeveral perſons whom we occaſionally met or overtook, and who, notwithſtanding that hardneſs of features which characteriſes mountaineers, diſplayed in their words and looks a certain candour and ſincerity, with an undeſcribed mixture of humanity and firmneſs, which we had rarely ſeen pourtrayed on the face of an Italian. Such virtues, perhaps, many Italians may poſſeſs; ſuch virtues Raphael and Guido probably diſcerned in their contemporaries; unleſs it be ſuppoſed that the *antique* not only ennobled and exalted, but originally inſpired their conceptions. Yet whatever might be the pre-eminence of Tranſalpine beauty, during the ſplendour of the *cinque cento*, it muſt be confeſſed of the Italians of our days, that the expreſſion indicating virtues of the mild or generous caſt, ſeldom breaks through the dark gloom and ſullen cares which contract their brows and cloud their countenances.

"At

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"At the diſtance of five miles from Rimini, a ſmall rivulet, decorated by a diſproportionably large ſtone bridge, which at another ſeaſon of the year would have exemplified the Spaniſh proverb of a bridge without water, ſeparates the territories of St. Marino from thoſe of the Pope. Proceeding forward, we found the road extremely narrow, much worn by the rain, alternately rough and ſlippery, and always ſo bad, that we congratulated each other on rejecting the uſe of the miſerable rips that were offered to us at Rimini. In the midſt of a heavy ſhower we clambered to the Borgo, ſituate on the ſide of the hill, and diſtant (as already ſaid) half a mile from the città, on its ſummit. The former is deſtined for the habitation of peaſants, artiſans, and ſtrangers; the honour of inhabiting the latter is reſerved for the nobles, the citizens, and thoſe who, in the language of antiquity, would be ſtyled the public gueſts of the commonwealth. In the whole territory there is but one inn; and that of courſe in the Borgo; for lone houſes are rare in all parts of the continent, the Britiſh dominions alone, by their native ſtrength and the excellence of their government, being happily exempted from the terror of banditti in time of peace, and marauders in time of war. We diſcovered the inn at St. Marino, as is uſual in Italy, by the crowd before the door. Having entered, we were civilly received by the landlord, ſeated by the fire-ſide in company with ſeveral other ſtrangers, and ſpeedily preſented with a bottle of ſparkling white wine, the beſt we had taſted in Italy, and reſembling Champagne in the characteriſtic excellencies of that ſprightly liquor.

"We had not remained long in this caravanſera, (for ſuch is the proper name for the place of hoſpitality in which we were received,)

received), when the drefs, manners, and converfation of our fellow-travellers ftrongly excited our attention, and afforded fcope for boundlefs fpeculation. They were the moft favage-looking men that I had ever beheld; covered with thick capottas [c], of coarfe dark brown woollen, lined with black fheep's fkin. Their hats, which they kept on their heads, were of an enormous fize, fwelling to the circumference of an ordinary umbrella. With their drefs and appearance their words and geftures bore too faithful a correfpondence. "*Schioppi*" and "*coltellate*" (gun-fhots and dagger-thrufts) were frequently in their mouths. As the wine went brifkly round, the converfation became ftill more animated, and took a turn more decidedly terrible. They now talked of nothing but fierce encounters, hair-breadth efcapes, and hideous lurking-places. From their whole behaviour, there was reafon to apprehend, that we had unwarily fallen into company with Rinaldo's party: but a few hints that dropped from him who was moft intoxicated finally undeceived us, and difcovered, to our fatisfaction and fhame, that inftead of a band of robbers, we had only met with a party of fmugglers. Their maffy capottas and broad-brimmed hats formed their defenfive armour againft cuftom-houfe officers and *fbirri* [d]; and the narratives which they heard or related with fuch ardor and delight, contained the acts of prowefs by which they had repelled the bravery of the Romans, and the arts of ftratagem by which they had deceived the cunning of the Tufcans. From the intermediate fituation of St. Marino between the dominions of Tufcany and thofe of the Pope, its territory is continually infefted by vifits from thofe unlicenfed traffickers, who being enemies

[c] Great coats. [d] Thofe who execute the orders of civil magiftrates.

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enemies by trade to thofe who adminifter the laws and collect the revenues of their country, naturally degenerate into daring and diforderly ruffians, the terror of peaceful men, and both the difgrace and the bane of civilized fociety.

From the company of the fmugglers we longed to feparate, the more becaufe they eagerly folicited our ftay, promifing to conduct us fafely acrofs the mountains, and to defend our perfons and properties againft robbers and affaffins; but we thought it a piece of good fortune, that our moft valuable property, as we fhewed to them, confifted in our fwords and piftols. Having called our St. Marino hoft, we paid him for his wine and his faufage (*profciutto*); and were pleafed to find, that contrary to our univerfal experience of Italian landlords, he was uncommonly thankful for a very moderate gratification, a fingularity which, though it probably proceeded from his being little converfant with Englifh and other opulent travellers, we treafured with delight, as a confpicuous proof of republican [e] virtue, that had efcaped pure and unfullied from the contagion of thofe worthlefs guefts, with whom the nature of his trade condemned him often to affociate.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, we left the Borgo to climb up to the Città, carrying our fwords in our right hands; a precaution which the company we had juft left warranted in this modern republic, but which, as Thucydides informs us in his proem, would have expofed us to be branded with the appellation

[e] According to Machiavelli and Montefquieu, and their mafter Ariftotle, republics require more virtue than monarchies, becaufe in republics the citizens make laws to govern themfelves, whereas in monarchies the fubjects are compelled to obey the laws made by the prince. In republican governments, therefore, the citizens ought, in the words of Ariftotle, and of a ftill higher authority, 'to be a law unto themfelves.' How few nations, therefore, are qualified, in modern times, for living quietly and happily under a republic; and leaft of all, that nation which has fhewn itfelf the leaft virtuous of all.

pellation of barbarians in the republics of Ancient Greece. Before we had reached the ſummit of the hill, the cloud had diſperſed, the ſun ſhone bright, we breathed a purer air, and the clear light, which diſplayed the city and territory of St. Marino was heightened by contraſt with the thick gloom which involved the circumjacent plains. Tranſported with the contemplation of a landſcape which ſeemed ſo admirably to accord with the political ſtate of the mountain, a bright gem of liberty amidſt the darkneſs of Italian ſervitude, we clambered cheerfully over the precipices, never reflecting that as there was not any place of reception for ſtrangers in the Città, we might poſſibly be expoſed to the alternative of ſleeping in the ſtreets, or returning to the caravanſera, crowded with ſmugglers, whoſe intoxication might exaſperate their natural ferocity. From all our paſt remarks, we had concluded that the vice of drunkenneſs was abominated even by the loweſt claſſes of the Italians. We dreaded their fury and their knives in this unuſual ſtate of mind; but amidſt all our terrors could not forbear philoſophiſing [f] on what we had ſeen, and conjecturing, from the tumultuous merriment and drunken debauchery of the ſmugglers, that the famed ſobriety of the Italian nation is an artificial virtue ariſing from ſituation and accident, not depending on temperament, or reſulting from character. Drinking is the vice of men whoſe lives are chequered by viciſſitudes of toil and eaſe, of danger and ſecurity. It is the vice of ſoldiers, mariners, and huntſmen;

[f] This word requires an apology; for the ſacred name of philoſophy has been as ſhamefully polluted in modern times, by ſophiſts and ſceptics, as the word republic by madmen and levellers. The preſent generation muſt perhaps paſs away, before either of theſe terms ſhall reſume its priſtine and native honours.

huntſmen; of thoſe who exerciſe boiſterous occupations, or purſue dangerous amuſements: and if the modern Italians are leſs addicted to exceſs in wine than the Greeks and Romans in ancient, or the Engliſh and Germans in modern times, their temperance may fairly be aſcribed to the indolent monotony of their liſtleſs lives; which, being never exhauſted by fatigue, can never be gladdened by repoſe; and being never agitated by the terrors of danger, can never be tranſported by the joys of deliverance.

From theſe airy ſpeculations, by which we fancied that we ſtripped Italy of what ſome travellers have too haſtily concluded to be the only virtue which ſhe has left, we were awakened by the appearance of a venerable perſon, in a bag wig and ſword, cautiouſly leading his *bourrique*[g] down the precipice. He returned our ſalute with an air of courteſy beſpeaking ſuch affability, that we quickly entered into converſation with him, and diſcovered to our ſurpriſe and joy, that we were in company with a very reſpectable perſonage, and one whom Mr. Addiſon has dignified with the appellation of 'the fourth man in the ſtate.' The ſtipendiary phyſician of St. Marino (for this was the perſon with whom we were converſing) told us, that we might be accommodated with good lodging in the convent of Capuchins; and as we were ſtrangers, that he would return, ſhew us the houſe, and preſent us to Father Bonelli. We expreſſed our unwillingneſs to give him the trouble of again aſcending the hill; but of this trouble the deeply-wrinkled mountaineer made light, and we yielded to his propoſal with only apparent reluctance; ſince, to the indelicacy of introducing ourſelves, we preferred the introduction of a man whom we had even caſually

met

[g] Aſs.

met with on the road. To the convent we were admitted by a *frate fervente*, or lay friar, and conducted to the *Padre Maestro*, the Prior Bonelli, a man fixty years old, and, as we were told by the phyfician, defcended from one of the nobleft families in the commonwealth. Having received and returned fuch compliments as are held indifpenfable in this ceremonious country, the prior conducted us above ftairs, and fhewed us two clean and comfortable chambers, which he faid we might command while we deigned to honour the republic (fuch were his expreffions) with the favour of our refidence. As to our entertainment, he faid we might, as beft pleafed us, either fup apart by ourfelves, or in company with him and his monks. We told him, our happinefs would be complete, were we permitted to enjoy the advantage of his company and converfation. My converfation! You fhall foon enjoy better than mine; fince within half an hour I fhall have the honour of conducting you to the houfe of a charming young lady (fo I muft call her, though my own kinfwoman), whofe *converfazione* affembles this evening. During this dialogue a fervant arrived, bringing our portmanteau from Rimini, and thereby enabling us with more decency of appearance to pay our refpects to the lady, in company with the prior her uncle. The Signora P—— received us politely in an inner apartment, after we had paffed through two outer rooms, in each of which there was a fervant in waiting. Above a dozen gentlemen, well dreffed and polite after the fafhion of Italy, with fix other ladies, formed this agreeable party. Coffee and forbettis being ferved, cards were introduced; and, in quality of ftrangers, we had the honour of lofing a few fequins at ombre with the miftrefs of the houfe. The other ladies prefent took up, each of them, two gentlemen; for

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for ombre is the univerſal game, becauſe in Italian aſſemblies the number of men commonly triples that of women; the latter, when unmarried, ſeldom going abroad; and when married, being ambitious of appearing to receive company every evening at home. During the intervals of play, we endeavoured to turn the converſation on the hiſtory and preſent ſtate of St. Marino, but found this ſubject to be too grave for the company. In this little ſtate, as well as in other parts of Italy, the ſocial amuſements of life conſiſting chiefly in what are called *converſazioni*, have widely deviated from the *ſympoſia* of the Greeks and the *convivia* of the Romans. Inſtead of philoſophical dialogues and epideiktic orations; and inſtead of thoſe animated rehearſals of approved works of hiſtory and poetry, which formed the entertainment and delight of antiquity, the modern Italian *converſazioni* exhibit a very different ſcene; a ſcene in which play is the buſineſs, gallantry the amuſement; and of which avarice, vanity, and mere ſenſual pleaſure form the ſole connecting principle and chief ultimate end. Such inſipid and ſuch mercenary aſſemblies are ſometimes enlivened by the jokes of the buffoon; the *improviſatore* ſometimes diſplays in them the powers of his memory rather than the elegance of his fancy; and every entertainment in Italy, whether gay or ſerious, is always ſeaſoned with muſic; but chiefly that ſoft voluptuous muſic which was baniſhed by Lycurgus, proſcribed by Plato, and prohibited by other legiſlators, under ſevere penalties, as unfriendly to virtue and deſtructive of manhood. The great amuſements of life are commonly nothing more than images of its neceſſary occupations; and where the latter, therefore, are different, ſo alſo muſt be the former. Is it becauſe the occupations of the ancients were leſs ſoftened than thoſe

thofe of the moderns, that women are found to have acted among different nations fuch different parts in fociety? And that the contraft is fo ftriking between the wife of a citizen of St. Marino, furrounded with her card-tables, her mufic, and her admirers, and the Roman Lucretia, *noctè ferâ deditam lanæ inter lucubrantes ancillas* (Tit. Liv. i. 57.), or the more copious defcriptions of female modefty and induftry given by Ifchomachus in Xenophon's Treatife on Domeftic Œconomy? In modern Italy this contraft of manners difplays its greateft force. Though lefs beautiful and lefs accomplifhed than the Englifh and French, the Italian women expect fuperior attention, and exact greater affiduities. To be well with the ladies, is the higheft ambition of the men. Upon this principle their manners are formed; by this their behaviour is regulated; and the art of converfation, in its utmoft fprightlinefs and higheft perfection, is reduced to that playful wantonnefs which, touching flightly on what is felt moft fenfibly, amufes with perpetual fhadows of defired realities.

To the honour of St. Marino it muft be obferved, that neither the Prior Bonelli, nor two *counfellors* who were prefent, took any confiderable part in this too fportive converfation; and the gentlemen at the Signora P——'s were chiefly Romans and Florentines; men, we were told, whom fometimes misfortune and fometimes inclination, but more frequently extravagance and neceffity, drive from their refpective countries, and who, having relations or friends in St. Marino, eftablifh themfelves in that cheap city, where they fubfift on the wreck of their fortunes, and elude the purfuit of their creditors.

Next morning Bonelli having invited feveral of his fellow-citizens to drink chocolate, we learned from them, that the morality

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morality and piety which had long diftinguifhed St. Marino, daily fuffered decline through the contagious influence of thofe profligate intruders, whom good policy ought never to have admitted within the territory, but whom the indulgence of humanity could not be prevailed on to expel.

After breakfaft, our good-natured landlord kindly propofed a walk, that his Englifh guefts might view the city and adjacent country. The main ftreet is well paved, but narrow and fteep. The fimilarity of the houfes indicates a happy mediocrity of fortune. There is a fine ciftern of pure water; and we admired the coolnefs and drynefs of the wine-cellars, ventilated by communications with caverns in the rock. To this circumftance, as much as to the quality of the foil and careful culture of the grape, the wine of St. Marino is indebted for its peculiar excellence.

The whole territory of the republic extends about thirty-five miles in circumference. It is of an irregular oval form, and its mean diameter may be eftimated at fix Englifh miles. The foil naturally craggy and barren, and hardly fit for goats, yet actually maintains (fuch are the attractions of liberty) upwards of feven thoufand perfons; and being everywhere adorned by mulberry-trees, vines, and olives, fupplies the materials of an advantageous trade, particularly in filk, with Rome, Florence, and other cities of Italy.

In extent of territory, St. Marino, inconfiderable as it feems, equals many republics that have performed mighty atchievements and purchafed immortal renown. The independent ftates of Thefpiæ and Platæa were refpectively lefs extenfive; and the boundaries of the modern republic exceed thofe of Ægina and Megara; the former of which was diftinguifhed by its

its commerce and its colonies in Egypt and the Eaſt; and the latter, as Lyſias and Xenophon inform us, could bring into the field, beſides proportional bodies of light troops, 3000 hardy pikemen, who with the ſervice of Mars united that of Ceres and of Bacchus; extracting from bleak hills and rugged mountains rich harveſts and teeming vintages.

The remembrance of our beloved republics of Greece, ennobled by the ineſtimable gifts of unrivalled genius, endeared to us St. Marino, even by its littleneſs. In this literary enthuſiaſm, we could willingly have traverſed every inch of its diminutive territory: but politeneſs required that we ſhould not ſubject Bonelli and his friends to ſuch unneceſſary fatigue; and the changeableneſs of the weather, a continual variation of ſunſhine and cloudineſs, the ſolemnity of dark magnifying vapours, together with the velocity of drizzly or gleamy ſhowers, produced ſuch unuſual accidents of light and ſhade in this mountain ſcene, as often ſuſpended the motion of our limbs, and fixed our eyes in aſtoniſhment. From the higheſt top of St. Marino we beheld the bright ſummit of another and far loftier mountain, towering above, and beyond a dark cloud, which by contraſt threw the conical top of the hill to ſuch a diſtance, that it ſeemed to riſe from another world. The height of St. Marino (we were told) had been accurately meaſured by Father Boſcovich, and found to be nearly half a mile above the level of the neighbouring ſea.

Almoſt immediately after returning from our walk, dinner was ſerved at the convent; for the politeneſs of Father Bonelli had prolonged his ſtay abroad far beyond his uſual hour of repaſt. Speedily after dinner we were conducted by the good father to the *converſazione* of another lady, alſo his relation, where

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where we had the honour of meeting the *capitaneos*, or confuls, the *commiffareo*, or chief judge, and feveral diftinguifhed members of the fenate. Recommended only by our youth and curiofity, we fpent the evening moft agreeably with thofe refpectable magiftrates, who were as communicative in anfwering as inquifitive in afking queftions. The company continually increafing, and Father Bonelli carefully addreffing all new-comers by the titles of their refpective offices, we were furprifed toward the clofe of the evening, and the ufual hour of retirement, that we had not yet feen *Il Signor Dottore* and *Il Pædagogo Publico*, the phyfician and fchoolmafter, reprefented by Mr. Addifon as two of the moft diftinguifhed dignitaries in the commonwealth. A fhort acquaintance is fufficient to infpire confidence between congenial minds. We frankly teftified our furprife to the father. He laughed heartily at our fimplicity, and thought the joke too good not to be communicated to the company. When their vociferous mirth had fubfided, an old gentleman, who had been repeatedly invefted with the higheft honours of his country, obferved, that he well knew Mr. Addifon's account of St. Marino, which had been tranflated more than once into the French and Italian languages. Remote and inconfiderable as they were, his anceftors were highly honoured by the notice of that illuftrious traveller, who, he underftood, was not only a claffic author in Englifh, but an author who had uniformly and moft fuccefsfully employed his pen in the caufe of virtue and liberty. Yet, as muft often happen to travellers, Mr. Addifon, he continued, has, in fpeaking of this little republic, been deceived by firft appearances. Neither our fchoolmafter nor phyfician enjoy any pre-eminence in the ftate. They are maintained indeed by public falaries, as in feveral other

other cities of Italy; and there is nothing peculiar in their condition here, except that the ſchoolmaſter has more, and the phyſician leſs, to do, than in moſt other places, becauſe our diſeaſes are few, and our children are many. This ſally having been received with approbation by the company, the veteran proceeded to explain the real diſtinction of ranks in St. Marino, conſiſting in the *nobili*, *cittadini*, and *ſtipendiate*, nobles, citizens, and ſtipendiaries. The nobles, he told us, exceeded not twenty families, of which ſeveral enjoyed eſtates without the territory, worth from three to eight hundred pounds ſterling a-year: that, from reſpect to the Holy See, under whoſe protection the republic had long ſubſiſted quietly and happily, many perſons of diſtinction in the Pope's territories had been admitted *cittadini honorati*, honorary citizens of St. Marino, particularly ſeveral illuſtrious houſes of Rimini, and the forty noble families of Bologna. Even of the Venetian nobles themſelves, ancient as they certainly were, and inveſted as they ſtill continued to be with the whole ſovereignty of their country, many diſdained not to be aſſociated to the diminutive honours of St. Marino, and to increaſe the number of its citizens; and that this aggregation of illuſtrious foreigners, far from being conſidered as dangerous to public liberty, was deemed eſſential, in ſo ſmall a commonwealth, to national ſafety.

Leſt the converſation might take another turn, I drew from my pocket Mr. Addiſon's account of St. Marino, which, being exceedingly ſhort, I begged leave to read, that his errors, if he had committed any, might be corrected, and the alterations noted which the country had undergone in the ſpace of ſeventy years, from 1703 to 1773.

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The propofal being obligingly accepted, I read in Mr. Addifon, 'They have at St. Marino five churches, and reckon above five thoufand fouls in their community.' Inftead of which I was defired to fay, 'They have in St. Marino ten parifhes, ten churches, and reckon above feven thoufand fouls in their community.' Again Mr. Addifon fays, 'The Council of Sixty, notwithftanding its name, confifts but of forty perfons.' That was the cafe when this illuftrious author vifited the republic; but the council has fince that time been augmented by twenty members, and the number now agrees with the name. Thefe circumftances are important; for from them it appears, that while the neighbouring territory of Rome is impoverifhed and gloomed by the dominion of ecclefiaftics, of which, in the words of Dr. Robertfon, 'to fqueeze and to amafs, not to meliorate, is the object [h];' and while the neighbouring cities of Tufcany are accufed of fhamefully abandoning their privileges and

[h] See Robertfon's Charles V. vol. i. fect. iii. p. 157. The Doctor adds, 'The patrimony of St. Peter was worfe governed than any other part of Europe; and though a generous pontiff might fufpend for a little, or counteract the effect of thofe vices which are peculiar to the government of ecclefiaftics, the difeafe not only remained incurable, but has gone on increafing from age to age, and the decline of the ftate has kept pace with its progrefs.' On reading over this paffage a doubt arifes whether it ought not to be expunged, as unjuftly fevere. Confidered in one view, the dominion of the popes was naturally prejudicial to fociety; but an evil becomes a good, which prevents evils greater than itfelf. The authority of popes reftrained the alternate tyranny of paramount kings and feudal barons. Religion, in its leaft perfect form, was a check to headftrong paffion, and a reftraint on ruffian violence: and fhould it be admitted, that the temporal government of ecclefiaftics had tended to deprefs the induftry and populoufnefs of their immediate dominions, (a pofition which would require a very complex and elaborate inveftigation to fubftantiate,) yet this local depreffion would be compenfated and overbalanced by the diftinguifhed merit of the popes, in the prefervation, advancement, and diffufion of learning, civility, and elegant arts; to which Rome, in barbarous ages, offered the only, or the fafeft, afylum; and of which fhe ftill exhibits the moft ineftimable models.

and their wealth to the Grand Duke, who, parſimonious in the extreme, as to his own perſon and government, is thought ſolicitous of ſeconding by his heavy purſe the wild projects of his brother the Emperor Joſeph, the little republic of St. Marino, on the contrary, has been increaſing its populouſneſs, confirming its ſtrength, and extending the baſis of its government. For theſe advantages it is indebted to its mountainous ſituation, virtuous manners, and total want of ambition; which laſt-mentioned qualities, as ancient hiſtory teaches us, are far from being characteriſtics of republican government; though a republic that is without them can neither ſubſiſt happily itſelf, nor allow happineſs to its neighbours.

In the republics of Italy, (St. Marino alone excepted,) the people at large are excluded, by the circumſtance of their birth, from any principal ſhare in the ſovereignty. Inſtead of one royal maſter, they are ſubjects of ſix hundred[1] petty princes; and their condition is far leſs eligible than that of the ſubjects of monarchies; becauſe the latter cannot be collectively degraded by the rank of a monarch, which, excluding compariſon, is ſuperior to envy; and are individually entitled to aſpire, by their talents and merits, to the exerciſe of every magiſtracy, and to the enjoyment of every preferment and every honour which their king and country can beſtow. The republic of St. Marino, on the other hand, like ſeveral commonwealths of antiquity, and like ſome leſſer Cantons of Switzerland, for the greater are univerſally moulded after the rigid Italian model, contains

[1] In the ſhop of an eminent bookſeller and publiſher of an ancient and celebrated republic of Italy, I was explaining to a young patrician the nature of an Engliſh circulating library. 'Why do not you, Paſquali,' ſaid he, turning to the bookſeller, 'introduce ſuch an inſtitution?' The other replied, '*Sono troppo principi!*—We have too many princes.'

contains what is found by experience to be a due mixture of popular government among fo fimple a people, and in fo fmall a ftate. The Council of Sixty is equally compofed of *nobili* and *cittadini*, patricians and plebeians. This council, which may be called the fenate, conducts the ordinary branches of public adminiftration; but the *Arengo*, or affembly of the people, containing a reprefentative from every houfe or family, may be fummoned for the purpofe of elections and on other important emergencies; it has long uniformly approved the decifions of the fenate. In choofing fenators and magiftrates, the refpect of the citizens for hereditary worth commonly raifes the fon to the dignity before held by his father. Indeed moft profeffions and employments defcend in lineal fucceffion among this fimple people; a circumftance which explains a very extraordinary fact mentioned by Mr. Addifon, that in two purchafes made refpectively in the years 1100 and 1170, the names of the commiffioners or agents, on the part of the republic, fhould be the fame in both tranfactions, though the deeds were executed at the diftance of feventy years from each other.

Notwithftanding the natural and proper influence of wealth and birth and merit, the liberties and properties of individuals are incomparably more fafe in St. Marino than they can ever poffibly be under the capricious tyranny of a levelling democracy; and the people at large have the firmeft fecurity that their fuperiors will not abufe their juft pre-eminence, fince all the plebeians of full age are trained to arms, and commanded by a fort of military tribune of their own choofing, whofe employment is inferior in dignity to that of the *capitaneos*, or confuls, yet altogether diftinct from the jurifdiction of thofe patrician magiftrates. This important military officer is overlooked by

Mr.

Mr. Addiſon, who has alſo omitted to mention the treaſurer of the republic. The buſineſs of the latter conſiſts in collecting and adminiſtering the public contributions, and in paying the *ſtipendiati* or penſionaries, whoſe ſalaries, as may be imagined, are extremely moderate; that of the *commiſſareo*, or chief judge, amounting only to ſixty pounds a-year. His income is conſiderably augmented by the *ſportulæ*, or fees paid by the litigant parties; ſo that his whole appointments fall little ſhort of one hundred pounds *per annum*, a ſum which in this primitive commonwealth is found ſufficient to ſupport the dignity of a chief juſtice.

The laws of St. Marino are contained in a thin folio, printed in 1599, at Rimini, intitled, "*Statuta Illuſtriſſimæ Reipublicæ*;" and the whole hiſtory of this happy and truly illuſtrious, becauſe virtuous and peaceful, community is compriſed in the following pages, extracted from the ſecret archives of the ſtate.

Marino and his companion Leon came from Illyria to Rimini towards the commencement of the fourth century, and exhibited the new phænomenon of Anachorites in the weſtern world. In order to practice their auſterities undiſturbed, Leon retired to Mount Feretro; and Marino, to Mount Titan; which mountains, diſtant ſeven Italian miles from each other, reſpectively aſſumed the names of San Leo and San Marino, about the beginning of the ninth century [k].

But

[k] The fame of theſe Saints appears to have been increaſed and confirmed by time. Marino, with whom we are concerned, is mentioned in martyrologies and calendars. He is ſaid to have been a Dalmatian by birth, and an architect by profeſſion; and to have come to Rimini, in his youth, towards the commencement of the fourth century. In the annals of Baronius, there is a letter of the year 511, which makes mention of an Anachorite who lived on Mount Titan. Marino, who afforded the firſt example of

6 this

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But long before this æra, many Italian monks emulating the auftere fuperftition of the Illyrian ftrangers, had been allured by romantic fituations which accorded with the loftinefs and folemnity of their own characters; the inhabitants of the neighbouring plains, haraffed by the barbarous incurfions which prevailed in the fifth and following centuries, occafionally fought refuge among rude and favage mountains, from more rude and more favage invaders. Amidft thefe ferocious incurfions, which were finally repreffed by Pepin and Charlemagne, the lay inhabitants of Mount Titan gradually united into a regular commonwealth; and the Anachorites formed themfelves into a religious fociety, under the direction of an abbot. The *republic* early endowed the *convent* with lands amply fufficient for its fupport; the property of which lands, as appears by a rare manufcript of the year 884, preferved in the fecret archives of the republic, was contefted by Delton bifhop of Rimini againft Stephen abbot of Mount Titan. The caufe was tried, according to the cuftom of thofe times, by the *judices datini* and *fcabini*; and decided in favour of the monaftery. The fame valuable monument which bears teftimony to thefe facts, difproves the fictitious donation of the mountain by King Pepin; of which grant the original has never been produced, but of which there are faid to be two copies, one by the Librarian Anaftafio, and the other by the Chamberlain Centio.

In

this auftere mode of life in the weft, muft have left behind him a ftrong impreffion of his piety; fince many churches were dedicated to his worfhip at wide intervals of time and place; among which may be mentioned the Royal Monaftery of Pavia, built or reftored by Aftolphus king of the Lombards; an ancient church with a rich monaftery at Rimini; the great parifh church in Bologna, as well as the cathedral in the city and ifland of Arbe in the Adriatic, oppofite to the Venetian province of Morlachia.

In the former we read "Serram[1] caftrum St. Mariani," and in the latter, "Serram caftrum St. Martini;" inftead of both which names, St. Marino has been as abfurdly as arbitrarily fubftituted; fince the place now bearing that name retained its original appellation of Mount Titan for more than a century after the date of king Pepin's pretended diploma.

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The firft inhabitants of the mountain did not eftablifh themfelves on the rough and rocky fummits on which part of the city now ftands, but occupied the gentle flope at a mile's diftance in the direction of fouth-weft, then embraced by deep woods, and ftill called *Il Luogo Vecchio*; words indicating that it was the ancient feat of the republic. In this fequeftered wildernefs the inhabitants of Mount Titan long enjoyed a peaceful obfcurity, undifturbed by the great powers which fwayed the politics of Italy; and almoft unknown to them, until Otho the Great invaded that country in the year 962, to make war on king Berenger. The latter retreated to Mount Feretro, aftewards called San Leo. His fortreffes there were blocked up two years; he was at length compelled to furrender through famine; his queen and himfelf were carried prifoners into Franconia. During this warfare, the diftrict of Mount Titan, confpicuous by its vicinity and its loftinefs to the contending parties, was allowed to maintain its neutrality; an indulgence for which it was in part indebted to the jealoufy fubfifting

[1] In barbarous Latin and Italian, *ferra* means a craggy mountain—a word applicable enough, but never really applied in ancient records to Mount Titan, afterwards called "Penne de St. Marino." The name is faid, in the manufcript above cited, to have arifen from the towers fhaped like the feathers of an arrow, with which the mountain was crowned.

APPEND. TO BOOK II. ſubſiſting between the emperor Otho and John XII., who then wore the papal crown. The latter laboured by repeated embaſſies to moderate the ambition of the former, and to reſtrain the incurſions of his troops. The emperor, on the other hand, ſtruck by the ſingular manners of a people, whoſe honeſt ſimplicity gained his eſteem, and whoſe poverty could not tempt his avarice, frequently viſited Mount Titan, while his army was employed in the ſiege of Feretro; and on one occaſion of this ſort, confirmed by his Imperial grant the entire liberty and independence which the principal citizens of the republic ſwore that their anceſtors had from time immemorial enjoyed.

During the eleventh century Italy began to be torn by the diſſenſions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines; the former, partiſans of the pope; the latter, of the emperor. This inteſtine war, which pervaded the whole country, greatly multiplied the towers and baſtions by which every province, every diſtrict, and the reſidence of almoſt every diſtinguiſhed nobleman long continued to be fortified. Men ſcarcely felt themſelves ſecure in the moſt inacceſſible ſituations; and the inhabitants of St. Titan, now denominated St. Marino, removed from the ſloping lawn formerly mentioned, to the very ſummit of the mountain called Rocca di Girone, which natural faſtneſs the jealous republicans farther ſecured by walls and towers [m].

In the twelfth century they ſtrengthened their ſecurity by entering into an intimate connection with the counts of Felori, diſtinguiſhed ornaments of the Imperial party. This noble family, which afterwards gave dukes to Urbino, condeſcended to

[m] In the principal church of the preſent city, there is a ſtatue of the ſuppoſed founder of the republic, holding a mountain in his hand, crowned with three towers or caſtles; emblems fitly choſen for the arms of the community.

to become citizens of the republic; and brought to it an acceffion of ftrength and wealth, which foon difcovered itfelf in the purchafe of fome grounds on the fouth-weft, and the extenfion of the city to fituations more eligible than the Rocca di Girone, where the fafety of the inhabitants was frequently endangered by the fury of the winds.

During the greater part of the thirteenth century, St. Marino efcaped moleftation from the petty, but almoft continual, hoftilities which diftreffed the neighbouring territories. This happy exemption from the evils incident to war, the republic owed to the wifdom and moderation of its own councils, and to the friendly protection of the bifhopric of Feretro, which was long hereditary in the family of the counts of Felori of Mount Capiolo. But when that bifhopric fell into the poffeffion of the Guelph faction, and efpecially after the new bifhop treacheroufly feized, in 1281, the fortrefs of San Leo belonging to the counts of Felori, the republic had its full fhare of troubles. Its territories were repeatedly invaded, but the invaders were as often manfully repelled. The danger, however, increafed when the crafty Malatefta de Verrucchio, who was alfo a warm partifan of the Guelphs, made himfelf mafter of Rimini towards the clofe of the thirteenth century; after having expelled from that city the chevalier Percitaule, a powerful Ghibelline, who with much difficulty efcaped to St. Marino to the houfe of his friend the celebrated Guido Felorio, a man who afterwards inflicted fignal vengeance on the party of the Guelphs.

From the æra laft mentioned, the age of perfecution commenced; and the republic was continually haraffed by the bifhops of Feretro, or by the lords of Rimini, for upwards of a century and a half; until, in the year 1462, the fierce Sigif-

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mond Malatefta, an execrated and excommunicated heretic, as odious by his vices, as eminent for his talents, was totally defeated by Pope Pius II. During this long period of warfare, the republic defended itfelf valiantly, under the counts of Felori and dukes of Urbino, its counfellors, protectors, and generals. About the middle of the fifteenth century, duke Frederic of Felorio procured for it an alliance with Florence; an alliance faithfully maintained on both fides, while that republic continued to fubfift. St. Marino alfo entered into a tranfaction with the king of the two Sicilies in 1459, in virtue of which it acquired the two fouthern diftricts of Fiorentino and Torricella, abounding in rich paftures, embowered in lofty forefts of oak and chefnut trees. At the expence of its perfecutor Sigifmond, it alfo extended its dominions on the north and eaft, by gaining the diftricts Serravalle and Faettano, highly productive in vines and olives; as well as the fertile fields of Mongiardino, which ftill form the granary of the republic.

Thus did this little ftate continue to flourifh amidft perpetual wars, and upheld by the virtue of its citizens, and guided by the paternal care of the family of the Felori. The alliance procured for it with Florence by means of Federico Felorio proved effectual for repelling the incurfions of the pope's armies, which in 1489 befieged Robert Malatefta, the fon of Sigifmond, in Rimini. The Florentines enabled Federic duke of Urbino, to cover the dominions of its ally, and completely to defeat the invaders, who feem to have aimed at nothing lefs than the fubjection of the community. The letters written by the government of Florence in this feafon of danger, are ftill preferved in the fecret archives of St. Marino. They bear teftimony to that fpirit of liberty which had prevailed in Italy from the æra

of

of the famous peace of Conftance in 1170, when many of the principal cities in that country affumed the republican form of government. The Florentines write to their diftreffed allies, whom they addrefs by the appellation of "Magnificent lords, our deareft friends," that they were not more indignant at the infolence of the pope's troops in making inroads into the poffeffions of St. Marino, than if they had carried their incurfions to the gates of Florence itfelf. They obferve, that they had haftened to fend troops and money, and alfo to difpatch letters to the duke of Urbino, and to the governments of Naples and Milan; that affiftance would fpeedily arrive; and the remedy, doubtlefs, prove more effecacious than even the greatnefs of the evil required. "Exhortations to you, to be of good comfort, are unneceffary, efpecially from us who know the greatnefs of your fouls, which render you fo refpectable a branch of our confederacy. Perfevere in fhewing your prudence, fidelity, and courage, which, befides that they will delight and gladden your own fouls, (fuch being the nature of virtue,) will greatly oblige us and our allies, who will keep your meritorious exertions in eternal remembrance." Next day the Florentines wrote again, exhorting the citizens of St. Marino "to remain firm and refolute, to lofe their lives rather than their liberties, fince it was far better for men accuftomed to freedom to be dead than enflaved. God, who favours the caufe of freedom, will profper your undertakings; and your interefts will never be forfaken by us and our friends. You have heard of the fupplies of men and money already raifed for your affiftance. More of both will continue to be provided, until you have enough."

From this time forward, until the year 1543, the republic, being unmolefted by foreign enemies, flourifhed in peace

and

APPEND. TO BOOK II. and profperity under the wife guidance of the dukes of Urbino, its counfellors and protectors. But in the year abovementioned, the exile Peter Strozzi, who commanded the French troops cantoned in Mirandola and its confines, where he was bufily employed in raifing recruits for the fervice of his mafter, Francis I. entered into a correfpondence with fome of the pope's generals in that neighbourhood, for the furprife and conqueft of St. Marino. The inftrument chofen for effecting this defign, was Captain Fabiano of Mount San Savino. The emperor Charles V. had landed at Genoa; and the pope Paul III. had proceeded as far as Bologna, eager to have an interview with the emperor, who was equally folicitous to avoid all intercourfe with his Holinefs. The movement thereby occafioned in that part of Italy feemed to Strozzi and Fabiano the moft favourable moment for executing their treacherous enterprife. Five hundred armed men were fent in fmall divifions acrofs the ridges of Montagnaola. It was intended that, under the conduct of different guides, they fhould unite into one body, and affail in the night the unfufpecting republicans. But a thick fog baffled the local knowledge of the guides. The troops could not be in due time affembled: and the inhabitants of the place, being meanwhile apprized of their own imminent danger, immediately flew to arms, and compelled the invaders to retreat with the mortification of committing a fruitlefs crime, which had redounded as much to their own difgrace as to the honour of their adverfaries.

The moft memorable circumftance attending this event was the warm intereft taken by the Italian powers in the fafety of St. Marino. Cofmo di Medici, duke of Florence, in a letter addreffed to that government, and dated the 20th June 1543, mentions with how much difpleafure he had heard of Captain

Fabiano's undertaking; he requefts that he himfelf might be favoured with a full account of the whole enterprife; its authors, agents, and abettors; affuring the "refpectable citizens of St. Marino, his deareft friends, that he will ever be ready to prove, by his utmoft exertions, his unalterable attachment to whatever may concern their intereft or honour." The marquis of Graffales, then refiding at Fano, as ambaffador from the emperor to the pope, immediately difpatched a courier to Genoa, to acquaint his Imperial majefty with the tranfaction. This powerful and renowed prince, whofe mind was equal to the greateft affairs, thought not the fmalleft below his notice. He was no fooner informed of the enterprife againft St. Marino, than he fent Baftamenti di Herrera to confer in his name with its magiftrates; to congratulate them on their fafety, and to affure them that he would always confider their affairs as his own; fince, befides his great concern for the tranquillity of Italy in general, he could not but view with the fondeft partiality a commonwealth, whofe government had ever been fo wifely and fo regularly adminiftered. The pope, Paul III., did not choofe to be behind-hand with other princes in his profeffions of regard: and in order to ingratiate himfelf with the emperor, whofe favour he then courted, thought fit to order the French troops to quit the neighbourhood of St. Marino, and to keep at an unfufpicious diftance from its territory.

This favourable difpofition in his Holinefs towards them, was cultivated by the republicans with equal affiduity and fuccefs. In the year 1548, the pope's treafurer and the officers of his revenue in Romagna endeavoured indeed to fubject the commonwealth to the new tax on falt, which had been impofed on all the reft of that province. But Paul himfelf explicitly

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plicitly difavowed this proceeding; and iffued his brief, dated 11th October 1548, declaring the complete independence of St. Marino in temporal affairs; and thus confirming its inhabitants in the enjoyment of their immemorial liberties. The fame equitable conduct towards the republic was purfued by his fucceffors Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; under the latter of whom, the duchy of Urbino, on the demife of its laft duke in 1623, being united to the dominions of the Holy See, the republic of St. Marino paffed under the protection of the fame power, upon many and well-defined conditions. This political connection with the pope was not thought greatly to intrench on the independence of the commonwealth. It had been ufual with the Italian republics of the middle age to court the patronage of neighbouring princes; and, even in their conftitutional concerns, to have recourfe to noblemen of high rank and fplendid fortune, who might alternately prefide in their tribunals [n], and command their armies. St. Marino had long repofed unbounded yet well-placed confidence in the family of Felori; and what Machiavel fays of Florence is in a great degree applicable to all the other free ftates of Italy, that their affairs were never profperous, unlefs when conducted by the fteady wifdom of fome illuftrious individual.

St. Marino refpected the popes in their civil, and venerated them in their religious character. The warm expreffions of thofe fentiments contented the vicars of St. Peter; but fuch empty acknowledgments would not fatisfy the ambitious and intriguing

[n] St. Marino was diftinguifhed above the neighbouring republics, for the impartiality with which juftice was adminiftered; and was later than moft of them in adopting the "Judice eftero," the jurifdiction of a foreigner, "articolo troppo neceffario per tolgierfi ogni fufpicione nei guidici præfani:" an eftablifhment found neceffary in confequence of the too juft fufpicions againft judges born in the country."

intriguing Alberoni, who, when legate of Romagna in the year 1740, formed a plan for converting refpect into allegiance, and the duty of protection into the right of dominion. A confiderable party of the inhabitants, feduced by his promifes, or gained by his bribes, had confented to betray into his hands the liberties of their country. When the appointed day arrived, Alberoni rode up the mountain, attended by a numerous fuite. He was received by the principal inhabitants at the door of the great church, and conducted by the priefts to a magnificent feat under a canopy. But unfortunately for the execution of his purpofe, the mafs began, as ufual in that republic, with the word "Libertas." This fingle word produced fuch an enthufiafm in the minds of thofe who underftood his defigns, as well as of thofe who only fufpected them, that they rofe with common confent, attacked the cardinal and his attendants, drove them precipitately from the church, and made them defcend the mountain with a degree of difordered trepidation extremely unlike to the flow and pompous folemnity with which they had afcended it. This laft memorable event in the hiftory of St. Marino well correfponds with that firmnefs and courage with which it is fuppofed to have maintained its independence, amidft the hoftile collifions of Imperial and Pontifical power; an independence, however, which appears to have been owing to the penurious circumftances of a people, which could not tempt rapacity, and their virtuous manners which always conciliated the affection of one party, more than they provoked the animofity of another.

From the preceding narrative it is not very eafy to afcertain what fhare Marino, the Dalmatian architect, had in the firft inftitution of the ftate. On the fuppofition that he was its founder

founder and lawgiver, Mr. Addifon obferves, "that the origin of St. Marino muft be acknowledged to be far nobler than that of Rome, which was an afylum for robbers and murderers; whereas St. Marino was the refort of perfons eminent for their piety and devotion. This obfervation appears to me to be erroneous in two refpects, decorating with unfair honours the one republic, and heaping unmerited difgrace on the other. If piety founded St. Marino, with this piety much fuperftition was intermixed; a fuperftition unfriendly to the beft principles of fociety, and hoftile to the favourite ends of nature, preaching celibacy, and exacting mortification, the hideous offspring of ignorance and terror, detefting men as criminals, and trembling at God as a tyrant. But Rome, according to the only hiftorian* who has circumftantially and authentically defcribed its early tranfactions, was an expanfion of Alba Longa, itfelf a Grecian colony, which, according to the immemorial and facred cuftom of its mother-country, diffufed into new fettlements the exuberance of a flourifhing population, produced by the wifeft and moft liberal inftitutions. According to the fame admirable hiftorian, the manly difcernment of Romulus offered an afylum not merely for robbers and murderers, but for thofe who were threatened with murder or robbery, who fpurned fubjection, or fled from oppreffion; for amidft the lawlefs turbulence of ancient Italy, the weak needed protectors againft the ftrong, the few againft the many; and Rome, at her earlieft age, already fyftematically affifted the weakeft party; thus adopting in her infancy that politic heroifm, that was deftined by firm and majeftic fteps to conduct her manhood and maturity to the fair fovereignty of confenting nations.

Both

* Dionyfius of Halicarnaffus.

Both in their origin and in their progrefs, Rome and St. Marino form the natural objects, not indeed of a comparifon, but of a ftriking contraft; and compreffed as is the latter republic between the dominions of the Pope and thofe of the Grand Duke, to whofe fubjects St. Marino is now bound to allow a free paffage through its territory, its citizens would deferve ridicule or pity, did they affect the character, or imitate the maxims, of thofe magnanimous fenators, who, for the fpace of more than two centuries, fwayed the politics and controlled the revolutions of the world. Convinced that their independence refults chiefly from their infignificancy, the fenators of St. Marino fmiled, when we read in Mr. Addifon, 'Thefe republicans would fell their liberties dear to any that attacked them.' We had not the indelicacy to defire them to interpret this fmile; or to make ourfelves any comment upon it, being perfuaded, that, precarious and fhadowy as their liberty is, their rational knowledge and their virtues have enabled them to extract from it both fubftantial and permanent enjoyment, and make them live happier here, amidft rocks and fnows, than are their Tufcan and Roman neighbours in rich plains and warm vallies.

To the inhabitants of this little ftate, the fenate, the affembly, the different offices of magiftracy, innocent rural labours, and military exercifes equally ufeful and innocent, fupply a continual fucceffion of manly engagements. Hopes and fears refpecting the fafety of their country awaken curiofity and excite inquiry. They read the gazettes of Europe with intereft; they ftudy hiftory with improvement; in converfation their queftions are pertinent, and their anfwers fatisfactory. Contrary to what has been obferved by travellers of other

 Italians,

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

Italians, the citizens of St. Marino delight in literary converfation; and Mr. Addifon remarks, that he hardly met with an unlettered man in their republic. In fpeaking of Beccaria's book on Style, then recently publifhed, one of the fenators faid, that it was a treatife on ftyle in a very bad ftyle, abounding in falfe ornaments and epigrammatic gallicifm. Another obferved, he wifhed that fafhionable writer, who had been commented on by Voltaire, an author ftill more fafhionable and more pernicious than himfelf, would confine himfelf to fuch harmlefs topics as rhetoric and ftyle; for his book on crimes and punifhments was calculated to do much ferious mifchief, at leaft to prevent much pofitive good; becaufe in that popular work he had declaimed very perfuafively againft capital punifhments, in a country long difgraced by capital crimes, which were fcarcely ever capitally punifhed.

The love of letters which diftinguifhes the people of St. Marino makes them regret that they are feldom vifited by literary travellers. Of our own countrymen belonging to this defcription, they mentioned with much refpect Mr. Addifon, and Il Signor Giovanni Symonds, now profeffor of hiftory in the univerfity of Cambridge. We were proud of being claffed with fuch men by the honeft fimplicity of thefe virtuous mountaineers, whom we left with regret, moft heartily wifhing to them the continuance of their liberties; which, to men of their character, and theirs only, are real and folid bleffings.

For let it never be forgotten, that the ineftimable gift of civil liberty may often be providentially withheld, becaufe it cannot be fafely beftowed, unlefs rational knowledge has been attained, and virtuous habits have been acquired. In the language of the wifeft man of Pagan antiquity, a great length of time

time is requiſite to the formation of any moderately good government; becauſe that government is always the beſt, which is the beſt adapted to the genius and habits of its ſubjects [p]. The inſtitutions which ſuit the well-balanced frame of mind of the mountaineers of St. Marino, who, breathing a purer air, ſeem to have diveſted themſelves of many of the groſſer and more earthly affections, might ill accord with the ſoftened tenants of the Capuan plains; ſince, according to the ſame penetrating ſearcher into the ſecrets of human nature, 'the inhabitants of the Fortunate Iſlands, if ſuch iſlands really exiſt, muſt either be the moſt virtuous or the moſt wretched of men.' Ariſtotle hardly knew the inhabitants of the Britiſh Iſles; but let us, who know ourſelves and our good fortune, confide in the aſſurance, that this incompatible author would no longer entertain the above geographical doubt, were he to revive in the eighteenth century, and to viſit the Britiſh dominions under the government of George III. [q] As we have long been the happieſt of nations, let us cheriſh the hope, that the cauſes of our happineſs are, morally ſpeaking, unalterable. The character of our anceſtors, uniting, beyond all people on earth, firmneſs with humanity, gave to us our government; and the preſervation of our government, as it now ſtands, under a prince who is at once the patron and the model of thoſe virtues on which alone national proſperity can reſt, forms the ſureſt pledge for the ſtability of that character, which has long adorned, and we truſt will ever adorn, the envied name of BRITON.

[p] Ariſtot. Politics, b. ii. p. 6.

[q] About the time this was written, a letter from a foreign prelate, now high in office in a neighbouring country, contained the following memorable words: "Tout ici," meaning England, "eſt dans un état de proſperité vraiment révoltante."

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Third Book, the author, proceeding to inveftigate the nature and characteriftic qualities of the different forms of government, begins, according to his ufual method, by analyfing that complex object, a commonwealth, into its conftituent elements, called citizens. His firft inquiry, therefore, is, what conftitutes a citizen? An inquiry that will appear very fimple to many of thofe fimple men who are continually debating particular cafes involved in the folution of this general queftion.

It is worthy of remark that in oppofition to thofe ancient, as well as thofe modern theories, which vainly endeavour to reduce practical matters to metaphyfical precifion, Ariftotle maintains that the definition of a citizen which holds good in one ftate, is often not at all applicable in another. He even beftows that honourable name on thofe who, in modern times, are more ufually denominated fubjects; obferving, "that as government is properly an arrangement of thofe who are partners in the benefits of political fociety, the fitnefs of government muft, like that of every other arrangement, depend primarily and principally on the nature and differences of the objects that collectively compofe the fyftem. This arrangement, therefore, muft vary

BOOK III. with every variation of its parts, materials, or elements; which, in this cafe, are fentient and moral beings, liable to be affected and altered by a wide variety of actuating principles." In enmuerating thefe principles, the author obferves, that the diftinctive characters of communities are greatly dependent on the means ufually employed by them for acquiring the neceffaries and accommodations of life. Paftoral, agricultural, and commercial nations are, therefore, feverally marked by ftrong lines of difcrimination. Climate alfo has a confpicuous influence; and innumerable local caufes concurring with the events of time and chance, and co-operating with education and nature fo varioufly mould mankind, that nothing but the blindnefs of ignorance and narrownefs of prejudice could think of extending fimilar plans of policy to nations as differently circumftanced, as they are unlike in the bent of their genius.

But though governments may and muft vary in their form, they ought all to agree in their end, "the good of the governed." Ariftotle ftrenuoufly maintains this doctrine, which will ever found fo harfhly in the ears of political bigots of all defcriptions; and which has ever been as infolently fcorned in the practice of republican demagogues, as it has been fhamelefsly combated in the arguments of court flatterers. By what arrangements the good of the governed is moft likely to be promoted, muft be learned from the experience of hiftory; but, in our author's opinion, that people ought to remain contented with its lot, which is not mocked with fhadows inftead of realities; deluded with tyranny under the femblance of royalty, oligarchy under that of ariftocracy, and democracy under that of a republic. Regardlefs of perfonal danger from tyrants or a tyrannical populace, the philofopher boldly arraigns thofe

bafe

base cheats and vile counterfeits; those unnatural perversions of lawful power, and wicked mimics of legitimate government. It is not easy to discover which of the parties that then divided and tore in pieces their common country, he most heartily abhors. In civil commotions, a man who is called to act, ought publicly to choose his side, though he may often have but a choice of difficulties; but he whose business is speculation will commonly best perform his duty, if, in proportion to the measure of his courage and abilities, he ventures to expose and condemn the excesses of contending factions, and to suggest those reflections that have the most direct tendency to sooth their rage, and to moderate their fury. This task our philosopher skilfully performs, by proving with irresistible evidence that birth, wealth, education, and authority, as well as courage, strength, numbers, and liberty, are all of them essential ingredients in the composition of a well-constituted commonwealth; but that the composition must fall in pieces, when any one of the elements is active beyond its sphere; whether government be engrossed by contemptuous opulence, or usurped by rapacious poverty; oppressed by the unfeeling pride of the few, or disgraced by the malignant passions of the multitude. BOOK III.

The Third Book of the Politics concludes with an enumeration and description of the different kinds of monarchy; a species of government which, according to our author, is not only legitimate, but in many countries necessary. The most extensive survey of history fully justifies the conclusions which the philosopher had drawn from the records of Egypt and the east. The Romans, who in the age of the Scipios had admired "the servile stupidity of the Cappadocians in declaring that they could not live without a king [a]," acknowledged in the age

[a] θαυμασαντες ει τινες μεν ὄυτως απειρηκοτες προς την ελευθεριαν. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

BOOK III. age of Auguftus, that their own commonwealth could not happily fubfift but under the dominion of one prince [b]. The emperor Julian [c] reprefents all the great nations of his own times as governed by the fame political principles, which had been fo uniformly [d] maintained by the Cappadocians. If liberty had been offered to the Thracians, the Myfians, and the Getæ, thofe populous and warlike tribes would, according to Philoftratus [e], have fpurned the unwelcome prefent. The hiftorian Livy acknowledges that the cities fubject to king Eumenes had not any reafon to envy the boafted condition of republicans [f]; and the orator Ifocrates congratulates in ftill warmer language, the felicity of the ftates of Cyprus, which had fubmitted to the dominion of Evagoras [g]. But the ftrongeft argument in favour of monarchy is deducible from the progreffive profperity of moft countries of Europe, during the prefent and two preceding centuries; in which courfe of time the difmembered provinces of the weftern empire have enjoyed under kings a meafure of national felicity unexampled in the hiftory of the world.

As a confiderable part of Ariftole's treatife on monarchy has perifhed, it would be prefumptuous to affign limits to the improvement of which he thought that form of government fufceptible. From a hint in the Sixth Book of his Politics, he appears to have been fully aware of the utility of a revifion of fentences paffed under the influence of popular delufion, or

[b] Seneca de Beneficiis, l. ii. c. 20. [c] Julian. adverf. Chriftian.

[d] They rejected the republican government when offered to them by their conquerors; and when their own royal line became extinct, called Ariobarzanes to an hereditary throne; and after the extinction alfo of the line of Ariobarzanes in the third generation, cheerfully fubmitted to Archelaus, a ftranger, recommended to them by Mark Anthony. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

[e] Philoftrat. in Vit. Apollon. [f] Liv. l. xlii. c. 5. [g] Ifocrat. in Evagor.

or extorted through the ſeverity of legal forms; maintaining that in every well-governed ſtate, a diſcretionary power of grace and mercy ſhould be lodged, not with the ſubordinate magiſtrate, but with the ſupreme executive authority. This doubtleſs, if not the moſt ſplendid diſtinction, is at leaſt the moſt amiable prerogative of the throne. But there are other diſtinctions totally unknown to antiquity, yet calculated to produce both the moſt important immediate benefits, and to give to modern monarchy a degree of firmneſs and ſtability of which no other form of government can boaſt.

We read in Plutarch[h] of the coronation oath adminiſtered to the kings of Epirus. Xenophon[i] mentions a ſimilar inſtitution in Lacedæmon. Both Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus[k] deſcribe the conſtitutional limitations of the kings of Perſia. The laſt-mentioned writer alſo copiouſly expatiates on the ſingular reſtraints impoſed on the kings of Egypt during their lives, and relates that thoſe of them who had incurred public indignation, were publicly arraigned after their death, and publicly puniſhed by the privation of a royal, or even a decent ſepulture[l]. Joſephus informs us that this regulation alſo prevailed in Judæa[m]. But all theſe expedients, as well as thoſe employed by the Macedonians, the freeſt nation of antiquity acknowledging the authority of kings, were coarſe and uncertain contrivances for limiting the regal power; contrivances always ſo doubtful, and often ſo ineffectual, that by the conſenting voice of antiquity, the happineſs of a people was held by the precarious tenure of perſonal merit in the prince. In conſequence of this opinion, the

[h] Plut. in Pyrrho. [i] De Repub. Lacedæm. [k] L. xvii.
[l] Diodor. l. i. ſect. 72. [m] Joſeph. l. viii. c. 3.

the right of election appeared the moſt plauſible title to a throne; and even in thoſe countries where the royal pre-eminence of particular families was univerſally acknowledged, there was not any invariable rule for aſcertaining among different pretenders the order of ſucceſſion. This is fully illuſtrated in the hiſtory of the kingdoms formed from the diſmemberment of the Macedonian empire, and deſerves to be conſidered as one principal cauſe of their rapid decline and final extinction. But when the ſalutary maxims are eſtabliſhed "that kings can do no wrong, and that acts of government can be legaliſed only through the intervention of reſponſible miniſters," the inequalities of perſonal character in princes become ſo harmleſs in practice, that the caſual advantages of election totally diſappear on compariſon with the certain benefit of a fixed and definite rule to which nations may always have recourſe for tranſmitting without bloodſhed the inheritance of their crowns.

On this ſpecies of monarchy, limited and hereditary, the fruits of genuine republicaniſm have been ſucceſsfully engrafted; and are found by experience to flouriſh there, with a degree of vigour and of beauty which they had never exhibited on their parent plant. This form of government alone completely ſolves the problem propoſed by our author, when he obſerves, that, "difficult as it is to adjuſt the true theory of political arrangements, it is ſtill more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper poſitions." This difficulty, I ſay, is ſurmounted by modern monarchy, and by it only; under which alſo, as will be proved hereafter, that diſtribution of political functions on which all kinds of good adminiſtration ſo greatly depend, may be moſt completely eſtabliſhed, and moſt ſteadily upheld.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Citizen—How conftituted.—Virtues of the man and of the citizen.—Their difference.—Different forms of government.—Their diftinctive characters.—Pretenfions of democracy—Of oligarchy.—Monarchy.—Its five kinds—Arraigned—Defended.

BOOK III. Chap. I.

Analyfis of a commonwealth.

IN explaining the nature and principle [a] of the different forms of government, which are nothing elfe than various arrangements of men in fociety, it is neceffary clearly to afcertain what conftitutes a ftate; an object not uniformly conceived, nor accurately defined; fince one perfon often afcribes *that* to the ftate, which another holds to be an act merely of the king or of the fenate, of the tyrant or the oligarchy. A ftate or commonwealth, then, is a complex object; its component elements are thofe called citizens; to know therefore what is a commonwealth, we muft previoufly inveftigate what conftitutes a citizen. In different governments, the term citizen denotes different defcriptions of perfons; in democracies, men in the loweft walks of life are often entitled to this refpectable appellation; from which perfons of the fame clafs are, in oligarchies, totally

[a] τις ἑκαστη (fcil. πολιτεια) και ποια τις. "What each form of government is, and what are its qualities." Its qualities, as we fhall fee, refult from its principle, and this again depends on the materials from which it is compofed; for Ariftotle did not agree with thofe audacious political fpeculatifts, who think it allowable to treat men as artificers do wood or metal.

BOOK III.

totally excluded. It is not, therefore, the rank in life that conſtitutes the rank in a commonwealth [o].

What conſtitutes a citizen.

The term citizen is ſometimes applied to illuſtrious foreigners who, for their merit or ſervices, have been aſſociated to the honours and adopted into the boſom of the republic. But ſuch honorary citizens form not the ſubject of our preſent inquiry. It is plain likewiſe that the bare circumſtance of place, or the habitual reſidence in the territory or city, does not conſtitute a citizen, ſince ſlaves, and the claſs of men called inhabitants [p], are not diſtinguiſhed by this appellation. Nor are thoſe to be conſidered as our fellow-citizens who merely enjoy the protection of our laws, and who are qualified in their own perſons to appear under the characters of plaintiffs and defendants; for ſtrangers with whoſe countries we have a treaty of commerce, or an intercourſe of hoſpitality, are entitled to challenge as their due the protection of our courts of juſtice; although in many cities thoſe who are ſimply inhabitants cannot proſecute or defend in their own name, but in all their legal tranſactions muſt have recourſe to their procurator or patron. Minors not yet enrolled at the regiſter-office, and perſons ſuperannuated, who are honourably diſcharged from civil functions, fugitives, outlaws, and men branded by the note of infamy, can none of them be called properly or ſimply citizens, ſince whenever we apply to them this name, we muſt join with it ſome epithet or corrective,

[o] For the ſake of perſpicuity, I have expanded this paſſage conformably to the author's words below, c. iii. and in various parts of his works.

[p] μετοικοι, commonly but improperly tranſlated ſojourners, ſince theſe have a caſual, merely, and unſettled reſidence; whereas the Grecian μετοικοι reſided habitually and fixedly in their reſpective ſtates, like the claſs called "habitans" in Geneva, and ſome Swiſs Cantons; and were, as our author ſays in another paſſage, ſharers in the ſame habitation, though not partners in the government.

corrective, without which addition we do not accurately explain our meaning. Who then is ſimply or properly a citizen? He, and he only, who enjoys a due ſhare in the government of that community of which he is a member.

The ſhare of the government, or magiſtracy, common to all the citizens not diſtinguiſhed by a name.

Of the offices of government, ſome are limited in point of time; the man who has exerciſed them once, cannot exerciſe them again, or at leaſt cannot reſume them, till a certain interval has elapſed from the time when he laid them down. Other offices are not thus limited, but may be occaſionally exerciſed by all the citizens, at all times, indifferently. Of this kind is the power of deciding as a judge or juryman in the tribunals, and that of voting as a member in the national aſſembly. It is true, that jurymen [q] and voters, as their office is common to all the citizens, are not diſtinguiſhed by any appropriate appellation denoting their indefinite or perpetual powers; they are not even dignified by the name of magiſtrates; yet if magiſtracy be ſomething more than an honorary title, it belongs in reality moſt peculiarly to thoſe who are inveſted with the higheſt authority in the ſtate; who direct the national deliberations, who govern the public reſolves, and who are the ultimate umpires of reputation, life, and property.

Though anonymous, the moſt important of all magiſtracies.

Under what conſtitutions the ſtrict definition of a citizen is applicable.

This definition of a citizen cannot, however, be applied in the greater part of governments actually exiſting in the world, many of which, as will appear hereafter, are nothing better than corruptions

[q] The Grecian tribunals agreed more nearly with our notion of juries than the Roman. The former generally admitted of the citizens at large; whereas the Roman judicature was exerciſed on ordinary occaſions, for near three centuries, by the Patricians excluſively. But that the Romans thought with Ariſtotle as to the ſupreme importance of the judicial power, appears from the perpetual ſtruggles on this ſubject among the orders in the commonwealth; particularly during that moſt important period which elapſed from the ſeditions of the Gracchi, to the deſpotiſm of the Cæſars.

corruptions and tyrannies. Neither is it applicable in its full extent in thofe communities which, though governed with a view to the public good, have fubftituted the authority of kings or fenates to the power of popular affemblies and popular tribunals. In Sparta and at Carthage, as we have before feen, the judiciary power is intrufted to certain magiftrates; to the Ephori in civil, to the fenate in criminal, trials; and when fuch magiftrates rule by vicarious fucceffion, he may be called a citizen who has a right to govern in his turn. In democracies, this right is extended to the people at large. The definition of a citizen above given is therefore peculiarly applicable to popular governments; and a city or commonwealth is nothing elfe than a collection of citizens thus defcribed, fufficiently numerous for attaining that purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence, for which civil fociety was inftituted.

Coarfe definitions of a citizen.

It is a coarfe and unfatisfactory, but fometimes an ufeful, definition of a citizen, to fay that he is one defcended from citizens in the male and female line; or one whofe anceftors were citizens for two or more generations. The queftion ftill recurs, what conferred this character on thofe anceftors who firft founded the ftate? To them the circumftance of defcent cannot poffibly apply; and if anceftry alone were fufficient to make citizens, we might inquire, as Gorgias of Leontium, either in doubt or in irony, afked the Theffalians of Lariffa, whether as potters make pots [r], there were certain artificers at Lariffa for manufacturing Lariffean citizens. It is inquired with better reafon, whether thofe are citizens who have obtained this appellation in confequence of a revolution in the commonwealth? At Athens, Clifthenes, after the expulfion of the tyrants,

Difficulties occafioned thereby.

[r] The original fays, "as mortar-makers make mortars."

tyrants, aggregated many ftrangers and many flaves to this honourable clafs [s]. In this cafe, the queftion is not whether thefe are citizens, but whether they became fuch *juftly*. Some, indeed, hold that he who is unjuftly a citizen, is a pfeudo-citizen, a mere counterfeit. But this cannot be true, if we define a citizen, as above, by the power or magiftracy with which he is invefted, and acknowledge that many magiftrates, and even kings, who have obtained their offices unjuftly, ftill continue neverthelefs to govern and to reign. He is juftly a citizen who is created fuch by the act of the commonwealth; but what is an act of the commonwealth may fometimes, as we before obferved, be a matter of difpute. When an oligarchy or a tyranny is converted into a democracy, fome people are of opinion that the contracts entered into by the magiftrates or the tyrant ought not to be fulfilled, becaufe thofe contracts were the acts not of the commonwealth, but of the government; and of a government too, not founded on public utility, but eftablifhed by injuftice, and fupported by force. Yet democracies themfelves have often been fo eftablifhed and fo fupported, and *their* acts, at leaft, have neverthelefs always been confidered as the acts of the commonwealth [t].

To

[s] Ariftotle fays, "ἐφυλέτευσε, diftributed among the tribes, many ftrangers," &c. See above, p. 68.

[t] Therefore, "If the acts of tyrannical democracies are confidered as thofe of the ftate, in the fame manner ought the acts of oligarchies and tyrannies." Hooker had ftudied Ariftotle, and from this *arch philofopher*, as he calls him, (Ecclefiaftical Polity, l. i. fect. 10.) he himfelf borrowed the moft folid parts of his excellent, but often mifapplied, work. In reference to the fubject in the text, he obferves, "that in many things affent is given, they that give it not imagining that they do fo, becaufe the manner of their affenting is not apparent. As for example, when an abfolute monarch commandeth his fubjects that which feemeth good in his own difcretion,

 hath

BOOK III. Chap. 2.

What constitutes the identity of a commonwealth.

To determine what is the act of the body politic often depends on afcertaining the circumftances which conftitute its famenefs or identity; circumftances which are no fooner withdrawn, than its continuity of exiftence is diffolved, and the commonwealth or city [u] no longer remains the fame identical city that it was before. That the famenefs of local fituation does not conftitute this identity, will appear evident to the moft fuperficial obferver. A commonwealth may tranfport itfelf from one place to another, and fome portion of its members may live at a remote diftance from the reft. The Peloponnefus and its feven republics might be inclofed within one wall; but within this wall would be contained not a city or commonwealth, but an aggregate of nations, lefs connected with each other than the inhabitants of Babylon, whofe walls, it is faid, were ftormed and taken upwards of two days before every divifion of the immenfe multitude was apprifed of the public difafter. Concerning the magnitude of ftates we fhall have occafion afterwards to fpeak; and to examine whether they may be compofed of many nations, or ought to confift of one only; an inquiry not mifbecoming a ftatefman. At prefent, let us inquire whether the famenefs of inhabitants, or rather the continuance

hath not this edict the force of a law, whether they difapprove or diflike it? Again, that which hath been received long fince, and is by cuftom now eftablifhed, we keep as a law which we may not tranfgrefs. . . . And to be commanded we confent, where that fociety, whereof we are part, hath at any time before confented, without revoking the fame after by the like univerfal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed paft is good as long as he himfelf continueth it, fo the act of a public fociety of men done five hundred years fince ftandeth their's who prefently are of the fame fociety, becaufe corporations are immortal: we were then alive in our predeceffors, and they in their fucceffors do live ftill." Ecclef. Polit. p. 19. edit. 1723.

[u] A city, the author obferves, is one of thofe words which are taken in different acceptations; in the fenfe here meant it is fynonymous with commonwealth.

continuance of the fame race of inhabitants, conftitutes the identity of a commonwealth, in the fame manner as the identity of a fountain or river is afcertained by the flowing of the fame kind of water from the fame fources, though in perpetually varying ftreams. Agreeably to this comparifon, ought we to fay that the commonwealth, while compofed of the fame race of men, continues the fame identical commonwealth? Or rather, ought we not to fay that the identity, in this cafe, is to be afcribed merely to the people or the inhabitants? Every commonwealth, as we have faid, forms a fort of partnerfhip or community; and in this community or partnerfhip each individual has his fhare. This fhare is determined by the form of the government, which is nothing elfe than the arrangement of the different individuals in the community; and when this arrangement is altered, the commonwealth, though ftill compofed of the fame perfons, cannot remain fpecifically the fame. A tragic and a comic chorus may be executed by precifely the fame performers; precifely the fame notes compofe the boldnefs of the Doric, and the wildnefs of the Phrygian mufic. In fuch cafes, though the conftituent parts be the fame, a difference in their arrangement and difpofition produces a totally different refult. The identity of a commonwealth depends, therefore, on the continuance of the fame form of government; but it is a diftinct inquiry, whether, in confequence of a change in the form of government, contracts fubfifting before the revolution ought, in juftice, to be fulfilled[x]?

A queftion

[x] The author does not examine this queftion, but it is eafy to perceive that he would have decided it in a manner little conformable to the prevailing practice of his own times. The Athenians, indeed, gave one illuftrious example of their refpect for the fanctity of engagements contracted in the name of the public, when they burdened themfelves

BOOK III. Chap. 3.

Diftinction between the virtues of the man and of the citizen.

A queftion naturally follows, whether a good citizen muft of neceffity be endowed with the virtues of a good man? This queftion can only be folved by confidering what are the effential qualities of a citizen. A citizen then is, as it were, one of a fhip's company, and a fharer with the reft in one common concern. Different failors have different occupations. One fteers the helm; another is boatfwain; many ply the oars. The accurate and complete definition of each individual muft, doubtlefs, exprefs his particular employment and his appropriate duty. Yet one general definition is applicable to them all; fince they are all alike concerned in promoting a profperous navigation, and all alike interefted in the fafety of the common veffel. The republic is the veffel in which citizens are embarked; and the fafety of the republic is, as we proved above, the fafety of its form of government. To this the virtues of good citizens muft always be relative; and as civil conftitutions widely differ, the virtues neceffary to preferve them muft differ as widely. They are virtues not abfolutely, but politically; and bear a reference to an end or purpofe, independently of which they would not deferve even the name of virtue. But the virtues of a good man are ultimately defirable on their own account, as conftituting in themfelves the perfection and happinefs of his rational and moral nature.

Political virtues relative to rank, age, and fex.

In no country whatever have the greater part of mankind attained this confummate excellence; but unlefs the majority in every country were politically virtuous, the commonwealth muft foon perifh, fince its fubfiftence can only be maintained while

themfelves with a loan which had been made to the thirty tyrants. Demofthen. adverf. Leptin. & Ifocrat. Areopagit. See alfo my Tranflation of Ifocrates, p. 495. and Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 125.

while each, or at leaft the greater part of its members perform their proper offices, or, in other words, exercife their refpective virtues; virtues as different from each other, as are the various exigencies of human life to which they are refpectively adapted. Our comparifon of the chorus is here ftrictly applicable. The office and the virtue of him who leads the band is altogether different from the office and the virtue of any other performer. But of the leader himfelf, of him who directs the chorus of ftate, what are the peculiar excellencies? When he executes his office aright, wifdom and goodnefs are with propriety afcribed to him. There is an education too, that befits men born to command, and them only; leffons of war and horfemanfhip are given to the fons of kings; and Euripides fays in the perfon of a young prince,

"Teach me not frivolous arts,
"But teach me only how to ferve my country."

There is an education, therefore, becoming a prince, and there are men fit for receiving none other. Jafon[y] of Pheræ declared, without a figure of fpeech, that he was famifhed for want of empire. Power, it feems, was as neceffary to Jafon, as food to other men; and if he had not gained a crown, he muft have ceafed to live. This magnanimous Theffalian had learned, forfooth, only how to command, but a citizen muft alfo learn how to obey; and it is juftly obferved, that, in the equality of free commonwealths, men muft be difciplined by obedience, before they can be fafely intrufted with authority. In proportion, therefore, as the form of government approximates political perfection, the virtues of a good man and of a good citizen will the more nearly coincide. In all fuch governments, prudence

[y] See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. pp. 377, 378, & feq.

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prudence in the governors, and right opinion in the governed, are effential and peculiar requifites; other virtues are common to both, but varioufly modified by age, fex, office, and condition [z].

Citizens and their virtues different in different forms of government.

If virtue, in the ftricteft fenfe, be effential to a citizen, by what name fhall we call thofe low mechanics, who are condemned by their indigence to unwholefome and degrading drudgery? They are not flaves, they are not mere inhabitants, their labour is ufeful to the ftate, and yet the lives which neceffity compels them to lead, contribute not in any degree to the formation of virtue, either intellectual or moral. In ancient times, thefe mean artifans were fometimes claffed with flaves; and as flaves in many cities, they ftill continue to be confidered; for it is worthy of remark, that defining a citizen as above, "one entitled to fhare the government of his country," we exclude from that rank, women, minors, and children, who are not lefs effential in a ftate than mechanics and artifans. But as there are various forms of government, there muft alfo be various kinds of citizens. In democracies, artifans and even day-labourers may enjoy the honours of the ftate; in ariftocracies this is impoffible, becaufe office is the reward of virtue; in oligarchies, the labourer never can, but the artifan fometimes may attain the rank of citizen; becaufe in fuch governments wealth chiefly opens the road to preferment, and induftrious and fkilful workmen often acquire confiderable opulence. A law therefore prevailed at Thebes, excluding every artifan who had not fhut fhop upwards of ten years, from enjoying any office of magiftracy. In times of national calamity, ftrangers, baftards, perfons of half-blood, and even flaves,

[z] I have tranfpofed and compreffed this paffage, omitting fome obfcure claufes which are elfewhere more clearly expreffed.

ſlaves, have been aſſociated to the honours of the commonwealth; but this liberality gradually ceaſed with the public exigency, and an honourable deſcent, firſt on the father's ſide at leaſt, and afterwards on the ſide alſo of the mother, was again required for conſtituting a citizen. Homer introduces Achilles complaining that he is treated like "an unhonoured ſtranger." A participation in honours and offices is, in fact, eſſential to the character of him who is truly a citizen; and when the appellation is beſtowed on any other, it is to be conſidered as nothing better than a flattering cheat. It is plain, therefore, that the character of a good man coincides in ſome governments with that of a good citizen, in others not; but that even in the former, the two characters completely coincide in the caſe only of thoſe properly qualified to ſhare and to direct the public adminiſtration [a].

Chap. 4.

Of the different forms of government.

We now proceed to inveſtigate the number, the nature, and the genius of the different forms of government [b]. Man, we have ſaid, is naturally a herding and political animal; he delights in the company of others, and covets it for no other purpoſe

[a] Hard would be the lot of mankind if thoſe only were fit to live in ſociety who had acquired confirmed habits of virtue. The purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which communities are inſtituted, does not require in the greater part of the perſons compoſing them ſuch conſummate perfection. There is one caſe, however, pointed out in the text, in which the character of a good citizen neceſſarily infers that of a good man. This is the caſe of magiſtrates or miniſters, of thoſe called to direct or conduct the affairs of the community. In political life, the diſtinction between private and public character was firſt invented by the moſt deteſtable knavery, as it is unhappily perpetuated by the moſt lamentable credulity.

[b] Ariſtotle here repeats, that government is the arrangement of men in ſociety, and eſpecially of thoſe men who, by the forms of the conſtitution, are inveſted with the ſovereignty. He enumerates alſo ſome different kinds of republics, as is done by him more fully hereafter in the next chapter.

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purpofe but merely that of enjoyment. But utility foon ftrengthens the affociation which nature has collected; for fociety is recommended to us not only for the purpofe of fupporting life, a thing fo fweet in itfelf that men are eager to preferve it even under moft deplorable circumftances, but for the purpofe of living honourably and happily. The comfortable fubfiftence, therefore, of the whole body collectively, and of each individual feparately, ought to be regarded as the end and purpofe for which communities have affembled, and the bond by which they are held together. In that moft unequal of all affociations, the affociation, if it may be fo called, of the mafter and the flave, we have already proved that there is a ftrict coincidence of interefts; for though the advantage of the mafter be the thing principally intended, the advantage of the flave (we mean the flave by imbecility of nature) is alfo a neceffary refult [c].

That all juft government has for its end and object the good of the governed.

In the management of families, the intereft of fathers and hufbands coincides with that of wives and children; but as every art has for its object the benefit of thofe on whom it is exercifed; phyfic, the health of the patient; gymnaftic, the ftrength and dexterity of the fcholar; fo the art of domeftic government muft have for its object the benefit of the houfe or family. The benefit of the mafter is likewife the ufual refult; for as he who profeffes the gymnaftic may himfelf fometimes be a wreftler, and as he who directs the veffel muft always

[c] See above, p. 32. The imperfection of modern language does not enable us to exprefs by one word δεσποτεια, which I have tranflated the affociation of mafter and flave: an affociation which the author endeavours to prove mutually beneficial to both parties, by obferving, as he had before done, that the deftruction of the flave would put an end to the δεσποτεια.

always be a paffenger, fo the one fometimes, and the other always, derives perfonal advantage from his refpective art, the direct and effential object of which lies, however, beyond himfelf, and centers in thofe for whofe improvement the leffons of the former are given, and for whofe fafety the fkill of the latter is exercifed. In political partnerfhips, the fame principle holds good; and the art of government, like all other arts, is practifed directly and principally for the benefit of thofe over whom it is exercifed, that is, the good of the governed [d]. This is fo ftrictly true, that in the equality of ancient republics, thofe who performed the tafk and fuftained the burden of magiftracy, and who fubjected themfelves to the painful duties of uninterrupted vigilance and ftrenuous exertion in the fervice of the public, thought it juft that others next in fucceffion fhould perform the fame tafk, fuftain the fame burden, and fubmit to the fame duties; and thus repay the benefit which they had previoufly received, and ferve in their turn as guardians and watchmen of the community [e]. But fees and falaries have corrupted this natural and healthy condition of fociety, and engendered the difeafe of avarice, which is only to be cured by the emolument of perpetual office. The emolument, however, is accidental; the burden effential. Thofe governments, therefore, which confult the good of the public, and thofe only, are right and juft. Thofe which confult the good of the magiftrates alone, are mere perverfions of government, corrupt tyrannies of unworthy mafters

[d] Plato, and, before him, the Pythagorean Fragments, forcibly maintain and beautifully illuftrate this doctrine. Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584. edit. Ficin. and Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi. p. 28.

[e] Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584.

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mafters over reluctant flaves: but a commonwealth is the partnerfhip of freedom.

Enumeration and definition of the different forms of government.

In enumerating and explaining the various forms of government, method requires that we begin with thofe which are right and juft, becaufe thefe being previoufly defined, their counterfeits and corruptions will at once become manifeft. In every political affociation, it is neceffary that one man, the few, or the many, fhould bear fway; and whichever of them happens to take place, if the public good be the great rule of adminiftration, the government is right and juft, and is called a monarchy when lodged in the hands of one; an ariftocracy, when in the hands of the few; and a republic, when in the hands of the many. The word ariftocracy denotes the government of the beft men, or the government that is beft in itfelf. A republic is the general name of all commonwealths, but is applied particularly to denote a government adminiftered by the people at large, but adminiftered with juftice, not oppreffive to any clafs of citizens, but impartially confulting the good of all.

The diftinctive characters of governments.

The propriety of thefe names is juftified by the nature of things. That one man, or a few, may be adorned by an accumulation of virtues, is what experience will juftify; but that the multitude in any country fhould be fo illuftrioufly diftinguifhed, is inconfiftent with experience. The virtue moft likely to pervade a whole people, is martial fpirit. Citizens, therefore, who are foldiers, naturally bear fway in that form of civil polity which is called by way of diftinction *the republic* [f]. The corrupt

[f] The natural connection between republicanifm and martial fpirit is ftrongly attefted by all the hiftorians of antiquity from Herodotus to Livy. See Herodot. l. v. c. lxxviii. and Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii. p. 364. and vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 7.

corrupt deviation from monarchy, or rather from royalty, is tyranny; for a tyrant is a monarch who rules with no other view than the benefit of himſelf and his family. Ariſtocracy degenerates into oligarchy, when the few, who are rich, govern the ſtate as beſt ſuits the intereſts of their avarice and ambition: and a republic degenerates into a democracy, when the many, who are poor, make the gratification of their own paſſions the only rule of their adminiſtration [g]. Wherever wealth alone opens the road to preferment, oligarchy prevails; poverty, on the other hand, is the conſtant attendant of democracy; and the diſtinctive character of thoſe governments conſiſts not in this, that the many or the few bear ſway, but in the one caſe, that rapacious poverty be armed with power, and in the other, that contemptuous opulence be inveſted with authority. But as

Read in Livy the Hiſtory of Rome after the expulſion of the Tarquins, and the deſtruction of the Decemvirs. But it is worthy of obſervation, that this eſſential connection has been ſometimes overlooked in modern times, and well it might by thoſe who attended only to names; for in ſpeaking of the greateſt battle fought among the Italian ſtates, many of which were called republics, towards the end of the fifteenth century, Machiavel has the following memorable words: "Et fue queſta giornata combattuta con più virtu, che alcun altra che foſſe ſtata fatta in cinquanta anni in Italia; perche vi mori tra l'una parte & l'altra più che mille huomini." Delle Hiſtorie, l. viii. p. 306. "This action was fought with more valour than any other which had happened for fifty years in Italy; ſince on the two ſides, the number of the ſlain exceeded 1000 men."

[g] Ariſtotle makes an apology for ſpeaking ſo freely of oligarchies and democracies, which were in fact the only governments then exiſting in Greece; and into one or other of which all republics have ſo natural and ſo ſtrong a tendency to degenerate. He ſays, that in treating a ſubject philoſophically, and not merely for the purpoſe of practical utility, a juſt theory cannot be educed, unleſs the particulars which enter into the general queſtion be fully enumerated and fairly examined. We are happy in living in a country where the injuſtice and cruelty both of oligarchies and democracies may be unreſervedly expoſed and fearleſsly arraigned.

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as eminence in wealth can only fall to the ſhare of a few, and as *all* may participate the advantages of equal freedom, the partiſans of the rich and of the multitude agitate republican ſtates, each faction ſtriving to engroſs the government.

Chap. 6.

The unjuſt pretenſions of the partiſans of democracy; and

In the contentions which take place, both parties pretend to have juſtice on their ſide; but there is a democratical and an oligarchical juſtice, which ſtrongly ſavours of iniquity. Moſt men are wretched judges in their own cauſe. Paſſion narrows their underſtanding; and in every complicated caſe they ſee thoſe circumſtances only which are favourable to themſelves, and obſtinately ſhut their eyes to whatever favours their adverſaries. Juſtice, the partiſans of democracy aſſert to be nothing but equality; adding, that where men are equal in liberty, they are entitled to an equal enjoyment of all other advantages. Juſtice, the partiſans of oligarchy maintain, and maintain rightly, to conſiſt not in equality, but in proportion [a]; not in this, that the ſhares of all be equal, but in this, that each man have his due: but as they themſelves are ſuperior in wealth, they claim a ſuperiority in all other reſpects.

the unjuſt pretenſions of the aſſertors of oligarchy, or what is now called ariſtocracy.

Their reaſoning would be concluſive, had communities been formed merely for the purpoſes of preſerving and accumulating riches. On that ſuppoſition, the proportions of the profit might be exactly aſcertained by the ſhares of the capital. But commonwealths have *not* been inſtituted for the ſake of riches, nor for commerce by which riches are acquired, nor for that ſort of juſtice or convention, by which they are maintained and defended. The Tuſcans, Carthaginians, and other maritime nations, are connected by the bonds of mutual traffic; their exports

[a] The ſubject of juſtice is fully diſcuſſed in the Fifth Book of the Ethics, to which the author here refers. See vol. i. p. 257, & ſeq.

ports and imports are carefully regulated by treaties; they have courts of juftice to which the fubjects of one country may apply when injured by thofe of another; and they have alliances in war ftipulating mutually to enfure to each other their refpective commercial advantages. But here, their reciprocal connections end; they are not fubject, in other matters, to the fame laws, nor governed by the fame magiftrates; they are not united by affection or friendfhip; and provided each party be juft in his dealings, it is totally indifferent to the other what may be his character in all other particulars; an indifference which cannot prevail among thofe who are fellow-citizens in reality, and not merely in name. But fuppofe the connection to be rendered more intimate, and imagine the walls of Corinth to be united with thofe of Megara: fuppofe ftill farther, that the right of intermarriage, a right effential to the exiftence of communities, were eftablifhed; and admit that each individual were protected in his induftry and in his dealings, by laws wifely framed, faithfully adminiftered, and realifing the metaphor of the fophift Lycophron [1], "that law is a furety and a pledge;" yet nothing of all this, neither the community of refidence, nor the connection of affinity, nor mutual dependence in trade, nor common affociation in war, none of thefe ties, nor all of them together, would be fufficient to confolidate the political edifice, and to conftitute that kind of partnerfhip which is properly called a commonwealth: a partnerfhip aiming not merely at fubfiftence, but at well-being; and fubfervient not merely to the interefts of life, but to the interefts of that kind of life which is

Difference between a commonwealth and other affociations.

[1] This Lycophron is mentioned by our author in his Sophiftic. Elench. paffim; & Rhetor. l. iii. c. iii.

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is ultimately defirable to man, as the perfection of his focial and moral nature.

This perfection cannot be attained independently of the community of refidence, the connections of affinity, and the long-continued habits of daily and familiar intercourfe. Feftivals, facrifices, common occupations, and common amufements knit mankind into friendfhip, collect families into cantons, and confolidate cantons into commonwealths. By exercifing the energies and operations of the focial principle, the genuine happinefs of human life is improved and perfected: and that man who, by his perfonal excellencies and the lovelinefs of his character, contributes moft to this great end, whatever may be his inferiority to many others in birth or in wealth, ought to be regarded as the principal fharer in the great political partnerfhip[k].

Chap. 7.

Difficulties attending the queftion, in what portion of the ftate the fovereignty ought to refide.

It has been found a matter of difficulty to determine in what portion of the ftate the fovereignty ought to refide. In the majority of the people at large? Then the fovereignty muft be vefted in poverty; and if the poor plunder the rich, who fhall arraign their injuftice? In the few, who are wealthy, or thofe ftill fewer, who are virtuous? Then the public muft be infulted in the one cafe, and difhonoured in the other: for offices of authority are the honours conferred by republics; and fhould the fame men remain always in place, they muft purchafe this pre-eminence by the difgrace of the people at large. Shall we

[k] The author concludes this chapter with a fentence unconnected with the context, namely, "The doubts and difputes concerning governments arife from confidering juftice, which is a complex object, under one only afpect; and thus fubftituting a part of it for the whole." This remark, which was before made, it feemed unneceffary to repeat.

we then eftablifh a king? The evil evidently would become the greater, how meritorious foever we may fuppofe the character of this king to be[l], fince the fphere of honour would thus be ftill more narrowly contracted, and that of difgrace ftill more widely expanded. Perhaps the vigour of fovereign power is incompatible with the imbecility of human paffion; and, therefore, ought not to be committed to man, but intrufted to law. Yet if the fpirit of your laws be democratical or oligarchical, wherein will this alteration avail you? The evils complained of, will evidently ftill prevail.

Solution of thefe difficulties.

Great as thefe difficulties feem, they are not, however, altogether incapable of folution. The people at large, how contemptible foever they may appear when taken individually, are yet, when collectively confidered, not, perhaps, unworthy of fovereignty[m]. It is a trite obfervation, that thofe entertainments where each man fends the difh moft agreeable to his own palate, are preferable to thofe furnifhed by the moft fumptuous delicacy of individuals. The people at large are allowed to be the beft judges of mufic and of poetry. The general tafte is thus acknowledged to be better than that of the few, or of one man,

[l] The author here does not dogmatife, but difcufs. In purfuing the principle on which he now reafons, he draws a conclufion againft royalty: but viewing the fubject under a different afpect, he confiders, in other paffages, the kingly power as a fit balance between the people and the great; and regards the royal authority as a firm pledge, that the poor fhall not be oppreffed, nor the rich plundered.

[m] This is the only queftion which the author here examines; leaving, as he obferves, the folution of the other difficulties to another opportunity. In the whole of what he fays, he fpeaks merely as an advocate; and his arguments, he obferves, apply not to any people indifcriminately, but to a people peculiarly circumftanced (προς τι πληθος), who are the only fit materials for what he calls his πολιτεια, or republic; as will be explained more fully hereafter. It is farther worthy of remark, that when Ariftotle fpeaks of the people, he here means *populus*, not *plebs*; the people at large, not the lower ranks only.

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man, however ſkilful. Conſidered collectively, the people form a complex animal, with many feet, with many hands, with many faculties, with many virtues; each member contributing ſomething, more or leſs valuable, to the perfection of the whole body. The moral and intellectual excellencies of the multitude thus differ from thoſe of a wiſe and virtuous man, as the beauty of a fine picture [a] does from the beauty of individuals; of whom ſome may have eyes, and others may have other features, more perfect and more beautiful than thoſe of the picture; yet the picture, collecting only excellencies, and always avoiding deformities, will be found more beautiful and more perfect than any original in nature, with whom it can be compared. The excellencies, therefore, of that complex entity the public, may ſometimes ſurpaſs thoſe of the moſt accompliſhed prince or moſt virtuous council. That this commonly holds, I would not, indeed, venture to affirm. It rather ſeems manifeſt, that to ſome bodies of men the argument cannot poſſibly apply; for if it applied to them, it would extend alſo to wild beaſts, ſince wherein ſome multitudes differ from wild beaſts it is not eaſy to diſcover.

For what functions the people at large are beſt qualified.

The ſafety of every free government requires that the major part of the citizens ſhould enjoy a certain weight in the adminiſtration. If this does not take place, the majority muſt be diſſatisfied; and where the majority are diſſatisfied, the government will ſoon be ſubverted. But what ſort of magiſtracy is the humble citizen, the mere unit of the crowd, qualified to exerciſe? Offices of high perſonal truſt, or of important executive authority, his ignorance would diſgrace, or his injuſtice might

[a] Such was the Helen of Crotona painted by Zeuxis. "Neque enim putavit, omnia, quæ quæreret ad venuſtatem, uno in corpore ſe reperire poſſe," &c. Cicero de Inventione Rhetorica, l. ii. c. i.

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might betray. For the performance of extraordinary taſks, extraordinary virtues, as well as extraordinary abilities, are required; and ſuch virtues and abilities are not to be expected in the individuals of a promiſcuous multitude. It remains, therefore, that the people at large be intruſted with the deliberative[o] and judicial powers of government, becauſe the members of aſſemblies, ſenates, and courts of juſtice, acting, not individually, but collectively, prove mutually aſſiſting to each other. In ſuch popular tribunals, virtue and paſſion, reaſon and ſentiment, courage and wiſdom, are harmoniouſly blended into one ſalutary compoſition, in which even the groſſeſt ingredients are not without their uſe; for experience teaches, that the pureſt nouriſhment is not always the beſt, but that fine flour is moſt wholeſome when mixed with the coarſe[p].

The exerciſe of the deliberative and judicial powers.

Guided by this principle, Solon and ſome other legiſlators committed to the people at large the power of appointing the magiſtrates, as well as that of taking an account of their adminiſtration. This political arrangement, indeed, is expoſed to the following objection. To appoint a phyſician, or to take an account of his conduct in his profeſſion, ſeems to belong only to thoſe who are ſkilled in the art of phyſic[q]. A geometer muſt

Objections on this ſubject propoſed and anſwered.

[o] In what ſenſe the word "deliberative" is to be here underſtood, will be explained preſently.

[p] Nam multitudo fere melius quam ſinguli de rebus omnibus judicat. Singuli enim quaſdam habent virtutum particulas, quæ ſimul collatæ unam excellentem virtutem conficiunt. Quod in medicorum pharmacis, ac in primis in antidoto eo, quod Mithridaticum vocant, perſpicue cerni poteſt. In eo enim pleræque res per ſe noxiæ, ubi confuſæ fuerint, ſalutare adverſas venena remedium afferunt. Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. xxviii.

[q] Perſons thus ſkilled, the author divides into three claſſes: δημιουργοι, αρχιτεκτονικοι, πεπαιδευμενοι; mere practitioners; men of accurate and profound ſcience; and perſons inſtructed,

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muſt be examined by geometricians; and a pilot, by men acquainted with navigation. Wherefore, then, ought the people indiſcriminately to be entitled to judge their magiſtrates, and to appreciate their merit or demerit in employments, which the people indiſcriminately are not qualified to exerciſe? This objection may be anſwered by recurring to the principles already eſtabliſhed, that the people collectively conſidered (unleſs conſiſting of a vile and ſlaviſh populace) are capable of diſcharging functions, of which, in their individual character, they ſeem altogether unworthy. Beſides this, the productions of every art are not beſt appreciated by its profeſſors. The pilot is a better judge of a helm than the ſhip carpenter. A cook is ſeldom conſulted about the merit of the ſupper which he has dreſſed; and he who inhabits a houſe, needs not a jury of architects to aſcertain the degree of praiſe or of blame due to the contrivance of the builder.

There is ſtill another ground on which the arrangement of popular governments is cenſured. That magiſtrates ſhould be elected by, and reſponſible to, the promiſcuous crowd of citizens, convened in aſſemblies and courts of juſtice, ſeems highly unreaſonable, becauſe the upper ranks of men are thus ſubjected to the authority of their inferiors. To be a general or a treaſurer, that is, to command the public force, or to manage the public purſe, or to perform any ſeparate function of executive magiſtracy, it is neceſſary to be endowed with certain pre-eminent qualifications; a mature age, an ample patrimony, an uniformly approved and reſpected character. Ought ſuch dignified perſonages

inſtructed, but leſs correctly and deeply, in the healing art. The diſtinction between οἱ ἀρχιτεκτονικοι, or οἱ εἰδοτες and οἱ πεπαιδευμενοι, occurs frequently in other parts of his works, and in reference to other arts and ſciences.

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personages to be examined, tried, and sometimes prosecuted to punishment, by men of no estimation; of different ages, different characters, and often destitute of fortune? Is not this to commit the greater magistracy to those judged unworthy of holding the lesser? These questions may be satisfactorily answered by observing, that the individuals composing the senate or assembly are not themselves the assembly or senate. They are parts only of those awful tribunals, and the magistrates are tried not by the parts, but by the whole; that is, by the assembly, senate, or courts of justice, which, whatever may be the character and condition of many of the members composing them, are certainly more wealthy and more respectable than any of those magistrates who are held amenable to their jurisdiction. The present difficulty, therefore, may thus be removed; but the doubt which we first started, proves that the laws should always decide whenever their general language (for their language must be general) applies to the case in question; and that judges should then only speak when the laws are silent. But what laws are entitled to the appellation of good, does not yet appear. This only is manifest, that the laws must depend on the nature of the government; just, therefore, under a good government, and unjust under a bad one.

Chap. 8.

According to what circumstances and qualities political honours and advantages ought to be apportioned and distributed.

Every science and every art proposes to itself some end or purpose which it considers as absolutely good and ultimately desirable, that is, good and desirable in itself without reference to the attainment of any object beyond it. Of politics, the most comprehensive and the most important of all sciences, the end and aim is the public good of the community, which can only be upheld by justice, which, as we before said, forms the great law of the moral world, To a certain length, the general

opinions

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opinions of mankind coincide, refpecting juftice, with the accurate decifions of philofophy. Among equals, juftice is acknowledged to confift in equality; among thofe who are unequal, it is acknowledged to confift in proportion, that is, in giving to each his due. But what, and how many, are the circumftances which ought to regulate this proportion, is not clearly afcertained. Ought a fuperiority in every advantageous quality, when other things are alike, to entitle its poffeffor to a fuperiority of political advantages? Shall men's ftatures or colours be confidered as laying a foundation for the difcrimination of ranks in fociety? In leffer matters, fuch a principle of diftinction is not allowed to operate. At a concert of mufic, the beft inftrument is given, not to the handfomeft man, but to the beft performer. How much foever he may be furpaffed in beauty or nobility, and how much foever the value of beauty and nobility may furpafs that of mufical fkill, yet the beft performer is always honoured with the beft flute. The reafon is plain; the circumftances in which his rivals are fuperior, contribute nothing to the work in hand. They have no manner of relation to mufical performance; and therefore, with regard to it, cannot ftand in competition with the quality in which he excels them. For things fpecifically different, and which admit not of a common meafure, can only be eftimated by confidering how far they refpectively contribute to fome common end. To compare them abftractedly is impoffible or abfurd. A difference in every valuable quality ought not, therefore, to be a fource of political diftinction. Swiftnefs meets with due honour at the Olympic games. But the honours conferred by cities, are apportioned to qualities effential to the exiftence or well-being of the ftate. A community cannot

cannot confift of beggars or of flaves. Liberty, therefore, and wealth and birth, naturally contend for pre-eminence; but if thefe things be neceffary to conftitute a commonwealth, juftice and valour are not lefs neceffary to defend and uphold it. In the conteft, therefore, for civil pre-eminence, education and virtue feem fairly entitled to the firft honours; becaufe of all things, education and virtue moft contribute to the perfection of civil fociety. The partifans of wealth allege, that the rich are moft faithful to their engagements; and that thofe who have the greateft fhare in the public ftock, ought to be invefted with the government. The nobles contend, that as flaves are effentially different from citizens, he who is fartheft removed from a fervile extraction, ought to be held a citizen of a fuperior clafs, and therefore to be armed with authority. They ftrengthen this conclufion, by obferving that nobility is nothing elfe but the virtue of the race, hereditary worth, and prefcriptive dignity. But fuch arguments, in their ultimate tendency, would prove, that one man, if more noble and wealthy than the reft, ought to be made king; and even in a virtuous republic, that he who furpaffed his fellow-citizens in virtue, ought to be exalted to regal power. Such is the abfurdity refulting from the fuppofition, that thofe who are fuperior in one particular [r] ought to be entitled to a fuperiority in political fociety; in which mankind have affembled in order to club their refpective advantages, and in order to direct their various but united efforts,

[r] Ariftotle obferves, that nothing is eafier than to eftablifh a democracy, an oligarchy, or a tyranny; becaufe all thofe governments are perfectly fimple in their conftruction; to make them requires no accuracy of comparifon, no power of combination. But he obferves and proves, again and again, that they are all of them mere perverfions and mockeries of juft government.

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efforts, to one falutary end and purpofe; and in which the people at large may always quafh the vain pretenfions of the few, by faying, *we collectively* are richer, wifer, and nobler than you. The beft laws, therefore, are thofe which are framed for the general benefit of the citizens; that is, of men qualified alternately to govern and to obey, differently qualified, indeed, in different governments; but in the beft, qualified and determined to govern and to obey according to the rules which right reafon prefcribes.

Chap. 9.

Virtue beyond compare unfit for fociety.

The exiftence of every commonwealth prefuppofes, however, a certain degree of equality among thofe who are its conftituent members. Should exceffive inequality prevail, efpecially in thofe things which form the power and fplendour of fociety itfelf, the affociation will gradually tend to a diffolution; and, therefore, if one man, or a few, fhould difplay a degree of virtue, by which that of all the reft would be totally eclipfed, fuch men, if too few in number to fubfift by themfelves in a feparate fociety, could not form a part, or be confidered as members, of any community whatever. It is the law of commonwealths, that the citizens compofing them fhould rule by vicarious fucceffion; becaufe thofe who contribute, nearly in equal portions, to the benefit and luftre of the community, are entitled to expect from that community nearly the fame treatment. But the fame treatment, that is, a mere equality of honours and advantages, would be the height of injuftice to confpicuous eminence and incomparable worth. Who is to govern the natural governors of mankind? What laws are made for men who are a law unto themfelves? The attempt to legiflate for fuch men would be expofed to ridicule;

and they might anſwer the arguments of thoſe fooliſh enough to undertake this taſk, as Antiſthenes[s] ſays, that the lions, in the aſſembly of beaſts, anſwered the eloquent harangue of the hares on the ſubject of equal laws.

Neceſſity of the oſtraciſm.

The oſtraciſm of democratics was invented for levelling that extreme inequality, under which ſuch forms of government cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt. The aſſembly baniſhes for a limited time thoſe too conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed by wealth, popularity, connections, or any other political advantage. For a ſimilar reaſon, the Argonauts, we are told, rejected the aſſiſtance of Hercules. His virtues too much overtopped thoſe of the adventurers with whom he wiſhed to be aſſociated. The counſel, therefore, which Periander gave to Thraſybulus is not blamable, abſtractedly and in itſelf, but becauſe that counſel was both given and employed for the purpoſe of ſupporting a cruel tyranny. Periander, we are told, ſaid nothing to the queſtion of Thraſybulus, "by what means he ſhould maintain the ſovereignty of Miletus;" but conducting his meſſenger into a field of corn, lopped the talleſt ſtalks, and thus levelled the ſurface. The meſſenger reported what he had ſeen, and what Thraſybulus appears to have underſtood, having ſpeedily ſet himſelf to cut off the firſt men of the city. Both democracies and oligarchies follow the ſame policy. The Athenians, in violation of treaties, chaſtiſed the Samians, Chians, and Leſbians, in order to break the ſtubborn pride of thoſe fierce iſlanders, and to level their aſpiring ſentiments with thoſe of their more ſervile allies. The Perſian monarch has often ſmit and humbled the Medes and Babylonians, vainly elated by the remembrance of their ancient empire.

[s] Antiſthenes was a ſcholar of Socrates, who, in imitation of his maſter, mixed facetiouſneſs with ſeverity. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxiv. p. 149.

BOOK III.

Illustrated by the example of the arts.

empire[1]. The levelling maxim, therefore, is univerfally applicable in all fuch governments. The fame principle obtains in mufic, in mechanics, in painting, and indeed, in every art. A painter would not admit into his performance, any limb or member, however beautiful, exceeding the proportional magnitude of the figure which he delineates. A fhip-builder muft adapt the helm, and every other part, to the fize of the whole veffel; and in a chorus of mufic, an overpowering voice would difturb and deftroy the effect of the fymphony. The oftracifm, therefore, in democracies, and fome analogous inftitution in monarchies, is ufeful for maintaining the harmony of the political concert. It is better, indeed, that the legiflator, at the firft formation of the commonwealth, fhould provide againft the neceffity of ever having recourfe to fuch violent remedies. But if this has not been done originally, he muft, in that cafe, as at fea, tack about, and thus fteer the veffel of the ftate into a fafe harbour.

The grofs abufe of this inftitution.

The oftracifm, however, inftead of being feafonably and ufefully employed, is too often abufed to factious and pernicious purpofes. In corrupt commonwealths, juftice is meafured by the utility of that portion of the ftate, to whofe intereft the public good is, on all occafions, readily facrificed. Such apparent or relative juftice is, indeed, real and abfolute iniquity; but it is the only kind of juftice that, under bad governments, can poffibly prevail. The oftracifm, therefore, will not be properly applied in thofe cafes to which it is folely or chiefly applicable; for it is a matter of doubt, whether this invention ought

[1] The author does not fay that thefe things are right; but he maintains that they are neceffary for the fafety of the government, which being bad in itfelf, can only be preferved by bad means.

ought ever to be employed in a virtuous and well-regulated community. When a man confpicuoufly overtops his fellow-citizens, I fay not in other political advantages, but in virtue itfelf, what is then to be done? It will not be faid, that in a well-regulated ftate, his fuperiority in virtue ought to fubject him to banifhment. Nor will it be faid, that fuch confpicuous fuperiority, fubmitting to the law of vicarious fucceffion, ought to command and obey alternately. This would be as abfurd as dividing the empire with Jupiter. It remains, therefore, that all men fhould cheerfully and uniformly obey fuch rulers, and acknowledge the natural and perpetual fovereignty of their virtues.

BOOK III. To what cafe inapplicable.

Chap. 10.

Of monarchy, and its five kinds.

This obfervation naturally leads us to fpeak of kings. We have formerly numbered monarchy among the juft forms of government. But whether is it univerfally the beft form; or ufeful in fome ftates and hurtful in others? Firft of all, it is evident that there are various kinds of monarchy. The kings of Sparta, who feem to be of all kings the moft limited by law, conduct the military expeditions, and prefide in the religious worfhip, of their country. They are the hereditary generals of the commonwealth. In the heroic ages, kings were not armed with the power of life and death, except by a kind of martial law, limited in its execution to a day of battle. Agamemnon patiently endures reproach and infult in the council; but iffuing to the field, he fays,

> "Who dares inglorious in his fhips to ftay?
> Who dares to tremble on this fignal day?
> That wretch, too mean to fall by martial power,
> The birds fhall mangle and the dogs devour,
> For death is in my hand [a]."

This,

[a] Iliad ii. v. 391. Ariftotle quotes Homer, and even Herodotus, from memory; fo

BOOK III. This, therefore, is one kind of monarchy, a perpetual generalſhip, ſometimes hereditary, and ſometimes elective. Another ſpecies of monarchy is that which prevails among the Aſiatic barbarians. Their kings exerciſe a power abſolute, unlimited, and almoſt tyrannical; yet their authority is legal, hereditary, and ſecure. The genius of the Greeks is, in point of government, different from that of the barbarians; and the genius of the Europeans is different from that of the Aſiatics, who of all nations are the moſt patient of deſpotiſm. Their kings, therefore, are guarded, not as tyrants are in Europe, by the arms of foreign mercenaries, but by the ſervile fidelity of their native troops; and their dominion becomes lawful, becauſe voluntarily endured; inſomuch that the guards of European princes are employed againſt the citizens, and the guards of Aſiatic princes conſiſt of the citizens themſelves. A third ſpecies of monarchy is that of the Æſymnetes in ancient Greece, who were nothing elſe than *elective tyrants*, ſometimes choſen for life, and ſometimes appointed for a limited time, or the concluſion of a particular buſineſs. The people of Mitylené thus choſe Pittacus to conduct the war againſt the exiles, headed by Antimenides, and the poet Alcæus; who, in one of his convivial ſongs, arraigns the folly of the multitude, "for appointing, vociferouſly and tumultuouſly, the baneful Pittacus to tyranniſe a frantic and ill-fated country." The government of the Æſymnetes partook both of tyranny and of royalty; they were deſpots exerciſing lawful power, becauſe lawfully granted; but differing from Aſiatic monarchs, becauſe their temporary power

ſo familiar was he with thoſe admired authors. From this circumſtance, his citations are not always correct; as in the example before us, where, to the four verſes in the text, he adds, from another part of the Iliad, παρ' γαρ εμοι θανατος—"For death is in my hand."

power was not congenial to the ſpirit and uſages of their country. A fourth ſpecies of monarchy prevailed in the heroic ages, a limited royalty; juſt, legal, and hereditary. Thoſe who ſignally benefited mankind in arts or arms, who collected ſocieties, formed ſettlements, and eſtabliſhed colonies, received voluntary ſubmiſſion from public gratitude [x]. They became generals in war, judges in peace, and preſided in ſuch acts of religion as were not excluſively attached to particular prieſthoods. In deciding the differences of their ſubjects, they ſwore to obſerve the rules of juſtice; and the form of the oath conſiſted in elevating the ſceptre [y]. In progreſs of time, theſe branches of authority were either voluntarily reſigned by kings, or forcibly reſumed by their people. In moſt commonwealths, kings have been reduced to the condition of mere preſidents in religious ceremonies; and in that country of Greece in which their office beſt deſerves the name of royalty, they are merely hereditary generals.

To theſe four kinds of monarchy above mentioned, we muſt ſtill add a fifth and laſt kind, the moſt abſolute of all. A king may bear to a ſtate the ſame relation which a maſter does to a family, having the whole power of the ſovereignty concentrated in his own perſon. The office of ſuch a monarch, and that of a king

[x] See Sarpedon's ſpeech in Homer, Γλαυκε τιη δη νωι τετιμημεσθα μαλιστα, &c. Il. xii. v. 310. and Pope, v. 370—386.

> " Such, they may cry, deſerve the ſovereign ſtate,
> Whom thoſe that envy, dare not imitate."

[y] The ſceptre was given to kings as the badge of their authority, and entitled them to adminiſter the θεμιστας Διος, Jove's laws; which when they perverted or infringed, the ſceptre dropped from their hands. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. paſſim.

BOOK III.

a king of Sparta, form the two ultimate limits of monarchical power, which cannot be greater than it is in the firft cafe, nor leffer than it is in the fecond. The perpetual generalfhip of Sparta cannot even be faid to conftitute a particular form of government. It is not the conftitution itfelf, but rather a law of that conftitution; and a law that may take place under any other conftitution whatever. We fhall not, therefore, at prefent examine its advantages or inconveniences; but proceed to confider thofe kinds of royalty which contain the fpecific qualities of kingly government.

Chap. 11.

An eftimate of the advantages and defects of monarchy.

In appreciating their merits or defects, we muft eftimate the contending pretenfions of good laws and good men [y]. The partifans of kings obferve, that laws can only fpeak a general language; that their applications to particular cafes, which, taken collectively, form the fum of human tranfactions, is often doubtful, dangerous, or hurtful; that there is not any art of which the practice can be regulated by immutable precept; that even in Egypt, a country fingularly attached to the formality of rules, phyficians are allowed, after the third day of the malady, to alter the mode of treatment prefcribed by authority; and even before that time, to alter it at their peril. The advocates for laws affert, and affert juftly, that the queftion partly refolves itfelf into one more general, "whether ought reafon or paffion to bear fway." Laws, therefore, muft be eftablifhed; but as they cannot completely involve the decifion of each particular cafe, whether ought one man, or many, to adminifter and apply them? The arguments in favour of the *judgment* of the many, we have already

[y] In treating of monarchy, Ariftotle has principally abfolute monarchy in view. He ftates the objections to it with that fulnefs and force with which he commonly reprefents the arguments of his adverfaries; refuting them afterwards with as much brevity as the fubject can poffibly admit.

already had occafion to explain [z]; and in favour of their *juftice*, it may be obferved, that the many are lefs liable to corruption than one man or the few, in the fame manner that a large lake is lefs corruptible than a fmall pool. If we deal, therefore, impartially with kings, magiftrates, and people, regarding them all as compofed of the fame materials, endowed with fimilar excellencies, and liable to fimilar imperfections; it muft be acknowledged that in communities confifting of fuch members, and particularly in the cities of Greece, a republic is better than an ariftocracy, and an ariftocracy than a monarchy. Kings were originally eftablifhed by the gratitude of fmall communities, in which there were but few perfons of confiderable weight or diftinguifhed merit. But as the number of men deferving the name of peers, or equals, increafed, the kingly government was changed for an ariftocratical republic. Under this government nations flourifhed, and riches were accumulated. Riches were followed by luxury, and luxury by rapacity. The wealth of the ftate became the plunder of individuals. Oligarchies, and then tyrannies, fucceffively prevailed; an ufurping faction continually narrowing the bafis of its own power, till this power, fupported on a fingle point, was eafily overturned by the juft refentment of the multitude [a]. Democracy then

Why introduced, and wherefore abolifhed.

[z] See above, c. viii. p. 187.

[a] Ariftotle's theory of political revolutions is wonderfully confirmed by the ancient Hiftory of Italy. In that country limited monarchies firft prevailed, which degenerating into tyrannies, made way for ariftocracies. Rome, Naples, Capua, Nola, Tufculum, were long governed by fenates: but as cities became more populous, an epidemical malady feized the people of perfecuting the Patricians. This evil raged during the Carthaginian wars, from which time there was a continual progrefs towards democracy. Yet in all thefe republics, whether popular or ariftocratical, the fupreme power of the ftate was generally held by diftinguifhed individuals; a Valerius, Camillus, or Fabius, of Rome; a Manilius, chief of the Latins; a Herennius, of the Samnites,

BOOK III.

then arofe, and prevailed in its turn; and it is a matter, perhaps, of fome difficulty to eftablifh any other form of government in large cities and populous communities.

Inconveniences of hereditary monarchy.

Should monarchy be admitted as an ufeful inftitution, a new queftion occurs, whether it ought to be hereditary? Whatever be the character of a young prince, ought he, in default of his father, to affume the government, and to rule for the ruin of his country? But the king, knowing the profligacy of the prince, will provide a more worthy fucceffor. This furely fuppofes a degree of virtue greater than can be expected from man, that, for the good of the public, a father fhould exclude his own fon from a throne. As adminiftrator of the laws, the king muft be entrufted with a military force, fufficient to render them effectual. This force, it is eafy to fee, ought to be fuch as will enable him to coerce refractory individuals, but not to oppres the community. Such was the proportion of troops anciently committed by the Greeks to their Æfymnetes; and fuch was the rule by which a citizen of Syracufe wifhed to limit the military force entrufted to Dionyfius.

Chap. 12.

Monarchy arraigned.

But fome perfons affert, that it is impoffible to modify kingly power into any thing like reafon and juftice. That the invention is altogether unnatural; and that placing a prince on the throne is nothing elfe than raifing paffion and a wild beaft to the feat of fovereignty. That no man is a fair judge in his own caufe; and that a king, therefore, can never judge fairly between himfelf and his people. That phyficians, when fick, truft not to their own fkill, but require the advice of others; and that mafters of the gymnaftic exercifes pretend not to be proper

Samnites, &c. all which acted fomething of a fimilar part in the cities of their refpective diftricts, which the Medici did in modern times in Florence, and the Malateftas, Vifcontis, Felorios, &c. in other cities of Italy.

proper judges of their own exhibitions. In all cafes whatever, mankind acknowledge the danger of impaffioned, and therefore partial, decifions, and ought the more earneftly to ftrive againft this danger, in proportion to the importance of the objects that inflame the ardour of defire, and ftrengthen the bias of felfifhnefs. That the only juft fovereigns, therefore, are God and the laws; efpecially thofe unwritten, moral, and univerfal laws, founded in nature, reared and perfected by education and cuftom. Befides this, were the heart and will of a king not to be diftrufted, his head and his underftanding would be totally unequal to the difcharge of an office not made for humanity. Can one man be fuppofed capable of fuperintending the concerns of a whole people? Let him be ever fo good, two muft ftill be better than one.

"By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done, and great difcoveries made;
The wife new prudence from the wife acquire,
And one brave hero fans another's fire [b]."

And Agamemnon, fenfible of his own inability to exercife regal power, prayed,

"Oh! would the Gods, in love to Greece, decree
But ten fuch fages as they grant in thee [c]:
Such wifdom foon fhould Priam's force deftroy,
And foon fhould fall the haughty towers of Troy [d]."

That the laws muft be adminiftered, and their general language adapted to particular cafes, by the difcernment of upright judges, affords not any argument in favour of the judge as fuperior to the law. For it is acknowledged, that in every cafe

[b] Pope's Iliad, ii. 224. [c] Ibid. 379. [d] Ibid. 443.

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case to which laws are applicable, they only ought to judge and to govern; and from the law itself men derive those principles that enlighten their reason and direct their decisions. Enured to the discipline of this wise school-mistress, they not only understand the letter, but imbibe the spirit of her instructions; and in continuing habitually subject to the laws, they become duly qualified to explain them, which that man can never be, who is raised above the laws.

All monarchies resolve themselves into oligarchies, or aristocracies.

Besides, there is an absurdity in supposing that one man with two eyes and two ears can observe as widely, or with two hands and two feet can act as vigorously, as many men with many perceptive and many active powers. Kings themselves bear witness to the law of nature, associating to their government many eyes, many hands, many organs of sense, and many instruments of action. Their *friends*, that is, the friends both of their persons and government, are full partners in power; they would not exert themselves to support a system to which they were unfriendly; and friendship, we have before proved, can only subsist among equals. The government of one, therefore, necessarily terminating in that of many, his peers and equals, it is surely most advisable to form directly and at once, that kind of constitution which must always be circuitously established.

Monarchy defended: to what nations it is best adapted.

These arguments against royalty are not so conclusive as they seem; because they rest entirely on the fallacy of extending to mankind in general, observations that have been found applicable to some particular communities. Government is nothing else but the arrangement of individuals in a state, and the propriety of every arrangement or composition must depend on the number and nature of its materials. Some societies of men are fitted for living under what we have called a republic,

that is, a juft and equal polity, adminiftered by rotation; and no people whatever are fitted for living under a tyranny, whether of one man, of an oligarchical fenate, or of a democratical affembly; all which we have declared bafe perverfions of government, and direct violations of nature. But between thefe extremes, there may be fome nations fo conftituted as fpontaneoufly to obey a lord or defpot, as fervants obey a mafter; and others fo conftituted as voluntarily to obey a king, or even an ariftocratical fenate, as wives and children obey their fathers or hufbands. Thofe who are unequal by nature, cannot be levelled by any contrivance of man; and when authority is juft and ufeful, fubmiffion will be ready and cheerful. Even in republics themfelves, where men are arranged, not according to their wealth, but according to their worth; where the citizens love liberty, which they have arms and courage to defend; yet fhould the illuftrious virtues of one man, or one family, totally eclipfe the merit of the community at large, fuch a man, or fuch a family, muft either be banifhed by the oftracifm or enthroned. So much concerning monarchy, its nature and kinds; what nations it fuits, and for what reafons it fuits them[e].

[e] The laft chapter is merely a recapitulation; after which the author fays, that it is his intention to proceed to treat of the beft form of government.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the Firft Book of his Politics, Ariftotle examines the origin of fociety and government, the effential diftinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and the beft plans of political œconomy. In the Second, he defcribes the moft admired fchemes of policy, either delineated by philofophers, or inftituted by legiflators. In the Third, (of which a confiderable part is now loft,) he explained the nature and principle of the various governments exifting in Greece and in the ancient world, whether republican or monarchical; beftowing juft and liberal praife, where praife feemed to be due; but declaring himfelf not completely fatisfied with any thing that philofophers had devifed, legiflators prefcribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in the Fourth (commonly publifhed as the Seventh) Book, to exhibit the refult of his own reflections concerning the great queftion, which form of government is the beft? BOOK IV.

This problem cannot, he obferves, be folved abftractedly; becaufe government being an arrangement, the beft government muft be the beft arrangement, and the beft arrangement is that

 which

BOOK IV. which the materials to be arranged, are the beſt fitted both to receive and to preſerve. The great nations of Egypt and the Eaſt had ſhewn themſelves incapable of ſubſiſting under any milder dominion than that of abſolute monarchy, which was not tyranny to them, becauſe voluntarily endured; congenial to their original character, and confirmed by hereditary and preſcriptive uſage. The genius and temper of the Greeks, indeed, were as different from thoſe of the Aſiatics and Africans, as from thoſe of the fierce and undiſciplined barbarians in the north and weſt of Europe. The queſtion therefore comes to be, what is the beſt government for the Greeks, or rather for that portion of the Greeks, ſufficiently numerous to form a community apart? for Ariſtotle thought the whole nation far too bulky to be moulded into one commonwealth, but well adapted by its magnitude to form a powerful confederacy; which by purſuing a line of policy which he marks out, in its foreign as well as domeſtic tranſactions, might have greatly accelerated the improvement and eminently heightened the proſperity of the ſurrounding world. The queſtion, therefore, ſtill returns, How are the firſt elements of this confederacy to be produced? What ought to be the conſtitution, and what the properties of that political germ, deſtined to invigorate into ſuch ſolid ſtrength, at the ſame time that it expands to ſuch flouriſhing beauty?

In treating this ſubject, Ariſtotle proves, with convincing evidence, that the ſame energies and habits conſtitute the happineſs both of individuals and of nations. Men make governments, not governments them: nor by any ſyſtem of political arrangement can a happy commonwealth be conſtituted from fools or cowards, profligates or knaves. The bricks muſt firſt be prepared before the edifice can be reared; and to the ſophiſts

ſophiſts of Greece, who maintained, that as men were corrupted by bad governments, ſo they might be corrected and purified by good ones, the author replies by aſking, how a good building can be made from bad materials? To make a government requires great length of time; and to amend a corrupt government, he obſerves, requires ſtill longer time; becauſe, in this latter caſe, men have not only to learn what they did not before know, but alſo to unlearn what they had previouſly been taught. The happineſs of the community at large is the end of all good government; but Ariſtotle derides the vain opinion that this happineſs, which is often deſtroyed by the injuſtice and cruelty of magiſtrates, is only to be recovered and reſtored through the operation of popular aſſemblies. The majority of the people are poor, their juſtice will therefore be rapacity; the majority of the people are ignorant, their policy therefore will be folly; the majority of the people are themſelves domineered by headſtrong and impetuous paſſions, their dominion therefore will be anarchy, oppreſſion, and cruelty; and to intruſt government, even for a moment, to ſuch clumſy and artleſs hands, will, inſtead of having any tendency to reform it, be the likelieſt means to prevent the poſſibility of any thing like rational reform from ever being effected.

Virtue, in a political ſenſe, is defined the love of the conſtitution; but under the beſt conſtitution poſſible, virtue ſimply, and political virtue, perfectly coincide. How virtue, ſimple and unqualified, that is, virtue in the ſtrict philoſophical ſenſe, may be rendered the actuating principle of government, Ariſtotle proceeds with great accuracy to explain; and the ariſtocracy which he thus eſtabliſhes, while it maintains the juſt pre-eminence of the few, will invariably promote the

beſt

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Readers of reflection will peruſe with pleaſure his judicious obſervations concerning the extent and populouſneſs of his commonwealth; the moſt advantageous ſoil and climate, the beſt ſituation of the country and of the capital; their neceſſary accommodations, and moſt deſirable embelliſhments. Such particulars as theſe ſufficiently explain themſelves; but the three following points, two of which relate to domeſtic, and one to foreign policy, are not unworthy of illuſtration.

For cementing his citizens into friendſhip, and for maintaining, unimpaired, the true ſpirit of any thing like a free and a good conſtitution, Ariſtotle, both in this and other Books, aſcribes ſingular efficacy to thoſe convivial meetings, called by the Greeks *ſyſſities*, and by the Engliſh *clubs*. In the Greek ſenſe of the word, clubs long formed the prevailing characteriſtic and peculiar delight of one modern nation. Our neighbours neither had the name nor the thing: and an Engliſhman who had inhabited the capital, whatever inducements might lead him to foreign lands, always ſighed with regret (and that in a degree proportional to his good ſenſe) for thoſe precious hours unincumbered by care and unfettered by ceremony, where frankneſs chaſtiſed by decency, and ardour fraught with knowledge, flowed in full and free ſtreams of unguarded converſation. Before haſtily condemning Ariſtotle for aſcribing great and momentous effects to ſlight and trivial cauſes, it may be worth while to pauſe, and carefully to conſider how much this ſingularity in our own manners contributed to form that cha-

racter, and efpecially that temper, which is beft calculated for enjoying, without abufe, the ineftimable benefits of a free government.

A fecond point on which Ariftotle refts the chief fupport of his commonwealth, is the diftribution of public functions among its citizens, according to their refpective ages. That a city or commonwealth may fubfift comfortably, as to matters of bodily accommodation, it muft be provided with peafants, mechanics, and merchants; that it may fubfift happily, fecurely, and refpectably, it muft be provided with magiftrates, priefts, and foldiers. Ariftotle endeavours to prove, both by experience and arguments, that the claffes of men habitually employed as inftruments of productive induftry, ought to be all of them ftrictly confined, each to his affigned tafk; and that the more minutely their tafks are fubdivided, and the more rigidly each through life adheres to his own, the more promptly and the more perfectly will the work of all be performed. But does the fame reafoning apply to thofe public and political functions which conftitute the duty and dignity of a citizen? As the trade of a weaver ought never to be conjoined with that of a fmith or a carpenter; in the fame manner ought the military profeffion never to be exercifed at the fame time, and by the fame perfons who perform the offices of priefts and magiftrates. Ariftotle maintains, that thofe functions ought to be performed by the fame perfons, not however fimultaneoufly, but at different periods of their lives. Young men in the bloom of their health, ftrength, and courage, make the beft foldiers; the matured vigour of underftanding is neceffary to the due exercife of deliberative and judicial powers; whereas the honourable functions of the priefthood, not requiringany painful or

any

any ſtrenuous exertion either of the body or of the mind, ought to be reſerved for the occupation and the reward of declining years.

Ariſtotle would have eaſily perceived the incompatibility of ſuch regulations with the condition of modern times. The civil law of Athens, and of every other republic of Greece, was a ſcience ſtill more ſimple than the civil law of Rome, of which Cicero boaſts, that amidſt all his variety of occupations he could make himſelf maſter in the courſe of a few weeks. In the Chriſtian kingdoms of Europe, prieſts are not only the performers of religious ceremonies, but the great moral inſtructors of mankind; and the preparations requiſite for the profeſſion either of the law or of the church are ſufficient to employ and exhauſt the diligence of that portion of life which, according to Ariſtotle's plan, ought to be dedicated to far different purſuits. It is thus that the arrangements in political ſociety muſt always depend on the materials to be arranged; and that inſtitutions ſeemingly the moſt natural and moſt ſalutary will, under given circumſtances, be found the moſt abſurd and moſt deſtructive. The ſtudy of abſtract politics is, therefore, of all ſciences the moſt liable to abuſe, though of them all the moſt uſeful, when confined within its proper ſphere. By determining thoſe arrangements which, independently of local and temporary circumſtances, are moſt conformable to the eſſential ſtructure and eſſential ends of ſociety, it ſupplies the conductors of public affairs with a political limit or model of perfection, to which, without ever reaching, they may continually ſtrive to approximate; thereby counteracting that tendency from bad to worſe, of which the ſuperficial as well as the deep obſervers of human life have at all times and in all countries ſo juſtly and ſo univerſally

verfally complained. In moral and intellectual endowments, one man is fcarcely ever more different from another, than the fame man is different from himfelf at different periods of his life. The diftinctions of age are the moft natural, the moft palpable, and the leaft invidious of all diftinctions; and wretched muft be that commonwealth, in which the prerogatives of virtuous old age are not both honourably fuftained and cheerfully acknowledged!

The juft and natural prerogatives of age ought, however, to be carefully diftinguifhed from the abfolute and unnatural dominion of fathers over their children, which was eftablifhed by law in ancient Perfia, and in ancient Rome. With refpect to the former country, Ariftotle fays, that its regulations concerning the *patria poteftas* were barbarous and tyrannical[a]. At Rome, fathers were not punifhable for felling their children, or even for putting them to death; and a fon, while his father lived, could not, unlefs emancipated, legally enjoy any feparate property. Extraordinary as thofe powers feem, they were not, however, rafhly given to fathers by the founders of the Roman ftate, the deepeft of all politicians, "fince they were induced to confer them, by confidering the natural pre-eminence of fathers, the innumerable labours which they fuftain for the fake of their children, the neceffity of keeping the latter under a watchful authority; which they knew, from the inftinctive affection of parents for their offspring, would be mildly exercifed." Such are the fentiments of Simplicius[b]; but Ariftotle holds, that parents, as to the treatment of their children, and mafters, as to the treatment of their flaves, ought

[a] Ethic. Nichom. viii. 12. [b] Ad Epictet. Encheirid.

ought to be amenable to the laws, and accountable to the magiftrates; fince power without refponfibilty is not made for man.

The third point in the prefent Book requiring illuftration, relates to the moft important branch of foreign policy. According to the theory at leaft, though not the practice, both of the Greeks and Romans, war could be warrantably undertaken only for the purpofes of felf-defence, of making reprifals, and of revenging injuries[c]. But the mild and manly fpirit of Chriftianity, reprobating, as an unjuftifiable caufe of action, every fpecies and every degree of revenge, is thought to have altered and improved the law of nations refpecting war and peace; and to have reftricted the right of hoftility fimply to refiftance. Even this law of refiftance or defence has been rejected by the fcruples of fome of the aufterer fects: but their arguments, founded on the literal fenfe of particular texts, have been anfwered by proving, that thefe texts enjoin forbearance only in the cafe of flight and trivial injuries, and are to be regarded as general recommendations of Chriftian patience, not as particular commands for abandoning to unjuft violence our perfons, our families, our friends, and our country. Had Chriftianity purpofed the complete abolition of war on all grounds whatever, fuch an innovation muft have been announced in language fpecific and peremptory. The new and extraordinary law would not have been left to be collected by inference; it would have been exprefsly declared and folemnly promulgated. By the power, indeed, of moral motives, and the force of rational arguments, Chriftianity renders odious or contemptible, ambition, avarice, uncharitablenefs, and all thofe felfifh

[c] Omnia quæ defendi, repetique et ulcifci fas fit. Liv. l. v. c. xlix.

felfifh paffions which are the principal and ordinary caufes of aggreffion. Were its divine doctrines univerfally refpected, wars would from that moment univerfally ceafe, becaufe none could meditate future wrong; and the party who had already committed injuries would be folicitous amply to repair them. But until this happy revolution be effected in human manners, violence may be repelled by force; crimes may be punifhed for the fake of amendment and example; and incorrigible offenders, whether individuals or communities, may be utterly cut off, when their deftruction appears effentially requifite to the public fafety. Befides thofe plain and palpable grounds of war, which have always been avowed in the practice at leaft of all Chriftian nations, Ariftotle maintains, that individuals or communities, qualified for command, may affert by arms an authority juftifiable, becaufe ufeful, to thofe who are its fubjects; an authority moderate and political over freemen, abfolute and defpotic over flaves. For extenuating the harfhnefs of this decifion, it may be obferved, that by metaphors familiar to moft languages, we fpeak of the infancy of fociety, indicating that many human beings, who have attained the age of manhood, are nearly as incapable as children of governing their own conduct. To fuch full-grown children, it would furely be a piece of good fortune to fall under the direction of a wife and virtuous father. We fpeak of other communities of men as fervile, barbarous, favage, and even brutal; it would, affuredly, be highly advantageous to fuch nations to meet with wife and virtuous mafters. Barbarous and favage nations, therefore, may be rightfully attacked in war, if, without being conquered, the former could not be civilifed, nor the latter be tamed.

 This

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This ſpecious maxim is liable indeed to be frequently abuſed, becauſe it muſt be explained and applied by human reaſon, dark in itſelf, and often clouded by paſſion. But does the principle of ſelf-defence, which Grotius would ſubſtitute in its ſtead, delineate an unerring rule of action? According to the uniform current of modern hiſtory, has not the approved right of ſelf-defence been conſtituted by an apprehenſion of remote and improbable contingencies? In the practice, at leaſt, of nations, does it not include whatever our avarice, our ambition, in one word, our ſelfiſhneſs, ſuppoſes eſſential to our well-being, the increaſe of our wealth or power, the ſuperiority of our military or naval force, the preſervation of our hereditary advantages, and the inſurance of our future proſpects? One nation is too ſtrong—our ſafety requires that it ſhould be weakened; another, by its ſituation, may be tempted to extend its borders—our own frontier is to be fortified by new acquiſitions of territory, and defended by new bulwarks; by territory to be gained by invaſion, and bulwarks which inſpire more real terror than that by which they were raiſed. It would be endleſs to recite the incongruities reſulting from the interpretation of a law, which tends to ſet the practice of nations at continual variance with their principles; a law too refined for the coarſeneſs, and too limited for the variety of human tranſactions; which, in our preſent imperfect ſtate, require that the exerciſe of the right of war, like all other deliberate acts, ſhould be governed by the fallible dictates of human prudence, adjuſting, as well as may be, the meaſures of coercion to the ſalutary ends of public expediency, including the beſt intereſts both of the victors and of the vanquiſhed.

It

It may be worthy of remark, in concluding this introduction to Ariſtotle's ideal commonwealth, that his great political as well as philoſophical adverſary was employed, in 1663, to delineate a plan of government for Carolina. He gave the whole authority, legiſlative and executive, to the eight proprietors. The great Milton propoſed a plan of government for England [d]. The ſovereignty was to reſide in a grand council, not only ſupreme but perpetual. Compared with Ariſtotle's commonwealth, that of Locke will appear no better than a diet of *ſtaroſts*; and that of Milton, an oligarchy of *decemvirs*.

[d] See his "Ready and eaſy Way to eſtabliſh a Free Commonwealth."

BOOK IV.*

ARGUMENT.

Different views of national happineſs.—Fair eſtimate thereof.—The beſt commonwealth.—Extent and nature of its territory.—Commerce—Naval power—Climate—Conſtituent members—Health—Marriage—Children.

BOOK IV. Chap. 1.

The foundation of public happineſs.

RIGHTLY to inveſtigate the beſt form of government, it is neceſſary previouſly to aſcertain what is the beſt kind of life; ſince the latter of theſe remaining undetermined, the former alſo muſt continue to be unknown. Thoſe men (barring improbable accidents) are the happieſt, who live under the beſt government of which their circumſtances admit. We muſt begin, therefore, by examining what kind of life is moſt eligible for mankind in general; and ſecondly, whether the well-being of individuals and of communities reſults from the ſame cauſes, and is to be eſtimated by the ſame ſtandard. The former of theſe topics has been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in our popular diſcourſes; where we made uſe of a diviſion that appears to be indiſputably accurate; namely, that the happineſs of men depends on their external proſperity, on the frame and habit of their bodies, on the ſtate and condition of their minds. He ſurely would be unworthy to be called happy, who poſſeſſed not the ſmalleſt particle of fortitude, of temperance, of juſtice, or of prudence; ſince the wretch totally deſtitute of theſe

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VII.

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these virtues respectively, would be frightened at the buzzing of a fly; would wallow unrestrained in the most beastly sensuality; would not hesitate, for the smallest gain, to destroy his best benefactor; and in point of intellectual operations, would betray either childish imbecility or frantic absurdity. That a certain portion of virtue is essential to the well-being of a human creature, cannot, therefore, be a matter of dispute; but to what this portion ought to amount, occasions much diversity of opinion. In general, mankind are satisfied with their respective shares of virtue, how scanty soever they may be, but extremely dissatisfied with their shares of all other advantages; for their measure of virtue, however inconsiderable it may appear to others, rarely appearing deficient to themselves, they seek not to augment it; while their estates and money, their fame and their power, cannot possibly, in their own opinion, be too widely enlarged, or too highly accumulated. But *we* say to them, that such vulgar illusions, even vulgar observation may suffice to dispel. The external advantages of power and fortune are acquired and maintained by virtue, not virtue by them; and whether we consider the virtuous energies themselves, or the fruits which they unceasingly produce, the sovereign good of life must evidently be found in moral and intellectual excellence, moderately supplied with external accommodations, rather than in the greatest accumulation of external advantages, unimproved and unadorned by virtue. External prosperity is indeed instrumental in producing happiness, and therefore, like every other instrument, must have its assigned limits; beyond which it is inconvenient or hurtful. But to mental excellence no limit can be assigned: the farther it extends, the more *useful* it becomes, if the epithet

of *uſeful* need ever to be ſuperadded to that of *honourable*. Beſides this, the relative importance of qualities is beſt eſtimated by that of their reſpective ſubjects. But the mind, both in itſelf and in reference to man, is far better than the body, or than property. The excellencies of the mind, therefore, are in the ſame proportion to be preferred to the higheſt perfection of the body, and the beſt diſpoſition of external circumſtances. The two laſt are of a far inferior, and merely a ſubſervient nature; ſince no man of ſenſe covets or purſues them, but for the ſake of the mind, with a view to promote its genuine improvement, and to heighten its native joys. Let this great truth then be acknowledged; a truth evinced by the Deity himſelf, who is happy, not from any external cauſe, but through the inherent attributes of his divine nature.

Chap. 2.

The ſame with that of individuals.

Proſperity and happineſs, then, are things altogether different. Chance or fortune may beſtow the former, but they cannot produce the energies of virtue, which are the eſſential ſource of the latter. Theſe energies are preciſely the ſame, whether exerciſed by individuals or by communities; neither altering their inward form, nor changing their external effects. Public and private happineſs, therefore, muſt reſt on preciſely the ſame foundation, a concluſion juſtified even by univerſal conſent; ſince thoſe who place the happineſs of the individual in riches, are ſolicitous chiefly about preſerving and augmenting national wealth; and thoſe who place the happineſs of the individual in power, are ſolicitous chiefly about preſerving or augmenting national dominion. A ſimilar inference is drawn by the admirer of virtue: He who regards it as the ſupreme felicity of the individual, alſo conſiders it as the main ſource of national happineſs.

 But

BOOK IV. Chap. 3.

The beft fchemes of national happinefs.

But fince virtue is twofold, fpeculative and practical, and that men ambitious of excellence refpectively dedicate themfelves to the purfuit of philofophy or that of politics; it is worth while to confider which of the two kinds of life, a life of ftrenuous action or of peaceful contemplation, is moft deferving of being imitated by ftates; fince it is the office of wifdom to teach nations as well as individuals to prefer the beft ends, and fkilfully to purfue them. The advocates for peaceful repofe and contemplative tranquillity obferve, that for a nation to govern its neighbour defpotically is the height of injuftice, and therefore the moft confummate folly; and that to govern them moderately and carefully, though not liable to fuch palpable objections, is however a work of great difficulty, and fraught with much trouble and much anxiety. Other reafoners, though they condemn every kind of injuftice and defpotifm, maintain that the contentious agitations of war and government form the happinefs and glory of nations, fince they afford the beft and nobleft field for the public exhibition of illuftrious abilities, and of pre-eminent virtues. A third clafs, and this is the moft numerous, boldly patronife ambition and tyranny, and affert that the main bufinefs of nations confifts in extending their power and aggrandifing their empire.

The practice of moft great nations fhews that they placed it in valour and conqueft.

In Sparta and in Crete, the public education, as well as the laws, are contrived merely as means for attaining this favourite end. The fame remark applies to the Scythians, the Perfians, the Thracians, and the Celts; and, indeed, to all thofe great nations whofe valour or populoufnefs have enabled them to affert their pretenfions, or encouraged them to difplay their ambition. In Carthage, a foldier is entitled to wear as many rings as he has ferved campaigns. There was an old law in

Macedon, that the man who had not flain an enemy in the field of battle, fhould be girt, not with an ornamental belt, but with a halter. The Scythians, in their public feftivals, never prefented the circling cup to hands guiltlefs of blood. The Iberians, a martial people, adorn the tombs of their deceafed warriors with obelifks or pillars, equal in number to the enemies whom they have refpectively flain [e]. Similar inftitutions prevail in other countries, either enacted by law, or eftablifhed by cuftom; and yet nothing can appear more abfurd to men capable of reflection, than to believe it the bufinefs of government to hold either nations or individuals in reluctant fubjection. Who ever heard that it was the duty of a phyfician to compel, or even to perfuade his patients to be cured, or the duty of a pilot to compel, or even to perfuade the fhip's company to be faved? The fcience of government, like that of phyfic and of navigation,

[e] The inftitutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity, which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Ariftotle, who flourifhed towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were diftinguifhed above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffufion, of military honours. From the time of the Publilian law, "ut plebifcita omnes Quirites tenerent," U. C. 416. which was a confirmation of the Valerian, U. C. 306.; and which was itfelf confirmed by the Hortenfian, U. C. 467. *, the people at large enjoyed an afcendancy in the government; and the military ambition of the commonwealth thereby acquired that degree of vigour and activity, which (external circumftances permitting) has always moft confpicuoufly appeared under fuch a political arrangement. In modern times, military diftinctions, as well as the martial fpirit, have prevailed moft in monarchies. This was not the cafe anciently, but completely the reverfe: and it may be obferved, that external circumftances being the fame, the ambition of conqueft diffufed through the general mafs of a fociety, muft be a more ardent as well as a more firm and fteady principle of action, than when confined within the breafts of a few individuals, whofe paffions are not, like thofe of communities, immortal.

* Conf. T. Liv. iii. 55. vii. 42. Plin. Nat. Hift. xvi. 10. & Pompon. de Origin. ii. 8. Aul. Gell. xv. 27.

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navigation, is invented for the public benefit; and men will allow themfelves to be benefited, without perfuafion and without compulfion.

Their eftimate proved to be erroneous.

The conduct of nations has perplexed this fubject, becaufe the conduct of nations has been diftorted by paffion. They have impofed laws on their neighbours, which they themfelves would have indignantly rejected. Behaving moderately and equitably at home, they have acted tyrannically abroad, confounding the limits of politic and defpotic government, although, as we have already proved, to enflave freemen, is not lefs abfurd and contrary to nature, than to hunt and eat them. A ftate may be fo circumftanced as to exift happily without conqueft and without war; and how fplendid foever military glory may be deemed, it is valuable merely as the means of obtaining a ftill more valuable end. This end cannot furely confift in gratifying the luft of ambition, for no pleafure is more contemptible than that of commanding flaves, and to reduce freemen into fervitude is an unnatural gratification, equally dangerous and deceitful. The happinefs of communities, as well as of individuals, confifts, doubtlefs, in action; but to the external action of a ftate, a wide field lies often in the diverfity of genius and character of the furrounding nations, each of which, to be treated juftly, muft perhaps be treated differently. Befides this, there are many internal relations which the conftituent parts of a commonwealth bear to each other, and many refulting duties to be habitually and daily performed [f]. But were nothing of this kind to be performed, nor

[f] Ariftotle here dwells on what is often repeated in other parts of this work, the injuftice of any kind of authority not derived from nature; the differences between the power or jurifdiction of mafters, fathers, and hufbands, and the evils refulting from confounding the limits of governments fpecifically different.

nor any external effect to be produced, action would not, therefore, ceafe; nor the purpofe of happinefs be defeated. The pleafure of intellectual action is the more perfect, in proportion as fuch action terminates in itfelf. The geometer who folves his problem, the philofopher who purfues his fpeculation[g], refpectively exercife energies immediately delightful in themfelves, independently of any diftant end, or any external effect. What can be external to God and the univerfe? Yet the action of the univerfe is not therefore fufpended; and the Deity[h], who fuftains

[g] τους ταις διανοιαις αρχιτεκτονας. The word architect in Greek was extended to fignify a contriver in general, the man who planned with his head, what others were to execute with their hands. In this fenfe it is ufed in the text; of which I have endeavoured to convey the full meaning without adhering literally to the words. How, indeed, can we tranflate clearly, yet literally, παλυ μαλλον τας αυτοτελεις. . . ἡ γαρ ευπραξια τελος, ὡστε και πραξις τις. Cicero, in many of the fineft paffages of his works, expands and adorns Ariftotle's thoughts. "Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum infulis, immortale ævum, ut fabulæ ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus effet eloquentia, cum judicia nulla fierent? aut ipfis etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudinis indigeremus, nullo propofito aut labore aut periculo; nec juftitia, cum effet nihil, quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quæ regeret eas, quæ nullæ effent libidines: ne prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu propofito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur effemus beati cognitione naturæ, et fcientia, qua fola etiam deorum eft vita laudanda. Ex quo intelligi poteft, cetera neceffitatis; unum hoc voluptatis." Cicero Fragment. Philofoph. five Hortenfius.

[h] This is conformable to a fublime theological paffage in the Treatife de Cœlo, L. ii. c. xiii. p. 465. in which Ariftotle, after explaining the Pythagorean fyftem of aftronomy, is endeavouring to refute one of its principal doctrines. The Pythagoreans held the element of fire to be more precious than that of earth, and therefore affigned to it the more honourable place, and confidered it as the center of the celeftial motions. This center being the poft of greateft importance in the univerfe, and requiring the moft vigilant watch, they called the fire occupying this poft Διος φυλακην, the watch of Jupiter. In oppofition to thefe hypothefes, Ariftotle, conftantly guided in his conclufions by obfervation and analogy, takes notice that the center or middle is certainly that which is moft important and principal in any fyftem, when it is that by which the fyftem is connected and fuftained. But this middle, or rather this principle of connection,

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fuftains the whole, enjoys the perfection of felicity in exercifing his divine energies. By fuch fublime comparifons we are taught, that the happinefs of men, confidered collectively or individually, is ftill to be found within themfelves; and that the fame kind of life which is the beft for each citizen apart, is alfo the beft for the whole community.

Chap. 4.

Tranfition to the examination of what is abfolutely the beft commonwealth.

This fhort preface feemed a neceffary prelude to our treatife concerning the beft form of goverment, for it was proper to begin with that which is the moft important of all, to which all other things are relative and fubfervient, and *without* which they are not, all of them taken collectively, of any, the fmalleft value: we now proceed to examine thofe external advantages and outward accommodations, which ferve as the materials from which the beft commonwealths are compofed, and as foundations on which the beft conftitutions are conftructed.

That fuch a commonwealth has limits in point of populoufnefs.

In explaining this fubject our fuppofitions, doubtlefs, are arbitrary; but good fenfe requires that they be not impracticable. The ftatefman, like the fhipbuilder or the weaver, requires a due provifion of materials; and the better thofe materials are, the more perfect will be the fruit of his political labour. The materials of the ftatefman or legiflator, are the number and character of his people, the extent and quality of his country. The

connection, will not be found to coincide with what is the middle in point of magnitude, or with what is called the center of gravity. In animals, the connecting and fuftaining principle refides not in the middle of their bodies; neither is there good reafon for fuppofing it to be fo fituated in the univerfe. Philofophers need not, therefore, give themfelves trouble about the fafety of the univerfe, fetting a watch at the center of its fpace or magnitude, but rather to inveftigate its connecting and fuftaining principle, where and of what kind it is. The reft is mere matter; this is the foul of the fyftem: ἡ ουσια της συςασεως, "that which gives the fyftem its characteriftic form, makes it fubfift, and be what it is."

The excellence of a commonwealth, however, is not to be eſtimated by its populouſneſs or extent, but by its fitneſs for performing its proper functions. Hippocrates was a greater phyſician than many phyſicians twice his ſize. Slaves, ſojourners, and ſtrangers render a city populous, but do not make it *great*; neither can this epithet be beſtowed, where there are many mechanics and manufacturers, but few citizens completely armed and ſkilfully diſciplined. The experience of hiſtory proves, that ſtates of unlimited populouſneſs have never been well regulated. How is it poſſible that they ſhould, if law be nothing elſe than an arrangement, and if *that* be incapable of arrangement which is indefinite in number or quantity? To harmoniſe immenſity into ſyſtem, is the work only of that Divine Power which comprehends the univerſe. Beauty commonly reſults from the proportion of quantity; and that which exceeds, as well as that which falls ſhort of the due proportion, cannot be called beautiful, either literally or figuratively. There is a limit, therefore, to the magnitude of every whole or ſyſtem, whether it be the work of nature or of art. A ſhip of two furlongs in length, is as unfit for the purpoſe of navigation as one of two ſpans; and although a community may contain a greater number of individuals than are requiſite for thoſe purpoſes of ſelf-ſufficiency and comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which commonwealths are inſtituted, yet this exceſs is not unlimited; ſince, when carried beyond certain bounds, it would diſqualify the body-politic for its proper functions; rendering it incapable both of prudent command and of prompt obedience. An army reinforced by continual acceſſions, would finally ceaſe to be an army; for were Stentor fit to be its herald, who would preſume

to

BOOK IV.

to be its general? What human ſkill would undertake to combine its operations, and to harmoniſe its movements?

What theſe limits are.

The ſovereign functions of a ſtate conſiſt in appointing magiſtrates, and in deciding differences. But it is impoſſible that magiſtrates ſhould be judiciouſly appointed, or differences ſkilfully decided, unleſs the characters and abilities of the citizens be carefully obſerved and accurately aſcertained: and theſe precautions will not be eaſily taken in countries of unbounded populouſneſs; in which, alſo, there is this inconvenience, that ſtrangers and ſojourners will have an opportunity, through the difficulty of detection, of clandeſtinely uſurping the rank of citizens. The magnitude of a commonwealth, though variable, has, therefore, on either ſide, its fixed boundaries. It muſt be all-ſufficient in itſelf for the purpoſes of comfortable ſubſiſtence, and for the reciprocal ſupply of mutual wants. But its inhabitants muſt not be too numerous to be comprehended at one glance of the ſtateſman's eye, and to be conducted in all their actions by the vigilant operation of political diſcipline.

Chap. 5.

Concerning the extent and nature of the territory.

Upon ſimilar principles we muſt decide concerning the extent and nature of the territory. That which is moſt fertile in the greateſt variety of productions ſeems entitled to a juſt preference, provided this fertility be not ſo luxuriant as to encourage indolence or engender voluptuouſneſs[1]. Military men will tell us what makes a country eaſy of egreſs yet difficult of invaſion.

[1] The author here promiſes to examine more accurately hereafter, what ought to be the limits of national wealth; but in the work as it now ſtands, this promiſe is not fulfilled. Several other queſtions are ſtarted by Ariſtotle in his Politics, which are not any where anſwered; which proves that performance to have come down to us in an imperfect ſtate.

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ſion. The territory ſhould alſo be compactly ſituate; that it may eaſily fall within the ſuperintending eye of the ſtateſman or general, that its parts may be able mutually to aſſiſt each other, and that the whole may be readily defended.

Chap. 6.

Whether the capital ought to be ſituated near the ſea.

The maritime poſition of the capital will greatly contribute to this laſt purpoſe; for its inhabitants may ſpeedily embark, and ſail to the defence of any part of their poſſeſſions that happens to be attacked; and they may attack the enemy in thoſe parts that are moſt vulnerable. It is alſo of great importance to commerce, and eſpecially to the tranſportation of wood and other bulky articles, that the capital be conveniently ſituate with regard both to the ſea, and to the circumjacent land. Yet, in other reſpects, the vicinity of the ſea* is attended with dangerous conſequences. Men will generally entertain a higher veneration for their hereditary inſtitutions, in proportion as they leſs communicate with ſtrangers; and the promiſcuous crowd of ſailors and foreigners, which traffic naturally collects, can ſcarcely fail to injure the morals of well-educated citizens.

If

* Maritime power was ſo groſsly abuſed by the ancient republics, that it is continually branded by moraliſts as producing vile and verſatile manners, ἠθη ποικιλα και φαυλα, Plato de Leg. ſub. init. The ſurpriſing of defenceleſs cities, the deſolating of unguarded coaſts, attacks without glory, and retreats without ſhame, were repreſented as operations not leſs inconſiſtent with true courage, than incompatible with humanity and juſtice. Iſocrat. Orat. de Pace, & Plato ubi ſupra. The ancient republics entruſted arms to thoſe only who had a property to defend. Their ſoldiers were levied from the firſt claſſes, or privileged orders, of ſociety. But ſailors were taken from the promiſcuous crowd, and generally from the meaneſt populace. This practice, which prevailed equally in Greece and Rome, was founded on ſound policy. The exertions of ſailors, being naturally directed againſt foreign enemies, are leſs likely to prove dangerous to the internal ſtability of government.

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How far commerce ought to be cultivated, and how its inconveniences may be remedied.

If we cultivate commerce, it muft be for accommodation only, not for gain: our citizens are not to degrade themfelves into brokers and carriers, nor to fquander away in the arts of luxury that labour which may be far more profitably as well as more honourably employed, in the cultivation of the foil and in the production of neceffaries; the occupation which is of all others the beft adapted to the bulk of mankind, the moft favourable to the health of their minds and bodies, and therefore the beft fitted to promote national profperity. Our commerce muft be limited to the purpofe of fupplying our domeftic wants; and in order to attain this purpofe without endangering the purity of our domeftic manners, we may imitate the example of thofe cities and countries which have their docks and harbours enclofed by walls and fortifications, and feparated at a due diftance from the capital; thus permitting the importation of foreign commodities, but intercepting the contagion of foreign vices.

Concerning naval power.

Naval power is peculiarly ufeful for the purpofes of intimidating our enemies and protecting our allies; but its extent ought to be commenfurate with the rank which a ftate afpires to hold in the political fyftem. A people ambitious of command muft be provided with a ftrong navy; and this may be equipped without raifing the naval crowd to the condition of citizens. Even on fhipboard, thofe who brandifh the fpear muft maintain their fuperiority over thofe who handle the oar; and the latter, in whatever number they may be wanted, will eafily be raifed from the mafs of the peafants and labourers. Such is the practice of feveral wife ftates, particularly of that of Heraclæa, which maintains a numerous fleet of gallies, yet preferves its citizens untainted by the contagious profligacy of mariners.

Thus

Thus much may fuffice concerning the extent of the city and territory, and concerning the magnitude of the naval force. We formerly affigned due limits to the number of the citizens, and now proceed to confider what ought to be their genius and character; a queftion that will be beft folved by paffing in review, and examining, thofe nations of Greece, and of the world in general, which appear to be moft worthy of our efteem. BOOK IV.

Chap. 7. — Of the character refulting from a cold climate; from a warm climate; from a temperate climate;

The inhabitants of Europe, and of moft cold countries, abound in ftrength and courage; but their intellectual powers are feeble or defective. They enjoy liberty, but are unacquainted with good polity; and though capable of maintaining their independence, are unworthy of afpiring to empire. The inhabitants of Afia, on the contrary, are artful and ingenious, but mean-fpirited and daftardly. They have, therefore, always been, and continue to this day, either fubjects or flaves. But the intermediate fituation of the Greeks feems to have happily blended in their character the virtues of courage and prudence, and to have formed them for thinking calmly, yet feeling ftrongly. They enjoy, therefore, the double advantage of liberty and laws; and are qualified for ruling the world, were they happily confederate under one form of government[1]. The Greeks, however, are not all equally confpicuous for this happy

[1] Ariftotle maintained in a former chapter that a commonwealth had its limits in point of populoufnefs; and endeavoured to point out with fufficient accuracy for all practical purpofes what thefe limits were. In the paffage before us he fays, γενος Ελληνων δυναμενον αρχειν παντων, μιας τυγχανον πολιτειας. "That the Greeks would be able to command all nations, if they had the fame form of government." In fact, the extreme difference in the forms of government in Greece, was the great obftacle to their national union in one political confederacy; which is the thing here intended by Ariftotle, fince, according to the principles above explained, Greece was far too populous to be happily united in one commonwealth.

BOOK IV.

The beſt moral materials for legiſlation.

happy temperament, and the manly policy which is its natural reſult. In ſome nations the character is rude and ſhapeleſs; one quality being deficient, while another is redundant: but in whatever people ardent courage moſt naturally harmoniſes with cool combination, and dignity of ſentiment with energy of intellect, that people muſt be conſidered as the beſt materials for legiſlation, and the fitteſt to be moulded into a virtuous commonwealth. It is ſaid by ſome writers, that the military guardians of ſtates ought, like faithful dogs, to ſhew themſelves mild towards thoſe whom they know, but fierce towards ſtrangers. Yet true magnanimity is incapable of ferocity, and is never moved even to aſperity, but in reſentment of injuſtice or inſult. When theſe provocations proceed from friends and acquaintances, our anger is enhanced by this circumſtance. "Waſt thou not tormented by thy friends?" ſays Archilochus, to whet his ſatire; and it is reaſonable that men ſhould be doubly offended when they meet with injury and neglect, where they had a right to expect friendſhip and regard. Hence the proverbs, "cruel are the wars of brothers;" and "thoſe who are incapable of anger and reſentment, muſt alſo be incapable of friendſhip and gratitude;" and indeed all thoſe affections originate in one and the ſame ſource [1]. Thus much may ſuffice concerning the qualities moſt uſeful towards the formation of good citizens; for in practical matters, ſcientific accuracy is neither attainable nor requiſite.

Chap. 8.

Diſtinction between the integral parts of a ſtate, and

Every whole or ſyſtem, whether it be the work of nature or of art, may require many things for its ſubſiſtence which are not to be numbered among its conſtituent parts. Food is neceſſary for ſupporting animal life, but is not a part of thoſe animals who conſume it. Land and other objects of property, whether

[1] See vol. i. b. vi. c. ii. p. 288. & ſeq.

whether inanimate or endued with life, are neceſſary for upholding ſtates, yet none of theſe poſſeſſions or inſtruments form any part of the commonwealth; which, as defined above, is the aſſociation of equals for the purpoſe of living happily, that is, of living virtuouſly, for happineſs has been proved to conſiſt in the exerciſe of virtuous energies; though men, indeed, ſeek to find it in very different purſuits, hunting vain ſhadows, which diverſify without correcting their purpoſes of life, and vary without improving their forms of government.

the things neceſſary for its ſubſiſtence.

Enumeration of the things neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of a commonwealth.

The things eſſential to every ſtate, whether as conſtituent parts or as concomitants [m], may be reduced to the ſix following heads. 1. Food, the great want of mankind. 2. Arts, becauſe to effect the comfort of life is a work requiring many inſtruments. 3. Arms, for citizens muſt be armed to prevent domeſtic diſorders, and ward off foreign violence. 4. Money, as the medium of exchange, and meaſure of value, and neceſſary in the exigences of war as well as in the operations of commerce. 5. An eſtabliſhment for the functions of religion [n], which are of all functions the firſt in dignity. 6. Councils of deliberation, and courts of juſtice, which are of all eſtabliſhments the moſt neceſſary. Any of theſe objects being wanting, the commonwealth is imperfect, or incapable of anſwering its end. In every commonwealth, therefore, there muſt be huſbandmen, artiſans, ſoldiers, merchants, prieſts, and judges [o].

A queſtion

[m] The author dwells here on this diſtinction, which is fully explained elſewhere.

[n] If we except the French republic, the Chineſe are the only great nation who, according to recent accounts, ever diſſented from Ariſtotle in this particular. See Staunton's Embaſſy to China, vol. ii. p. 101.

[o] Under the name of judges he means to comprehend, as in the following chapter, το βουλευομενον περι των συμφεροντων, as well as το κρινον περι των δικαιων, "thoſe who deliberate and determine in queſtions of public expediency," as well as "thoſe who examine into and adjuſt the controverſies between individuals."

BOOK IV.
Chap. 9.

In the beſt common-wealth, thoſe employed in mean and mercenary labour not to rank as citizens.

A queſtion ariſes, whether in that moſt perfect community of which human nature is ſuſceptible, the citizens ſhould aſſume indifferently, and as their occaſions may require, all thoſe various characters; or whether certain employments be not inconſiſtent with the habitual exerciſe of thoſe virtuous energies, which we have proved to be the principal end and aim of every political partnerſhip. It appears at firſt ſight, that a life of mechanical drudgery, or a life of haggling commerce, is totally incompatible with that dignified life which it is our wiſh that our citizens ſhould lead, and totally adverſe to that generous elevation of mind with which it is our ambition to inſpire them. The mere trade of huſbandry, the aſſiduous labour and minute attentions which it requires, would be deſtructive of that ſecure leiſure which is eſſential to the formation of their characters; and ſuch ſordid cares would impede and obſtruct the generous and manly exertions by which virtue is diſplayed and confirmed. Men, habitually addicted to the lowly purſuits of providing neceſſaries and accumulating gain, are unfit members of our republic, becauſe they are incapable of reliſhing thoſe enjoyments in which we have ſuppoſed its chief happineſs to conſiſt. They are to be claſſed with things neceſſary to the commonwealth, but not to be ranked with its citizens; for the beſt and moſt perfect commonwealth muſt provide for the happineſs of all its members, and a commonwealth founded on virtue cannot provide for the happineſs of men who are but feebly touched by her charms. Such men, therefore, though neceſſary to a commonwealth, are not parts of the commonwealth, any more than food, though neceſſary to an animal, is part of an animal; or than the inſtruments employed in producing any work, are themſelves parts of that work. The productive labour of

8 peaſants

peafants and artifans, how neceffary foever to the purpofes of outward accommodation and comfortable fubfiftence, is not, therefore, to be confounded nor claffed with the high political functions of foldiers, priefts, and magiftrates °.

What are the proper employments of citizens.

It remains, therefore, to examine, whether arms, religion, and magiftracy ought to be regarded as things fpecifically different, and of which the offices ought to be feparately exercifed by diftinct profeffions. In every good government the military ought, doubtlefs, to depend on the civil power; but will men bearing arms be contented with a condition of unalterable dependence? Or will thofe who feel their ability to change the conftitution at pleafure, fubmit for ever to a political arrangement difgraceful to themfelves? Such patient refignation cannot reafonably be expected, nor can that which is contrary to reafon be requifite to good government.

That thefe employments ought to be diftributed according to the different periods of human life.

The capacity for exercifing military and civil functions depends on qualities that are variable, becaufe they refult from a variable caufe, the changeable powers of man in the different periods of human life. Strength, agility, and courage attain their higheft perfection at that period of youth when the body reaches its prime; forefight, temper, and wifdom do not acquire their full maturity, but with the acmè and perfection of the mind. The *fame* perfons, therefore, but at *different* periods of their lives, muft exercife military and civil functions; and thus each clafs of citizens will perform that office for which it is beft qualified, and to which it is beft entitled. It remains only to fpeak of the priefthood. This folemn function muft, doubtlefs, be exercifed by men of the

° In this paffage I have changed the order of the fentences, the better to prepare the modern reader for a decifion, which to him muft appear harfh in the extreme, though it could not be viewed in that light by the readers of antiquity.

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the moſt reſpectable claſs. But to perform with decency and dignity the rites of religion, requires not any violent exertion of body or mind. Such honourable duties, therefore, ought to be reſerved for the occupation and the reward of declining years; and thoſe who have ſpent their youth and their manhood in more active and ſtrenuous cares, ought to dedicate their old age to the calm ceremonies of religion, and finally to repoſe in the peaceful ſanctuaries of the gods.

Chap. 10.

That the wiſeſt nations of antiquity acknowledged the diſtinction between citizens on the one hand, and peaſants and artiſans on the other.

The diſtinction between the conſtituent parts of a commonwealth, and things merely neceſſary for its ſubſiſtence, remounts to the higheſt antiquity. Both in Egypt and in Crete [p], the ſoldiers have long been, what they continue to this day, a claſs altogether diſtinct from the peaſants. Seſoſtris is ſaid to have eſtabliſhed this arrangement in Egypt; and Minos, in Crete. The *ſyſſitia* or public tables, in that iſland, are thought to have been inſtituted as early as the time of Minos; and ſimilar eſtabliſhments are ſaid to have taken place in Italy at a ſtill earlier date. For the hiſtorians of that country inform us, that Œnotria received the name of Italy from king Italus; a name comprehending the coaſt between the Scyllatine and Lametine gulphs; which are oppoſite to each other, and diſtant by land only half a day's journey [q]. Italus is ſaid to have changed the Œnotrians from ſhepherds into huſbandmen, and to have given them other laws relative to their new mode of life, and particularly thoſe regulating the public tables; which remain in force among his deſcendants to this day. For northwards, from the country firſt called Italy, the Opici and Auſonians

[p] This chapter may be conſidered as an illuſtration of the principles eſtabliſhed in the preceding, from the hiſtory of thoſe nations who diffuſed religion, laws, and civility over the ancient world.

[q] Vid. Cluverii Ital. Antiq. p. 1290. & ſeq.

Aufonians extend themfelves, on one hand, towards the Tufcan fea; but on the other hand, the Chaonians, an Œnotrian tribe, have ftretched towards the Ionian fea and Iapygia. Among them the eftablifhment of *fyffitia* firft prevailed, and from them it was adopted by other nations. But the feparation of citizens and peafants prevailed much earlier; for the age of Sefoftris long preceded that of Minos. It is probable that political, like all other inventions, have been often difcovered and often loft; and that many inftitutions have been laid afide and revived, times without number. Men having acquired neceffaries, naturally feek accommodations; and having provided for the ftrength and fupport of their political edifices, they fet themfelves to improve and embellifh them. The ftyle of fuperfluous ornaments varies with the caprice by which they are produced; but there are ornaments connected with ufe, which ought to be found in every well-regulated commonwealth; and why we take the *fyffitia* to be of this kind will be afterwards explained.

Of the diftribution and character of the peafants and artifans, and that liberty ought to be propofed as the reward of all flaves worthy to enjoy it.

We are now to fpeak of the diftribution and character of the peafants and artifans, which, according to our principles, muft be partly the property of the public and partly the property of particular citizens; for although our republic rejects the community of goods as repreffive to exertion, and even deftructive of virtue, yet wifhing poffeffions to be ftrictly appropriated, we wifh that their ufes be freely communicated; that according to the proverb all things may be common among friends; and that no one of the citizens may long continue in want of any object with which another can conveniently fupply him. The citizens, therefore, are to be maintained at public tables, the

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the expences of which, as well as thofe of the facrifices and religious feftivals, are to be fupplied from the lands laboured in common by the public flaves; for men of fmall incomes could not contribute fufficiently for thefe purpofes, and at the fame time fupport eafily the charges of their private families. The territory, therefore, ought to confift partly of common, and partly of private property; and each of thefe ought to be again fubdivided, fince the common is deftined to anfwer two purpofes, and to fupply the expences of religion and thofe of the *fyffitia*; and fince the lands of each citizen ought to lie partly in the vicinity of the capital, and partly on the frontier, or, if united in one mafs, ought to have fome fituation nearly equidiftant from thofe extremes. Both juftice and expediency require fuch a diftribution; for advantages and inconveniences will thus be more fairly balanced among the private citizens, and the ftate itfelf will be thus rendered more unanimous in public deliberations and military enterprifes. As poffeffions are now arranged, one portion of the community is commonly too much, and another too little, alarmed at the profpect of a foreign war; wherefore fome ftates have enacted that landholders living on the frontier fhould not be allowed to vote in queftions concerning war and peace, becaufe fuch perfons are likely to facrifice to private intereft the advantage and honour of their country. Such ought to be the diftribution of the territory, and thofe who cultivate it ought (if we can have them to our wifh) to be flaves of various extractions, different in manners and endowments, but all deftitute of courage. But if this cannot be obtained, let them be the barbarians in our neighbourhood, of ftrong bodies and fervile minds. How flaves are to be treated

we ſhall afterwards explain; and alſo aſſign our reaſons why liberty ought to be the reward of all ſlaves univerſally [r] who approve themſelves worthy of obtaining and capable of enjoying it.

Chap. 11.

The ſituation of the capital ought to be determined by circumſtances moſt conducive to wealth, comfort, and ſecurity.

We have explained what is the beſt ſituation of the capital, both with reſpect to the ſea and to the contiguous territory. But its ſituation ought alſo to be relative to health, which depends chiefly on good air and good water; and calculated for the enjoyment of peace, and for ſafety in war. The circumſtances, therefore, that ought to determine the poſition of our capital are theſe four, air, water, comfort, and ſecurity. In Greece, cities open to the eaſt are deemed the moſt healthful; and next to that, a northern aſpect is preferred, chiefly for the ſake of coolneſs. A capital ſituate to our wiſh, ought to abound in ſalubrious fountains; and if that advantage cannot be obtained, preparations ſhould be made for receiving the rain water

The circumſtances moſt conducive to health;

[r] The moſt ſolid objection to ſlavery is that of its perpetuity; that a human being, whatever may be his acquirements and his merits, ſhould never be the director of his own conduct; and how well qualified ſoever he may become to govern himſelf, ſhould be perpetually and unalterably ſubjected to the authority of another. This objection forcibly ſtruck Ariſtotle at a time when the lower claſſes of men in all countries and under all forms of government univerſally ſubſiſted in the condition of ſervitude. It is to be regretted that we have not his reaſons at length why emancipation, the practice of which was ſo common in the ancient world, ſhould not depend on the will of individual maſters, but ſhould reſult from the general will of the community, granting on certain conditions, and after a certain time, liberty to ſlaves. It may be objected indeed, that a cruel or unjuſt maſter would be ready to impoſe a double taſk on thoſe who were likely ſoon to eſcape from his hands. But this is anſwered by ſaying, that according to Ariſtotle's principles ſuch a man was not qualified, and therefore not entitled to be a maſter; and that ſlaves in the ancient republics at leaſt were under the protection of the laws, which reſtrained or puniſhed the cruelty or injuſtice of maſters. See above, b. i. c. iii. p. 33.

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water in copious refervoirs: and the pureft fprings fhould be fet apart for the fuftenance of human life, under ftrict prohibitions of employing them for any lefs important purpofe. This law ought not to be regarded as frivolous: for good health depends chiefly on the quality of thofe things of which we make the moft frequent ufe; and fuch manifeftly are air and water.

to comfort and fecurity.

The nature of fortifications and fortreffes is relative to the nature of government, and ought to vary with the alteration of its forms. Lofty and impregnable citadels beft fuit monarchies and oligarchies. The equal defence of walls, guarding with impartial juftice the fafety of the people at large, is beft adapted to republics and democracies; and the authority of ariftocratical nobles will be moft fecurely maintained, neither by walls nor citadels, but by a number of well-fortified caftles. With regard to the form and diftribution of manfions and ftreets, the modern ftyle of building, introduced by the architect Hippodamus[a], is moft favourable to health and pleafure, and moft convenient for all the occupations and purpofes of civil life. But his ftraight lines and fpacious openings impair ftrength while they embellifh beauty, and render his cities eafily pervious to an invading enemy. For the purpofes of war, ftreets ought to be winding and intricate, obftructed by impediments and entangled by perplexities. But that cities may anfwer the ends both of war and peace, they fhould be at once ftrong and elegant; and this complex object will be beft effected by imitating the labours of the gardener in planting his quincunx, where refiftance combines with arrangement, and where perplexity refults from uniformity itfelf. There is more folly than magnanimity in the opinion, that cities ought not to be walled.

True

[a] See b. ii. c. vi. p. 95. & feq.

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True courage will not reject the affiftance of art under manifeft inequality of ftrength; and as miffile weapons and battering engines have been perfected by the ingenuity of the prefent age, the fafety of cities requires that the fcience of defence fhould keep pace with that of attack. The Lacedæmonians and others who have difdained walls as the refuge of cowardice, have dearly paid for their temerity.

Chap. 12.

The ornaments of the capital.

By good regulations, fortified cities may enjoy all the advantages of thofe that are open to the country on every fide; and the bulwarks and battlements may be converted into agreeable ornaments, fcenes of pleafing recreation to the citizens, but of threatening afpect to hoftile neighbours. The guard rooms may ferve as halls for the fyffitia or common tables; near to which may be worfhipped, in one edifice, thofe Gods whofe temples neither laws or oracles command to be feparated, at a certain diftance from all other buildings. This edifice, erected in honour of religion in general, ought to be as lofty and confpicuous as its purpofe is ufeful and dignified, of awful magnificence and commanding ftrength. Around this temple a forum ought to be formed and inclofed, fimilar to that of Theffaly, called the liberal rendezvous. This fpacious inclofure is not to be encumbered by the fhops of artificers, nor polluted by the tricks of traffic. Neither peafant nor mechanic is ever to enter its pure precincts, unlefs fummoned by the magiftrate; for it is confecrated as the fcene of liberal converfe and manly exercife; where perfons, claffed by their ages, are to invigorate and confirm their powers by emulous contention; and where youth is to be trained to modefty and manlinefs, under the vigilant fuperintendence of virtuous old age. The fquare employed for the market-place, is to be totally diftinct; it ought to

The liberal rendezvous.

The market-place, and courts of juftice.

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to be eafily acceffible to imports by fea, and tranfportations by land; the officers of police and the courts of juftice are to affemble in its neighbourhood; it is deftined for bufinefs and neceffity, as the liberal forum is deftined for exercife and enjoyment.

The diftricts and townfhips.

The diftricts and townfhips are to be regulated after the model of the capital; but on this fubject it is not neceffary to enlarge: to contrive good arrangements is eafy; the difficulty lies in reducing them to practice. Good intentions are fufficient for the firft; the fecond requires the co-operation of good fortune.

Chap. 13.

Tranfition to the character of the citizens of the beft commonwealth.

Having thus explained the external accommodations of our commonwealth, we next proceed to examine what ought to be the genius and character of its citizens; and to explain what are the means moft likely to infpire that genius, and imprefs that character, which will beft qualify them for enjoying political happinefs. The perfection of human felicity requires that we fhould choofe the beft ends, and employ the beft means for attaining them. Thefe objects fometimes harmonife, and are fometimes difcordant; the means being bad while the ends are good, or the ends being bad while the means are good; and fometimes neither the one nor the other are worthy of approbation; which happens when the means are not likely to attain the end propofed, and when this end itfelf, though attained, is not likely to promote the great ultimate purpofe of good or happinefs. This takes place in phyfic, when the phyfician errs both in afcertaining that habit of body which is moft conducive to the health of his patient, and in appreciating that mode of life, that diet, and exercife which are fitted to fuperinduce the habit which he has erroneoufly preferred. But the felicity of men depends not entirely on human efforts; for nature

nature or fortune muft alfo contribute their fhare. Yet to minds confirmed in virtue, few accommodations are requifite; while fuch is the depravity of fome characters, that the moft favourable circumftances only heighten their wretchednefs; and to think with the vulgar, that external advantages alone can produce happinefs, is not lefs abfurd than to call the lyre a mufician, and to afcribe *that* to the inftrument which ought to be referred to the artift. A good man will, on every occafion, act handfomely; and perform his duty under poverty and difeafe, as well as in health and profperity. A juft judge will condemn guilt as well as reward merit. Yet the happinefs of a good man and the juft judge is connected with the latter circumftances rather than with the former; becaufe in the latter no painful conflict is required, but the mind is left to the free exercife of virtuous energies, unclogged by difficulties [a] and unretarded by obftacles. In forming our republic, we may, therefore, fuppofe the work of fortune to be done to our hands; our bufinefs is to teach the legiflator how to perform his duty; or, in other words, how to render his commonwealth virtuous and happy.

BOOK IV.

What this character ought to be.

Chap. 14.

Analyfis of education.

Happinefs depends on virtue; and virtue depends on nature, cuftom, and reafon. That we are formed capable of virtue, and fufceptible of certain qualities of mind and body, is the bounty of Nature, which has made us of the human kind. But habit can improve or pervert thefe natural advantages. Other animals

[a] This doctrine is more fully explained in thofe paffages of the Ethics which treat of happinefs. What the author calls in the text the χρησις αρετης τελεια, and the χρησις εξ ὑποθεσεως; "abfolute and conditional virtue;" is fufficiently explained by the examples given in the tranflation. Happinefs confifts rather in fuch actions as are virtuous *fimply and abfolutely*, than in fuch as neceffarily imply fome pre-exifting evil, which they are exerted to remedy.

animals march uniformly in the tract of nature; fome few are guided alfo by cuftom; but man only is difciplined by reafon; and may be perfuaded even to change bad habits, by the influence of example and the conviction of argument. From thefe two united, the power of education refults; that forming and preferving power without which the beft political fabrics would foon crumble into duft; and which we now proceed to explain, having formerly defcribed what ought to be the natural difpofitions of thofe moft fufceptible of its benefits.

That education ought to be public and uniform.

Firft of all, this education ought, according to our principles, to be uniform; for it is our aim to render the citizens at large virtuous and happy, and to qualify all of them for the offices of government as well as for the duties of obedience. Were one portion of the community as far diftinguifhed above the reft, as we believe the gods and heroes to be exalted above men, or as Scylax fays, "that the kings of India are fuperior to their fubjects, in the virtues of mind and body," it would be proper that thefe dignified races or families fhould be invefted with hereditary and unalterable authority; and, for this purpofe, trained and educated in a manner peculiar to themfelves, and relative to that pre-eminent rank which they were for ever deftined to hold. But fince fuch races or families are no where to be found in thefe parts of the world, juftice concurs with good policy, in requiring that the citizens fhould rule by vicarious fucceffion; and how this ought to be done, nature herfelf fufficiently indicates. According to the order of Nature, fome men are young while others are old. This diftinction of age is the leaft invidious of all diftinctions; and it is well obferved, that thofe only are qualified to command, who have been fkilfully trained to obey. Of the command exercifed by defpots

despots we do not here speak; *their* government is useful only to themselves, to their families and favourites; but the government of a commonwealth is instituted for the benefit of the governed; who in youth will cheerfully submit to many tasks and many services, which would be disgraceful if performed merely for the sake of others, but which are ennobled by their tendency to promote the improvement of those on whom they are imposed.

What are the ends at which it ought to aim.

Since the education of the citizens ought then to be uniform, and since we formerly proved that the virtues and happiness of the citizen coincide with those of the man, we have next to inquire wherein the perfection of the individual consists. In the human soul there are two distinct parts, one of which is endowed with reason, and the other, though not possessing reason in itself, is framed capable of listening to, and obeying its dictates. On the disposition of these two parts, the virtues and excellencies of human nature depend; but in which of the two the ultimate end or chief happiness of man is placed, will not be difficult for those acquainted with our philosophy to decide. From the works of art and nature submitted to our observation, it it easy to remark that things which are worse are always made for the sake of those that are better; that this order is never on any occasion reversed; but how long soever may be the series of means and ends, that all the intermediate ends finally terminate and center in some one great and ultimate purpose. But that part of the soul which is endowed with reason, is manifestly better than that which is merely capable of obeying its dictates; the operations of the one, therefore, must be proportionably better than those of the other; and the exercise of the latter must be considered as merely preparatory to the

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energies of the former. The energies of reafon or intellect may either be employed in comtemplation, or applied to the practice of life. It is, therefore, theoretical or practical; the former engaged in the purfuit and contemplation of truth and beauty, the latter occupied in the acquifition of things neceffary or ufeful to ourfelves or others. Human life is thus divided between war and peace, bufinefs and leifure, the occupations impofed by neceffity, and the enjoyments attending that refined pleafure which accompanies and completes our intellectual energies. In his fyftem of education, the legiflator ought to have refpect, doubtlefs, to all thefe objects; yet never to forget that war is undertaken for the fake of peace, and bufinefs for the fake of leifure; and that the occupations of utility and neceffity ultimately terminate in the purfuit of beauty and truth.

That thefe ends have been mif-taken by Lycurgus and other legiflators.

But in oppofition to thefe unalterable maxims, the moft famed legiflators of Greece have illiberally perferred things ufeful to things honourable, and have been illiberally and abfurdly praifed by Thibro, and other writers, for this prepofterous preference of means to ends. Lycurgus is celebrated for forming a nation of conquerors; his laws were in force when the Lacedæmonians were defeated and fubdued. Yet had his defign been fuccefsful, it would not have been either commendable or profitable, fince the unjuft dominion exercifed by Sparta over her neighbours and allies would have taught fome fecond, but more lucky Paufanias[r], to render himfelf the tyrant of his country. Abfolute power over equals is defirable neither for individuals nor ftates; nor ought war ever to be waged in order to obtain it. Yet the military virtues will be cultivated by

[r] See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xii. p. 56. & feq.

by every wife republic; firft, for its own defence; fecondly, for acquiring a dominion juft and lawful, becaufe advantageous even to the vanquifhed; and thirdly, for reducing into flavery nations incapable of living fafely under any more honourable condition. Experience juftifies thefe affertions. Moft ambitious nations have been faved for a while by war, but finally ruined by conqueft. Their characters rufted like iron, and in peace loft their fplendor. Their misfortunes are chargeable on a faulty legiflation, which had not taught them to enjoy leifure.

Chap. 15.

Our commonwealth to be formed on a more extenfive plan; great in war, but chiefly illuftrious in peace.

But, according to the proverb, leifure is not made for flaves. This beft bleffing muft be acquired and preferved by ardent enterprife and unbending fortitude; fince a community deftitute of courage and impatient of fuffering, muft fpeedily fall under the yoke of fome more warlike neighbour. The active and ftubborn virtues of war are neceffary, therefore, as remote means towards enjoying the happinefs of peace; but they are neceffary barely as means, for the enjoyment itfelf muft be fought in wifdom. The virtues of juftice and temperance are neceffary under all circumftances, but chiefly in peace and profperity; for the hardfhips of war are a fchool of difcipline, whereas the indulgences of peace naturally engender infolence; fo that were the fable of the Fortunate Iflands to be realifed, their inhabitants would of all men moft require the affiftance of wifdom, juftice, and temperance; fince, deftitute of thofe virtues, they would be of all men the moft wretched. Our commonwealth, therefore, is not to be moulded after the narrow Lacedæmonian model, nor are our citizens to be great only in war; they are to be chiefly illuftrious in peace; and to render them fuch, muft be the work of early and affiduous culture.

BOOK IV.

This muft be the work of education. The order in which it is to be conducted.

In explaining how this culture ought to be conducted, we muft again obferve, that man being compounded of foul and body, the foul itfelf is compofed of a rational and irrational part; and that thofe parts of our complex frame which are firft in their origin, are laft in dignity. The body is made before the foul, and the defires and paffions of the foul, conftituting its irrational part, appear in young children and infants long before the age of reafon. Yet the rational part is that which properly conftitutes the man, being the end and perfection of his nature. With reference to this end, therefore, culture fhould begin early to operate, by means of cuftom and habit, on the appetites and paffions; fo that when reafon firft dawns, thefe fubordinate powers may already be difpofed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her in due time, in the fweeteft harmony. Such then is the order in which education muft be conducted. The body is firft to be formed, and that for the fake of the foul; and then the irrational part of the foul is to be difciplined, and that for the fake of the rational.

Chap. 16.

Importance of the queftion refpecting the age fitteft for entering into wedlock.

According to this fyftem of arrangement, the firft care of the legiflator ought to confift in afcertaining the age and qualities of perfons fit to be joined in wedlock. Perfons fo united, ought to defcend together into the vale of years; and their powers of producing beings like themfelves ought together to co-exift, uniformly to decay, and nearly at the fame time to ceafe: the contrary of which feldom fails to occafion much domeftic uneafinefs. Refpect alfo fhould be had to the fucceffion of children, who ought neither to be too remotely diftant, nor too clofely to tread on the heels of their parents. When the former takes place, parents can expect to derive but

 little

fittle benefit from their children; and when the latter is the cafe, children will feldom entertain much reverence for their parents, who, being nearly their equals in age, will be confidered as on a foot of equality in all other refpects; and with whom, therefore, they will be often ready to differ in matters of opinion, or to quarrel about matters of intereft. It happens moft fortunately that all thefe ends and purpofes may be attained and anfwered by precifely the fame means, the coupling parties in wedlock at the proper and feafonable age.

What this age ought to be in either fex.

About the age of feventy, men commonly ceafe to be hufbands; and after the age of fifty, women feldom become mothers. The times of entering into marriage for the different fexes ought to be refpectively regulated by thefe extreme limits; which will reduce the fitteft marriageable age of women to eighteen, and of men to thirty-feven, a little more or lefs; for the propriety of practical matters confifts not in an indivifible point. In confequence of this regulation, the contracting parties, in that which forms one main object of their union, will enjoy the happieft correfpondence, their powers will fimultanioufly flourifh, and fimultanioufly decay. Premature conjunctions produce imperfect offspring, females rather than males, and thofe feeble in make, and fhort in ftature. That this happens in the human race as well as in other animals, is vifible in the puny inhabitants of countries where early marriages prevail. But to the female fex premature wedlock is peculiarly dangerous, fince in confequence of anticipating the commands of nature, many of them fuffer greatly in childbirth, and many of them die. The evil reaches the mind itfelf, for early habitudes make the moft indelible impreffions; and the germ of voluptuoufnefs too fpeedily expanded, will penetrate the whole frame, and for ever vitiate the character. In males, premature

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premature venery feems to ftunt the growth: the animal ought to be itfelf perfect before it is duly qualified to propagate its kind. Let the fexes, therefore, contract marriage at the periods above determined. They will be then refpectively in the acmè and full bloom of their age. The correfpondence of their powers will render their defires harmonious, and their lives happy. They will grow old together; and, as fuch feafonable marriages will for the moft part be foon productive of progeny, the fon will be advancing to perfect manhood when the father is verging to the extremity of old age.

The fitteft feafon and beft habit for the purpofe of wedlock.

Winter is the fitteft feafon for confummating marriage; and, as naturalifts tell us, when the wind blows from the north [a]. The ftate of body moft likely to fupply the commonwealth with good children, is neither the artificial brawninefs of prize-fighters, nor a frame emaciated and worn out by abftemioufnefs or fatigue; but a conftitution equally remote from thefe vitious extremes, invigorated by fuch exercifes as the life of a free citizen requires; not exceffive, but frequent; various, not violent.

Attention due to pregnant women for the fake of their minds and of their offspring.

Thefe obfervations are applicable to both fexes; but of women in pregnancy particular care is to be taken that they do not indulge themfelves in indolence, nor enfeeble their offfpring by ufing too thin a diet. For the prevention of both evils, (fince exercife will ftrengthen appetite,) the legiflator fhould enjoin his countrywomen, when pregnant, to walk daily to the temples, and pay their devotions to the powers prefiding over childbirth. At the fame time the female mind, in this delicate fituation, fhould be diligently attended to, neither foured by neglect

[a] This explains why the governors of the winds were invoked by the Greeks wifhing to have children: a thing which archbifhop Potter thinks extraordinary and unaccountable: "What bufinefs the winds have in generation is difficult to imagine." Potter's Antiq. vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 318.

neglect nor ruffled by paffion, but amufed by images of pleafure, and foothed into unalterable ferenity; for plants do not more certainly indicate the foil from which they fpring, than children receive and reflect the temper of their parents.

BOOK IV.

Concerning the expofition of children and chaftity.

Concerning the expofition of children, let it be enacted that nothing that has life fhall be deftroyed unlefs it be defective in its members, or grofsly deformed in its fhape. Yet means muft be taken to prevent exceffive population [t]; and, as one period of life is unripe, fo another is too far decayed for the purpofes of wedlock. Thofe who diftribute the epochs of life into periods of feven years, affign fifty for the acmè of the mind. Four or five years after fifty, a man, therefore, fhould abftain from the rites of love merely for the fake of offspring, which would probably enjoy neither vigour of mind nor health of body. Let the rites of the marriage-bed be at all times equally refpected by the hufband and by the wife; but fhould the hufband, during the period limited for giving children to the republic, be convicted of a breach of chaftity, let him be punifhed with public infamy, and thofe evils which follow in its train.

Chap. 17.

Concerning the nourifhment of children, their exercifes and treatment.

The nourifhment of children is bountifully fupplied by nature in the copious exuberance of milk, which the example of warlike nations, and even of wild animals, proves to be of all kinds of food the moft congenial to the body, and the moft favourable

[t] το δε ὁσιον και το μη, διωρισμενον τη αισθησει και το ζην εσται. Ariftotle would have the exuberance of population to be reftrained, yet nothing that has life to be deftroyed, unlefs marked or depraved by exceffive deformity. In the career of his ftern decifions he ftops fhort of the unrelenting Chinefe: "among whom habit feems to have familiarifed a notion that life only becomes truly precious, and inattention to it criminal, after it has continued long enough to be endowed with a mind and fentiment; but that mere dawning exiftence may be fuffered to be loft without fcruple, though it cannot without reluctance." Staunton's Embafly to China, v. ii. p. 158.

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favourable to its growth and ſtrength. Wine, doubtleſs, gives ſpirits and vigour, but the uſe of wine in children might be productive of diſeaſe. All young animals delight in freely exerting their natural motions; and this inſtinctive propenſity is equally ſtrong and equally ſalutary to infants. Care, however, muſt be taken that their delicate members be not diſtorted through too eager a contention: in this view various mechanical contrivances have been invented, and proved by experience to be of important uſe. Infants ſhould be early accuſtomed to bear cold; which will invigorate their ſtrength, and gradually prepare their bodies for reſiſting the hardſhips of war. Some barbarous nations plunge their new-born infants into rivers. The Celts expoſe their children in thin coverings to the northern blaſt; and whatever is to be effected by cuſtom, ſhould be begun early, and carried on gradually. In the preſent caſe, the firſt experiments will not be attended with danger, for the natural heat of children fits them for ſurmounting the impreſſions of cold. Such are the attentions required by our firſt years.

In the following age, and until children have completed their fifth year, no painful taſk ſhould be impoſed, and no violent exertion required from the mind or body, leſt health might be injured, and growth obſtructed. All that utility demands, is to keep their faculties awake, and to prevent them from contracting any habits of ſloth; which will be beſt effected by ſuch plays and ſports as are neither illiberal, nor fatiguing, nor ſedentary. The tales and fables which are told them, ought to be written, at leaſt examined, by the magiſtrate who preſides over education; and their playful amuſements ought, in general, to be imitations of thoſe ſerious tranſactions in which they will be concerned when called to the buſineſs of life. Laws and con-

trivances

trivances have been devifed and framed for preventing thofe compreffions of the breath and thofe exertions of the voice which are frequent with young children; but all fuch attempts to counteract the defigns of nature, we totally difapprove. The contentions of the breath and fpirits are known by experience to invigorate the exertions of men; and the crying of children, which occafions fimilar intenfions and remiffions of their organs, is equally falutary to them, promoting their growth and augmenting their ftrength.

The education of children till the age of puberty, chiefly phyfical and moral.

Until the age of feven complete, the fchool for children ought to be the father's houfe; but during this early period, they muft be ftrictly guarded againft the infectious communication of flaves; no illiberal gefture is to be prefented to their fight; no illiberal image is to be fuggefted to their fancy. Lewd indecency of language ought to be reprobated and punifhed in every well-regulated city; for, from ufing filthy expreffions without fhame, there is an eafy tranfition to the practifing of filthy actions without difguft. Obfcene ftatues or pictures are never to be feen but in the temples of thofe divinities, whom the law enjoins to be worfhipped under fuch emblems, by fathers, in behalf of their wives and families; nor ought children to be fpectators of comedy or farce, before the age of admiffion to the public tables, when education, if well directed, will have confirmed their morals. Theodorus, the celebrated tragic actor, made it a rule never to allow any player, how inferior foever might be his talents, to occupy the ftage before him; obferving, that mankind were always governed by firft impreffions. If that be the cafe, how much care fhould be taken to render the firft impreffions of children favourable to virtue, and to make them regard as ftrange and monftrous whatever

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ever might ſow the ſeeds of malice, cruelty, or turpitude? Let them behold in their tender years, thoſe honourable occupations, and thoſe martial exerciſes, which they are deſtined in due time carefully to learn, and ſkilfully to practice. Above all, let thoſe important periods of life preceding and following puberty, be the objects of moſt aſſiduous vigilance; but as this depends not entirely on age, we are leſs to regard the fanciful diſtinctions of numbers, than to watch the ſolid differences of nature; of which it is the ſole buſineſs of education to ſecond the views, and to ſupply the defects.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK V.*

INTRODUCTION.

IN the Fourth Book Ariftotle defcribes the beft form of government; and in the Fifth, he explains that fyftem of education by which this government will be beft upheld. Plutarch and other approved authors, ancient and modern, who have exprefsly written on education, do little more that expand and illuftrate the pregnant fenfe which uniformly pervades this Book; omitting fome remarks, which, being peculiar to Ariftotle, will be found by moft modern readers equally new and important. BOOK V.

Mufic, confidered under a certain afpect, was the claffic learning of antiquity, and regarded as intimately, almoft infeparably, connected with morality, as well as poetry. The author, therefore, as might be expected, expatiates on the fubject of mufic; which he claffes with thofe fciences that terminate completely in themfelves, and which, independently of profit or utility, merit cultivation merely for the fake of pleafure; forming at once the higheft embellifhment and happieft exercife of the mind.

Having

* Commonly publifhed as Book VIII.

Having repeatedly remarked, that education ought to be relative to the nature of the government, he maintains as a confequence of this maxim, that the cuftoms prevalent in his own age ought to be totally reverfed; and that the people in democracies ought to be trained to modefty and refpect for their fuperiors, while the nobles in ariftocracies ought to be habituated to moderation and affability towards their inferiors. In conformity with this doctrine, he thinks that education ought to be public; and I believe that the experience of modern as well as of ancient times will juftify and confirm his conclufion; having had an opportunity to remark during a long refidence in a great variety of different countries, that the inhabitants were better educated almoft exactly in proportion to the degree in which public education prevailed among them.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Education.—Its different branches.—How far to be cultivated.—Grammar—Drawing—Gymnastic—Music.—Exercises adapted to different ages.—Doubts concerning music.—Its different kinds.—Purgation of the passions.

BOOK V. Chap. 1.

Education the forming and sustaining power of government.

THAT the education of youth ought to form a principal object of the legislator's attention cannot be a matter of doubt; since it is education that first moulds, and that afterwards sustains the various modes of government; a democratical education alone suiting a democracy, an oligarchical an oligarchy; and the better and more perfect are the different systems of education, the better and more perfect will be those plans of government which they are respectively calculated to introduce and uphold. Preparation and exercise are necessary for the acquisition of every art; and not least for the attainment of the great art of political life. In this important object fellow-citizens are all equally and all deeply concerned; and as they are all united in one common work for one common purpose, their education ought to be uniform and public, and regulated by general consent; not abandoned, as at present, to the blind decision of chance, or the idle caprice of parents. For the children of citizens belong to the commonwealth, of which they are destined to be members; and, like every member or part, must be formed and fashioned in subserviency to the

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the good of that whole, or fyftem, to which they collectively appertain. Such are the maxims of the Spartans, which cannot in this particular be too highly extolled. Of all men they are the moft attentive to education, and their education is public.

Chap. 2.

Wherein political education confifts.

But wherein ought political education to confift; what are its different branches, and in what manner, or to what extent, ought each branch to be cultivated? The difcordant practice of nations has involved thefe queftions in much perplexity. Different fyftems of legiflation have different fcopes and tendencies, and even when they agree in the fame end, they employ different means for its attainment. Is education to be chiefly directed to things of common and vulgar ufe, fubfervient to bodily accommodation and productive of external profperity? Or ought its main bufinefs to confift in fharpening, fortifying, and ennobling the mind? If the mind and virtue be juftly preferred to the body and fortune, yet by what principles are we to arrange the virtues themfelves? With which of them ought our culture to begin, and in which of them ought it to terminate?

Its different branches.

To what extent each branch ought to be cultivated.

Firft of all, it is evident that children ought to be inftructed in things fubfervient to the purpofe of external accommodation, in proportion to their neceffity or utility, provided fuch things be not illiberal and fordid, tending to diftort or enervate the body, to narrow or debafe the foul, to chill the fancy or encumber the intellect. From fuch mean and mercenary drudgery, which would difqualify them for the exercife of virtue, and unfit them for the offices of freemen, our citizens muft totally abftain. Even to thofe arts dignified by the epithet of liberal, their application ought not to be directed without due felection and prudent referve. In many accomplifhments, mediocrity is preferable to excellence; for an ambition gratified by what is frivolous will

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be incapable of afpiring to what is great. In afcertaining the doubtful nature of thofe frivolous but agreeable talents, much depends on the end or purpofe for which they are acquired and cultivated. To difplay them for vanity or gain, is worthy of none but flaves; but they will not mifbecome a citizen, if he exercifes them for his own amufement, or the gratification of his friends; as relaxations from feverer ftudies, or preparations for higher purfuits.

Chap. 3.

Grammar or letters, their ufe.

Education is moft commonly reduced to four heads, grammar [a], gymnaftic, mufic, and drawing. Letters are the elements of calculation, as well as of grammar or compofition, and are effentially requifite in innumerable purpofes of daily occurrence. The fame may be obferved of drawing, which teaches the knowledge of forms, about which fo many indifpenfable occupations are continually converfant. The gymnaftic is fubfervient to ftrength and courage, invigorating the body and fortifying the mind. Mufic, indeed, is now degraded into a playful paftime, but was introduced into education, by our wifer anceftors, becaufe youth ought to be taught, not only how to purfue bufinefs, but how to enjoy leifure; an enjoyment which is the end of bufinefs itfelf, and the limit in which all our active purfuits finally terminate. This enjoyment is of a nature too noble and too elevated to confift in plays and paftimes, which it would be abfurd to confider as the main end and final purpofe of life, and which are chiefly ufeful in the intervals of toilfome exertion, as falutary recreations of the mind, and feafonable unbendings from contentious activity.

Drawing, its ufe.

Gymnaftic, its ufe.

Mufic, its ufe.

The example of mufic proves that there is an

Leifure is in itfelf pleafurable; and on its own account, defirable: whereas bufinefs is never undertaken and purfued merely

[a] Conf. Diodor. Sicul. vol. i. p. 486.

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education requiſite to the enjoyment of liberal leiſure.

merely for its own ſake, but for the ſake of ſomething beyond it; a ſomething as variable as the opinions of men are manifold, and their habits diſſimilar; ſome placing happineſs in one kind of enjoyment, and others in another; but thoſe who are beſt formed and moſt ſkilfully educated, placing it in ſuch enjoyments only as are honourable and laudable. An education, therefore, is requiſite to make us delight in thoſe things which are beſt calculated to afford genuine ſatisfaction; and the arts and ſtudies from which this ſatisfaction reſults, are not to be degraded by the epithets *uſeful* or *neceſſary*, ſince they relate to nothing external, but terminate in themſelves, and are on their own account and ultimately the objects of deſire, as the immediate cauſes of rational and honeſt pleaſure. In this view the ancients conſidered muſic, and gave it a diſtinguiſhed rank in their ſcholaſtic ſyſtem; not as a thing uſeful, for to what purpoſe does it ſerve? Not as neceſſary in the way that letters are neceſſary in accounts, in œconomy, in literature or ſcience, and a thouſand political purpoſes, both civil and military; or as drawing is uſeful in teaching the knowledge of forms, in appreciating works of art, and in preventing deception in the purchaſe of inſtruments and utenſils, the implements of trade, or the articles of furniture. It remains, therefore, that muſic ſhould be acquired and cultivated as a thing deſirable in itſelf, for the agreeable occupation of liberal leiſure, and the elegant embelliſhment of life. Therefore Homer ſays, "Let ſweet Thalia decorate the feaſt;" and again, "The bard is called to raviſh every ear." And Ulyſſes thus paints the beſt enjoyments of peace and proſperity,

"How ſweet the products of a peaceful reign,
The Heaven-taught poet and enchanting ſtrain [b]."

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[b] Odyſſ. ix. v. 213.

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The example of music, as taught by the ancients, juſtifies us, therefore, in aſſerting, that our ſons ought to be inſtructed not only in things uſeful or neceſſary, but in things liberal and honourable. How many, and what theſe things are, and by what means the taſte for them may be beſt inſpired, and the knowledge of them beſt communicated, we ſhall examine hereafter. At preſent it is ſufficient to have proved by the authority of the ancients, that ſuch things exiſt, and ought to be objects of our care. This is plain in the caſe of muſic; and a little attention will ſhew that it holds true in other ſtudies. The knowledge of letters is uſeful in the buſineſs of life, in reading and accounts, and innumerable other purpoſes. But the ſtudy of them is not bounded by this vulgar utility. They are preparations for higher branches of ſcience. Drawing alſo is uſeful for the ordinary and coarſe purpoſes above ſpecified; it is, therefore, admitted into the general courſe of common education. But the ſtudy of drawing leads to ſomething beyond theſe vulgar uſes; and by familiariſing us with the nature and variety of forms, carries us to the contemplation of *beauty*, as letters, which are the elements of calculation and compoſition, terminate in the contemplation of *truth*. Thoſe men reſt ſatisfied with a condition far ſhort of the perfection of their nature, whoſe minds have never opened to ſuch ſublime pleaſures. To be always ſeeking what is uſeful, is unworthy of a liberal, and inconſiſtent with an elevated, character.

Chap. 4.

How the body is to be hardened by exerciſe without inſpiring ferocity of character.

We have before obſerved, that moral education ought to precede the intellectual, and that the culture of the body ought to precede that of the mind. The nations moſt attentive to the formation of the body, ſtrive to give to it an athletic habit, which injures the beauty of the ſhape, and ſtunts the growth. The

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The Lacedæmonians avoid this error; but by impofing exceffive labours on the body, they engender ferocity in the mind, thinking this conducive to martial fpirit. But, as we before obferved, education ought not to be confined to any one object, nor chiefly directed to fuch objects as military valour; and if this excellence were our principal concern, it would not be infpired by the Spartan difcipline. For neither in men nor in animals does valour accompany fullen ferocity, but is rather found in mild, generous, and lion-like natures. There are many nations who delight in carnage, that are deftitute of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi of Pontus, cowardly as they are, feel neither horror in fhedding, nor difguft in tafting human blood; fome inland nations of Afia equal or furpafs this brutal favagenefs; they are cruel beafts of prey, not warlike men. Even the obftinate fiercenefs of Sparta could not maintain her pre-eminence. She has been excelled by her neighbours in the virtues of war as well as of peace. While the Lacedæmonians alone cultivated arms, they acquired an eafy afcendancy over undifciplined troops. But fince their neighbours have been trained to martial exercifes, they have approved themfelves fuperior in war to the Spartans. Neither a wolf nor any other fuch bloody favage, but only a brave man, is truly qualified to maintain an honourable conflict. For mere warlike courage, taken feparately by itfelf, is a doubtful and defective quality; and cultivated too affiduoufly by the hardening difcipline of toils and ftruggles, will degrade and debafe the man, blunt his faculties, narrow his foul, and render him as bad a foldier as he is a contemptible citizen.

Of the exercifes beft adapted to

The gymnaftic, therefore, muft be taught and exercifed in fubferviency to nobler purfuits. Till the age of puberty, the lighter

lighter exercifes only fhould be enjoined and practifed: athletic exertions and a forced diet ought to be profcribed and prohibited; for fuch artificial violence would marr the work of nature, disfigure the fhape, ftunt the growth, and for ever prevent the attainment of manly ftrength. That this muft be its effect, experience evinces. In the long lift of Olympic victors, fcarcely two or three have gained the prize, both when they were boys and after they became men. Their capacities were checked, and their powers exhaufted by premature exertions and an unfeafonable regimen. During the three years immediately following puberty, the application of youth fhould be directed to thofe branches of education which form and invigorate the mind. They will then, at the age of feventeen, be capable of fubmitting to a regulated diet, and of fuftaining the fatigue of athletic exercifes. For laborious contention of the mind and of the body ought not to take place at the fame age; the exertions of the body obftructing thofe of the mind, and the exertions of the mind relaxing the vigour of the body.

the refpective ages.

Chap. 5.

Doubts concerning mufic.

Is it merely a foothing recreation?

In a former chapter, fome difficulties occurred refpecting mufic, and fome doubts were ftarted concerning its power and its end. Is it merely a foothing recreation, like the two *care-killing* powers of fleep and wine? Thus they are characterifed by Euripides; and it muft be acknowledged that, by many, mufic, fleep, and wine, are arranged in the fame clafs, and ufed for the fame purpofe; to which, dancing, alfo, is by fome thought to contribute. Or is mufic not merely a recreative paftime, but an effential branch of difcipline, capable of moulding and fafhioning the mind, not lefs than the gymnaftic moulds and fafhions the body? Or is the efficacy of this noble art limited by neither of thefe ufes, and mufic to be re-

or an effential branch of difcipline?

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garded neither as a recreation from paſt labours, nor a preparation for future exertions, but as an enjoyment complete and perfect in itſelf, analagous to the pleaſure eſſential to moral and intellectual energies, which, forming the perfection of man, are deſirable on their own account, independently of any thing that has preceded, or of any thing that is to follow them?

or an enjoyment complete in itſelf?

Difficulties attending theſe queſtions.

That muſic, conſidered as a branch of education, is not merely for recreation or ſport, is deducible from this, that every effort of attention, and therefore the learning of muſic, is, in children, attended rather with pain than pleaſure. It is equally evident, that children are not inſtructed in muſic as the agreeable employment of their liberal leiſure; for ſuch perfect enjoyments could not be reliſhed by their imperfect faculties, nor the moſt complete fruits of life gathered from their crude immaturity. But, perhaps, children are taught muſic that it may contribute in their riper years to their recreation, their improvement, or their enjoyment. Yet theſe purpoſes may be better attained without learning the art, or ever touching the lyre. The Perſian and Median kings attain them completely, when they enjoy the correct execution of the beſt muſical performers; the Lacedæmonians, without learning muſic, boaſt that they can readily diſtinguiſh between manly and effeminate airs; between melodies that contribute to moral diſcipline, and thoſe that vitiate the mind, or diſſipate themſelves in empty ſound. To diſtinguiſh and reliſh good victuals, is it neceſſary to be a cook? Which of the poets ever introduced Jupiter ſinging and harping? Such occupations are univerſally aſcribed to inferior divinities; and among men, we know that they belong to mercenary practitioners, whoſe undivided application to muſic has given them great proficiency in this art,

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but has debafed their fouls and narrowed their faculties; whereas by truly liberal and ingenious minds, mufic is feldom confidered as a ferious engagement, and is rarely practifed, but as a recreative paftime, or a natural expanfion of jovial merriment. Such are the doubts attending the accurate arrangement and proper ufe of mufic; and fuch the difficulties in afcertaining the place which this agreeable art ought to hold, and the function which it is calculated to perform, in the important fyftem of political difcipline.

Solution of thefe difficulties.

Yet let it be confidered whether this refined art, though it cannot be accurately and exclufively referred to any one of the ends above fpecified, may not in fome meafure comprehend them all. Play is introduced for the fake of recreation; and affords no fmall degree of pleafure, merely as a repofe from the pain of labour, of which it is the natural remedy. But the liberal exercife of our beft energies is fweetened by pleafure as well as ennobled by dignity; for happinefs, which confifts in this exercife, certainly includes both thefe elements. Now mufic, whether fimple or accompanied by poetry, is acknowledged and felt to be one of the moft delightful of pleafures; wherefore Mufæus fays,

"Of human joys, the fweeteft is to fing."

On this account, its power is fummoned to gladden our feftivities, to brighten and exalt the enjoyments of peace and profperity. Our children, therefore, ought to be inftructed in mufic, becaufe every innocent pleafure is not only ufeful as a falutary and feafonable recreation, but defirable in itfelf as one of the beft enjoyments of life. But as the lives of moft men are a continual variation of toil and repofe, they are apt to confound the light and temporary pleafure of recreation, with thofe more perma-

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nent and more ferious joys, which conftitute the perfection of human happinefs; efpecially fince there is this refemblance between them, that neither of them have reference to futurity, our nobleft and moft delightful energies *terminating* in *themfelves*, and our lighteft and moft frivolous paftimes, being the medicine of *paft* labours, and relative to nothing that is future.

The efficacy of mufic in moral difcipline.

Yet it is worthy of confideration, whether recreation and enjoyment be not both of them, in this cafe, mere acceffaries; and whether mufic, if properly directed, may not effect a more important purpofe, promote moral improvement, refine the fentiments, and exalt the character. Mufic will be acknowledged to have this tendency, fhould it appear capable of affecting the paffions and changing the manners; and that it really does this, manifeftly appears from various examples, and particularly from the melodies of Olympus, which cannot be liftened to without infpiring enthufiafm, which is plainly a moral affection. Independently of meafure or melody, even the fimple cries of nature, when faithfully imitated, powerfully excite our fympathy, and difpofe us to joy or to grief. Mufic is naturally pleafant, and the main object of moral education is to teach us to be pleafed or offended as propriety requires, to love what is truly amiable, and to hate what is truly deteftable. Nothing, therefore, is of more importance than to learn this art, and by cuftom to confirm our approbation of thofe rythmical fucceffions of melodious founds, which are expreffive of decent and dignified manners, of manly and honourable actions. Ingenuous and well-difciplined natures find in the varieties of melody and rhythm, ftriking refemblances of anger and meeknefs, of manlinefs and temperance, and of all fuch moral affections, as well as of their contraries.

The caufe of this efficacy explained.

This is proved by the effect of mufical performance; which, while we liften to it, changes

changes the form and quality of the ſoul, melts it to tenderneſs, or hardens it to fortitude; and the habit of being thus powerfully affected by the reſemblances of manners, is nearly related to that of being affected ſtill more powerfully by their realities; ſince, were we highly delighted with looking on a portrait, for no other reaſon than its beautiful form, it would follow of neceſſity, that we ſhould alſo be ſtill more delighted with beholding its original. Of all the objects of our ſenſes, ſounds are the moſt ſtriking reſemblances of manners. The objects of our touch and of our taſte have no moral reſemblance whatever: and even in the objects of our ſight, ſhapes, and colours, the reſemblance is faint and imperfect, becauſe calm and motionleſs, and rather a mere ſign of manners than their natural imitation, ſince manners can only be exhibited by actions, and therefore only repreſented by motions, by which alone actions are forcibly expreſſed. Yet even the mere ſigns of manners are not to be rejected as things uſeleſs in education; and our youth ought, doubtleſs, rather to contemplate the works of Polygnotus, and ſuch artiſts as ſkilfully employ thoſe ſigns or marks, than ſtare on the unmeaning productions of Pauſon. But if the mere ſigns be uſeful, how much more efficacious muſt be the reſemblances. And ſuch reſemblances evidently prevail in the *melodies*; each of which having its diſtinctive character, produces its peculiar effect; ſo that our affection changes with each change of the muſic; and in hearing one melody we are agitated with quite different emotions from thoſe with which we were affected at hearing another. At the will of a ſkilful compoſer, the mind expands into joy, or contracts into grief; ſome airs melt us into ſoftneſs, while the Dorian mode confirms our fortitude, and the Phrygian inſpires us with enthuſiaſm. Theſe

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remarks have been well illuftrated by the writers on mufic, who take experience for their guide; from which it appears that the efficacy of time, that is of rhythm or meafure, is not lefs than the efficacy of tune, that is of the modes and melodies. Some movements are brifk and lively, others grave and fedate; fome vulgar, and expreffive of irregular paffions; others liberal, and expreffive of well-governed affections. But mufic confifts in the fkilful combination of time and tune, from which its power appears manifeftly; and, therefore, the propriety of teaching it to youth, efpecially as mufic is naturally pleafant, and the attention of that early age is difficultly detained in any exercife or employment in which pleafure is not an ingredient. It appears alfo that there is an affinity between meafures and melodies, and that both have a near relation to the foul; from which fome have inferred that the foul is harmony, and others that harmony is one of its effential attributes.

Chap. 6.

That children fhould be taught to perform mufic.

We now proceed to examine whether children fhould be taught, not only to underftand and relifh, but to practife and perform mufic. This queftion muft be anfwered in the affirmative, for it is impoffible, at leaft exceedingly difficult, to be a good judge of performances which we are ourfelves unable to execute; and whatever affections or qualities mufic may excite or produce, its efficacy will be the ftronger when it is the work of our own hands. Befides this, children require fome employment to occupy and exhauft their reftlefs activity; for which reafon Archytas's rattle is no contemptible invention, fince while fhaking this noify plaything, their activity is agreeably and harmlefsly employed. Education, well directed, is the rattle of boys; and at this age they may be taught arts, which it would mifbecome them afterwards to exercife, but

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of which the practice in youth will enable them in manhood to relish works of art the better, and to appreciate them the more skilfully. The objection to music as illiberal, may be easily removed, if we distinguish between that taste and skill in the art, which would disqualify a man from performing the offices of a citizen, and that taste and skill which would be attended with no such pernicious effect. If the music that we study, enervates or debases the soul, or the instruments on which we practise, distort or enfeeble the body, or if the mind is narrowed by the intense application to one secondary pursuit, it is plain that this ingenious art will occasion much mischief, and both incapacitate the young for learning their political duties, and disqualify the old from performing them honourably. The artificial and complicated music, therefore, which has little other merit than the difficulty of execution, and little other effect than to astonish the gaping multitude, but which has engrossed and degraded our public exhibitions, ought never to have been introduced into education, whose best purposes it is only calculated to pervert [b].

To what extent musical skill ought to be cultivated.

Musical performance may be cultivated, and manual dexterity acquired; but the degree in which they are desirable, is limited by that proficiency requisite for enabling us to relish liberal rhythms and manly melodies, not to practise those vulgar sleights and musical trifles which delight children, slaves, and even some brute animals. It is plain, therefore, that the simplest instruments deserve the preference, as fittest for the purpose of education. The flute, the harp, and others of that kind are to be rejected as too artificial and complex, and re-quiring

What instruments are fittest to be employed.

[b] For better understanding what follows concerning music, the reader may consult History of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. v. p. 238, & seq.

BOOK V. quiring more attention and practice than liberal minds can ſpare from more important purſuits. The flute is, beſides, better fitted to excite enthuſiaſm than to regulate the affections, and is therefore better adapted to purgation than to inſtruction; to operate as a violent remedy under violent diſorders of the mind, than to ſerve in uſual health for ſalutary nouriſhment. In playing the flute it is impoſſible to uſe the voice, on which account our anceſtors finally rejected this inſtrument, which they had introduced into education with innumerable other novelties, amidſt the intoxication of their Perſian victories. After the repulſe of Xerxes, a Lacedæmonian exhibiting at his own expence a chorus of muſic, himſelf played on the flute; and there was then ſcarcely an Athenian citizen totally unacquainted with this inſtrument, as appears by the picture dedicated by Thraſyppus of the muſical exhibition, which he defrayed and directed. But on mature reflection, the flute was proſcribed in education, and its uſe forbidden to freemen; and the ſame may be ſaid of the dulcimer and various other inſtruments of different ſhapes and names, which are fitly employed for amuſing the vulgar, by their admitting wonderful diſplays of manual dexterity. It is an ancient and well-contrived fable, which ſays, that Minerva after inventing the flute rejected its uſe. The reaſon why ſhe did ſo, is not a bad one; namely, that ſhe was angry at ſeeing how much the blowing of the flute diſtorted her countenance. Yet it is far more probable, that Minerva, who is believed to preſide over learning and ſcience, diſdained an inſtrument which contributed nothing to mental improvement; which neither fortified diſcipline, nor ſharpened intellect, nor elevated ſentiment. All complex and difficult inſtruments are, therefore, to be baniſhed from the pure region of education,

and to be consigned to the sordid displays of mercenary practitioners, who cultivate music, not for any salutary purpose, but for the low gratification of an illiberal audience; whom such things only can please as nourish their corrupt passions, by a mean compliance with which, the musical performers in our days disqualify themselves in mind and body, from performing the duties of good citizens.

Chap. 7. Analysis of music.

In music two things are to be considered, tune and time, the varieties of the former constituting the different modes and melodies, the varieties of the latter constituting the different measures and rhythms. Are all these gradations and all these proportions of sound to be used indifferently, or ought due selection to be made? Ought this selection to be invariably the same, or ought it to be modified by the different ends and purposes of musical performance? And in music, which is the principal, time or tune? For minute and circumstantial solutions of these questions, we refer to the philosophical writers on music, meaning to touch but slightly on the subject, and as far as seems requisite in a work on legislation. We approve the general division of music into moral, practical, and rapturous; according as it is fitted to regulate our affections, to excite us to action, or to inspire us with enthusiasm. Experience proves that different melodies and rhythms are respectively adapted to these different purposes; so that as moral strains are to be employed for mental discipline and liberal pleasure, the enthusiastic, and sometimes the practical, may be listened to for the purpose of what, by a natural metaphor, is called purgation [e] which shall be more fully

Its division into moral, practical, and rapturous.

[e] Plutarch de Auditione, p. 42. edit. Paris, quotes a saying of the philosopher Ariston, that neither a bath nor a discourse did any good unless they cleansed and purified; using the verb from which the substantive here translated purgation is derived.

BOOK V.

What is meant by purgation of the paſſions by muſic.

fully explained in our treatiſe on Poetry. Let it ſuffice at preſent to obſerve, that thoſe paſſions (ſuch is the uniſon of minds) by which one perſon is ſtrongly affected, are felt in a certain degree by all around him[c]; and, therefore, when ſkilfully expreſſed by the muſician, they will be powerfully communicated, eſpecially to thoſe who, by their natural conſtitution, are peculiarly expoſed to their influence; and whoſe extreme ſenſibility will thus be excited and agitated, and thereby purified and refined[d], and

rived. In the following ſentence, by a bold mixture of metaphors, he ſays, λογῳ δριμει την διανοιαν αχλυος πολλης και αμβλυτητος γεμουσαν εκκαθαρη. "That we ought to be thankful to philoſophers, who, by the ſeverity of their exhortations, purge our underſtanding from the thick darkneſs and bluntneſs with which they are filled."

[c] Compare above, c. v. ακροωμενοι των μιμησεων, γιγνονται παντες συμπαθεις.

[d] This obſcure ſentence is beſt explained by a collateral paſſage in Plato de Republica, p. 625. edit. Ficini. He is treating of the neceſſity of combining in a well-directed education, muſic with the gymnaſtic; becauſe men who apply only to muſic, will ſoften into effeminacy; and thoſe who apply only to the gymnaſtic, will harden into brutality. In expanding and illuſtrating this obſervation, he ſays that ſtrength is increaſed and courage confirmed by the gymnaſtic, but what will happen if a youth is trained to the gymnaſtic only? ουκ, ει τι ενην αυτου φιλομαθες εν τῃ ψυχῃ, ἁτε ουτε μαθηματος γευομενον ουδενος, ου ζητηματος, ουτε λογου μετισχον, ουτε της αλλης μουσικης, ασθενες τε και κωφον και τυφλον γιγνεται, ἁτε ουκ εγειρομενον, ουδε τρεφομενον, ουδε διακαθαιρομενων των αισθησεων αυτου. "In this caſe, even ſhould he naturally be endowed with an ingenuous and inquiſitive mind, yet having never taſted the pleaſures neither of ſcience, nor inveſtigation, nor reaſon, *nor the other muſic*, his condition as a man will be that of blindneſs, deafneſs, and debility, his faculties having never been *nouriſhed, excited, agitated, and purged*." What Plato means by ſaying *the other muſic*, may be underſtood by the words of Strabo in the admirable mythological digreſſion in his Tenth Book, where he remounts to the root and ſource of myſticiſm in the human heart, and examines the fabulous traditions and religious arcana of his country, with that liberal criticiſm which became an hiſtorian, that was a traveller and a philoſopher. ευ μεν γαρ ειρηται και τουτο, τους ανθρωπους τοτε μαλιστα μιμεισθαι τους θεους, ὁταν ευεργετωσι· αμεινον δ᾽ αν λεγοι τις, ὁταν ευδαιμονωσι· τοιουτον δε το χαιρειν και το ἑορταζειν καὶ το φιλοσοφειν και μουσικης απτεσθαι· μη γαρ ει τις εκπτωσις προς το χειρον γινηται των μουσικων εις ἡδυπαθειας τρεποντων τας τεχνας εν τοις συμποσιοις, και θυμελαις και σκηναις και αλλοις τοιουτοις διαβαλλεσθω το πραγμα· αλλα ἡ φυσις ἡ των παιδευματων εξεταζεσθω την αρχην ενθενδε εχουσα.

and (*as melancholy is purged by tears*[e]) difburdened and lightened with a pleafurable relief. Thus it is that, at the celebration of Orgic rites, enthufiafm vents itfelf and evaporates in thofe facred melodies, during the performance of which the mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is thereby cured of its frenzy. The fame thing happens in all other violent affections, whofe exceffes cure themfelves; and of which, in proportion as the preceding agitation has been the greater, the fubfequent relief proves the more delightful.

The different kinds of mufic; their nature and effects.

To this purpofe theatrical mufic might be happily directed; but as the fpectators at theatres confift, not merely of the liberal and enlightened, but of the vulgar and illiterate; of mechanics, manufacturers, fervants, and flaves; fuch perfons require paftimes fuitable

εχουσα. Και δια τουτο μουσικην εκαλεσεν ὁ πλατων, και ετι προτερον οἱ πυθαγορειοι, την φιλοσοφιαν, και κατα ἁρμονιαν τον κοσμον συνεσταναι, παν το μουσικον θεων εργον ὑπολαμβανοντες. Ουτο δε και αἱ Μουσαι θεαι και Απολλων Μουσαγετης, και ἡ ποιητικη πασα ὑμνητικη ουσα· ὡσαυτως δε και την των ηθων κατασκευην τη μουσικη προστιθεασι· ὡς παν το επανορθωτικον του νου τοις θεοις εγγυς ον. "It has been well faid, that a man moft imitates the gods, when he does good; but it would be better faid, when he is happy; that is, when he enjoys merriment and feftivity chaftifed by the decent charms of mufic and philofophy. For though mufic is often degraded in our theatres, in our ftreets, and at our entertainments, into the pander of fenfual paffions, yet the art itfelf ought not, therefore, to be arraigned, but rather the merit of that difcipline fairly eftimated, of which mufic is the principle and the fource." On this ground Plato, and the Pythagoreans before him, called philofophy, mufic, maintained that the world fubfifted by harmony, and that mufic in its largeft fenfe, meaning arrangement and proportion, fhone in every work of the gods. The mufes themfelves are goddeffes; Apollo is the leader of the mufes; and poetry, which originally confifted in hymns, was invented to fing the praifes of the divinity. To mufic the ancients alfo referred moral philofophy, or ethics, confidering as the gift of Heaven whatever tended to exalt and purify the mind *.

[e] Plato de Republ. l. 111.

* Literally, "confidering as near to the gods whatever is corrective of the mind." If every work of the gods partook of mufic, then moral philofophy, as corrective of the mind and a gift of Heaven, might be referred to mufic as the fpecies is to its genus. But this will not neceffarily follow, if we tranflate with Cafaubon, "that all mufic is the work of the gods."

BOOK V.

fuitable to their tafte; and their perverfe minds can relifh none but perverfe mufic; a mufic overftrained by the vehemence of contention, and disfigured by a crowd of motley embellifhments. But that which is a fit amufement for flaves and men of fervile characters, would be of all things the moft improper for the liberal difcipline of youth. To the purpofe of education, the manly Doric, and other congenial moral melodies, are found to be the beft adapted. Socrates in Plato's Republic admits no other modes of mufic but the Dorian and Phrygian; but there is an inconfiftency in admitting the latter after he had excluded the ufe of the flute, for the Phrygian is among melodies what the flute is among inftruments, a pathetic enthufiaftic ftrain; and fo peculiarly adapted to dithyrambics, that when Philoxenus attempted to fet thefe rapturous hymns to Doric mufic, he found the thing impoffible, and naturally reverted to the Phrygian mode. The Dorian is to be preferred for its firmefs, gravity, and ftability, as holding the middle place between two exceffes, that of fury on the one hand, and that of effeminacy on the other.

The different kinds of mufic refpectively adapted to different periods of human life.

In education we ought never to lofe fight of poffibility and propriety; and propriety generally lies in the middle between two vicious extremes. Propriety, therefore, is mediocrity; but this mediocrity, in practical matters, does not confift in an indivifible point, but admits of confiderable latitude, and is to be modified in different cafes by different circumftances; and in the cafe of mufic, chiefly by the circumftance of age. Strong founds and rapid movements accord not with the debility of declining years. The writers on this fubject, therefore, juftly blame Socrates for banifhing the gentle languor of foft mufic, as producing the noxious confequences of wine, when the

ardour

ardour of intoxication has given place to painful laffitude or liftlefs torpor. But men meafure every thing by their own ftandard; and that may be approved by old age, which feems feeble or languid to the prime of life. Youth, alfo, has a mufic peculiarly adapted to it. This is the Lydian, which unites grace with ftrength, and while it regulates the affections, has no fmall tendency alfo to embellifh the manners. It is plain then, that poffibility, mediocrity, and propriety are views and boundaries, of which, in education, we ought never to lofe fight. BOOK V.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VI.*

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Book Ariſtotle approves himſelf, as even Locke acknowledges, "a maſter in politics;" ſurpaſſing in perſpicuity and preciſion every writer ancient or modern in explaining how "civil ſociety is formed into different models of government, and the ſeveral ſpecies of it [a]." His writings on this ſubject are eminently diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of his rivals and detractors. As he ſtands on a loftier ground, his ſight has a wider range; and while his ſituation is more commanding, his eye is alſo more piercing. A great part of his life was employed in doing for moral and political philoſophy, that which, with regard to modern geometry, Vieta and Deſcartes began; Barrow and Leibnitz and Newton ſo wonderfully carried on and improved; and that which Waring and a few others of our contemporaries are ſtriving ſtill further to extend and perfect. The extraordinary elevation which that noble ſcience has attained, is owing chiefly to obſtinate and patient induſtry in improving and perfecting the ſigns by which our notions of magnitude

* Commonly publiſhed as Book IV.

[a] See Locke's Letter to King.

BOOK VI.

magnitude are compared; and the reſults of our compariſons ſurely drawn, and clearly expreſſed. The Stagirite was equally ſucceſsful with thoſe great men, in the ſtill more important taſk of ſimplifying and improving the ſigns or expreſſions by which compariſons are made, involving the civil happineſs of mankind and the beſt intereſts of ſociety. His diſtinction between the eſſential members of a commonwealth and its barely ornamental concomitants; his diviſions and definitions of the different forms of government, with the important principle by which the form is diſtinguiſhed from the ſubſtance; the mutual relations between government and laws; and the relations between both theſe and the variable moral nature of man, which make thoſe inſtitutions and arrangements, that are juſt and ſalutary in one country, unjuſt and pernicious in another; theſe and other collateral points are explained in the preſent Book, with a copiouſneſs that affords ſatisfaction, and a clearneſs that defies contradiction.

In treating of the *ſovereignty* in a ſtate, our author analyſes this complex object into deliberative, appointing or elective, and judicial, powers. To juſtify his diviſion in compariſon with that which modern writers have ſubſtituted in its ſtead; namely, powers legiſlative, executive, and judicial; it may be obſerved that in every community the ſovereignty, whether reſiding in one, the few, or the many, muſt neceſſarily be employed in deliberating concerning public meaſures; in electing or appointing magiſtrates; or in diſtributing juſtice, and deciding differences. But the work of legiſlation, when once complete, ought never afterwards, according to our author, to be touched but with a cautious and trembling hand [b]; and to ſay that the actual ſovereign, whether king, nobles, or commons, or all three collectively, are inveſted with

[b] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 101.

with the plenitude of legiflative authority, is in his opinion to grant to them a power, which, in its full extent, they cannot ever rightfully exercife, unlefs it could be fuppofed that one generation of men might be fairly entitled to intercept from pofterity the improvement made, and the light accumulated in the long courfe of preceding ages. To do this, is a ftretch of authority to which the moft defpotic princes of Afia have never yet laid claim. In the abfolute monarchies of Europe, while unjuft wars were undertaken, exorbitant taxes impofed, and temporary regulations refpecting every public meafure capricioufly made, and capricioufly abolifhed, the fundamental laws of their refpective kingdoms were acknowledged and refpected by thofe branded as the wildeft and moft furious defpots. In matters of policy that cannot be juft or fit, which never can be ufeful; and our author endeavours to prove that it never can be ufeful for a nation completely and fuddenly to depart from its hereditary inftitutions: a departure which, deftroying that principle on which the efficacy of all laws is founded, would deftroy government itfelf[c]; that illuftrious work of nature, which mere human powers, as they could not originally eftablifh it, cannot have a right to purfue thofe meafures by which it is likely to be eventually overturned[d].

The branch of government now denominated the executive, Ariftotle calls the appointing power, when it refides in one; the electing power, when it refides in many. His language is more accurate than our's. To give orders, and to appoint or elect thofe empowered to carry them into execution, is doubtlefs a branch of the fovereignty; but the part merely executive belongs

[c] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 102.   [d] Ibid. b. i. c. ii. p. 22, & feq.

BOOK VI.

belongs to low inftruments; and all the intermediate functions, between the firft order or appointment, and the final execution or effect, fall within the department of dependent and refponfible minifters.

After thus analyfing the fovereignty, the author proceeds to examine how its different elements are diftributed in the different forms of government, and how they ought to be placed in a well-conftituted commonwealth; holding the juft mean between the vicious extremes of domineering oligarchy and furious democracy. Nothing can be added to the copioufnefs and perfpicuity with which he explains under what circumftances democratical and oligarchical laws are to be alternately felected; and on what occafions neither the one nor the other ought to be entirely and exclufively adopted, but rather both to be blended into one truly political and falutary inftitution. The perfection of practical matters, as he often obferves, lies not in a fixed and indivifible point; it varies with the indefinite variation of circumftances; but the beft practical tefts of good government, he holds to be univerfally the two following: firft, when men of the middle ranks abound more than either the infolent rich or the rapacious poor; and fecondly, when there is a difficulty in determining to which of the fimple forms of government the conftitution moft inclines, and ought moft properly to be referred. There is a pleafure not to be expreffed, but which every friend to his country muft warmly feel, in reflecting that Ariftotle's two tefts are more applicable to the government eftablifhed in this ifland, than to any other which hiftory exhibits.

The praifes which the author beftows on the fuperior happinefs of the middle claffes in fociety, tends to reconcile the people at large with their refpective lots, and to fhew that the condition to which

which every man by an ordinary degree of prudence and good fortune may attain, is precifely the beft in which he could be placed. The miferies of individuals, as well as the convulfions of nations, originate in that moft prevalent and widely-diffufed error of confidering rather their relative than their abfolute advantages [e]. To the bleffings of health and competency with fecurity and a good confcience, what flender additions can be made by the moft extenfive power and moft unbounded opulence? The loweft fituation in civilifed fociety is preferable to the higheft among barbarians. But inftead of contemplating with grateful complacence the real enjoyments within its reach, difcontent broods over its comparative inferiority; and each thinking too highly of himfelf, even the more fortunate individuals will fcarcely allow that full juftice is done to their merit; while they depreciate the prodigious fum common to all, and magnify the minute differences by which the fhares are diftinguifhed.

BOOK VI.

[e] Suique ipfam, *malo arbitrio*, quo a proximis quifque minime anteiri vult, penituiffe. T. Liv. l. vi. c. xxxiv.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Governments—Their claſſification.—Democracy—Its four kinds.—Conſtitutions—One thing by law—Another in fact.—Materials reſpectively fitted for different governments.—Mixed governments.—Teſts of good government.—How governments may be meliorated.—Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people—And the people the nobles.—Analyſis of the ſovereignty—Conſtitution of its different branches—Agreeably to the different ſpirit of different governments.

BOOK VI. Chap. I.

Politics as a ſcience, how it ought to be treated.

IT is the buſineſs of every ſcience, and every inquiry that bears a reference to any whole claſs of objects, to conſider not only the powers or capacities belonging to the beſt and moſt perfect individuals comprehended under that claſs; but thoſe which belong to the claſs in general, or rather to the moſt conſiderable portion of it; and alſo thoſe which belong to ſuch individuals of the claſs as are peculiarly circumſtanced. The maſter of exerciſes, the phyſician, and every other artiſt pays due attention to this threefold diviſion. The teachers of the gymnaſtic art, for example, well know that of the youths committed to their care and diſcipline, few are capable of attaining the moſt athletic habit, or likely to carry off the firſt prizes either of ſtrength or agility. Yet it is the duty of their profeſſion to improve the natural powers of their diſciples, and to exerciſe each of them in ſuch accompliſhments as are moſt ſuitable to their reſpective views and particular conſtitu-

BOOK VI.

tions. It is not enough, therefore, for the ſpeculative politician, if he would render his ſpeculations practically uſeful, to conſider what arrangements beſt ſuit men provided with a complete accumulation of external and internal advantages. He muſt conſider alſo, what are the arrangements beſt adapted to the particular circumſtances in which communities are placed; and moſt likely to promote that particular ſcheme of national happineſs which the founders of the commonwealth have thought fit to prefer; though neither the moſt deſirable abſolutely in itſelf, nor the beſt even in relation to the means and materials which nature or fortune had ſupplied. Above all, the political philoſopher ought moſt diligently to inveſtigate that form of government adapted to mankind in general, circumſtanced as they are moſt commonly found to be; from the neglect of which inquiry, authors who have written well, have not written uſefully. In all matters of practice, poſſibility is to be conſidered as well as perfection; and things eaſily accompliſhed are preferable to thoſe barely poſſible. In oppoſition to theſe maxims, projectors in politics content themſelves with deviſing arrangements adapted only to men formed and circumſtanced agreeably to their mind and wiſh, the mere creations of their own fancy; or if they condeſcend to take leſſons from hiſtory, they are ſatisfied with extolling and recommending the Lacedæmonian or ſome other approved government, without ſtopping to reflect whether the ordinary circumſtances in which nations are placed, will ever allow them to imitate ſuch admired models. For it is not an eaſier taſk to regenerate a conſtitution, than originally to eſtabliſh it; ſince in working this reformation, it is neceſſary that men

ſhould

ſhould not only learn what they did not formerly know, but *unlearn* many things which they had previouſly been taught[r].

BOOK VI. Chap. 2.

How governments are to be divided and claſſed.

To treat the ſcience of politics completely and uſefully, we muſt not be contented with the general diviſion of governments into monarchies, ariſtocracies, and republics; and their reſpective corruptions, tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies. It is neceſſary ſtill farther to examine wherein one government, or one corruption of government, differs from another bearing the ſame name. We ſhall then more eaſily diſcern for what materials each political ſtructure is beſt adapted; what are the changes which it is moſt likely to undergo; and what are the laws and regulations by which it may be preſerved, ſubverted, or amended.

Chap. 3.

General diviſion.

The cauſe of the wide variety in governments muſt be ſought for in the wonderful diverſity of their conſtituent parts; for a ſtate is a very complex object, compoſed of individuals and families; ſome rich, others poor; ſome ſubſiſting by agriculture and paſturage, others by manufactures and commerce; and ſome provided with arms, while others are altogether defenceleſs. The higher claſſes of men are alſo variouſly diſtinguiſhed by their abilities, their virtues, their birth, or merely by their wealth; which laſt, when conſiderable, enables them to rear and train horſes, a circumſtance which alone has been ſufficient to decide the nature of the government. For in ancient times, wherever the national force conſiſted in cavalry, oligarchy was prevalent; as among the Chalcideans, the Eretrians, the Magneſians ſituate on the banks of the Meander, and

[r] In the firſt chapters of this book there is much derangement, and much repetition. I have endeavoured to expreſs the author's ſenſe in fewer words, and with greater perſpicuity.

BOOK VI.

and many other wealthy communities of Aſiatic Greece[g]. It is plain, therefore, that governments vary according to the differences of thoſe conſtituent parts of the ſtate, which either engroſs or ſhare the ſovereignty. The moſt palpable, and alſo the moſt ſpecific difference (as will appear hereafter) is the diſtinction of riches and poverty: wherefore, all governments have been divided into oligarchies and democracies, as the winds are divided into the north and the ſouth, the former comprehending the weſt, and the latter the eaſt; and as melodies are divided into the Dorian and Phrygian, all other kinds of muſic, in proportion to their reſpective proximities, being aſcribed to the one or the other of thoſe very different ſcales. But the general diviſion, above given in this work, appears more ſatiſfactory and more uſeful: namely, that certain polities are wiſely combined and juſtly tempered, as certain harmonies are ſkilfully compoſed and properly blended; that other polities, as well as other harmonies, are vitious deviations and baſe corruptions, whether they be ſtrung into deſpotiſm, or relaxed into democracy.

Chap. 4. Particular diviſion.

The more minute ſubdiviſions of governments muſt be obtained by the ſame means, by which other objects of ſcience are compared and claſſed. In zoology[h], we begin by conſidering what are the conſtituent parts of animals, or, in other words, the parts eſſentially neceſſary to their exiſtence. Theſe are ſome one of the ſenſes[i], with an inſtrument for ſeizing, and another for receiving food, together with ſome inſtrument or member by which the motions belonging to the animal may conveniently be performed. But all theſe parts or organs are ſuſceptible

[g] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii. [h] See Analyſis, p. 125.
[i] ἑνα των αισθητηριων. See Analyſis, &c. p. 41.

fufceptible of great variety in their refpective ftructures, fince, in fome animals, one member is very differently formed from an *analogous* member in other animals; that is, from a member anfwering a fimilar purpofe. But if our enumeration of the parts or organs be correct, and if we have carefully diftinguifhed the differences in the ftructure of each organ, we muft obtain the whole number of kinds or claffes by multiplying the number expreffing the differences in one conftituent part, into the product of the numbers expreffing the differences in all the other conftituent parts.

The conftituent parts of commonwealths.

The fame principle applies to the claffification of commonwealths, thofe complex moral entities, confifting of many parts or members, differently conftructed, and varioufly combined. An effential ingredient in every commonwealth is, that great portion of the people employed in providing food, which may be varioufly fupplied by the different modes of induftry and accumulation above fpecified. A fecond indifpenfable ingredient confifts of thofe employed in arts and manufactures, whether neceffary for fubfiftence, or ufeful for accommodation. A third clafs of the people are thofe converfant about exchange or traffic, foreign as well as domeftic. The foldiers form a fourth clafs, not lefs neceffary than any of the preceding; fince communities are collected for all-fufficiency, and cannot have attained their end, if continually expofed to deftruction or fervitude. Judges, to adminifter juftice, and perfons qualified by their abilities to deliberate and decide concerning public concerns, are the fifth and fixth claffes: for if a foul be neceffary to conftitute an animal, not lefs than a body, juftice, valour, and political wifdom, are not lefs effential to a ftate, than thofe

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exertions of bodily labour by which daily wants are fupplied[k]. The feventh and eighth claffes confift in thofe who perpetually, or interchangeably, exercife the various duties of executive magiftracy; and thofe who, by their feafonable contributions, fupply the occafional exigencies of the public fervice. Of thofe various offices or functions, fome indeed may be united in the fame perfon. The fame individual may alternately decide as a judge, and deliberate as a fenator; the fame hands may alternately hold the plough and brandifh the fpear. But as opulence and poverty cannot in any country be afcribed to the fame perfon at once, the moft diftinct claffes of every ftate are the poor and the rich; and the evident differences in government muft refult from thefe diftinctions: from power engroffed by wealth, or power ufurped by indigence. Kings, they fay, are chofen in Æthiopia on account of their beauty and ftature. If the fame rule prevailed in electing republican magiftrates, the principle of election would be highly oligarchical, becaufe the tall and beautiful are always the fmaller number. The rich alfo are commonly the few: and the poor the many; but to conftitute an oligarchy, the few, who are mafters of the government, muft be rich; and to conftitute a democracy, the many, who are mafters of the government, muft be poor; for it is only when both circumftances concur in thofe governments, that their refpective characters are ftrongly impreffed, and their oppofite genius fully difplayed. At Apollonia, near the Ionian fea, and in the ifle of Thera, the defcendants of the firft fettlers retained the whole government in their hands, notwith-

[k] The author here, as elfewhere, blames Plato for confidering in his "Republic" foldiers as mere fupplements, while he places hufbandmen, weavers, &c. among effential parts or members.

notwithſtanding powerful acceſſions of new inhabitants. But the government was not a democracy, becauſe the rulers were inconſiderable in number when compared with the ſubjects over whom their power was exerciſed. At Colophon, on the other hand, the many were maſters of the government; yet they did not conſtitute a democracy, becauſe, before the Lydian war, the far greater proportion of the inhabitants of that commercial city were poſſeſſed of conſiderable opulence.

Democracy, its four kinds.

The nature of oligarchies and democracies muſt vary in conſequence of variations in their parts or elements. When the notables, or nobles, are diſtinguiſhed by their education and virtue, there will reſult a very different kind of oligarchy from that in which the ſovereigns of the ſtate are characteriſed merely by their birth or their wealth. The differences in the people at large are occaſioned chiefly by the different occupations which they purſue. Some live by agriculture; others by manufactures and commerce; and many cities and iſlands ſubſiſt chiefly by the ſea. Their veſſels are employed in war, commerce, fiſhing, and carriage. In ſome places, almoſt the whole ſhipping is deſtined for one ſingle uſe; as the fiſhing boats of Byzantium and Tarentum, the gallies of Athens, the merchantmen of Ægina and Chios, and the tranſports of Tenedos. In the commonalty of a country, there may alſo be a variety in the proportion of mere populace, perſons deſtitute of property, condemned through poverty to the meaneſt drudgery, and participating, on one ſide at leaſt, of a foreign or even ſervile extraction. Such are the differences in the parts or elements, from which ſuch a variety of diſpoſitions, habits, manners, and characters muſt neceſſarily flow, as will render

thoſe

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those arrangements which suit the genius of one people altogether unsuitable to that of another. The first kind of democracy requires that all men should be treated alike; that the rich and the poor should indifferently share the government, and enjoy an authority in its deliberations and measures exactly proportional to their numbers. Liberty, the partisans of this government assert, is chiefly to be found in democracies; and when all men are placed on a foot of equality, then, and then only, this liberty will be complete. The second kind of democracy requires a small qualification in point of fortune, in those entitled to offices of government. The third kind excludes from those offices persons branded by any note of infamy, or chargeable with any public delinquency. The kind first mentioned does not make these distinctions, but admits to magistracy without exception, the citizens at large. Yet all these democracies are governed by general and fixed laws, which it is the duty of magistrates and assemblies to administer and apply, without ever interposing their own authority, unless the law be silent or its voice uncertain. But there is a fourth species of democracy, differing from the others just mentioned, in this important particular, that it is governed not by permanent laws, but by occasional decrees. This happens through the dangerous artifices of demagogues, a description of men for which there is not any room in countries subject to law; but where law is set aside, the authority of wise and good men is overturned, and that of demagogues established on its ruins; the people in the assemblies assuming the form of one complex monarch; tyrants not individually, but collectively. The authority of the many is reprobated by Homer, in what sense is

uncertain [1]. In fuch a democracy, then, the people knowing itfelf to be an abfolute monarch, affumes all his pretenfions, and exercifes all his prerogatives; fetting every principle of order at defiance; rewarding and honouring none but the bafeft flatterers; and exhibiting in all its tranfactions the fame contraft to a well-conftituted republic, which a tyrannical ufurpation exhibits to a legal monarchy. Of the real individual tyrant, and of this tyrannical corporation, the manners are precifely the fame. The decrees of the one are as defpotical as the edicts and ordinances of the other. Both prove the bane of human fociety, the oppreffors of virtue, the munificent rewarders of vice. The court flatterer flourifhes under the tyranny of one man; the demagogue, under the tyranny of the multitude; and the flatterer and demagogue are equally folicitous to extend that unlawful domination on which their own influence depends. The demagogue perfuades the multitude to difregard the authority of precedent, and to trample under foot every law of the conftitution, that full fcope may be given to the authority of occafional decrees, well knowing that while the paffions of the multitude govern, he who can manage thofe paffions muft be mafter of the ftate. The multitude liften with delight to one who feems to have nothing at heart but to promote their intereft, or gratify their pleafure; and cheerfully accept his invitation of taking the public concerns entirely into their own hands; fo that every eftablifhed magiftracy, and every regular function of political power is enfeebled, fufpended, or utterly abolifhed. The author, therefore, who arraigns fuch a demo-

cracy

[1] ουκ αγαθη πολυκοιρανιη, Iliad, ii. v. 204. Ariftotle fays, it is uncertain whether Homer meant to brand the complex tyranny of the multitude, or the authority of many individually. Pope prefers the former meaning, "That worft of tyrants, an ufurping crowd." Iliad ii. v. 242.

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cracy as unworthy of the name of government, feems to reafon juftly; for what government can fubfift without laws? If we admit, therefore, democracy to be a form of government, it is plain that a ftate continually fubject to the caprice of occafional decrees, cannot properly be claffed even under the name of democracy [m].

Chap. 5.

Oligarchy, and its four kinds.

Of oligarchy as well as of democracy, there are various kinds. The firft kind is that in which all political power belongs to men of a certain cenfus or fortune, and in which this cenfus is fo high, that the great body of the people are totally excluded from every fhare in the adminiftration. The fecond kind is that in which the pecuniary qualification for office is not fo high as totally to exclude the majority of the citizens, but in which the various councils and magiftracies fupply by election the vacancies that happen among their own members: if they elect from the citizens at large, they act conformably to the principle of an ariftocracy; if they confine their choice to men of a certain cenfus only, they act conformably to the principle of an oligarchy. A third kind of oligarchy takes place, when offices are hereditary; and a fourth, when in addition to this circumftance, the magiftrates govern by their own will and pleafure, and not by eftablifhed laws. This laft and worft kind is called in Greece a dynafty. It bears the fame relation to oligarchy that tyranny does to monarchy, and that the turbulence of the democracy laft defcribed bears to the fair equality of popular government.

Such

[m] This worft fpecies of democracy is what Polybius calls an ochlocracy.—It takes place, he obferves, wherever the will of the majority prevails; one cafe only excepted, that of a people among whom it it habitual and hereditary to venerate religion, law, virtue, and old age. Comp. Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. & c. ix. This ochlocracy, he obferves, neceffarily terminates in the tyranny of one defpot. Ibid.

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Such then are the various kinds of oligarchies and democracies. But it ought not to escape the notice of a diligent inquirer into politics, that a conftitution may be of one kind by law, and of another in fact. Some ftates are governed democratically, of which the fundamental laws are not democratical; and others are governed oligarchically, of which the fundamental laws are not oligarchical. In fuch commonwealths the practice of the government is at variance with its theory; and this moft frequently happens in confequence of a filent, gradual, and, therefore, unperceived revolution. In operating this revolution, there is fometimes a long conflict between laws and manners.—Manners finally prevail. The law remains only as a dead letter; while the men who have effected the change, become mafters of the commonwealth.

A conftitution fometimes one thing by law and another in fact.

How this happens.

Chap. 6.

The forms of oligarchy and democracy, which we have hitherto examined abftractedly, have each of them fuitable materials with which they naturally incorporate. A people fubfifting chiefly by agriculture, and poffeffed, as is ufual with fuch a people, of very moderate fortunes, naturally arrange themfelves into a legal and well-conftituted democracy. They may fubfift comfortably by labour, they would be foon ruined by idlenefs; they contrive a government, therefore, which requires as little expence of time as poffible; and employ on all occafions, when it is practicable, the great machine of law to fave the labour of man. Their affemblies convene but rarely, becaufe they never convene unneceffarily. A certain cenfus is requifite for enjoying a fhare in the government; but this cenfus is fo moderate that it may be acquired by every induftrious citizen, without greater exertions of labour than are neceffary to make provifion for his family. Among fuch a

Of the people qualified for enjoying the beft and cheapeft form of democracy.

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people, government is carried on without ſalaries, without revenues, and without taxes. The affairs of the community, therefore, are left to aſſume their natural order; ſince men have no undue motive to engage them to abandon their own profitable concerns, in order to employ themſelves in matters which will be much better managed without their unſeaſonable interference[1].

Of the people fit only for the worſt and moſt extravagant democracy.

Between this ſimple and frugal democracy, and that which naturally eſtabliſhes itſelf in conſequence of wealth acquired by commerce or conqueſt, there are two intermediate gradations; one, in which without requiring any qualification in point of fortune, all thoſe who are not of a ſervile or foreign extraction, are held partners in the government; and another, in which without any regard even to deſcent or birth, all thoſe who are freemen enjoy the rights of citizens. Yet as under both thoſe gradations, ſalaries and fees of office are unknown, there will not be any unſeaſonable interference in matters of adminiſtration; and the regularity of law will prevail over the caprice of human affection. The fourth kind of democracy ariſes the laſt in point of time, becauſe it cannot take place till cities have acquired a certain meaſure of population and of wealth. A great population, and that condenſed in cities, makes the multitude feel, and enables them to exert their ſtrength. All men indiſcriminately claim a ſhare in the government; and as moſt people cannot, without reducing themſelves to beggary, afford time for exerciſing the functions of the citizen or ſtateſman, their public ſervices muſt be paid by the commonwealth, and the revenues of the ſtate muſt ſupply the deficiencies of their private fortunes. By ſuch an expedient the poorer citizens obtain a greater command of leiſure than even the rich themſelves.

The

[1] This meaning is naturally ſuggeſted by what immediately follows.

The former have nothing to care for, their wants being ſupplied by the public; the latter are encumbered with the weight of their private affairs; and on every occaſion ſo much outvoted, that they often ceaſe to attend any aſſemblies whatever, either deliberative or judicial, thus abandoning their country to the licentious and lawleſs multitude.

Chap. 7.

Of the people fit for living under the different kinds of oligarchy.

The firſt kind of oligarchy naturally takes place, when there is a conſiderable but not an exceſſive diſproportion among the eſtates of individuals; and when the cenſus requiſite for ſharing the government, excludes the majority of the people, yet comprehends, however, ſuch a conſiderable number of men, that motives of perſonal intereſt are outweighed by conſiderations of public good. Exceſſive wealth and exceſſive poverty are equally productive of that reſtleſs temper which ſubverts laws and ruins ſtates. When the members of a democracy are not ſo poor that they muſt ſubſiſt at the public expence, and the members of an oligarchy not ſo rich that they diſdain the management of their private eſtates, neither the one nor the other will be eaſily perſuaded unſeaſonably to interfere in matters of government; and their own intereſt and convenience will naturally lead them to prefer the authority of laws to that of men. But when the wealth of an oligarchy increaſes as the number of its members diminiſhes, then ambition will take poſſeſſion of every breaſt; and the *oligarchy* will be exactly the more vicious, in proportion as it approaches to *tyranny*. While diffident of its own ſtrength, it will content itſelf with commanding elections, and raiſing to office its creatures and dependents. It will then proceed to govern by itſelf without the inſtrumentality of others, and advancing from one ſtep to another in its ambitious career, will render its power

 firſt

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firſt abſolute, and then hereditary; thus ſucceſſively degenerating into what has been called a lawleſs and tyrannical dynaſty [m].

Of ariſtocracy, and its different kinds.

Beſides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, there are two other kinds of government; that which is commonly called an ariſtocracy, and that which we have named by the general appellation of all commonwealths, a republic; a form of political arrangement which, as it rarely occurs, has been omitted by Plato and other writers. In ſtrictneſs of language, an ariſtocracy is that form of polity in which the pre-eminence of birth, wealth, and every ſuch political advantage totally diſappears and vaniſhes in compariſon of that which is infinitely greater than them all; a government in which civil honours are diſtributed or apportioned by no other rule or ſtandard but that of virtue alone; and in which the duties of a good man perfectly coincide with the duties of a good citizen. But the ariſtocracies which commonly prevail, are formed on a coarſer model; and as they differ from oligarchies on the one hand, ſo they differ from this perfect republic on the other. In ſuch ariſtocracies, reſpect is had, not merely to wealth, not merely to virtue, not merely to ſtrength and numbers; but all thoſe political advantages claim their reſpective ſhares of political conſideration; and, combined with each other, form the rule or principle according to which honours and offices are diſtributed and conferred. Such is the political arrangement of the ariſtocracy of Carthage. Virtue, pure and unmixed, is not the governing principle of that ſtate. Yet virtue ſtill enjoys a certain ſhare of influence; maintaining in the political conflict, an honourable ſtruggle againſt wealth and numbers; equal to either of them ſingly, though inferior

[m] Ariſtotle here repeats that this kind of oligarchy correſponds with the fourth ſpecies of democracy.

inferior to their united ftrength. In Sparta, virtue and numbers long divided the field; and the reciprocal fhocks of thofe contending principles maintained the pre-eminence of the few, and the freedom of all. There are then various kinds of ariftocracies, befides that which is the beft and moft perfect; and to thofe already mentioned, we may add every form of mixed government in which the balance of power vifibly inclines to the fide of the few.

Chap. 9.

Of a republic, ftrictly fo called, or mixed government:

It remains now to treat of this mixed government and of tyranny; which laft we throw into the back ground, as being of all others the leaft deferving the name of polity. The nature of a mixed government, or what for diftinction fake we call a republic, will evidently appear by confidering the elements of which it is compofed. Thefe are, oligarchy and democracy; though fuch mixed governments as incline moft to the fide of democracy are commonly called republics, while thofe which incline moft to the fide of oligarchy are commonly called ariftocracies; becaufe birth and education feem to have a natural connection with wealth; the rich being already in poffeffion of that very object for the acquifition of which men are moft frequently ftimulated to injuftice. In vulgar language, therefore, a rich man is confounded with a good one; and as there are only three diftinct principles which contend for political authority, virtue, wealth, and numbers, (for birth may always be analyfed into hereditary virtue or hereditary wealth,) it is plain that if we comprehend under the name of ariftocracy, all thofe governments in which virtue forms a conftituent element, we muft define a republic, ftrictly fo called, to be that in which wealth and numbers, that is, the prerogatives of the few, and the rights and liberties of the many, are duly refpected and impartially maintained. The laws, therefore, adapted to a republic, muft be formed by properly blending thofe

its definition.

which

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By what nice principles established, and regulated;

Illustrated by examples.

which prevail in democracies and oligarchies. When, with regard to any one object, the respective laws of these distinct forms of polity are not incompatible with each other, both are to be employed; when they are totally inconsistent, neither of them is to be employed, but a new law is to be framed holding a due middle between them; and when the oligarchic and democratic laws regulating any object, are both of them complex, and consist of many articles or clauses, some clauses are to be copied from the one, and some from the other. In oligarchies, for example, the service of the rich as jurymen, is compelled by a fine; but that of the poor is not rewarded by a fee. In democracies, on the contrary, the attendance of the poor is rewarded, but the non-attendance of the rich is not punished. A law, truly politic and republican, must unite both those partial regulations, by punishing the non-attendance of the rich, and paying the attendance of the poor. Again, in oligarchies a high qualification, in point of fortune, is necessary to constitute the right of voting in the national assembly; in democracies this qualification is often reduced to a mere trifle. A good political law will adopt neither of these extremes, but prefer and establish what is the just middle between them. Again, appointment to office by suffrage is most suitable to the nature of an oligarchy, and appointment to office by lot is most suitable to the nature of democracy; in the former government a high census is required in the candidates; in the latter a small census only, or none. A well-constituted republic, therefore, will borrow the clause respecting the mode of appointment to office from oligarchies, and the clause respecting the pecuniary qualification of the candidates, from democracies. It will *elect* its magistrates, but without paying undue regard to their opulence.

The

Rule by which it may be known whether a republic be well conftituted.

The ftrongeft proof that a republic is well compofed and happily blended refults from this, that the terms oligarchy and democracy may be applied to it with equal, though not exact propriety. Such a republic feems to comprehend both extremes, becaufe it contains a due mixture of oppofite principles, nicely poifed and accurately adjufted. Of this kind is Sparta, which many call a democracy, becaufe the children of the poor enjoy a fimilar education with thofe of the rich; becaufe, in their advancement to manhood, the fame inftitutions and modes of life ftill embrace both ranks; in their drefs and diet there is not any diftinction; they eat at common tables, and the clothes of the moft wealthy are fuch as even the pooreft can afford to wear. Of the two higheft magiftracies, the citizens elect the one, and may be themfelves elected to the other. The fenators are chofen by the affembled multitude, and every one of the people may be chofen to fill a place in the council of the Ephori. On the other hand, many call Sparta an oligarchy, becaufe all offices are conferred by fuffrage, none beftowed by lot; and becaufe the power of life and death refides in the breafts of a few. A well-mixed republic, then, muft participate of oligarchy and democracy; it muft feem to be both, and neither; and it muft fubfift by internal vigour, not by foreign influence. Any form of commonwealth, good or bad, may be kept together by the impreffion of external force; but that form is good which flourifhes by its native energy; for this can only take place, when each component part feels its own benefit intimately connected with the fafety of the whole.

Chap. 10.

Of tyranny, and its different kinds.

We now proceed to fpeak of tyranny, rather for the fake of method, than that fuch an inftitution is at all worthy of confideration. In treating of monarchy, we formerly examined whether kings were, in general, ufeful in a commonwealth;

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and under what particular circumftances royal government might with propriety be eftablifhed. We likewife mentioned two kinds of tyranny, both of which bear a refemblance to royalty; the firft is, that which generally prevails among barbarians, and which is confonant to their genius and character; the fecond is, that which occafionally prevailed in fome countries of Greece, the government of the Æfymnetes. Both the Barbarian monarchs and the Grecian Æfymnetes, were unqueftionably tyrants, fince they exercifed unlimited and abfolute power. But they refembled kings in this, that their power was voluntarily conferred, cheerfully fubmitted to, and, therefore, lawfully eftablifhed. But there is a third kind of tyranny, which moft properly deferves that odious name, and which ftands in direct oppofition to royalty; it takes place when one man, the worft, perhaps, and bafeft in the country, governs a kingdom with no other view than the advantage of himfelf and his family: a government, which it cannot be fuppofed, that thofe who know what freedom is, fhould voluntarily endure.

Chap. II.

Principles by which it may be determined, what is practically the beft form of government.

We proceed now to inveftigate what is practically the beft fort of commonwealth: not fuch a commonwealth as requires for its conftruction any extraordinary combination of virtues and talents, embellifhed by an accumulation of external advantages; the union of all which ought to form the object rather of our prayers, than of our hopes; but fuch a commonwealth as is adapted to the ordinary condition of fociety, and of which moft men are qualified to be members. The ariftocracies which we formerly defcribed, are either too refined for the coarfenefs of practice, or approach fo nearly to what we have called a republic, that they may be examined by the fame principles, and eftimated by the fame ftandard; and, indeed, the maxims which we formerly eftablifhed in our treatife of Ethics, will enable us to appreciate the practical

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value of all governments whatever. The beſt and happieſt life, we proved in that treatiſe, to be a life of virtue, unobſtructed in its exertions by external impediments; and virtue itſelf, we proved by an accurate and full analyſis, to conſiſt in mediocrity. What the beſt kind of life, therefore, is to an individual, the beſt government is to a ſtate; for the government I mean (as above ſpecified, not the government conſtituted by law, but the government exiſting in fact) is the life of the ſtate. The perfection, therefore, of this political and incorporated life, muſt be found within the ſame limits or boundaries which comprehend that condition of external circumſtances, and that inward frame of mind, conſtituting the happineſs of thoſe individuals of whom communities are compoſed.

Illuſtration of theſe principles; and the praiſe of mediocrity.

With regard to external circumſtances, communities are compoſed of three claſſes of men: men encumbered by wealth, men oppreſſed by poverty, and men enjoying a happy mediocrity of fortune. Exceſs of wealth, like ſuperiority in ſtrength or in beauty, diſdains the dictates of propriety, and ſpurns the authority of reaſon: extreme poverty, like weakneſs and deformity, ſours the temper and debaſes the character. The former exceſſes produce inſolence; the latter engender baſeneſs: and theſe, together, form the ordinary ſources of all human turpitude; the one ſpreading into every ſpecies of audacious guilt, the other ſinking into every kind of cowardly fraud and mean miſchief. Under great inequality of external circumſtances, a city therefore muſt be filled, not with men, but with deſpots and ſlaves, of thoſe unfit for exerciſing legal authority, and thoſe unfit for yielding liberal obedience; while friendſhip, the bond of ſocial life, is broken, deſtroyed, or corrupted into contempt on the one ſide, and into envy on the other. A certain mediocrity is neceſſary to equality, equality to friendlineſs, and friendlineſs to ſecurity. Under all governments, the hap-

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"How happy is the middle walk of life,
"O! may it be my portion in the ftate!"

It is plain, therefore, that the beft commonwealth is that in which middling men moft abound; and prove, if not more powerful than both, at leaft, fuperior to either of the extremes. When this does not take place, the commonwealth neceffarily degenerates either into oligarchy or into democracy; both which forms of government are much more likely than a republic abounding in the middle ranks to fall under the tyranny of one man; as fhall be explained more clearly hereafter, in treating the fubject of political revolutions. Such a republic is not only lefs liable to be fubverted: it fubfifts unagitated by fedition; the great intermediate mafs reftraining the activity of the two hoftile extremes; for this reafon, democracies are found to be more durable than oligarchies, becaufe in the former, the middling clafs is more numerous than in the latter; and large communities enjoy more tranquillity than fmall ones, which, from the paucity of their members, have few citizens of an intermediate condition between riches and poverty. It is this intermediate clafs, however, that alone balances and keeps fteady the veffel of the republic; when this clafs is deftroyed or removed, an outrageous democracy takes place, which is fpeedily overwhelmed in its own fury.

The

[n] A gnomic or moral poet of Miletus, who flourifhed five hundred years before Chrift, the contemporary of Theognis, of Megara; which two, together with old Hefiod, Ifocrates confiders as the beft mafters of life and manners. Orat. ad Nicocl. The remains afcribed to Phocylides do not contain the words in the text; but although they amount to only 215 verfes, they thrice repeat the fentiment. See vv. 12, 52, 65.

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The beft legiflators have, in point of rank and fortune, been men of an ordinary level. As to himfelf, Solon attefts this in his poetry. The fame is to be faid of Charondas, and of almoft all others. Lycurgus was not the king, but the legiflator of Sparta. A republic founded on the falutary principles of mediocrity and juft equality is, indeed, a rare phænomenon. Of all thofe invefted with power, one man alone°, as far as hiftory informs us, could be prevailed on to eftablifh fuch a political arrangement; moft other leaders, whether of the nobles or of the people, never contenting themfelves with equality, but always afpiring to fuperiority, and alternately abufing their advantages for giving an undue preponderancy to their refpective factions. In this fatal ambition they have been encouraged and confirmed by the leading ftates of Greece, which have always been folicitous to mould every neighbouring republic after their own model. Blinded by paffion, contending parties have been unable, or unwilling, to perceive any thing between the miferable alternative of commanding with infolence, or obeying with fervility; and fubftantial happinefs has therefore been almoft conftantly facrificed to filly pride.

The paffions of individuals, and of ftates, refift the eftablifhment of the beft government;

Having thus examined what is practically the beft commonwealth, it will be eafy to appreciate the merit of all others, by their degrees of approximation to this model of perfection; a model, which the legiflator ought always to keep in view under every condition of fociety, but which the wide variety of materials, on which he has to operate, will enable him to imitate under different circumftances with more or lefs exactnefs, and more or lefs facility.

which is a limit and model of perfection, to which legiflators ought continually to approximate.

In

° Ariftotle perhaps means Clifthenes, the Athenian, whom he praifes in other parts of this work, particularly l. vi. c. 4. See the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xviii. p. 118. Clifthenes reftored the inftitutions of Solon. This was his chief merit. I rather think, therefore, that Ariftotle means Solon himfelf.

BOOK VI. Chap. 12.

The legiflator and ftatefman ought always to ftrengthen the middling clafs, and to render it more powerful than either extreme.

In every community whatever, the ftability of government requires, that thofe who defire its continuance fhould be more powerful than thofe who defire its diffolution. The political arrangement, therefore, of every ftate, muft always depend on the prevailing inclination of that party which is preponderant; and this preponderancy again muft confift either in quantity or quality; quantity, denoting mere fuperiority in number; and quality, the diftinguifhing excellencies of the upper ranks, birth, wealth, education, the love of glory and of the republic. Quantity and quality often acting in oppofite directions, their relative forces muft be eftimated, and a proportion inftituted for difcovering which principle will prevail in the conflict. If one party furpaffes in quality more than it is furpaffed in quantity, it is plain that the balance muft incline to the fide of the few, and different kinds of oligarchies muft neceffarily be eftablifhed. If, on the contrary, the popular party exceed more in quantity, than they are excelled in quality, democracy muft prevail: the firft and beft kind of democracy, if the majority of the people be hufbandmen: the laft and worft, if tradefmen and manufacturers: and, in proportion to the ingredients compofing them, the intermediate kinds, more or lefs faulty. But, in all thofe cafes, a wife legiflator will conftantly endeavour to comprehend, in his fcheme of polity, men of the middle rank, and to render them, if not more powerful than both the extremes, at leaft fuperior to either; becaufe, when this takes place, the government is likely to prove durable. There is not any reafon to apprehend, that the rich and the poor fhould lay afide their natural animofities, and confpire againft this clafs which is comparatively on good terms with both, and the natural mediator between them. The contending parties cannot, therefore, weaken or diminifh its influ-

ence, without proportionally ſtrengthening the power of their reſpective adverſaries. But thoſe who eſtabliſh oligarchies neglect this conſideration; and by aſpiring to an imaginary good, incur a real evil: for the prepoſterous ambition of the great proves ruinous to more ſtates than even the unjuſt violence of the multitude.

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Chap. 13.

The political ſleights by which the great deceive the multitude, regard five objects. 1ſt, The aſſembly.

The great, in order to diſguiſe their ambition, and the multitude, in order to palliate their injuſtice, have recourſe to many juggling artifices, by which they endeavour mutually to deceive each other. Theſe devices regard the five following objects; the aſſembly, the courts of juſtice, the magiſtracies, the militia, and the gymnaſtic exerciſes. To engroſs all power in the aſſembly, the rich and noble eaſily delude the people into a law, exacting a ſevere fine for non-attendance from men of a certain cenſus. Such men, therefore, will be careful to attend; while the poor, who are not liable to any penalty, will for the moſt part deſert their duty, and thus abandon their ſhare in the government. A ſimilar contrivance ſucceeds with regard to the courts of juſtice, and the duty of ſerving as jurymen. By a law of Charondas[p], a fine was in this caſe impoſed even on the poor; but ſo ſmall, that it ſerved no other purpoſe than that of ſaving appearances; for when one trick is diſcovered, another is ſubſtituted in its ſtead. Thus, all who have inſcribed their names in the public regiſter, are entitled to exerciſe the functions of deliberative and judiciary power; but if, after this, they neglect to exerciſe them, they ſubject themſelves to a ſevere penalty; the poor, therefore, avoid enrolling their names, leſt they ſhould incur the penalty. With regard to burdenſome offices, they are permitted to excuſe themſelves from holding them, without other proof than that of their own oaths; they are not compelled, under heavy fines, to provide

2d, Courts of Juſtice.

3d, The magiſtracy.

4th and 5th, Arms and exerciſes.

[p] See above, b. ii. c. x. p. 121.

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provide themſelves with arms, nor to acquire ſkill in the gymnaſtic exerciſes; and all thoſe exemptions, which they are taught to regard as indulgences, effectually diminiſh their conſideration in the ſtate.

Thoſe by which the democratical party deceive the great,

The lower claſſes of men ſometimes endeavour, in their turn, to encounter the artifices of the great with ſimilar addreſs. The non-attendance of the rich in the aſſembly, or courts of juſtice, is not puniſhed; but their own attendance is rewarded; and this fee or reward, which is to them a mighty matter, is far too ſmall to operate as a motive on their ſuperiors. A well-conſtituted republic ought, as we obſerved before, to fee the poor, and fine the rich; by which means, both parties would be rendered diligent in the diſcharge of their political functions, and neither ſide be enabled to engroſs power, and uſurp the commonwealth.

Rule by which the the cenſus ought to be eſtabliſhed.

Wealth is a thing relative and indefinite; and the cenſus, therefore, in each ſtate, muſt vary with the circumſtances of the community. It ought never to be ſo high, as to leave that portion of the citizens which is excluded from office, more conſiderable than that which is admitted: otherwiſe, the government cannot be expected to prove durable. The mere populace will eaſily ſubmit to excluſion, but they will not tolerate injuſtice, or brook inſult. They will even fight boldly, if they are fed abundantly; and the patient ſubmiſſion of the people may generally be enſured by the prudent moderation of their ſuperiors.

Rule by which the military force ought to be eſtabliſhed;

The cenſus, we have ſaid, is a thing comparative and indefinite: but the right of bearing arms has its preciſe limit. It muſt be beſtowed on citizens, and them only; for to diſarm men is little leſs than to enſlave them. In ſome ſtates, as the republic of Malea, all thoſe who have ever borne arms, exerciſed the

deliberative

deliberative and judiciary powers; but offices of executive magiſtracy belonged to thoſe only who were actually enrolled as ſoldiers. After the ſubverſion of royalty, the firſt governments in Greece were entirely in the hands of military men, and thoſe wholly horſemen; for before the invention of tactics, the ſtrength of ſtates conſiſted merely in cavalry. But as populouſneſs increaſed, and tactics were improved, the ſphere of political conſideration was extended, and the people at large became ſharers in the great partnerſhip of government. What is now regarded as an ariſtocratical republic was, therefore, anciently *called* a democracy, but had, in *fact*, a ſtrong tendency to oligarchy, or even to royalty. The intermediate ranks were then few in number, and deſtitute of ſtrength; and therefore they, as well as their inferiors, eaſily ſubmitted to the authority of the ſame men in peace whom they had been accuſtomed to follow and obey as their leaders in war.

Illuſtrated by hiſtory.

Chap. 14.

Analyſis of the ſovereignty into the deliberative, the executive, and judicial powers.

Having thus examined ſtates in relation to the materials of which they are compoſed, and ſhewn how many, and what kinds of compoſitions reſult from the various combinations of the ſame ſimple elements, we muſt proceed to analyſe and explain what is properly called the ſovereignty. This complex object comprehends the deliberative, executive, and judicial powers [q]; powers, which muſt be differently regulated and diſtributed in relation to the nature and plan of each particular conſtitution; but which, in all conſtitutions, ought to be regulated and diſtributed agreebly to public utility, the great end of all legal governments. The deliberative power is generally ſuppoſed to include the right of determining concerning war and

Wherein the deliberative power conſiſts.

[q] I have here expreſſed Ariſtotle's ſenſe in modern language. In this chapter he treats concerning that part of the ſovereignty which he calls, το βουλευομενον, tranſlated the deliberative;—in chapter xv. concerning that part which he calls το περι τας αρχας, tranſlated the executive;—in chapter xvi, concerning that part which he calls το δικαστικον, tranſlated the judicial.

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and peace; concerning laws, treaties, alliances, death, banifhment, and confifcation; as well as the right of calling the magiftrates to account for malverfation in office. Thefe important matters muft be entrufted either to the people at large, or to a certain defcription of the people conftituting one or more diftinct councils: or fome of thofe great queftions muft be decided by the popular affembly, and others committed to diftinct tribunals, or particular magiftrates. That all matters of deliberation fhould be decided by all the people, which is confonant to the nature of democracy, is fufceptible of many variations; for all the people may be entitled to deliberate and decide, either collectively, or fucceffively; which latter obtains in the republic of Telecles the Milefian. In fome republics, the different magiftrates form a fupreme council, which directs the ordinary bufinefs of government; but magiftracy is exercifed by men drawn promifcuoufly from tribes, wards, diftricts, and the minuteft fubdivifions of the people, until it paffes fucceffively through the whole body. Yet the citizens at large never convene in the popular affembly, except for the purpofe of making new laws; of regulating the conftitution; or of hearing, on any important emergency, the refolves of the magiftrates. In other republics, the affembly convenes not only for thofe purpofes, but for the purpofe of elections, for deciding war and peace, and for examining the conduct of men in office, who, on all ordinary occafions, direct, as well as carry on, the bufinefs of government, acting for the people at large[r], from whom

The various modes in which it may be regulated in democracies;

[r] In modern language, reprefenting the people at large. We fhall foon find deliberative and elective affemblies, compofed of a part of the citizens, acting for, or reprefenting the people at large; which Ariftotle fometimes confiders as the beft form of democracy, and fometimes qualifies with the title of πολιτεια. εισι δε οι τροποι τε παντας, πλεικς· ἱις μεν, το κατα μερος, αλλα μη παντας αθροως. This is faid with regard to deliberative affemblies, c. xiv. and with regard to elective affemblies, he fays, c. xv. το δε, μη παντας ἁμα μεν καθιςαναι, εξ ἁπαντων δε, : : : πολιτικον.

whom they are appointed by lot, or elected by ſuffrage. Another mode of conſtituting the deliberative power is, that the national aſſembly convene, to appoint the magiſtrates, to take an account of their adminiſtration, and to decree war or peace; but that all other matters be determined, as well as conducted, by diſtinct magiſtrates or miniſters appointed by lot, when ordinary talents and plain honeſty are ſufficient for the proper diſcharge of their duty, and elected by ſuffrage when, in addition to theſe qualities, experience and ſkill appear requiſite for the due execution of their office. The laſt and worſt mode of conſtituting the deliberative power, is that of lodging it on all occaſions with the great body of the people, convened in the public aſſembly, and rendering the magiſtrates, as to matters of volition, mere paſſive inſtruments for executing the pleaſure of the multitude. This prepoſterous diſtribution prevails only in that kind of democracy, which we have proved to be analogous to oligarchic dynaſty and monarchic tyranny.

in oligarchies;

All the modes of regulating the deliberative power, above explained, are conſonant with the nature of democracy; but when this power is always lodged with a part of the community, or with a particular deſcription of men, to the perpetual excluſion of all others, an oligarchy neceſſarily takes place. Yet, when this deſcription includes men of moderate fortunes, and when all who acquire ſuch fortunes are of courſe ſummoned to the council, and when there are certain fundamental laws, which even this ſupreme council does not think itſelf empowered to abrogate or alter, the moderation of ſuch an oligarchy approaches nearly to the arrangements of what we have called a well-conſtituted republic. That alſo may be called a moderate oligarchy, in which men of a certain cenſus elect a council entruſted with the deliberative power, but bound

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to exercife this power agreeably to eftablifhed laws. The oligarchy degenerates into a tyrannical dynafty, when the deliberative body fupplies, by its own authority, the vacancies among its members; or, what is ftill worfe, when prudence in deliberation is fuppofed an hereditary virtue, and the right of deciding abfolutely for the community at large is vefted in certain families, and defcends from fathers to their children [r].

in mixed governments.

When fome matters of deliberation are entrufted to the magiftrates, and others committed to the people at large, particularly the alternative of war and peace, and the impeachment of men in office, fuch an arrangement may be called ariftocratical; particularly when the magiftrates are appointed by election, or by a mixture of choice and chance, that is, appointed by lot from perfons whofe characters have been previoufly examined, and generally approved. The mixture of lot and fuffrage, and the appointment to fome deliberative functions in the one way, and to other deliberative functions in the other, is confonant to the nature of what we call a republic. Such then are the modes of diftributing this portion of the fovereignty, conformably to the nature of different governments.

How democracies and oligarchies may be improved into better governments.

It would be highly conducive to the improvement of what is now called democracy, were that oligarchic regulation to be introduced which fines the rich for non-attendance. By this means, the affembly would be better compofed, and its deliberations more moderate and more falutary, the paffions and interefts of different orders mutually repreffing that violence to which all of them, unchecked, are liable. It would, alfo, prove greatly advantageous, that in each tribe or diftrict, certain deliberative functions fhould be conferred by fuffrage, and others

[r] See above, p. 288. with which compare Polybius, vi. 8. vol. ii. p. 471. edit. Sweigh.

others decided by lot; and if the populace be extremely numerous, that only certain divifions of them fhould be entitled fucceffively to receive fees, or allowed fucceffively to try their chance in the appointment by lot. In oligarchies, on the other hand, the people at large might be rendered lefs hoftile, nay friendly, to the government, were certain deliberative functions entrufted to men chofen from the whole promifcuoufly, or were an inftitution to be introduced fimilar to what prevails in fome republics, called the Council of Preadvifers, who prepare and impartially examine thofe public queftions, which the nobles or citizens are afterwards entitled to decide. Nay, the nobles or magiftrates might affume the office of preädvifers, which would give them a negative, before debate, on all popular decrees; or they might fubmit public meafures to the free difcuffion of the people, referving to themfelves the right of ultimate decifion. In republics, the people convened in the national affembly ought to have the power of acquittal, but not of condemnation; the latter, in the laft refort, ought always to reft with the magiftrates and the law. The reverfe of this prevails; the power of acquittal depends on the few, that of condemnation is lodged with the many. So much with regard to the deliberative power, which conftitutes the foundation and root of the fovereignty.

Chap. 15.

Of the executive power in republics.

The executive power of government muft neceffarily be entrufted to magiftrates, in whofe appointment, regulation, and diftribution, there is a great variety of cafes. How many magiftrates ought there to be? with what functions ought they to be entrufted? how long ought each office to laft? a year, fix months, longer than the former period, or fhorter than the latter? Ought any offices to be for life, and ought the fame

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offices to be held more than once by the fame perfon? Still farther, who ought to elect or appoint the magiftrates? from whom ought they to be chofen or appointed? and in what manner ought the appointment to be made? A philofophical ftatefman ought clearly to comprehend all thofe varieties, and to be capable of folving each queftion in all the ways that are particularly adapted to the nature and end of the different forms of government.

Wherein the executive power confifts.

First of all, it is not perhaps clearly afcertained what properly conftitutes a magiftracy. A ftate requires many affiftants and many fuperintendants—priefts; ambaffadors; facred heralds; exhibitioners, at their own expence, of public amufements; all of whom, if not neceffary for its mere fubfiftence, are yet effential to its well-being and happinefs. None of thefe, however, are called magiftrates, though they be appointed, as all magiftrates are, by fuffrage or lot; neither do we call magiftrates thofe deftined to functions merely fubfervient to œconomy, as corn-meters; nor thofe employed in offices rather menial than magifterial; offices, which in ftates moderately wealthy, are commonly configned to flaves. He then is a magiftrate who, in his own perfon, or affociated with colleagues, is in certain matters entrufted by the public with the power of deliberating, of judging, above all of commanding; and to define the word more nicely, is not neceffary for our prefent purpofe.

The difcrimination of offices in relation to the magnitude of the community, and the various forms of government.

To return then from words to things, we obferve that the divifion of labour greatly facilitates all purfuits, and that each kind of work is beft performed, when each is allotted to a feparate workman. To the complicated affairs of government, this obfervation is particularly applicable; but it is not always poffible that it fhould be practically applied. Small communities require

quire nearly the fame diftinct offices of magiftracy, that are neceffary in large ones; but they do not require, that the duties of any one office fhould be fo often exercifed, or that the magiftrates fhould fo often perform precifely the fame functions. Small communities therefore may, without much inconvenience, admit of pluralities; and this is a fortunate circumftance, fince it would not be eafy, in fuch communities, to find a fucceffion of men willing and well qualified to exercife all public offices feparately. It is neceffary, therefore, to have recourfe to an accumulation of employment, and to make the fame individual anfwer feveral purpofes; competently, though not perfectly; like thofe complex contrivances, the *obelifcolychnia*, which, in the houfes of the poor, ferve alternately as fpits and candlefticks. Some offices muft be feparated, on account of the different places in which they are exercifed; and others, on account of the different objects or perfons to whom they relate. Can the fame magiftrate, who prefides over the police in the market-place, direct that important object elfewhere? Ought he, who fuperintends the modefty of boys, to have the additional burden of guarding that of women? Under different forms of government, there muft be different magiftrates, and thofe, invefted with different degrees of power, and appointed from different defcriptions of perfons. The office of fenator is confonant to the nature of democracy; but that of preadvifer, which was above defcribed, is peculiarly applicable to oligarchy. In fome democracies, indeed, the authority of the fenate is inconfiderable; but this happens only in that laft and worft kind of democracy, where the people, corrupted by fees, forfake their private affairs, to carry on the lucrative trade of government. The cenfor of manners, is a magiftrate adapted only to an ariftocracy. What fhould he do in a democracy!

Is

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Is it poffible, under fuch a government, to keep the wives of the poor in their houfes! and his remonftrances would be fuperfluous in an oligarchy, where women, efpecially the wives of the magiftrates, are diffolved in luxury.

The various ways of appointing magiftrates,

We now proceed to the important fubject of the appointment of magiftrates; a fubject included within three terms, each of which admits of three variations. The three terms are, thofe who may appoint, thofe who may be appointed, and the manner of the appointment. Thofe who appoint, may confift either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in fome offices, they may confift of all; in others, of a part. Thofe who may be appointed, may confift either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in fome offices, of all; in others, of a part. The manner of appointment is alfo threefold, by election; by fuffrage; in fome offices by election, in others by fuffrage. There are, therefore, in all, nine variations or differences; and it comes to be confidered in how many ways thofe nine differences may be combined with each other; the appointers, the appointed, and the mode of appointment entering into each combination. The three variations or differences, in the appointers, combined with the fame number of variations or differences in the appointed, will give, it is plain, nine combinations of two terms; and each of thefe nine may be repeated three times, fince the appointment may be made in three ways. There are, therefore, in all twenty-feven combinations, or twenty-feven varieties in the appointment of magiftrates; of which varieties, fome are confonant to the nature of one kind of government, and others to that of another. That *all* the citizens fhould be capable of appointing, or capable of being appointed, is confonant to the nature of democracy; but more efpecially when the word *all* is taken to denote the whole body of

of the citizens collectively. It alfo denotes the feveral tribes and minuter divifions of the citizens, which, united, compofe the whole. In this latter fenfe, all the citizens are capable of appointing fucceffively, or of being fucceffively appointed; each divifion enjoying thofe advantages in its turn; which regulation, while it prevents the tumult incident to numerous affemblies, enfures the benefits of equality and freedom[s]. We have fhewn that each of the three terms concerned in the appointment of magiftrates, admits of three varieties. If two of the terms, namely, the appointers and appointed, be limited to two varieties only, and confift in all elections either of the whole or a part of the citizens, without coupling together the whole and the part in the manner above fpecified, then all the varieties in conftituting magiftrates will be reduced to twelve[t]. For the whole citizens may appoint from the whole, by fuffrage; by lot; in fome offices by fuffrage, in others by lot: or the whole may appoint from a part by fuffrage; by lot; and fometimes by fuffrage, fometimes by lot. This, then, affords fix varieties; and there muft be the fame number precifely when a part only appoints. For this part may appoint from the whole by vote, by lot; or fometimes by vote, fometimes by lot; and likewife from a part, by the fame three modes of appointment, that is by vote, by lot; and fometimes in the one way, fometimes in the other. There will,

[s] Such, according to Ariftotle, was once the plan of the republic of Mantinæa, fo juftly celebrated; and fuch was the republic of Telecles the Milefian. Polyb. l. vi. c. xliii. Ælian Var. Hift. l. ii. c. xxii. Maximus Tyrius, Differt. vi. The laft mentioned author calls Mantinæa an ariftocracy, which the learned Schweighæufer, Annot. ad Polyb. t. v. p. 384. fays, agrees with Ariftotle, Polit. l. vi. c. iv. This, however, is not true; for Ariftotle calls it a democracy.

[t] When there are three varieties in each of the three terms, then $3\times3=9\times3=27$; but when two of the terms are fuppofed to vary only in two ways, then $2\times2=4$. & $4\times3=12$. The text is corrupt; and it feems fcarcely poffible to give any clear explanation of it, that will not be liable to philological objections.

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will, therefore, be twelve combinations, without coupling together the whole and the part, either in the appointers or the appointed; that is, without reckoning the combinations reſulting from the whole appointing in ſome caſes, and a part in others, and from the capacity of the whole to be appointed in ſome caſes, and that of a part only in others. A ſimple democracy requires that the whole collectively ſhould appoint from the whole by vote; by lot; or in ſome offices by vote, in others by lot. A well-ordered republic requires that the whole not collectively, but ſeparately by diviſions, ſhould appoint from the whole, or from a part; by ſuffrage, by lot, or by a due mixture of both. An oligarchy requires that a part only ſhould be inveſted with the right of appointing, either by vote or by lot; or in ſome caſes by vote, in others by lot; and this laſt mode, as it is moſt ſatisfactory to the people at large, is moſt favourable to the ſtability of the government. In ariſtocracies, all the citizens may be inveſted with the right of electing, but the elected muſt be perſons of a certain deſcription. In oligarchies, the ſphere of the candidates, as well as that of the electors, muſt be narrowed and confined to perſons of a certain cenſus. Such then are the principal modes of conſtituting magiſtrates, which are reſpectively adapted to different governments; but when different modes are equally well adapted to the frame of the government, the propriety of preferring the one to the other will depend on the duties and functions of the office or magiſtracy itſelf. Under the ſame form of government there may be good reaſons for appointing a general in one way, and a judge in another.

adjuſted to the different forms of government.

Chap. 16.

Of the judiciary power.

Of the three portions of the ſovereignty above mentioned, the legiſlative, the executive, and the judiciary, the laſt only remains to be treated. The varieties of courts of juſtice are limited by the different modes in which they may be conſti-

15 tuted;

tuted; the qualities of the members of whom they may be compofed; and the various kinds of caufes which they are empowered to determine. Judges may, like other magiftrates, be appointed by fuffrage, or by lot; from all the citizens indifcriminately, or from perfons of a certain defcription only; but the different nature of the caufes which they are empowered to determine, forms the fpecific diftinction among courts of juftice. Thefe caufes may all be reduced to the eight following claffes: 1. The refponfibility of magiftrates; for in every government not arbitrary, there muft be a court of impeachment. 2. Acts of injuftice refpecting the property of the community, whether committed by magiftrates or private perfons. 3. All acts, by whomever committed, which have a tendency to fubvert or change the conftitution. 4. All matters relating to fines and amercements. 5. Difputes concerning contracts of a certain importance, or concerning objects exceeding a certain value. 6. All caufes concerning homicide, including under that general name, malice propenfe, chance-medley, and all the various cafes in which the life of a man is acknowledged to have been taken away, but the criminality of the act is the matter in queftion. The court of Phreattæ in Athens tries perfons who, having fled for murder, have returned to their country; which caufes, however, cannot prove fo numerous as to require a feparate jurifdiction, even in large communities. 7. The caufes of ftrangers, whether among themfelves or between ftrangers and citizens, form the feventh clafs. 8. The eighth includes pecuniary queftions of fmall amount, five drachmas, or a little more, which muft indeed be determined, but which ought not to occupy the attention of a numerous tribunal.

Judicial proceedings reduced to eight kinds.

How inferior courts are formed, is not always a matter of the moſt eſſential importance; but unleſs thoſe ſupreme judicatures be well regulated, which decide great political queſtions, and aſcertain men's rights in ſociety, confuſion and ſedition will enſue.

The various ways in which courts of judicature may be conſtituted.

Such courts may be conſtituted from the citizens at large, appointed by lot or ſuffrage, to judge of all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, and in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by ſuffrage, and partly by lot. There are, therefore, four ways in which the judges may be appointed from all the citizens collectively; and there are preciſely as many when courts are conſtituted from all the citizens, not collectively, but ſucceſſively; that is, when each diviſion of the people enjoys in its turn the privilege of ſupplying the country with judges. Again, if the judges are to be appointed from men of a certain deſcription only, courts may, on this ſuppoſition alſo, be conſtituted in four ways. For men of this decription, diſtinguiſhed by wealth, birth, or merit, may be appointed by lot or ſuffrage to try all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by lot and partly by ſuffrage. There appears, therefore, to be in all twelve modes of forming judiciary aſſemblies, without coupling together the whole and the part; that is, without ſuppoſing that ſome courts are formed from the whole citizens collectively or ſucceſſively, and others compoſed of men of a certain deſcription only; or that the

numbers

numbers of the fame courts are chofen partly from the citizens at large, and partly from men of diftinction.

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Adjufted to the different forms of government.

That all political or public caufes fhould be determined by judges chofen from the people at large, is agreeable to the nature of democracy; that all fuch caufes fhould be determined by men of a certain defcription, is agreeable to the nature of oligarchy; but that fome courts fhould be formed from the citizens at large, and others from a diftinguifhed portion of the citizens; or that the members of the fame court fhould be appointed, fome of them from the whole body of the people, and others from a diftinguifhed part of the people; fome of them by lot, and others by fuffrage; all thefe mixtures and combinations are agreeable to the nature of a juftly conftituted and fairly balanced republic.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VII.*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Seventh Book treats of political revolutions, whether ſlow and gradual, or rapid and violent; whether originating in the nature of civil ſociety itſelf, or reſulting from the form and principle of different conſtitutions of government. Had the author written with the expreſs deſign of benefiting the preſent age, this part of his work could not be more uſeful or more ſeaſonable. Even a more ſerious attention is due to it, than to any thing which the preſent times could poſſibly produce; ſince at this momentous æra, when the nations which have overturned their own governments, are continually exhorting and encouraging neighbouring ſtates to imitate their example, we here find the opinions of the wiſeſt man of antiquity on the great and awful queſtions which now agitate the world: the opinions of an author remote from our concerns, unmoved by our paſſions, unaffected by our intereſts. On this ſerious ſubject, therefore, which now more than at any other period in modern hiſtory, comes home to the buſineſs and boſoms of individuals, I need not be greatly apprehenſive of tiring the reader, when I endeavour to place in a clear and ſtrong

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* Commonly publiſhed as Book V.

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ftrong light, thofe obfervations of the Stagirite which feem beft calculated to anfwer the immediate purpofe of public and prefent utility.

From the nature of fociety, which, as above explained, is not a mere mafs but a fyftem, implying a diftinction and fubordination of parts; and ftill more palpably, though not more neceffarily, from the nature of property, the creature of fociety; which in its very effence implies inequality, there muft grow up and co-exift, with every community of men, whatever be the form of the commonwealth, a popular and an ariftocratical intereft [a]; and thence, not indeed a perpetual conflict, but a perpetual tendency to conflict, between the rights and privileges of the many, and the pre-eminences and prerogatives of the few. This fermenting difcontent may be hindered from blazing into fedition, either by force or by art. All ranks may be levelled by the cruel hand of defpotifm; they may all be confounded by the wild rage of democracy. But thefe are remedies which cure the evil only by killing the patient. The important queftion is, how this tendency to diffenfion may be repreffed, without deftroying that degree of independence or fecurity which is effential to happinefs, or that degree of power and authority which is effential to humanity itfelf; fince indifpenfably neceffary in rearing and holding together the fabric of political fociety, in which all the perfections of humanity originate, and in which only their energies can be unfolded and difplayed [b].

The

[a] In fome of the Italian republics of the middle age, the people deftroyed the nobles; but the diftinction immediately fprang up between "il popolo graffo & il populo minuto;" and faction, inftead of being foftened, was thereby exafperated. Machiavel, Nerli, Malavolti, paffim.

[b] See above, p. 21, & feq.

The propofed queftion Ariftotle endeavours to anfwer. He obferves that the evil moft threatening to fociety, may be leffened by fkilful political arrangement, nicely adapting to each other the principles and fprings of government; but that it never can be eradicated unlefs one portion of mankind are fo trained and educated that they will difdain to commit injuftice, and think themfelves more degraded by offering an infult, than even by receiving it; while thofe of an inferior ftamp, how much inclined foever many of them may be to do wrong, are convinced that it cannot be done with impunity, and that they cannot hurt their fuperiors, without thereby more materially hurting their families and themfelves [c]. In an age expofed like the prefent to the conflict of oppofite and unrelenting factions, the Stagirite, therefore, maintained that oligarchies, ariftocracies, and every defcription of government vefted in the few, can only be upheld by moderation in language as well as in behaviour; and that a fingle word of contumely had fometimes fhaken the proudeft *dynafties* [d]. He maintained, that popular governments on the other hand, could reft fecurely on no other foundation than that of political juftice; which confifts in diftributing to each individual his due, and in affigning to wealth and birth as well as to talents and virtues, their legitimate diftinctions and fair honours. While he thus endeavours to moderate the hoftility of contending extremes, and to fmooth their mutual afperities, he ftrenuoufly exerts himfelf to make the middle claffes of men love and cherifh their condition as the very beft and happieft in which they poffibly could be placed; and, therefore, to reject and repel every attempt that might difturb or deftroy it, as a daring invafion of their

[c] Book ii. c. vii. paffim. [d] See above, p. 288.

BOOK VII. their deareſt intereſts. Governments are good and nations happy, in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppreſſion of the great, as well as to reſiſt the rapacity and malignity of the vulgar. Where this grand teſt of national felicity is found, the citizens or ſubjects ought to regard as matters of little moment, and even to conſider with diſtruſt, any propoſed additions to their political advantages; which it will be always eaſier for vice and folly to deſtroy or diminiſh, than for the moſt enlarged wiſdom to meliorate or extend[e].

Governments muſt always have their imperfections, while conducted by ſuch imperfect creatures as men, whoſe nature it is to beſtow an undue preference on the preſent above the future, and on a ſlight immediate benefit reſulting to themſelves above a far greater, more extenſive, and more permanent advantage accruing to the public. All governments, therefore, that ever were eſtabliſhed or deviſed, have contained, on the ſlighteſt examination, innumerable inconveniences; which when deeply and intimately mingled in the nature of the conſtitution itſelf, ought rather to be patiently endured than violently corrected[f], becauſe they are as much more tolerable than would be the evils of anarchy and ſedition, as a ſtate of civilization in which men lie under many oppreſſive reſtraints, is preferable to that of ſavage ferocity in which they are continually tearing to pieces each other; a melancholy ſpectacle which hiſtory never fails to exhibit, when government is for a moment ſuſpended, or its powers to a certain degree enfeebled. The inherent vices of man, his pride, avarice, ambition, and ſelfiſhneſs, render it neceſſary that power ſhould ſomewhere be exerciſed, leſt injury ſhould every where be committed; and the fewer

and

[e] See above, Book iv. c. xi.

[f] See above, Book ii. c. vi. p. 101, & ſeq.

and feebler thofe vices are, the government will naturally be the milder and more moderate. All plans of policy which fuppofe a complete reformation in the manners of mankind, are chimerical; but reformation to a certain point, falutary difcipline will gradually produce; and exactly in proportion to the effect of this difcipline, governments may be meliorated, and one fyftem of policy be rendered more gentle and more defireable than another [c]. For this reafon our author obferves, that the more fociety is improved and education perfected, the more equality will prevail, and the farther will liberty be extended.

But even this political equality or liberty has, according to the Stagirite, its fixed and unalterable limits; fince no political advantage, except the equal protection of juft laws, can be carried to its utmoft height, without becoming inconfiftent with other advantages, collectively more important. Men in one fenfe are born equal; they are all equal as to their vifible powers or *energies*, becaufe they are all at their birth devoid of *any* that can be of the leaft public utility; but they are even then, extremely unequal as to their latent endowments or *capacities*; fince, with precifely the fame treatment and the fame education, different individuals will attain very different meafures of courage and wifdom, as well as of ftrength and agility. This original inequality is confirmed and ftrengthened by the exigencies and neceffities of fociety, under all its poffible forms; which, the more perfect it is, the more perfectly it will concur with the views and intentions of nature in promoting the benefit and happinefs of the human race; purpofes that can only be promoted by

[c] αιει δε το βελτιϛον ηθος, βελτιονος αιτιον πολιτειας. Polit. l. viii. c. i.

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by the fubordination of paffion and ignorance to reafon and wifdom. This is the great and paramount law of political fociety by which all men are bound from infancy to old age, and from their birth to their death [d]. Society then is a fyftem, having the good and perfection of humanity for its end, and requiring for the fpecific purpofes for which the fyftem is ordained, an interchange of action, a reciprocity of aid, a diftinction and fubordination of parts; heads to contrive, and hands to execute. For this reafon, the inferior ranks of men, thofe habitually employed in perfonal fervice or productive induftry, were debarred in moft Grecian republics from high political functions; functions deemed incompatible with thofe mean and mercenary employments, that have a tendency to narrow or debafe the faculties; to obftruct liberal thought, and reftrain manly exertion. What is properly called the populace in contradiftinction to the people at large, then confifted almoft entirely of flaves; a palpable and odious deformity in the ancient republics; fince a great proportion of mankind was thus fubjected to a government, not of law, but of arbitrary will [e]. Yet perfect equality and univerfal fuffrage are arrangements not lefs blameable or lefs dangerous; fince, as our author perpetually inculcates, thefe wild projects would totally fubvert the principles on which fociety is built, and overturn

[d] "A natural ariftocracy is diffufed by God through the whole body of mankind." Harrington's Oceana, p. 14. edit. 1656. "An army may as well confift of foldiers without officers, as a commonwealth confift of a people without a gentry." Ibid. Yet Harrington, furely, was not a man of a flavifh mind. How far have the profeffed followers of Locke, the Rouffeaus, the Turgots, the Prices, &c. outdone the enlightened friends of liberty in former ages!

[e] See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 32. The Grecian inftitutions, as I have there fhewn, tended to palliate, but certainly did not cure the evil.

overturn the great fundamental law on which only it can reft. BOOK VII.

Innumerable examples might be given of the fame kind, all confpiring to prove that an ambition to reach perfection in one point of advantage, is deftructive of other advantages not lefs effential. An experiment has been made in our own times of forming a fimple legiflature; or, in other words, of confiding what is called by Greek writers the deliberative power of government to one fingle affembly. This experiment ftands in direct oppofition to the recorded wifdom of antiquity, which maintained that two deliberative affemblies were effentially neceffary in every well-regulated ftate, becaufe abfurd and ruinous refolutions were much lefs likely to be taken by two different bodies of men deliberating concerning the fame object, than by one body of men only; whether a fenate of the nobles, or an affembly of the people. If we fuppofe it to be ten to one, that fuch an extraordinary combination of circumftances fhould occur, as might extort from one of thofe courts or affemblies a decree ruinous to the ftate, or to any part of it, the rules of calculation will teach us, that it is not twenty, but an hundred to one, that the fame decree fhould at the fame time be confirmed by the fecond court or affembly, differently compofed, and differently conftituted. For the fafety of the public, therefore, two deliberative bodies are always better than one; and according to the fame principle of reafoning, three would be ftill better than two, and four better than three. But it is eafy to perceive that though the purpofe of mature deliberation would thus be more perfectly fecured by the multiplication of courts and affemblies, the great end of feafonable and wife decifion would not thereby the more probably be attained; but on the contrary, through

 delays

BOOK VII. delays and diffenfions, would commonly be entirely defeated. From this plain and palpable example, we may learn to perceive with our author that, in matters of far more difficulty and delicacy, political wifdom confifts in avoiding extremes. He continually inculcates and repeats, that the propriety of practical things lies not in an indivifible point, but in a broad middle; that in them nice accuracy is not to be aimed at; but that we muft be contented in politics with fuch a degree of perfection as fuits the coarfenefs of the fubject; nor prepofteroufly forego, by over-refinement in one point of advantage, other advantages ftill more folid; relinquifh certainty for hope; or incur the danger of real evil for the fake of imaginary improvement.

Of all political errors (an error long prevalent in the practice as as well as in the theory of the Greek republics) the greateft is that of thinking that the inftitutions of one people may be fafely communicated to another, differently endowed and differently circumftanced. Men are no where to be found unwritten tablets. Their minds are deeply impreffed by education and habit, as well as by the events of time and chance, which giving to each nation its diftinctive character, peculiarly adapt it to that form of political arrangement into which it has been gradually moulded. The eftablifhing of governments is the work of time; and to new-model them fuccefsfully and happily, requires ftill more time than originally to eftablifh them; becaufe laws operate as practical principles of moral conduct, and old principles muft be obliterated by time and cuftom, before the new can by the fame means be communicated and impreffed. Men deftitute of principles are the moft odious and moft abominable of favages; and practical principles are to be acquired by practice only; they are

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the refult of repeated acts, fortified by time and familiarifed by cuftom. Yet in direct oppofition to thefe maxims of reafon, confirmed by univerfal experience, we have feen the revolutionary doctrines which prevailed in the worft times of Greece, revived in the prefent age; and a fingle nation propofing in a tone of authority the inftitutions, which fhe herfelf has thought fit to adopt, to all the countries around her; and, in her eagernefs not only to diffufe her political principles as extenfively as the world, but to reduce them every where to practice, ftriving, with the cruel tyranny of Procruftes, to fit the body of each captive traveller to her murderous and torturing bed. BOOK VII.

When Ariftotle oppofes innovation, however, it is not on coarfe popular arguments: he does not appeal merely to our feelings; he does not addrefs our *prejudices*; he does not attempt to excite a fuperftitious veneration for antiquity. To prefer what is ancient, merely becaufe it is ancient, and to deduce the expediency of our laws and cuftoms merely from the practice of our remote anceftors, he well knew, was to appeal to the imagination and paffions, in a cafe that ought to be decided by the fole authority of reafon. In various parts of his works, and not leaft in his book on political revolutions, he powerfully interefts the heart; but he always endeavours to reach it by the road of the underftanding: nor did it ever occur to his difcernment, that any thing could be prudently faid to the feelings of the former, which might not bear to be examined by the light of the latter. With him, mere feeling was but a part of the low animal nature, a part which in brutes is directed to its proper ends by an intelligence not their own; but which in man muft, according to the ordinance of Deity itfelf, be directed and difciplined by reafon and cuftom, that it may thus be

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ftrengthened into habit and exalted into virtue; for, in the language of ancient philofophy, virtue, as the attribute of a man, is fynonymous with habit. In every well-regulated ftate, early inftitution is the great forming and vivifying power of government; and that which education begins, the law carries on and perfects [f]. They are both practical principles, and right

[f] Ariftotle places the ftability of government chiefly in the three following points: firft, the refpect due to age and experience; fecondly, the diftribution of honours and offices according to evident and approved merit; thirdly, an education accurately adapted to the pattern of the commonwealth. Were we to examine the hiftory of all the governments on earth, we fhould perceive that they have been upheld by an adherence to thofe grand principles, and fubverted by a departure from them. I fhall felect, for the fake of illuftration, the examples of China and France; the former of which is rendered familiar to the reader's mind by a recent publication, and the latter is impreffed by the momentous events and unexampled calamities which mark the prefent times. In China, the paternal authority is the main pillar of the political edifice; all offices are beftowed, according to the proficiency of the candidates in ufeful knowledge, by comparative trials, fimilar to thofe by which academic honours were formerly conferred in Europe; and the education of youth is fo accurately fitted to the plan of the government, that the education in China exactly fuits that country, and it only. The confequence of all this is plainly attefted in hiftory: the conftitution of China has been, and continues, the moft invariably ftable of any known in the world. The conftitution of France, on the other hand, has been completely fubverted in the courfe of a few years. What are the caufes? The veneration for aged experience had ceafed; intrigue fupplied the place of merit; and the principles inftilled into youth, and into the public at large, directly counteracted the fpirit of the government. The minifters of Louis XV. are known to have fet the firft example in France of beftowing the higheft dignities of the church on young gentlemen of family; thus degrading thofe facred honours which Ariftotle maintains ought to be the exclufive reward of venerable age; from which chiefly they derive their awful influence over the minds of men. Their ambition, and that of their fucceffors under a new reign, rendered them the armed abettors of American independence. Reafons were to be found for juftifying a meafure in direct oppofition to the laws of nations and the faith of treaties. Thefe reafons were only to be deduced from that principle, fruitful in monfters, the unalienable fovereignty of the people; which was, therefore, now firft adopted in France; cherifhed, invigorated, and propagated with a degree of zeal and activity which eftablifhed

right only, when originating in a right practice; by means of which, combined with example and exercife, they operate an early and wonderful change on the paffions and appetites; fo that as reafon fortifies and improves, thefe fubordinate powers of our nature are continually more difpofed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the fweeteft harmony. To alter laws and political inftitutions without the moft evident neceffity, is, therefore, wantonly to tamper with the fpring of moral action; to weaken or deftroy that principle in man, on which the perfuafive efficacy of all laws is founded; from which governments derive their ftrength; and individuals, their fecurity.

In oppofition to the tenets which have been fo induftrioufly propagated in fome modern nations, Ariftotle, while he inhabited the freeft and moft democratical republic of all antiquity, maintained that, from a due mixture of ariftocratic elements, the fabric of political fociety derives both its folidity and its fplendour. The very popular doctrine, therefore, which maintains that all power is derived from the people [g], to the majority of

blifhed a democracy in the public mind, even during the exiftence of the monarchy. The diforders of the finances were the immediate occafion, not the ultimate caufe, of the revolution. The notables, and afterwards the ftates general, had only to affemble in order to prove by their conduct that opinion governs the world.

[g] According to Dr. Price, liberty is "The power of a civil fociety to govern itfelf by its own difcretion, or by laws of its own making, by the majority, in a collective body, or by fair reprefentation. In every free ftate every man is his own legiflator." Price on Civil Liberty. This definition contains the effence of Locke on government, and of its French tranfcript, the "Contrat Social." Locke, I firmly believe, was a religious man, and a good fubject; yet, by a ftrange combination of circumftances, the philofophical opinions of this great adverfary of Ariftotle, have had no fmall tendency to promote fcepticifm, and his political principles to encourage rebellion.

of whom it unalienably belongs, and by whom it may always lawfully be refumed, muft have appeared to him not lefs wicked than it is weak, not lefs deteftable than it is extravagant; efpecially, could he have forefeen that many of the authors who fupported this wild affertion, fhould have exerted themfelves moft ftrenuoufly to deftroy all reverence for thofe inftitutions, which, while they enlarge the wifdom and exalt the affections of the few, have the moft direct tendency to reftrain the vices and to moderate the paffions of the multitude. What renders Rouffeau of Geneva, and other writers of that ftamp, fo hoftile to Chriftianity? They tell us that it commands fubmiffion to the higher powers; and is, therefore, a religion fit only for flaves [h]. But an author, not inferior to Rouffeau in vigour of fancy, incomparably his fuperior in point of learning and judgment, and a far better advocate in the caufe of true liberty, had long before proved that the pretended flavifhnefs of Chriftianity amounts to nothing more than lending its awful fanction to fupport eftablifhed magiftracy, and uphold lawful authority [i]. In this particular, Chriftianity commands what philofophy had uniformly prefcribed; maintaining that obedience to authority is effential to humanity, fince the powers of human nature cannot be unfolded but in a ftate of fociety; and fince, without government, fociety could not for a moment be fecurely preferved, any more than it could, without government, have been originally eftablifhed. Upon this foundation, the Stagirite afferts that birth and wealth, as well as talents, morals, and experience, ought to have their due weight in every community which has the good of the whole for its main object, and that every prin-

ciple

[h] Contrat Social, l. iv. c. viii.

[i] Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. lxiii. lxiv. & lxv.

ciple which tends to maintain a reaſonable and moderate ariſtocracy, ought to be improved and cheriſhed, in order to counteract that dangerous propenſity to ſedition and anarchy, which, wherever they prevail, render the habitations of men more bloody and more abominable than the dens of wild beaſts [k].

As a due proportion of ariſtocratic elements is eſſential to the very exiſtence of a commonwealth, it is a queſtion of the utmoſt importance how that ariſtocracy ought to be conſtituted? When ſuperiority in wealth is accompanied by ſuperiority in worth, which will naturally happen when the higher ranks are more watchfully and more liberally educated, in proportion to the extent of their fortunes, the plain and palpable diſtinction of opulence will then, doubtleſs, be entitled to a certain degree of political pre-eminence. The evil is, when the reſpect either for wealth, or for birth, which is recommended chiefly as hereditary wealth, gives to ſuch diſtinctions, independently of the education and manners with which they ought to be accompanied, too decided and too overbearing a ſuperiority; and when the ariſtocracy is thereby ſo much narrowed, that its intereſts are detached and ſeparated from thoſe of the community at large. The worſt ſpecies of ariſtocracy degenerates into what Ariſtotle calls a *dynaſty*; the abſolute power of fierce and arbitrary chieftains over timid and ſervile vaſſals. When power is not an appendage of the perſon or the individual, but belongs to the whole body of nobles, who ſerve mutually to check

[k] απειρος γαρ ἡ της επιθυμιας φυσις, ἧς προς την αναπληρωσιν οἱ πολλοι ζωσι. "How is this univerſal evil, the ſenſeleſs deſires and dangerous propenſities of the multitude, to be controlled?" αν ηττους τε ωσι, και μη αδικωνται. "By the weight of authority, and the equity with which it is adminiſtered." Polit. l. ii. c. vii. p. 324.

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check and controul each other, the government, by a proper degree of moderation in the magiftrate, may be rendered fafe and falutary, and the object even of affection to the fubject [l]. But the beft adjuftment of thofe ariftocratical elements is that by which they are rendered fubfervient to the interefts of the community at large; productive of its profperity, and conducive to its ftability. Ariftotle has endeavoured to fhew how thefe defirable ends were attained in fome governments of antiquity. But the moft illuftrious example of this kind which the hiftory of the world ever exhibited, is the ariftocratical arrangement in the conftitution of Great Britain. The nobles of this country are not invefted individually with any degree of pre-eminence or authority that can be at all dangerous to the meaneft of the people, fince all executive power flows folely from the crown, and is exercifed by refponfible minifters; a king of Great Britain being conftitutionally, in the words of the Stagirite, "a public guardian; and his high office, a pledge and fecurity that the nobles fhall not be fubjected to injuftice, nor the people to infult [m]." The peers, taken collectively, form a fecond deliberative

[l] This obfervation is ftrongly confirmed by the hiftory of the two ariftocracies of Venice and Bern, the former (till its late deftruction) comprehending the moft beautiful and beft cultivated territory in the north of Italy, and the latter extending over the third part of Switzerland. Under both thefe governments, the fubjects have long enjoyed an enviable condition of peace and profperity; happy in themfelves, and therefore contented with their mafters. But it would be an error to believe that thofe republican inftitutions which fuit a certain mediocrity of circumftances, might be fafely adopted by great nations.

[m] Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 403. That the majefty of the throne is the beft fafeguard of equal laws and public liberty, is a truth perpetually attefted in the annals of modern Europe. The people at large, whenever they had an opportunity of declaring their fentiments freely and fully, uniformly maintained the authority of their kings againft the arrogant pretenfions of priefts and nobles, and the daring invafion of upftart factions.

berative affembly, which was formerly proved to be an inftitution effentially requifite in every well-regulated ftate. They conftitute alfo the propereft tribunal that could poffibly be devifed for trying perfons impeached by the Commons. A feat in the Houfe of Peers is naturally and not unfrequently the reward of important fervices and illuftrious merit; and muft, therefore, continue to operate in the commonwealth as a perpetual incentive to emulation, and an unceafing fpring of energy. With all the privileges and advantages peculiar to that order, the peers are entitled even to refpect only when they exhibit characters fuitable to their rank. They dare not oppreſs; they dare not injure; they cannot infult with impunity the meaneft of their fellow-fubjects. They are intimately united in their moft effential interefts with the other branches of the conftitution. They cannot, confiftently with their own fafety, co-operate

factions. The nations of the north and of the fouth on every occafion difcovered the fame difpofition, and preferred even the abfolute power of a prince to the more dreaded exertions of a divided authority. To the deputies of the people at large, affembled not as ufual at Odenfee, but in the midft of the populace of Copenhagen, the kings of Denmark owe the prerogatives which they have enjoyed fince 1660. The crown of Sweden, which had been trampled on by the nobles in 1756, was reftored to its ancient fplendour by the co-operation of the burghers and peafants in 1772. If we examine the hiftory of the cortes of Spain, the ftates general of France, the diets of Germany, we fhall fee in all thofe affemblies alike, that the Tiers Etat, the deputies of the people, were the moft ftedfaft adherents to the fovereignty of kings*; and in England, when monarchy was overthrown by a combination of knavery and fanaticifm, it was re-eftablifhed with more general confent than was, perhaps, ever given to any public act by fo great and populous a nation.

* In the tumultuary ftates of 1614, the deputies of the people defended againft the nobles and clergy the authority of an undivided executive. "Que l'autorité du roi foit et demeure abfolue fur tous fes fujets de quelque profeffion qu'ils foient; & foit ce tenu pour loi fondamentale du royaume que la perfonne du roi eft fainte et inviolable, auquel eft due toute obeiffance et fidelité, fans qu'il foit loifible à aucun de fes fujets, de quelque qualité et condition qu'il foit, ecclefiaftique ou feculier, de s'en exempter."

operate with thofe leaders of the people who might be inclined to inftitute a republic; becaufe their own honours and pre-eminences originating in the monarchy, can only be upheld by its ftability; they could not abet the meafures of thofe courtiers or minifters (were it poffible to find any of fuch confummate folly) who might be inclined to render the crown abfolute; becaufe they would thereby not only furrender the birthrights of their own children, but totally degrade and debafe themfelves. Their lives, and liberties, and properties, are maintained by the fame falutary inftitutions, which guard thofe of the people at large. Compared with this ineftimable benefit of juft and equal laws, how light in the balance are their pre-eminences, their diftinctions, and their titles? The conftitution of England has taken for its model Nature herfelf; and in afferting the exclufive privileges of the few, offers to the enjoyment of all, great and abfolute benefits, before the fplendour of which perfonal and relative advantages fade away and vanifh.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Caufes of feditions.—Infolence and rapacity of men in power.—Secret combination of obfcure factions, &c.—Particular caufes in each form of government refpectively.—How governments are to be preferved—By ftrengthening the middle ranks, &c.—Of laws relative to Democracy—Oligarchy—Monarchy—Tyranny.

BOOK VII. Chap. 1.

Of the primary caufes, or fountains, of fedition.

HAVING confidered almoft all the other queftions that formed the object of this inquiry, we proceed to examine the important fubject of political revolutions; their nature and number; their caufes and their confequences: an examination which will enable us to determine by what regulations and expedients, government in general, as well as each form of government in particular, may be ftrengthened and upheld. Juftice, the great law of the moral world, is acknowledged in all communities; but diffentions, and thence revolutions, take place, becaufe the rules of juftice are often eftimated by very different ftandards. The citizens at large, becaufe they are all equal in freedom, think themfelves entitled equally to participate in all other advantages; the diftinguifhed portion of the community, becaufe they are fuperior in fome particulars, think themfelves entitled to claim pre-eminence in all other refpects;

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refpects; and as it is difficult for any fyftem of government to gratify the expectations of the rich or noble, on the one hand, and thofe of the people at large on the other; the feeds of difcontent lurk in the bofom of every community, and require but a favourable feafon to ferment into fedition. Birth, wealth, ftrength, and every fuch political element, ftrives to extend its influence, and to enlarge its dominion; and when checked in its ambitious purpofes, is prepared to convulfe the ftate. Virtue alone remains contented with the place allotted to it in the general arrangement, and though contributing more to the happinefs of civil life than all its other elements united, yet virtue never emblazons its titles, nor exaggerates its prerogatives; it neither plans confpiracies, nor foments factions; and in this forbearance, it fhews as much wifdom as goodnefs, for the virtuous are comparatively fo few in number, that fhould they imprudently enter the political lifts, their party would be foiled in every conflict.

The general object and aim of revolutions.

Such then are the principles, and, as it were, the fountains of fedition; of which the object may be, either to fubvert eftablifhed government, or to acquire the principal fhare in adminiftration; to change monarchy or ariftocracy, into a republic or a democracy; or to incline the balance of power, more than the conftitution warrants, to the fide of the prince, of the nobles, or of the people; to alter or abolifh fome particular magiftracy, as Lyfander, at Sparta, endeavoured to deftroy the office of king; and Paufanias, in the fame republic, ftrove to abolifh the authority of the Ephori. At Epidamnus[u], the power

[u] Epidamnus, an Illyrian city, and one of the moft confiderable fea-ports on the coaft of the Hadriatic. See Hiftory of Antient Greece, vol. ii. p. 185.

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power belonging to the heads of tribes was transferred to a fenate. The government was thus partially altered [o].

The beft means of preventing them.

In all political conflicts, the contending factions alternately appeal to juftice; but the one party, as we obferved before, meafures juftice by an arithmetical, and the other by a geometrical ftandard[p]; whereas, in fact, it ought to be regulated by both; and fuch governments as equitably combine arithmetical and geometrical proportion into one compound political ratio, can alone expect to be profperous or ftable. Regard ought, therefore, to be had to pre-eminent advantages peculiar to the few; regard ought, alfo, to be had to ordinary but ufeful qualities, common to all; yet, in the great partnerfhip of a commonwealth, if men's fhares are to be apportioned by one fingle ratio only, that of equality, in point of fafety, is preferable[q]; for in democracies, there is but one principle of difcord, the jarring interefts of the many and of the few; but in oligarchies, the few not only maintain a perpetual conflict with the many, but frequently quarrel with each other; whereas, the diffentions of the people, among themfelves, are comparatively flight and inconfiderable. Befides, a democracy is nearer to what we have called a republic, or government refiding chiefly in men of the middle rank; which, of all popular conftitutions, is the beft and fafeft.

Chap. 2.

In political revolutions three things to be confidered.

In examining the nature of political revolutions, we have to confider the fituation of mind or difpofition of thofe who are diffatisfied

[o] The next fentences have a reference to fimilar changes in Athens; but the text is imperfect and corrupt.

[p] See what is above faid of arithmetical and geometrical proportion, vol. i. B. v. c. vii. p. 264.

[q] The author here prefers democracy to an oligarchic dynafty, as explained above, B. vi. c. vii. p. 291. But every people are not fit for living under the former government, " fince, wherein fome favage multitudes differ from wild beafts, is not eafy to point out." See above, B. iii, c. vii. p. 184.

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diffatisfied with the exifting government; the caufes which excite this diffatisfaction; and the various felfifh paffions of which the meaneft, when fully roufed, is fufficient to inflame difcontent into fedition. Men who think themfelves worthy of being treated as equals, will not contentedly fubmit to be treated as inferiors; and men who think themfelves entitled to pre-eminence, will not contentedly brook equality. The fituation of men's minds, therefore, which fits them for attempting revolutions, is a conception, well or ill founded, that they are deprived of their due rank in the commonwealth. This rank is a complex object, and refolves itfelf into profit and honour. Men, therefore, are tempted to fedition by a defire to increafe thefe objects, and to diminifh their contraries; to increafe their profits and honours; or, on the other hand, to prevent lofs and avoid difgrace. They are tempted to fedition, not merely that they may enrich or aggrandife themfelves, but becaufe they fee other men unjuftly enriched, and unjuftly aggrandifed; and, oftentimes, the moft folid merit offends by the glare of too confpicuous a profperity. The ordinary fources of fedition then are, infolence, contempt, fear, difproportionate increafe, and immoderate elevation. Impelled by fuch caufes, men fly to arms, and fuddenly fubvert the government. The fame event happens as furely, but more flowly, through the combination of obfcure factions [r]; through negligence in the magiftrates, particularly in difregarding the effect of fmall alterations; and

Of the caufes of difcontent incident to all governments.

[r] Of this there is a ftriking example in the following paffage of Livy, l. ix. c. 46. "Eodem anno (fcil. U. C. 449.) Cn. Flavius Cn. filius, fcriba, patre libertino, humili fortuna ortus, ceterùm callidus vir et facundus, ædilis curulis fuit. Ceterùm Flavium dixerat ædilem forenfis factio, Appii Claudii cenfura vires nacta'; qui fenatum primus, libertinorum filiis lectis, inquinàverat: et poftquam eam lectionem nemo ratam habuit, nec in curia adeptus erat quas petierat, opes urbanas, humilibus per omnes tribus divifis, forum et campum corrupit. Ex eo tempore in duas partes difceffit

and through a variety of differences and incongruities, particularly a moral diffimilitude in the citizens.

That the infolence, the rapacity, and the invidious honours of men in power, are, all of them, caufes of fedition, is too obvious to require illuftration. Refentment is eafily transferred from perfons to things. In odious hands, authority itfelf becomes hateful: and the feelings of mankind confpire with their reafon, to deftroy a government pregnant only with mifchief, difgraced by private injuftice, or deformed by public peculation. The undue influence of one man, or of a few, and their elevation towering too high above the level of the community, converts free governments fometimes into monarchies, and fometimes into *dynafties*, the worft fpecies of oligarchy. To prevent fuch fatal revolutions, the Argives and Athenians have recourfe to the oftracifm. But it is better to reprefs the firft fymptoms of immoderate elevation, than to counteract its tendency by a remedy as cruel as it is violent; a political amputation, which fevers from the commonwealth thofe qualified to form its beft defence and higheft ornament.

The infolence and rapacity of men in power.

Fear operates in two ways as a caufe of fedition; fince thofe who dread to fuffer wrong, will attempt to difarm the oppreffor;

Fear, its twofold operation as a caufe of fedition.

difceffit civitas: aliud, integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum, aliud, forenfis factio tenebat." This unfortunate divifion of the city, fomented by Appius, a proud ariftocrat, and by Flavius, a plebeian notary, gave to the rabble of the Forum a decided advantage over the found and refpectable part of the community. The former party fupplied by experience and trick, their grofs defects in point of fortune, morals, and liberal education. Their triumph, however, was not lafting. The illuftrious Q. Fabius, who, from this atchievement, acquired the name of Maximus, purged the commonwealth from this excrement, which he threw into "four city tribes." Omnem forenfem turbam excretam in quatuor tribus conjecit, urbanafque eas apellavit. Tit. Liv. ubi fupra.

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Contempt, its operation illuftrated by examples.

oppreffor; and thofe who have committed wrong, will attempt to anticipate the hand of vengeance. Contempt converts oligarchies into democracies, when the ftrength of the many is brought into comparifon with the weaknefs of the few; and the fame paffion fubverts democracies, when the concerted wifdom of the few is contrafted with the folly and anarchy of the multitude. The tumultuous democracy of Megara was deftroyed by its own violence. The fame caufe overturned the popular government of Thebes, after the famous battle in the vineyards. Anarchy fubjected Syracufe to the tyranny of Gelon; and the diforderly behaviour of the Rhodians enabled an ariftocratical confpiracy to feize the government.

The difproportionate increafe of any of the conftituent parts of the commonwealth.

The difproportionate increafe of any of the conftituent parts, is not lefs fatal to the political, than to the natural body; and when any of thefe parts is changed, not only in quantity or bulk, but in organization or form, new governments muft refult, fpecifically different from the old. Such alterations happen fometimes gradually and imperceptibly; at other times, fuddenly and palpably. Soon after the Perfian invafion of Greece, the flower of the Tarentine nobility was cut off in a battle againft the barbarous Iapygians; and this difafter, diminifhing, by a fudden jerk, the weight of the ariftocracy, enabled the people to change the *mixt polity* of Tarentum into a fimple democracy. The overthrow of the Argives by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, compelled them to affociate their peafants to the honours of government. In the Lacedæmonian war, the Athenians were fummoned to take the field in the order of the mufter-roll; and the moft diftinguifhed portion of the citizens thus fuffered a great and fpeedy diminution; which operated the fame effect

on

on the form of government, as would have been produced by a fudden and difproportionate increafe of the populace.

BOOK VII.

The fecret combination of obfcure factions.

Governments change gradually through the fecret combination of obfcure individuals. At Heraca, the ariftocratical mode of appointment to office was changed for one more popular, becaufe a combination of mean mechanics determined to vote for none but perfons of their own level. The higher ranks of men, therefore, preferred the capricious decifion by lot, to the certain partiality of election.

Negligence:

Governments are changed through negligence, when high offices of ftate are entrufted to perfons unfriendly to the conftitution. The oligarchy of Oreum[s] was thus fubverted by Heracleodorus, a partifan of democracy. Great revolutions fometimes arife from flight neglects. At Ambracia[t], the cenfus requifite for a citizen was fmall. It was imprudently reduced to nothing; and the country foon fell into the hands of a houfelefs rabble.

Diffimilitude of manners and character;

Nothing is more unfriendly to public tranquillity than diffimilitude of character in the citizens. A heterogeneous affemblage of mixed tribes, cannot fpeedily coalefce into a nation; and communities, which have grown populous by fudden acceffions, are generally torn by fedition. The Achæans and Træzenians[u], united in colonifing Sybaris; but the Achæans, reinforced by new colonies from home, expelled the Træzenians. The

its effect in producing revolutions illuftrated by examples.

[s] Formerly, Hiftiæa, a city in the ifle of Eubæa. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 389.

[t] A Corinthian colony in the Ambracian gulph, which derived its name from Ambrax, the grandfon of Lacaon. The capital was fituate on the doubtful confines of Thefprotia and Moloffia. Comp. Stephan. Byzant Paufan. Eliac. p. 437. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxviii. c. 4.

[u] Træzené, a city in the territory of Argos.

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The Sybarites who colonifed Thurii, experienced a fimilar misfortune; and claiming fuperiority over their fellow-planters, in virtue of their prior poffeffion of the country, they were driven into banifhment. The new inhabitants of Byzantium were difcovered confpiring againft the old; attacked, defeated, and expelled. The Antiffæans firft received with hofpitality, but afterwards ejected by arms, the Chian exiles; and the exiles of Samos ejected the Zanclæans[x], by whom they had been hofpitably received. Apollonia, on the Euxine, was deformed by domeftic difcord, from the moment that its populoufnefs was increafed by a new colony. After the expulfion of their tyrants, the Syracufans enrolled as citizens, mercenaries and foreigners. Diffenfions and battles enfued. Amphipolis admitted a colony from Chalcis[y]: moft of the original inhabitants were driven into banifhment. So true it is, that every promifcuous multitude cannot be fafhioned into a commonwealth, the formation of which requires materials fkilfully prepared, and muft be the work of time; for the caufes of diffenfion are innumerable. Even the diverfities of local fituations engender parties, and foment faction. At Athens, the inhabitants of the Piræus are diftinguifhed from thofe of the upper city, by their fond admiration for democracy. In the city of Clazomené, the inhabitants of the main land were commonly at variance with

[x] Zanclé, the ancient name of Meffana, now Meffina, derived from the Sicilian word ζαγκλοι, a fcythe or fickle. Steph. Byzant.

[y] The Chalcis in Thrace, which gave name to the Chalcidicé. Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xv. p. 196. The Thracian Chalcis was fo called from its metropolis, the principal city in the ifle of Eubæa, fituate at the narroweft part of the Euripus, where Eubæa is fuppofed by Pliny to have joined the continent of Bœotia. Plin. l. iv. c. 12. This city colonifed the eaftern fhore of Sicily, and was the mother of a new Chalcis, of Naxos, Catana, Leontium, and other Sicilian republics. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. pp. 12, & feq.

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with thofe in the ifland. Localities, equally unimportant, diftracted into parties the citizens of Colophon and of Notium[a].

Even the frivolous quarrels of the great.

In war, the fmalleft ditch or rivulet diforders the ranks, and breaks the phalanx. In politics, every diftinction forms a ground of feparation, and opens a fource of hoftility; and the flighteft differences may occafion the moft important revolutions, when they happen to arife among perfons of weight in the ftate.

Their baneful effects illuftrated by example.

Syracufe was anciently divided into two exafperated factions, in confequence of a frivolous love-quarrel between two young men, who happened to be both in the magiftracy. In the abfence of the one, the other corrupted his miftrefs[b]; the injured man retaliated, by feducing his colleague's wife; and the whole ftate took part with one fide or the other. The difference, flight in itfelf, had this extenfive confequence, becaufe it arofe between perfons in the magiftracy, and thus affected the fource and principle of the government itfelf; and the principle, or beginning, by the trite but juft proverb, is counted "the half of every thing;" fo that a fmall deviation from rectitude at the firft outfet, diverges into a great and even indefinite diftance at the further extremity. Shortly after the Perfian invafion of Greece, the difpute of two brothers, men of note, concerning their father's inheritance, involved Heftiæa in a civil war. The rich fided with the fortunate brother; and the poor took party with him who complained of being deprived of his patrimony; and of the concealment of a large treafure which, he faid, had been found by his father. An ancient quarrel about a marriage occafioned all the feditions that have happened at Delphi to the prefent hour. A bridegroom,

[a] Notium derived its name from νοτος, the fouth, being fituate a few miles to the fouth of Colophon. Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 292.

[b] τον ερωμενον.

groom, terrified by fome unlucky omen, rejected the bride; whofe relations, enraged at this injury, conveyed into his pocket, while he was facrificing, a quantity of the facred money, and then flew him as guilty of facrilege. At Mitylenè, two young women, heireffes, occafioned all the misfortunes of that republic, and the war with the Athenians, in which Paches took the city. The young women were the daughters of Timophanes; Doxander fought them in marriage for his two fons; his demand was flighted; he meditated vengeance, began to cabal at home, and applied to the Athenians, with whom he was allied by hofpitality, and ftimulated them to a war, which proved ruinous to his country. An incident nearly fimilar occafioned the facred war at Phocis. An heirefs was concerned; the authors of the fedition were Mnafias, the father of Mnefon, and Euthycrates, the fon of Onomarchus. A contract of marriage changed the government of Epidamnus. The father of a young woman betrothed, happening to be archon, had occafion to exercife his authority as magiftrate, in fining his intended fon-in-law; the latter, thinking himfelf not only injured but affronted, confpired with thofe diffatisfied with the government, and effected a revolution.

Governments overturned by an alteration of the relative importance of their conftituent parts.

Governments are changed, when the relative importance of their conftituent parts is altered. During the Perfian war, the council of the Areopagus, by the wifdom and firmnefs of its meafures, acquired juft renown; and the merit of this tribunal, compofed of the principal citizens, tended to invigorate the ariftocracy; but foon afterwards, the Athenian feamen, confifting of the loweft rabble [b], having gained the battle of Salamis, and thereby raifed their country to the fovereignty of the fea, increafed the weight of democracy in a far greater proportion.

Examples thereof.

The credit gained by the Argive nobles in the battle of Mantinæa,

[b] See above, B. iv. c. vi. p. 225.

tinæa, and the defeat of the Lacedæmonians, occaſioned the attempt to deſtroy the popular government at Argos. The Syracuſan mariners, having conquered the Athenians, changed, on the other hand, the mixed republic of Syracuſe into a ſimple democracy. The merit of the people of Chalcis, in aſſiſting the nobility of that city to deſtroy Phoxos, the tyrant, procured for them a ſhare in the government. A circumſtance exactly ſimilar converted the oligarchy of Ambracia, after the expulſion of the tyrant Periander, into a democracy. And the obſervation univerſally holds, that whenever any portion of the ſtate, magiſtrates, nobles, or people, has procured for the public ſome ſignal advantage, a foundation will be thereby laid for political commotions, which often terminate in revolutions. For the honours beſtowed on thoſe public benefactors excite jealouſy, and embitter envy; and the benefactors themſelves, elated by their newly-acquired importance, diſdain to reſt ſatiſfied with their hereditary rank and preſcriptive advantages.

General theorem on this ſubject.

Governments, alſo, are univerſally liable to be ſhaken, when parties, animated by principles of mutual hoſtility[c], are nearly equal in ſtrength; when the natural influence of wealth, or of nobility, is reſiſted, for inſtance, by the weight of numbers and the independence of induſtry; for ſhould either the rich or the poor be incomparably more powerful than their adverſaries, the weaker party abandons the ſtruggle in deſpair. For this reaſon, virtue, though the principal element in public happineſs, and therefore juſtly entitled to political pre-eminence, ſeldom however comes forward to aſſert its pretenſions, and to claim its well-earned reward. Virtuous men know how inconſiderable their own party is; they

Governments diſturbed in conſequence of the near equality of hoſtile parties.

[c] Parties are thus animated when there is not a middling claſs between the great and the vulgar to hold the balance between them. See above, B. vi. c. ii. p. 298.

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they feel and acknowledge the irrefiftible ftrength of their opponents.

All revolutions effected by force, or by fraud, or by a mixture of both.

Such then is the general nature of political revolutions. They are produced either by violence, or by fraud, or by the union of both; for, fometimes, what is begun by fraud is ended by force. It was thus that the tyranny of the four hundred was eftablifhed at Athens. The people were firft cheated out of their liberties, by the delufive hope of Perfian fubfidies; and when the deceit was difcovered, the four hundred had recourfe to arms. In this cafe, force was employed as an auxiliary to fraud; but fraud is often fufficient to do the work alone.

Chap. 5.

General caufes of revolutions modified by the nature of each government in particular.

Democracies ruined by the impudence of demagogues.

The caufes of fedition, hitherto enumerated and explained, apply univerfally to all governments; but thefe general caufes are varioufly fubdivided and modified by the nature and form of each government in particular. The impudence of demagogues is the ordinary bane of democracies. By private calumny, and public impeachment, thefe incendiaries exafperate the poor againft the rich; and compel the rich, through their common fears, to unite into an exafperated faction, actuated by oppofite interefts to thofe of the community at large. The refentment of men of property, provoked by the wickednefs of demagogues, overturned the democracy of Cos. In Rhodes, the demagogues profecuted and defrauded the Trierarchs, in order to corrupt the foldiery; the troops, raifed from the promifcuous multitude, were thus feduced and bribed at the expence of thofe who generoufly equipped and maintained the guardian navy of that maritime republic. But the indignation of the Trierarchs mutinied againft this complication of ingratitude and injuftice, deftroyed the demagogues, and overturned the

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the democracy. Heraclæa, ſoon after its populouſneſs was augmented by an Athenian colony, fell a prey to ſedition. The perſecution of demagogues drove moſt families of diſtinction from the place; but the emigrants returned with an armed force, and eſtabliſhed an oligarchy. Revolutions, proceeding from ſimilar cauſes, and exactly ſimilar in their iſſue, happened at Cumæ and at Megara: And it may be regarded as a general theorem in politics, that demagogues are the peſts of democracies, ruin liberty under pretence of preſerving or augmenting it, corrupting the multitude by indulgence, and exaſperating the rich by agrarian laws and the weight of public burdens, till neceſſity compels the latter to reſiſt oppreſſion by force, and to fight in their own defence with courage heightened by deſpair.

Why democracies in ancient times terminated differently from the manner in which they terminate at preſent.

In ancient times, when the talents of the ſtateſman and the general were often cultivated by the ſame man, democracies often ended in tyrannies. The demagogues, equally ſkilled in war and in eloquence, ſupported their arguments by arms, and eked out fraud by force. But ſince rhetoric has become a ſcience of ſuch extent, that none can acquire it in diſtinguiſhed perfection, but thoſe who cultivate it with undivided attention, demagogues have been contented with deceiving the people, and have ſeldom attempted to enſlave them. Tyrannies, beſides, were of old more frequent than now, becauſe it was then uſual to entruſt particular magiſtrates with more extenſive diſcretionary powers, (witneſs the Prytanes of Miletus,) and becauſe, while men lived ſcattered in the country, diligently employed in their huſbandry, cities were leſs populous than at preſent, and therefore leſs capable of reſiſting with concert and activity, the eloquence and artifices of their demagogues, eſpecially when reinforced by military ſkill and martial ſpirit.

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How demagogues deceive the people, and by what means their machinations might be defeated.

The confidence of the multitude, however, was the great engine by which thefe military politicians and politic generals affailed the freedom of their country; and the pledge of this confidence was their hatred and perfecution of opulence and nobility. It was by perfecuting the wealthy Pediaci, that Pififtratus enflaved Athens: Theogenes purfued the fame plan at Megara, and there met with fimilar fuccefs. Dionyfius, by the impeachment of Daphnæus and other rich men, raifed himfelf to the throne of Syracufe. Democracies fink into the loweft degeneracy, when the national affembly is perfuaded to fupplant the authority of laws by the caprice of occafional decrees: This generally happens through the feduction of thofe, whofe ambition to obtain office is too extravagant to yield to any civil duty, and too violent to be checked by any moral obftacle; and who avail themfelves of the confufion and tumult incident to crowded affemblies, to precipitate the heedlefs multitude into the moft ruinous meafures. To prevent or diminifh this evil, it will be expedient to alter the mode of election to magiftracy, and to entruft this power not to the people collectively, but to the various parts or tribes into which the community happens to be divided [a].

Chap. 6.

Caufes of the revolutions in oligarchies.

Infolence or injuftice of the magiftrates.

There are two moft manifeft caufes of revolutions in oligarchies. When the people at large are grofsly injured by men in power, they willingly hearken to and follow any leader of fedition; but this leader is more efpecially dangerous, if he happens to be one of the magiftrates. This was the cafe in Naxos, where Lygdamis, jealous of his colleagues, overturned the oligarchy, and afterwards made himfelf king [b]. When an oligarchy, the name of which denotes that the few govern

[a] See above, B. vi. c. xv. p. 312.

[b] Athenæus, l. viii. p. 348.

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Oligarchies overturned by narrowing their bafe.

govern the many, is ftill further narrowed, fo that magiftracy, inftead of extending by rotation among the general mafs of wealthy and eminent citizens, is confined within the circle of a few families, opulence and eminence will not patiently brook an abfolute exclufion from authority, but will rather convulfe the ftate than fubmit to be debarred from civil honours.

Examples thereof.

In the concentrated oligarchies of Marfeilles, Ifter, and Heraclea, the political edifice was overthrown in confequence of the narrownefs of its bafe. The wealthy citizens of Marfeilles never ceafed plotting againft the government, till all men of a certain cenfus were declared capable of holding offices, not indeed fimultaneoufly, but, as in fome other countries, alternately or fucceffively; that is, firft, the eldeft brother of a family, and then the younger, or if more in number, each in his order. The rigour of oligarchy was thus mitigated at Marfeilles. In Ifter, the oligarchy was changed into a democracy: And at Heraclæa, the power which had formerly been lodged in few hands, was communicated to fix hundred citizens. The diffenfions of the Cnidian nobles, refpecting the limitation of candidates for office, encouraged the people, headed by one of the better fort, to attack and overthrow the oligarchy. In ancient times Erythræ [c] was well and wifely governed by the family of Bafilides, of which the individuals lived in perfect harmony with each other: yet the people difdained to remain fubject to their authority, and to permit thofe honours and offices, which they confidered as the public ftock, to continue the patrimony of a family.

Oligarchies

[c] There were cities of this name in Bœotia, Locris, Libya, and Ionia. That in Ionia was one of the twelve Ionic cities, and founded by Neleus, fon of Codrus. It is now reduced to a miferable village, but ftill called Erethri. See Hift. of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. pp. 101, & feq.

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Oligarchies deftroyed by the flattery of fycophants.

Oligarchies not only perifh by external violence but fuffer, and fometimes fink, under internal diforders; they are not exempted from the peft of demagogues, flattering partifans of tyranny, as the demagogues in democracies are of licentioufnefs, and who, to promote their own views, feduce, inflame, and betray that party in the ftate to whofe interefts they affect to be moft entirely devoted.

Examples thereof.

At Athens, Charicles was the demagogue of the thirty tyrants; and Phrynichus was the demagogue of the arbitrary faction of the four hundred. When perfons by their cenfus capable of office are dependent on the people for their elections, like the ftate guardians of Lariffa and Abydus, thofe who covet preferment frequently have recourfe to the difhoneft arts of feduction and flattery. The fame confequence happens, when the judiciary power is in the hands of the people at large; the nobles are ruined in the courts of juftice, and the oligarchy is thus overturned: this was the fate of the government of Heraclæa [d] on the Euxine. Sometimes an oligarchy is narrowed into a junto; and the party illegally excluded from office, is compelled in its own defence to appeal to the people.

Oligarchies overturned by fpendthrifts, by mercenaries, and by the arrogance of the magiftrates.

Spendthrifts are always promoters of innovation: in oligarchies they ftrive to ufurp tyranny for themfelves, or to procure it for one who will reward their labours. At Syracufe the fpendthrift Hipparinus warmly feconded the views of Dionyfius. The profligate Cleotimus, by the affiftance of a colony from Chalcis, raifed an infurrection in Amphipolis. In Ægina, a man of ruined fortune, diftinguifhed by his well-known tranfaction with Chares, attempted to change the government. Ambition and rapacity often fet the members of oligarchies at variance with each other; and when

[d] One of the Greek cities on the fouthern coaft of the Euxine, of which Sinopé was the mother and the queen. See Hift. of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxvi. p. 224.

when divided among themfelves, they are eafily fubdued by the people. This happened at Apollonia on the Euxine: but where perfect harmony prevails, an oligarchy is not eafily fubverted; witnefs that of Pharfalus. The oligarchy of Elis was narrowed into a cabal of ninety fenators, whofe authority was arbitrary, and whofe office was perpetual [e]. In war, oligarchies are ruined for want of confidence between the nobles and the people: the former hire mercenaries for the public defence, and the leader of the mercenaries often becomes mafter of the ftate. It was thus that Timophanes made himfelf tyrant of Corinth. When there are different bodies of mercenaries under different leaders, thefe will fometimes combine their ftrength, and form themfelves into what is called a dynafty, the worft fpecies of oligarchy. To prevent thefe evils, the nobles, when they have occafion to ufe the fervice of the people in war, fometimes voluntarily admit them to a fhare of the government. In peace, oligarchies are fubverted when the nobles and the people are mutually fo diftruftful of each other that they commit the fafety of the ftate to a garrifon of foreign mercenaries, whofe commander, inftead of continuing the mediator between the two parties, makes himfelf the mafter of both: this happened both at Lariffa and at Abydus. The overbearing infolence of individuals, quarrels about marriages and law-fuits, fometimes occafion public commotions which terminate in revolutions. Diagoras's difappointment in marriage overturned the oligarchy of the knights or horfemen of Eretria [f]. Seditions arofe in Thebes and in Heraclæa

[e] Ariftotle fays their election refembled that which prevailed in electing fenators in Sparta. The text is corrupt. See above, B. ii. c. vii. p. 109.

[f] A flourifhing fea-port of Eubœa before the Trojan war, oppofite to Delphinium in Attica. Strabo, p. 687. It was demolifhed by the Perfians in their invafion, but its ruins were to be feen in the time of the above-mentioned geographer. Ibid.

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Heraclæa in confequence of the degrading fentences paffed on Archias and on Eurytion, that they fhould ftand (the former for adultery) in the pillory in the market-place. The defpotic arrogance of the magiftrates fubverted the oligarchies of Chios and Cnidos.

In confequence of the events of time and chance.

Revolutions fometimes happen in confequence of the events of time and chance, independently of human defign or human forefight. In oligarchies, and in what we have called republics in oppofition to wild democracies, a certain cenfus is requifite for holding civil offices; all whofe fortunes fall fhort of this ftandard are excluded; fo that the majority of the people are excluded in oligarchies, and thofe who in point of fortune are confiderably below the middling clafs, are excluded in republics: but in confequence of a long peace, or other fortunate events, the value of lands may be fo greatly enhanced, that the poffeffions of the pooreft man fhall exceed the regulated cenfus: and this, whether it happens flowly or fuddenly, will occafion a political revolution. Governments change not only from one form into a contrary, but from one fort of democracy or of oligarchy into another that is different; as from governments acknowledging the authority of laws to democracies ruled by the caprice of the multitude, or oligarchies confifting of a junto of tyrants.

Chap. 7.

Caufes of the revolutions in ariftocracies.

The fupreme authority may center in a few men of wealth and credit, or may refide in a few perfons of diftinguifhed virtue: in the latter cafe the government is called an ariftocracy, and is expofed to revolutions from the paucity of thofe who engrofs power. From a coincidence in this circumftance, an ariftocracy is liable to be confounded with an oligarchy,

Their fimilarity to oligarchies,

which a high-minded people muft always be defirous to overthrow. The Partheniæ, fprung from the beft blood of Sparta,

Sparta, but degraded by the illegitimacy of their birth, and debarred from public honours, were caught confpiring againft their country, and fent to colonife Tarentum. The lofty virtue of Lyfander difdained to acknowledge a fuperior even in a king: the ftubborn audacity of Cinadon [g] confpired to deftroy every Lacedæmonian of a rank fuperior to his own. Ariftocracies are alfo liable to convulfions in confequence of the great inequality of private fortunes, efpecially when, by an invading enemy, any confiderable part of the country has been ravaged, and the inhabitants reduced to beggary: this happened to Sparta in the Meffenian war, when the people infifted on an equal divifion of lands, as we learn from a poem of Tyrtæus, called the *Eunomia*, by which he appeafed the fedition.

which a high-minded people will not brook.

As the accumulated honours even of good men are apt to excite envy and jealoufy, fo the moderate and defined honours of bad men prove incentives to the luft of dominion, and encourage them to attempt rendering their power arbitrary and their honours unbounded: this fatal project was at Carthage adopted by Hanno; and in Sparta by king Paufanias, who repelled the invafion of the Medes.

The magiftrates corrupted by their honours.

An error in the original ftructure of government often proves ruinous to republics and ariftocracies. When the ingredients of virtue, wealth, and numbers (efpecially the two latter) are unequally combined, or improperly blended, the compofition has a tendency to feparate with noife and violence into its conftituent elements: when the balance inclines to the fide of numbers, a republic, that does not degenerate into a fimple democracy, retains its original and fpecific name; but when the balance inclines to the fide of wealth, it is frequently, though improperly, called an ariftocracy. Of thofe two

Revolutions in republics, or mixed governments,

[g] For all thefe events confult the Hiftory of Ancient Greece.

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two forts of republics, that verging to democracy is the moft fecure and the moft permanent, becaufe the majority are mafters of the ftate, and the people at large, as before obferved, are lefs liable to the temptations of a felfifh ambition: yet where-ever the political forces of wealth and of numbers are not duly adjufted, that is, when they are not proportioned to each other with as much accuracy as matters of practice require or admit, the fabric of the conftitution is always liable to overfet. Some-times it falls on that fide to which it formerly inclined. A republic thus relaxes into a perfect democracy; and what is called an ariftocratic government is ftrung into a tyrannical and cruel oligarchy: but this does not invariably take place; for when the prevailing powers are guilty of grofs injuftice, the ftrenuous efforts of their oppreffed antagonifts to recover their due weight in the ftate, fometimes changes the confti-tution into its direct contrary; the refentment of the poor changing an ariftocratic republic into a democracy, or the in-dignation of the rich converting a popular republic into an oligarchy. The former event happened at Thurii; the balance of political power being on the fide of the nobles, or rather on that of property, they yielded to the temptation of injuftice, and engroffed, contrary to law, almoft the whole lands of the country: provoked at their rapacity, the people, who were warlike, flew to arms, expelled the mercenary garrifon, and divefted the nobles of their overgrown and unjuftly acquired eftates.

when the elements of wealth and numbers are not equally balanced:

unexpected effects thereof.

Examples.

An ariftocratical government, in proportion as it partakes of the nature of an oligarchy, has a tendency to foment info-lence on the one hand, and to excite refentment on the other. By committing too much authority to the nobles, it enables them to promote what they take to be their private or do-

Caufe of revolution peculiar to a republic inclining to an ariftocracy.

meftic interefts, at the expence of what is the intereft of the community at large. The connection formed by marriage, between a family of diftinction at Locris and Dionyfius the tyrant, ruined that ftate; and fuch a connection would not certainly have been permitted either in a democracy, or in a well-balanced ariftocratical republic.

Example.

Neglect in little matters.

The neglecting of little matters, as altogether immaterial, was formerly faid to be a general caufe of political innovation. Nothing, however little, fhould be regarded as unimportant, which touches the fpring of the government; fince by changing the form of the fmalleft part, the beauty of the whole fyftem may be deftroyed. It was the cuftom at Thurii, that thofe who had been officers in the army fhould not be re-elected to military command till after an interval of five years. Some fpirited young men, whofe martial ardour had acquired for them great popularity among the troops, endeavoured to procure a law for enabling them to retain their rank: a committee of the fenate appointed for examining this bufinefs, at firft refifted, but finally yielded to the project of innovation; thinking, that being gratified in this one point, the officers would not proceed farther, but allow the conftitution in general to remain unaltered; but in this they were miferably difappointed. New alterations were propofed, which the magiftrates, now overawed by an armed force, durft not venture to oppofe; their authority was thus overturned; and the government fell into the hands of thofe who had been gratified in their firft dangerous demand.

Example.

External caufes of revolutions in republics.

Such are the internal fources of the diffolution of governments. They may alfo be deftroyed by external violence. To this evil they are particularly expofed, when a neighbouring ftate is governed on principles directly oppofite: or when this oppofite

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opposite syftem prevails in a ftate more remote but alfo more powerful, with which the governments in queftion are connected by the ties of commerce and confanguinity, or by the relations of war or alliance, of war undertaken or meditated, of alliance enjoyed or coveted. It was thus that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as their fortune alternately rofe and funk in the fcale of Greece, refpectively deftroyed, the former oligarchies, and the latter democracies; becaufe each of thofe domineering republics afpired to mould the political edifices of their neighbours or allies after their own model.

Example.

Chap. 8.

How good governments arepreferved:

We now proceed to examine how governments in general, and each form of government in particular, are to be upheld and perpetuated. Firft of all, it is evident, that if we clearly comprehend the caufes which deftroy governments, we may eafily difcover thofe which are beft fitted to preferve them; for deftruction and prefervation being things in their nature contrary, contrary means will be fuccefsfully employed to produce thofe contrary effects. In well-balanced republics, then, all deviations from eftablifhed laws are to be carefully avoided, efpecially in matters, which becaufe they are little, are apt to appear infignificant: it is by fmall expences that the greateft eftates are brought to ruin, becaufe the occafions of fuch expences are fo numerous, that they may be confidered as infinite and unlimited; and becaufe men are always liable to be deceived by the vulgar fophifm, that one grain makes not an heap; and therefore that a trifling expence may fafely be incurred, or a trifling alteration may be harmlefsly made.

by avoiding fmall, and feemingly infignificant alterations:

The next rule of importance for upholding the ftability of well-mixed governments, is, that the nobles and the people be mutually on their guard againft the political artifices or juggling fleights,

by counteracting political fleights.

ſleights, formerly enumerated and deſcribed [f], by which the one party endeavours to diſguiſe its ambition, and the other to palliate its injuſtice.

Governments, defective in their ſtructure, preſerved by the virtues of the magiſtrates:

Some republics have been long preſerved, not by the excellence of their ſtructure, but through the ſolid virtues of thoſe who governed them: though appointed from men of a privileged order, the magiſtrates, while they lived with their colleagues and equals in fraternal harmony, were careful never to inſult, never to injure their inferiors; they were careful never to provoke the proud by contempt, nor to exaſperate the poor by rapacity; and the leaders of the multitude moſt diſtinguiſhed for their merit, whatever might be the circumſtances of their birth, were ſeaſonably exalted to a higher claſs, and thus aſſociated to the honours of government [g]. When the nobles are extremely numerous, they form a ſort of democracy among themſelves, and ought therefore, in managing the affairs of their own order, to adopt the inſtitutions beſt calculated for preſerving that form of government. It will be uſeful, for inſtance, to inſiſt on a frequent rotation of office; and in ſome caſes to enact that magiſtracies ſhall be held only for the term of ſix months; for as democracies have their demagogues, ſo oligarchies and ariſtocracies have their talebearers and ſycophants, mean and malicious flatterers of men in power; who, in proportion to the extent and duration of that power, will be more likely to degenerate into tyrants.

by the proximity of danger:

Governments are ſometimes preſerved, not by the remoteneſs, but by the proximity of danger. The terror hanging over them

[f] See above, B. vi. c. xii. p. 301, & ſeq.

[g] The reader's own ſagacity will apply theſe obſervations to the effects reſulting from the different conſtitution of the privileged orders, as they have been called, in the different countries of modern Europe.

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them keeps men continually on their guard. This falutary vigilance may be excited by imaginary caufes, when real ones are wanting; by approximating diftance, and anticipating futurity. The dangerous animofities of the great are to be diligently watched, and, if poffible, fpeedily appeafed; and much care is to be applied that thofe who ftill remain difpaffionate and impartial, be not whirled within the vortex of either of the contending parties: difcord between men diftinguifhed by rank, fortune, and office, may produce the moft baneful effects, becaufe its operation is exerted on the firft principle or moving power of government; and to perceive and obviate errors in their principle or beginning, which might fwell to much greater evils, is the work of no ordinary ftatefman. To prevent fuch revolutions as gradually proceed from the augmentation or diminution of private fortunes, it will be neceffary to have recourfe to the cenfus. In fmaller ftates, which are liable to more frequent concuffions, the cenfus may be taken annually; in larger republics, every third or fifth year; and the qualifications for office muft be heightened or lowered in proportion to the increafe or diminution of eftates.

by obviating errors in their firft principles:

by preventing the difproportionable exultation of individuals or families:

It is dangerous under every form of government, whether fimple or mixed, whether democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy, to allow fuch difproportionate exaltation of particular men, or particular families, as greatly overtops that of perfons and families of their own order. Honours to be lafting muft be moderate; and there are but few minds of fuch a firm and perfect texture as to bear with impunity the infectious affaults of fudden and fignal profperity. Yet if any honoured individual has been greatly exalted by an accumulation of dignities, it is not advifable to reduce him at once to the ordinary level; his

his too luxuriant honours muft be lopped gradually; and above all, it ought to be the aim of a wife legiflation, in the firft place, to prevent, if poffible, any individual from attaining too confpicuous a fuperiority in power, in wealth, or in the number and ftrength of his adherents; or, if the evil has not been prevented, to remove him from his vantageground at home, under pretence of employment in honourable commiffions abroad.

by the cenforial power: Since manners have fo powerful an influence on government that many are found willing to overfet the conftitution for no other reafon but that in future they may be at liberty to live as they lift; it is ufeful in every commonwealth to have a particular magiftracy to fuperintend the manners of the citizens, and to check or difcourage every deviation from that mode of life which is beft adapted to the nature and principle of each form of government.

by ftrengthening the middle ranks: The events of time and chance will often give to fome one of the conftituent parts of a ftate, or to fome particular magiftracy, more than their due importance and their proper weight. This alteration muft be carefully watched, and wherever the balance inclines, whether on the fide of the rich, the noble, or the populace, care muft be taken to correct the preponderancy; and by the diftribution of honours and offices to equalife the contending factions, and to ftrengthen that intermediate portion of the people which is always more ftedfaftly attached to the public welfare, than either thofe who are elated by wealth, or thofe who are depreffed by poverty [h].

by preventing peculation: Every principle of law, and every maxim of government, ought to be fkilfully and fteadily directed againft the peculation of men in office. Oligarchies, efpecially, ought never to lofe fight of this object; for the people at large will be greatly incenfed when

[h] See above, B. vi. c. ii. p. 297.

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when they are not only excluded from offices and honours, but robbed by thofe who adminifter the one and engrofs the other; whereas the firft hardfhip, taken feparately by itfelf, will be greatly foftened by the confideration, that an exclufion from public employments operates as an advantageous exemption; and allows thofe who enjoy the immunity, to apply with undivided attention to the improvement of their private fortunes[1].

by paying the magiftrates with honour, not with fees and falaries:

A republic, in which the various offices of ftate fhould be paid merely by honour, but rewarded by no emolument whatever, might unite the advantages both of ariftocracy and democracy, without incurring the inconveniences of either. The people at large might be entitled to every employment; but the poorer fort would certainly wave their claim to unprofitable pofts, that they might ply their profitable trades. They would relinquifh public concerns to thofe who had more time to fpare than themfelves. The better fort of the citizens, therefore, would thus efcape the grievance to which they are fubjected in democracies, of being frequently governed by perfons greatly their inferiors; and the poorer and lower claffes of men would efcape the grievance, to which they are fubjected in ariftocracies and oligarchies, of being legally and perpetually excluded from all public preferments. The abolition of fees and falaries will not, however, be alone fufficient to enfure the benefits of this falutary regulation. The revenues of the ftate muft be publicly

by exactly infpecting

[1] Such maxims were purfued for many centuries by the ariftocracy of Venice, where all honourable offices were proportionably expenfive. The policy of the ariftocracy of Bern was directly the reverfe. A man's fortune might be often ruined by holding thofe offices which belonged exclufively to noble Venetians; his fortune is always benefited by holding thofe which belong exclufively to the citizens of Bern.

publicly received, and publicly depofited; and feparate accounts of them muft be kept in the halls of the various tribes, wards, and fraternities into which the republic may happen to be divided.

the adminiftration of the public revenues.

The demagogues in democracies muft not harafs the rich by agrarian laws, and the demand of expenfive exhibitions.

To preferve the ftability of democracies, the leaders of the populace muft ceafe to harafs the rich and noble by agrarian laws. The old proprietors muft not only retain their hereditary lands, but alfo enjoy, unmolefted, their annual fruits; which, as matters are now managed, are often indirectly and imperceptibly wafted for purpofes the moft ufelefs and the moft frivolous. Shows, dances, vain illuminations, and pompous proceffions, are unprofitable to thofe who behold, and ruinous to thofe who exhibit, them. A reafonable people, inftead of condemning their richer fellow-citizens to fuch grievous expences, would turn with difdain from the childifh gratifications for which they are incurred [k].

In oligarchies, peculiar indulgences fhould be granted to thofe claffes of the people who are excluded from a fhare in the fovereignty.

To preferve the ftability of ariftocracies or oligarchies, great regard muft be had to thofe claffes of the people who are excluded from a fhare in the fovereignty. Injuries committed againft them, efpecially when accompanied with infult, muft be punifhed with more feverity by the magiftrate than thofe committed againft perfons of his own rank or his own order. Such fubordinate employments as are attended with fees or perquifites fhould be granted in preference to the poorer fort of citizens; and to promote equality, as much as is confiftent with the nature of the government, it will be proper to reftrain the

[k] It appears from the Hiftory of Greece, that this was indeed moft falutary, but with refpect to him who propofed it, very dangerous advice. By a law of the demagogue Eubulus, it was made capital at Athens, to propofe diverting the theatric funds to any other purpofe than that of the public amufement. Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 473.

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A similar rule applicable in all governments.

the freedom of donations and marriage contracts, and thereby to limit or prevent the accumulation of too many estates in one family. It is of essential use in preserving all governments, that those who are the least sharers in the sovereignty, be treated with great equity, and even peculiar indulgence, in all other respects. In oligarchies, the people, in democracies, the wealthy, ought respectively to enjoy every advantage and every preference that is not incompatible with the nature of the government. The superiority given to them in matters of little moment, will dispose them patiently to brook their inferiority in solid power.

Chap. 9.

The requisites for holding supreme magistracies.—Patriotism. Capacity. Virtue.

To partake of this power, or of what in every state forms the sovereignty, three qualifications are essentially requisite. The supreme magistrates must be animated with the warmest love for that constitution, the government of which they are called to administer. They must be endowed with the capacities and powers necessary to the discharge of their high functions. They must, in the third place, possess that particular species of virtue, and especially of justice, which, in each form of government, is best fitted to ensure the stability of that particular constitution; for as justice is measured by different standards in oligarchies and democracies, it is plain that, in a political sense, the virtue of justice is itself variable, and that what is right in one government, may be wrong in another. When the three requisites above mentioned do not concur in the same person, an important question will arise, to which of them is the preference due? In the appointment, for instance, of a general, a man presents himself possessed indeed of great military talents, but not remarkably distinguished by his justice or his patriotism. Another is eminent for those virtues, but has never exhibited

When these requisites do not all concur, by what rule the preference among them is to be decided.

any

any fignal proof of his genius for war, and his capacity for command. By what rule ought the preference to be decided? We anfwer, there is a middle portion of talent, as well as of virtue, that is the ordinary lot of humanity. Whatever exceeds this middle portion can fall to the fhare of a few only. Many men poffefs enough of juftice and enough of patriotifm to make good generals; but there are few endowed with that degree of fkill and experience which is requifite for the honourable difcharge of high military truft. This degree of fkill and experience is, therefore, chiefly to be regarded in the choice of a general. Were we to appoint a public treafurer, we muft ftill reafon on the fame principle, and becaufe we reafon on the fame principle, we muft in this cafe vary our decifion; and give the preference to moral, rather than to intellectual, accomplifhments. The fkill, experience, and capacity requifite in a magiftrate of this defcription, are fuch as the greater part of mankind may be fuppofed to poffefs. But his juftice and integrity ought to rife above the common level; and it will be the beft recommendation to his office, that thofe virtues fhine in his character with more than ordinary luftre.

Application of the rule to particular cafes.

But as to a proper difcharge of public offices in general, it may be afked, why I have faid that there are *three* effential requifites? Let us fuppofe a man endowed with a fufficient capacity for his employment, and animated by a warm love for his country; will not thofe qualifications alone render him an upright and ufeful fervant of the public? I anfwer, they will not; and affirm that, in addition to them, and in order to complete the character of a good magiftrate or minifter, a third ingredient muft neceffarily enter into the compofition. He muft poffefs, at leaft in a certain degree, the practical habit of all

Proof that patriotifm and capacity are not alone fufficient to form the character of a fupreme magiftrate.

all the virtues, without which, how much foever he may love his country, and how well foever he may underftand its interefts, he will often be hindered by floth, diffipation, intemperance, or cowardice from rendering it any effential fervice; nay, he may be tempted by thofe, though oftener by contrary vices, to do his country much pofitive mifchief. Men are generally clearfighted enough in perceiving their own intereft; and they cannot be fufpected of not loving themfelves with an affection fufficiently fincere; yet how many, through a defect of moral attainment, daily plunge themfelves into inextricable diftrefs? Can it be expected that they fhould treat their country better than they treat themfelves?

In what manner laws are relative to different governments,

Laws, we have faid, are things relative, and therefore variable; and in order to be good, they muft be adapted to the circumftances of the people for whom they are promulgated. Whatever law is well adapted to the conftitution, will facilitate its motions, invigorate its health, and thereby confirm its ftability; and efpecially if the law, pregnant with that which we have often mentioned as the great and principal element of political fafety, confpires to convince the people at large, or at leaft that portion of the community which is moft numerous or moft powerful, that their intereft and happinefs are intimately connected with the prefervation and permanence of the conftituted authorities. Befides this, the fafety of ftates requires that the legiflature fhould never lofe fight of that golden mean, which is univerfally overlooked or defpifed in corrupt republics.

particularly to democracies and oligarchies.

Many inftitutions, feemingly favourable to democracy, have proved its ruin; and many inftitutions, feemingly favourable to oligarchy, have totally deftroyed that form of government. Demagogues and fycophants, the partifans of the multitude, and the flatterers of the great, regard that plan of

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of policy which they refpectively efpoufe, as the confummate pattern of perfect excellence, and therefore think, or affect to think, that they cannot poffibly do too much for promoting the interefts of democracy on the one hand, or of oligarchy on the other. In this, however, they err egregioufly; and fet themfelves in oppofition to the firft principles of fociety, and to the whole analogy of nature. The limb of an animal may be elegant without being ftraight; and the nofe, that characteriftic feature, may deferve in a certain degree the epithets of depreffed or aquiline, and yet this fmall deviation from ftraightnefs into curvature may heighten and embellifh beauty. But if you increafe too much its fwell or its depreffion, you will thereby disfigure the whole countenance. There is not any reafon whatever, why the fame obfervation fhould not apply to forms of government. The popular and ariftocratical powers, acting in nearly oppofite directions, will, if nicely adjufted, keep the motion of government ftraight and uniform. This right line, however, may, by a fmall variation in the relative force of the generating powers, deviate a little into either of the oppofite curvatures, without affecting the beauty of the fyftem. But if you vary this force or celerity too much, if you render the democracy too democratical, or the ariftocracy too ariftocratical, you will firft of all enfeeble, then fhake, and finally fubvert the government. The nature of democracy requires that the fupreme authority of government fhould refide, not in the diftinguifhed few, but in the great body of the people; the nature of oligarchy or ariftocracy, requires that the fupreme authority of government fhould refide, not in the people at large, but in the few diftinguifhed by wealth or virtue. Both oligarchies and democracies, there-

Illuftration.

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fore, imply the exiftence of thofe oppofite defcriptions of perfons, the rich and the poor, the few and the many. Thefe defcriptions are the elements of which fuch governments are compofed; and in proportion as you diminifh or deftroy either of the conftituent elements, you muft impair or demolifh the whole fabric of the conftitution. How abfurdly, therefore, do thofe demagogues and thofe fycophants reafon; who, the former in democracies, would plunder and harafs the nobility; and the latter, in oligarchies, would oppress and perfecute the people? How weak as well as wicked are thofe oaths which are taken in fome oligarchical governments, "I will refift the populace with all my might; I will bear them eternal ill-will, and never ceafe to inflict on them every injury in my power?" Did thefe haughty but contemptible nobles confult their own intereft and honour, they would fwear the direct contrary; "I will never injure the people, I will always treat them with kindnefs."

The errors of demagogues and fycophants.

The citizens muft be taught to fhape their lives by the pattern of the commonwealth.

But the main fource of political fafety confifts in an expedient now univerfally neglected by ftates, though it has more efficacy alone, than all other contrivances combined. How wifely foever laws may be framed, and with whatever precifion they may be penned, they will prove impotent and ufelefs, unlefs thofe who are deftined to adminifter them, be carefully trained to fhape their lives agreeably to the pattern of the commonwealth. The conftitution of a ftate, as well as that of an individual, may be ruined by intemperance; and the danger of intemperance can only be prevented by early and affiduous culture. If the government, therefore, is a democracy, the education muft be democratical; if it is an oligarchy, the education muft be oligarchical.

Of democratical and oligarchical education.

garchical. But an education properly adapted to either of these forms of government, must not be such as will excite their respective magistrates to indulge their political propensities, and to gratify their selfish or factious passions, but such as will give to their public conduct that firmness and moderation, which the safety of the state requires, and without which it will be impossible for the popular party long to defend the democracy against the nobles; or for the partisans of the Few, long to defend the oligarchy against the people. Education, when properly directed, is the preserving and vivifying principle of all good policy; but as it is now conducted, it becomes the cause of instability, and produces frequent revolutions. Under every species of oligarchy, the children of the great are brought up delicately, and often indulged criminally. The children of the poor are hardened in their bodies by exercise, and fortified in their minds by discipline. Can it be expected that weakness should long continue to prevail over strength; or that men softened by sloth, should long continue to command men invigorated by exertion? In democracies, on the contrary, where justice is defined by equality, and where it is thought sufficient, that all be treated alike, without considering whether each will thus have his due, liberty too naturally degenerates into licentiousness, and the citizens, instead of submitting cheerfully to the salutary restraints of discipline, think themselves entitled, as Euripides says,

"Each man to live as perverse will directs:"

because otherwise, forsooth, their liberty would be abridged. But this is absurd in the extreme. To be obliged to shape our lives to the pattern of the commonwealth, is not slavery but safety.

Such

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Such then are the caufes and contingencies which, in republics, promote or prevent revolutions; we now proceed to explain thofe caufes and contingencies which have been found to overturn or to uphold monarchies.

Chap. 10.

Of revolutions in monarchies.

Monarchies, whether limited or abfolute, are liable to nearly the fame changes and accidents which befal republics; for royalty is analogous to ariftocracy; and tyranny is compofed of rigid oligarchy and the worft fpecies of democracy, and is, therefore, moft ruinous to its fubjects, as containing the evils and deformities of two peftilent mifchiefs. The two kinds of monarchy are different in their origin. Royalty is produced from the weight and influence of the nobles concentrated in one diftinguifhed and illuftrious character, in order the more firmly to refift the dangerous encroachments of the populace. Tyranny, on the other hand, is generated by the combined ftrength of the populace, who think they can never enough exalt the leader who undertakes to defend the popular caufe, and to repel oligarchic oppreffion. Moft tyrants, therefore, have fprung out of demagogues, who had captivated the affections of the people, by traducing and perfecuting their fuperiors. This, I fay, has happened in large ftates; for in ancient times, and before the aggrandizement of cities, kings would often tranfgrefs the limits of their lawful power; and magiftrates, availing themfelves of the duration and importance of their civil and religious offices, which then lafted much longer than they do now, would often by theft or robbery ufurp a throne. The tyranny of Pheidon of Argos was nothing but an undue extenfion of his royal authority. The fame may be faid of the other tyrannies which about that time prevailed in Greece. Phalaris of Agrigentum, and the tyrants of Ionia, were originally republican magiftrates, who

The origin of royalty.

Of tyranny.

who abufed the authority of their elective functions for obtaining unlimited power. But Panætius of Leontium, Cypfelus of Corinth, Peififtratus of Athens, and Dionyfius of Syracufe, all thefe and many others acquired tyranny by flattery; they firft captivated the *affections* of the people, before they enflaved their *perfons*.

Royalty analogous to ariftocracy.

Royalty, we faid, is analogous to ariftocracy. It may, in fact, be analyfed into the fame elements; fince kings are created for their perfonal or hereditary worth, and for the benefits which they feem capable of conferring, or which they have actually conferred on their nation. Codrus, who defended the Athenians in war; Cyrus, who delivered Perfia from bondage; the martial leaders of the Lacedæmonians, Macedonians, and Moloffians, whofe fuccefsful valour acquired lands for their refpective followers, and maintained them in quiet poffeffion of their important conquefts; thefe and fuch illuftrious men received the honours of royalty from the admiring gratitude of the public, and adorned the throne by the fame virtues through which they were enabled to afcend it.

Definition of a king; and contraft between kings and tyrants.

A king, in his nature and end, is a public guardian. His office is a pledge, that the nobles fhall not be fubjected to injuftice, nor the people to infult. A tyrant, as we have faid and repeated, is not effentially governed by any public-fpirited motive; and if ever he confults the intereft of his country, it is merely as that intereft happens accidentally to affect his own. To enjoy pleafure, the meaneft pleafure, is the only reafonable aim of a tyrant; to acquire glory, the brighteft glory, is the aim of a king. A tyrant, therefore, delights in wealth, as furnifhing means to his end; a king delights in honour, juftly obtained and hardly earned. A tyrant is guarded by mercenary foreigners; a king, by the affection of his people.

The

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Analyfis of tyranny; the inherent evils of its conftituent elements.

The mifchief of that complex thing a tyranny, will manifeftly appear by confidering the inherent evils of its conftituent elements. It is compofed, we faid, of rigid oligarchy and of lawlefs democracy. From the former it borrows that rapacity for wealth, (the proper end of oligarchy,) without which the tyrant can neither purchafe criminal pleafure, nor pay his mercenary attendants. In imitation of oligarchic magiftrates, the tyrant will diftruft and difarm his fubjects, plunder and banifh them, as fear or avarice directs; and, difregarding every domeftic and every focial tie, tranfplant them, as fuits his conveniency, from one diftrict to another, and thus tear afunder their affections, and render them ftrangers in their native country. From democracy, on the other hand, tyrants will borrow their animofity to the nobles, and lofe no opportunity of deftroying them, fecretly or openly; of banifhing them from their country, and of inflicting on them every calamity, that either vengeance can dictate, or that fear may fuggeft. For tyrants never forget that the moft diftinguifhed portion of the community muft ever be the moft hoftile to their government, and the moft able as well as the moft willing to fubvert it; becaufe of fuch men, fome will be ambitious of dominion, and all of them muft be impatient of fubjection. Tyrants, therefore, regarding them as hindrances in the way of their power, and obftacles to the unbounded gratification of their paffions, will never lofe fight of the advice of Periander to Thrafybulus, " that in order to reap the full harveft of their government, it is neceffary to cut off the talleft ftalks, and to level the political field."

Caufes of the revolutions in tyrannies.

From thefe obfervations, it is plain that both the caufes which precede, and the confequences which follow revolutions, muft be nearly the fame in monarchies and in republics. The immediate

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immediate and impelling caufes of innovation, are injuftice, fuffered or apprehended, fear, contempt, and efpecially fuch acts of injuftice as are accompanied with infult. The ends in view are to ftrip the tyrant of his ill-gotten wealth, and to diveft him of his ufurped power, in order to apply the former to the exigencies of the community, and to divide the latter among lawful magiftrates. Confpirators fometimes ftrike at the tyranny, fometimes at the perfon of the tyrant. The latter takes place in the cafe of infult; for perfons infulted commonly feek not advantage, but vengeance. It was thus that Harmodius and Ariftogeiton overturned the tyranny of the Peififtratidæ. The infult offered to his fifter, animated the hand of Harmodius; the infult offered to his beloved Harmodius, fharpened the fteel of Ariftogeiton. Periander of Ambracia provoked the vengeance even of his pathics by the infolent obfcenity of his language. Philip of Macedon was flain by Paufanias, becaufe he made light of the difgrace which that young nobleman had fuffered from the audacious impurity of Attalus. The indignant manhood of Derdas punifhed by death the brutal affaults of Amyntas, furnamed the Little [i]. The refentment of blows and ftripes has often threatened the fafety of men in power, and often proved fatal to them: witnefs the Penthalidæ at Mitylené, and alfo Penthilus himfelf, the former of whom were deftroyed by Megacles, the latter by Smerdes; witnefs alfo, the affaffination of Archelaus king of Macedon, effected at the inftigation of Decamnichus, whom that prince had caufed to be whipped, in compliance with the defire of Euripides the poet [k]; who was provoked at being taunted by Decamnichus for his ftinking breath.

Infult.

Examples.

i A few fentences are omitted, the fubject being as impure as the text is corrupt.

k Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxiii. p. 6.

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breath[1]. Innumerable inftances might be given of kings and tyrants who, through fuch caufes, have been at once deprived of their power and of their lives; efpecially when the indulgence of their unbridled paffions has been accompanied by an open defiance of the fentiments of mankind, and when injury has been heightened by mockery and infult.

Fear, contempt, &c. with examples.

The fear or the contempt of fubjects often proves ruinous to kings. Xerxes commanded Artabanus, the captain of his guard, to kill Darius. Artabanus did not obey the order, thinking the king himfelf might forget, or be willing to revoke, it, as the command was given in his cups. But the officious envy of courtiers failed not to refrefh the king's memory; and Artabanus, alarmed for his own fafety, confpired and flew his mafter. The mean effeminacy of Sardanapalus, who, if the ftory told of him may be credited, was found weaving and fpinning with his women, excited that contemptuous indignation which tumbled him from the throne. The drunkennefs of the younger Dionyfius, which rendered him defpicable to his fubjects, animated the republican patriotifm of Dion, and enabled him to rid Syracufe of a tyrant. This paffion of contempt is moft likely to operate on two claffes of men; on the friends of the monarch, who, becaufe they enjoy his confidence, think it will be eafy for them to deceive and to deftroy him; and on the minifters of his power, becaufe they think it will not be difficult for them to ufurp his dominion. Cyrus was only the general of a provincial army; but he became mafter of the Eaft, becaufe he defpifed the luxury of Aftyages, and the flothful effeminacy of his

[1] This paffage is fomewhat abridged. Compare Diodorus Siculus, b. xiv. fect. 37.

his guards. Seuthes, the Thracian general, confpired againft his mafter Amadocus, and feated himfelf on his throne. Sometimes avarice, and fometimes ambition, combines with contempt, and accelerates revolutions. The love of money made Mithridates dethrone Ariobarzanes. Ambition often fprings up in men of courageous natures invefted by monarchs with high military command; for courage becomes enterprife, when armed with power. Ambition alfo, in another view, is productive of revolutions; an ambition, not to gain power, but to obtain glory. Confpirators, animated by this principle, are few in number; for they muft difregard what moft men highly value, perfonal fafety; and like the high-minded Dion, muft be carelefs how far they proceed in their enterprife, but think, that while invading the power of a tyrant, the firft ground they gain will be an honourable grave.

External violence, the hatred of republics;

Monarchies, like other forms of government, perifh through external violence. An interference of interefts renders them obnoxious to democracies: for as potters, according to Hefiod, envy potters, fo is a fingle tyrant expofed to the hatred and vengeance of a tyrannical populace. An oppofition of principle and fyftem renders tyrannies odious to royalties and ariftocracies. The ariftocracy of Sparta, therefore, deftroyed many tyrannies; as did alfo the republic of Syracufe, while wifely governed. In deftroying monarchies, external violence is often affifted by domeftic difcord. This happened in the cafe of Gelon; and recently in that of the younger Dionyfius. Thrafybulus, Hieron's brother, playing the demagogue, corrupted by pleafures and profligacy the heir-apparent of Gelon's monarchy, that he himfelf might be king. A confpiracy was formed to deftroy Thrafybulus while the tyranny remained fafe, but a part of

affifted by internal difcord.

of the confpirators feized the opportunity of diverting the whole family, at once, of honours which no individual of it feemed worthy to wear. The family of Dionyfius was divided againft itfelf; for Dion was his kinfman. By the affiftance of the people he expelled the tyrant; but through the unjuft fufpicions of the fame people, he was afterwards himfelf moft unworthily flain.

Different operation of hatred, contempt, and anger.

Of the two caufes which deftroy tyrannies, hatred and contempt, the firft is inherent in the very nature of tyranny, fince that man cannot fail to be odious, who is invefted with arbitrary power. Contempt, though not effential to tyranny itfelf, is, however, a more frequent caufe of its deftruction. Experience juftifies this remark. Thofe who were the firft to mount a defpotic throne, have for the moft part been able to preferve it; they were odious, but not contemptible; but their fucceffors, naturally becoming contemptible as well as odious, have univerfally been divefted of their unlawful power; and as fhamefully difgraced as they were unworthily exalted. Anger may be regarded as a fpecies of hatred; it differs however in this, that as its proceedings are deftitute of reflection, it is always more prompt, and fometimes more efficacious; but hatred, as it acts under the direction of reafon, though more flow, is commonly more dangerous and more fatal. The arbitrary government of the individual perifhes (to fpeak in general) through the fame caufes which deftroy rigid oligarchies and lawlefs democracies; both of which are nothing elfe but complex tyrannies.

Of revolutions in limited monarchies.

Royalty is not eafily demolifhed by external violence; and this form of government often lafts long, fince honours are naturally durable in proportion as they are moderate. Royalty perifhes, however, through the internal difcord of men in office, and through the prepofterous ambition of kings to make

them-

themfelves abfolute. At prefent, ftates are feldom erected into royalties; for amidft the great equality of mankind, few are thought worthy of unrivalled pre-eminence, or deemed capable of fuftaining with dignity a lawful and voluntary fceptre; and a king, whofe authority muft be fupported by force or by fraud, immediately degenerates into a tyrant. To the caufes, therefore, already mentioned of the deftruction of monarchy, we muft add one peculiar to hereditary monarchy; the contemptible characters of youths born in the purple, and their pronenefs to offenfive infolence. The authority of fuch youths cannot be *voluntarily* endured; and thus, the government, if a royalty, is effectually deftroyed, and a tyranny, probably of fhort duration, fubftituted in its ftead. Thefe and other fuch caufes produce revolutions in monarchies.

The worthleffnefs of youths born in the purple.

Chap. 11.

Limited monarchy preferved by moderation.

The means of their prefervation, it is plain, muft in general be directly contrary to the caufes of their deftruction. As to limited monarchy, or royalty, the more it is limited, the longer it is likely to laft. Moderation, therefore, is the great prefervative of this form of government. Princes, the farther they recede from defpotifm, and the nearer they approximate to equality of right with their fubjects, are the lefs expofed to hatred, envy, and all that train, or all thofe complications of paffions, which fo often prove ruinous to their power. Moderation long upheld the monarchy of the Moloffians. The royalty of Lacedæmon, which has proved fo permanent, was, from the beginning, moderated by divifion between two kings; and farther attempered, under Theopompus, by a due mixture of popular and democratic powers. When that wife prince inftituted the office of the Ephori, he abridged the power of royalty, but increafed its ftability. The fhort-fighted pride of his queen afked

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asked him, whether he was not ashamed to transmit to his posterity a sceptre less splendid than that which he had received from his ancestors? "No, surely," he replied; "I shall transmit to them a throne more stedfast and more durable."

Absolute monarchy preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission.

The former mode explained with an enumeration of tyrannic maxims.

Absolute monarchy, or tyranny, is preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission. The first mode consists in tightening the reins of power, by vigilance and severity; it is usual and hereditary among tyrants. The suspicious and stern Periander exercised it in all its bitterness at Corinth. The cruel institutions of the Persian monarchs are stamped with the same character; and the maxims which we formerly mentioned, of mowing the tallest stalks; of prohibiting, under severe penalties, convivial meetings of clubs and assemblies; of destroying public schools; and of subverting every establishment that may have a tendency to engender mutual confidence, or to create a national spirit; all these precautions, and others of the same kind, would, if any thing could, render tyranny secure. It will tend to the same purpose, that persons of distinction frequent the halls, or crowd the gates, of the palace; their machinations against the government will thus be easily discovered and speedily suppressed; and their minds, degraded and debased by the servility of court attendance, will finally become incapable of forming any generous resolution. These, and such like, are Persian, Barbarian, and Tyrannic maxims, directly tending to destroy that freedom of communication which is as essential to mutual confidence, as mutual confidence is essential to boldness of enterprise. Spies, accusers, insidious listeners, like the Syracusan tale-bearers, are instruments useful to tyrants, whose interest it is to set their subjects at variance, instigating the people against the nobles,

and

and the rich and noble againſt each other. Above all, the poverty of the ſubjects is the beſt pledge of the permanence of tyranny; for people impoveriſhed have neither the leiſure to contrive, nor the means to effect, revolutions. The pyramids of Egypt, the magnificent dedications of the Cypſelidæ, the rebuilding of the Olympian temple by the ſons of Peiſiſtratus, the ſumptuous works of Polycrates of Samos; theſe were the productions of toil and miſery, monuments as uſeful for the power of monarchs, as ruinous for the proſperity of their ſubjects. Enormous contributions in money, and enormous contributions in labour, have preciſely the ſame tendency. By both alike the people are reduced to poverty and wretchedneſs; their *time* is enſlaved; they muſt be beggars or drudges; and men robbed of leiſure are not likely to recover liberty. Under the tyrannical government of Dionyſius, the ſubjects of Syracuſe returned, in the ſpace of every five years, the amount of their whole property into the exchequer. Still faithful to his principle, the tyrant delights in war; extorting not only the wealth, but the blood of his people; eſpecially ſince military expeditions are calculated to engroſs their whole attention, and to confirm their habitual ſubmiſſion. The ſafety of a king lies in his friends; but a tyrant diſtruſts *his friends* beyond all others; knowing that all others are willing, but that his friends only are always able to deſtroy him. The inſtitutions adapted to lawleſs democracy, equally ſuit tyranny. The unbridled licence of ſlaves and of women, forms the reproach of both theſe governments. The order of ſociety is inverted; in families, ſlaves are diſobedient, and women are imperious; they are ſpies and accuſers of their maſters and huſbands; and cheriſhed by the ſingle, as well as the complex tyrant, for thoſe

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Examples.

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odious purpofes, they become abettors of unjuft domination, which they ftrive to perpetuate and extend. None but the worft or meaneft of mankind can have credit in democracies and tyrannies. The furious fanguinary demagogue is all-powerful in the firft; the cruel unfeeling courtier is alone regarded in the fecond; for the licentious multitude and the tyrant are governed by their paffions; and as their paffions are criminal, wicked inftruments alone are qualified to gratify them. Tyrants, fenfible of their own worthleffnefs, ftand in perpetual need of flattery, without which anodyne, the internal fmart of their crimes would render them intolerable to themfelves. But men of elevated minds are totally incapable of every fpecies of adulation. Tyrants, therefore, cannot endure any fuch men; their liberal fpirit and confcious dignity are regarded as infolent ufurpations of the imperial prerogative. None, therefore, can affociate with tyrants, but thofe who will comply with their humours; and in admiffion to their table and familiarity, foreigners, as lefs dangerous, will always be preferred to their native fubjects. Such are the expedients by which tyranny is upheld; expedients wicked in the extreme, and indefinite in number, but which are all contrived for the three following purpofes: Firft, to debafe the fouls of their people; for it is not the part of low-minded perfons to become political reformers. Secondly, to deftroy all mutual confidence, for without confidence in each other, it is impoffible for any fet of men to effect a revolution; tyrants, therefore, are neceffarily enemies to honefty, not only becaufe men of integrity are naturally hoftile to their government, but becaufe fuch men alone, by the confidence which their characters infpire, are capable of fubverting it. Thirdly, tyrants will ftrive to reduce their people to indigence and debility;

Tyrannic maxims all reduced to three.

lity; and thus deter them from all thoughts of fedition, by making them fenfible of their total inability to effect any falutary revolution.

The mode of preferving tyranny by remiffion, with maxims by which a tyrant may obtain popularity, and appear not a plunderer but a protector.

This, then, is the firft mode of preferving a tyranny; the fecond is directly the reverfe. We may perceive wherein it confifts, by reflecting on what was above faid concerning the deftruction of royalty. As royalty is deftroyed by rendering it tyrannical or abfolute, fo tyranny may be preferved by rendering it royal or moderate; with this condition, however, that the monarch, while he flackens the reins of his power, ftill continues to hold and to guide them: for fhould he once abandon his power, and begin to reign merely by the voluntary fubmiffion of his fubjects, he would from that moment ceafe to be a tyrant, and rife into a lawful prince. His power, therefore, muft be preferved, as the only foundation of his authority; but while he keeps hold of tyrannic power, he may feafonably decline to exercife it, and with great advantage to his own fecurity, begin to play the part of a king. In affuming this borrowed character, he will firft of all pretend to be mightily concerned for the intereft and glory of his country. He will not incenfe the people by lavifhing the hard earnings of their fweat and toil, on harlots, flatterers, and fiddlers. Some tyrants have been fuch admirable actors of royalty, as even to give their fubjects a faithful account of their receipt and expenditure. The deluded multitude confidered them as ftewards, not as mafters. Thofe, however, who have power, can never be in want of property; and an ambitious monarch, frequently engaged in foreign enterprifes, acts wifely in not leaving at home a rich

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treafury behind him, fince thofe whom he appointed to guard it, would prove his moft formidable adverfaries. Generous in his own perfon, he views with complacence inexhauftible treafures, always at his command, in the purfes of his fubjects; yet, he never demands their money or their fervices but under pretence of the public exigency. It is the honour and fafety of the country, not the ambition of the prince, that fummons them to war. They follow his ftandard readily, regarding him, not as a tyrant, but as a protector. If he proceeds in other inftances to act his part well, he will endeavour to infpire, not fear, but refpect: this, indeed, is not eafy, if his character at bottom be really contemptible; yet, much may be done by pretending a fincere love for his country, and exhibiting himfelf to the multitude as the guardian and champion of the ftate. An abfolute monarch, who would preferve his power, muft, in public at leaft, keep a watch over his voluptuoufnefs, and take care that none of his minifters or favourites infult the youth and beauty of either fex. His wives and miftreffes muft alfo be taught to correct that fupercilious and offenfive haughtinefs, and to reprefs thofe infolent airs, which has already caufed the fubverfion of fo many tyrannies. As to fenfual pleafures, his conduct ought to be directly the reverfe of that ufual with fome princes, who are not completely gratified by the moft criminal indulgence in luft and luxury, unlefs they openly expofe their wickednefs and emblazon their profligacy; challenging the admiration of mankind, for that drunken debauchery and prodigal whoredom which ought to cover them with eternal infamy. A crafty tyrant will avoid giving fuch

fuch caufes of offence; knowing, that he who is drunk or afleep is more obnoxious to a confpiracy than the man who is vigilant and fober. Inftead of diffipating his treafures in perifhing luxury, he will employ them in embellifhing his capital, and improving his country. This will exhibit him under the amiable character of a public guardian; and above all, he muft appear to be much addicted to religion, and anxioufly attentive to whatever regards the honour of the gods. Perfons of this character are lefs likely to commit injuftice, and therefore lefs the objects of fear: they are, alfo, lefs liable to fuffer wrong, becaufe men will be afraid of injuring thofe who reckon the gods themfelves in the number of their friends. A tyrant, therefore, muft endeavour to appear religious; but this fpecious fhew of religion muft not be deformed by abject fuperftition. It will contribute much to his fecurity, to be diligent in difcovering and rewarding merit, wherever it may be found; and to be careful to treat men of eminent talents with fuch diftinguifhed honour, as will leave them little room to regret that it is not their lot to live under a free republic. Of rewards and honours, he himfelf muft be the difpenfer; but punifhments muft be inflicted by the authority of his courts of juftice, or the command of his fubftitutes[1].

It is a maxim of ftate in every kind of monarchy, never too highly to exalt any individual fubject. When great powers muft

1 See Libro del Principe; particularly chapters 18, 19, 21. Machiavel has neither the merit nor the infamy of the maxims ufually afcribed to him, but which he has copied verbatim from Ariftotle. Yet, in defcribing the contrivances for preferving tyranny, whether by the way of intention or remiffion, the Grecian philofopher is more careful than the Florentine fecretary to avoid faying any thing that is liable to mifreprefentation or reproach.

muft be delegated, it is better that they fhould be lodged with a commiffion, confifting of feveral perfons, whofe rivalry and jealoufy will afford the beft pledges of their fidelity; but when the nature of any important function of fovereignty requires that it fhould be intrufted to one only, the tyrant fhould take care, that this minifter be not of too enterprifing a fpirit; or if he has imprudently aggrandized fuch a perfon beyond the due meafure, he muft beware not to curtail him of his ample dignities at once, but flowly and imperceptibly. The fudden fall of an ambitious minifter has fhaken the ftability of many a government. All kinds of offenfive infolence are to be moft carefully avoided, efpecially fuch infolence as vents itfelf in acts of violence or luft. The crafty tyrant muft perfuade the victims of his outrageous and infamous paffions, that they are the objects of his love, and repay their fecret fubmiffions by confpicuous honours. But when he fufpects that his infolence has really offended, he muft particularly be on his guard againft men jealous of their honour, incapable of reftraining their anger, and willing, as Heraclitus fays, to purchace vengeance at the price of their lives.

As every ftate confifts of two principal claffes, the rich and the poor, the tyrant muft endeavour to make it appear, that his authority is ufeful to both; or if that be impoffible, he muft diligently court and gain the ftrongeft party. If *their* favour can be obtained, it will be needlefs for him to have recourfe to the ordinary expedients of emancipating his flaves and difarming his fubjects, fince the ftrength of his guards, abetted by a powerful party among the people, will be fufficient to uphold his tyranny. It is needlefs to expatiate on this fub-

ject;

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ject; for all the other maxims that might be enumerated muft ftill have the fame end in view, to gain popularity, and muft be calculated to make the tyrant appear, not as a mafter, but as a fteward; not a plunderer, but a protector [k]. By avoiding blameable excefs, and confining his life within the bounds of moderation, he will ceafe to be the object of fear and hatred; his reign will be more illuftrious and more honourable, in proportion as his fubjects are lefs miferable and lefs abject; his throne alfo will be the more fecure. As to morals, therefore, let him, if it is impoffible to be virtuous, be at leaft half virtuous, and not altogether wicked, but only half wicked [l].

Chap. 12.

That oligarchies and tyrannies are the leaft durable of all governments. Examples.

Of all governments, the leaft durable are oligarchies and tyrannies. The moft lafting tyranny on record was that of Orthagoras and his fons in Sicyon. It continued a hundred years. The caufe of its long duration was the laudable moderation of thofe princes, and their cheerful fubmiffion to the laws. Clifthenes, befides, was a man of a martial fpirit; and, therefore, by no means an object of contempt, which fo often proves fatal to tyrannies; and he, as well as the other princes of his family, knew the arts of government, and affiduoufly cultivated popularity. His impartial equity crowned the honeft boldnefs of the judge who, in a difpute refpecting a gymnaftic victory, adjudged the prize to his competitor. It is faid, that the ftatue fitting in the market-place of Sicyon, adorned with a crown,

[k] How well did the late Frederic II. of Pruffia, as well as his model, Philip II. of Macedon, practife the more effential part of Ariftotle's maxims! See my View of the Reign of Frederic, c. vi. p. 376, & feq.

[l] Machiavel fays more explicitly, "non partirfe dal bene, potendo; ma fapere entrare nel male, neceffitato." The maxim, if it has any fenfe, only fhews that tyranny being a bad thing in itfelf, can only by preferved by bad means.

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crown, perpetuates the remembrance of the judge's integrity, and of Clifthenes's magnanimity. Peififtratus of Athens gave an ufeful leffon to tyrants. When fúmmoned before the Areopagus, he appeared in perfon to plead his caufe, and refpectfully heard the decifion of that ancient tribunal. The fecond example of a durable tyranny is that of Cypfelus and his family at Corinth. It lafted feventy-feven years and fix months; for Cypfelus himfelf reigned thirty years; Periander, forty-four; and Pfammetichus, the fon of Gondius, three years and fix months. The duration of this government proceeded from the fame caufes. Cypfelus was a man of uncommon addrefs, and knew how to practife every feductive and every popular art. He even difbanded his guards, as ufelefs for his fafety. His fon Periander was indeed a tyrant; but his character was ennobled by martial fpirit, and illuftrated by military fuccefs. The third and laft example of a durable tyranny was that of the Peififtratidæ at Athens. It was not, like thofe above mentioned, uninterrupted; for Peififtratus twice abdicated and fled; fo that in the courfe of thirty-three years, he reigned only feventeen; his fons reigned eighteen years; the whole duration of their government, therefore, exceeded not thirty-five years. That of Gelon and his family in Syracufe was ftill fhorter-lived. Gelon reigned feven years; Hieron reigned ten; but Thrafybulus was banifhed in lefs than twelve months. The greater part of tyrannies have perifhed ftill more fuddenly [m].

Thus

[m] When Ariftotle fpeaks of tyrannies, he here means ufurpations of arbitrary power in countries formerly free; whether under a lawful monarchy, or under a republican government. It is ftrictly confiftent with his principles, that fuch ufurpations fhould be fhort-lived, becaufe they are incompatible with the fentiments, principles, and habits of thinking moft prevalent among the people at large.

Thus much concerning revolutions in monarchies, how they are caufed, and how they may be prevented [a].

[a] The conclufion of this chapter is employed in refuting Plato's fanciful notions concerning political revolutions; notions founded on the wonderful powers afcribed by the Pythagoreans to periods and numbers. This wild doctrine is explained in the eighth book of Plato's Republic. Ariftotle proves, by the facts above ftated, that it is totally inconfiftent with experience. The revolutions, however, which hiftory defcribes, and which theory explains, it is the bufinefs of policy to apply, that the experience of the paft may thus ferve for regulating the conduct of the future. While the fame caufes produce the fame effects, nations fimilarly circumftanced muft, it is thought, neceffarily run the fame political career; obtain by fimilar exertions the fame degree of profperity; commit, through ambition or infolence, nearly the fame errors; and, in confequence of thofe errors, be liable to nearly equal reverfes of fortune. The truth of thefe general obfervations cannot be difputed; but in making particular applications of them, either for the purpofe of confirming their own confidence, or of infpiring terror into their enemies, men are almoft continually deceived by appearances; fometimes miftaking even contrafts for parallels. It is not unufual with the great military republic of recent date, to compare itfelf with Rome, and its naval and commercial rival with Carthage. Yet it is only under one afpect, and in particulars the flighteft and moft fuperficial, that Carthage and England exhibit a falfe air of refemblance; while in their characterifing properties, the two maritime commonwealths form the fubject of a contraft rather than of a comparifon. The one continental, the other infular; the former depending entirely for defence on foreign troops, the latter exulting in domeftic ftrength; Carthage noted for penurioufnefs and perfidy; England equally diftinguifhed for probity and profufion; the African republic, addicted folely to lucrative purfuits, confidering literature and philofophy as things beyond its fphere; Great Britain, the feat of arts and elegance, of growing fame in literature, and of unrivalled pre-eminence in fcience.

The parallel between Rome and France is attended with this fingularity, that the latter has run through the fame ftages in a few years, which the former did in as many centuries. It has expelled or deftroyed its royal line; abolifhed privileged orders; laid all honours open to the people at large; difplayed the enthufiafm of liberty; proved the connection between this principle and military energy; defeated its neighbours on the Continent; obliged them to fupply its armies with pay, corn, and clothing; plundered their altars and temples; carried off their pictures and ftatues. I need not fay more of what France has done; but among the tranfactions indicating what fhe in future is likely to do, the reader of ancient hiftory will recollect that Buonaparte is entrufted with nearly the fame commiffion that the Romans beftowed on Cæfar before he became dictator, and in precifely the fame countries on both fides the Alps.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VIII.*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book is placed laſt in order, becauſe it ſeems to have been written to ſupply the defects of ſeveral preceding parts of the work. Ariſtotle had ſufficiently explained the principles and arrangements of the ſimple forms of government; but he thought it might be uſeful further to examine wherein governments bearing the ſame name, might yet eſſentially differ in their nature. This leads him to enumerate and deſcribe the different kinds of democracies and oligarchies, and to ſhew how the worſt kinds might be improved and corrected; and, when thus happily altered, how they might beſt be upheld and perpetuated. In this Book he alſo examines the different kinds of military or naval force in their relation to the different forms of government; ſhewing which kinds of the former are reſpectively beſt adapted to the different modes of the latter. He concludes the Book with an accurate analyſis of the executive power; enumerating and deſcribing the different functions of magiſtracy eſſentially requiſite in every well-regulated commonwealth. On this important ſubject, the following remarks will not appear unſeaſonable.

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When

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VI.

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When our author firſt analyſed government into deliberative, judicial, and executive [a] powers, he meant ſomething more than merely to explain the ſubject as a matter of ſpeculation. For it is neceſſary, he obſerves, not only to know what, and how many are political functions, but according to what ſubordination they ought to be arranged and diſtributed. That they ought to be as minutely ſubdivided as ſtate neceſſity will permit, he thinks moſt evident from this ſimple conſideration, that each individual will be likely to act his part moſt properly, when each has his aſſigned taſk. The military power ought to depend on the civil [b]; that the army may be formidable only to the enemies of the ſtate: and the executive power ought to be clearly diſtinct from the legiſlature; leſt tyrannical laws ſhould be enacted, and thoſe executed tyrannically. All magiſtrates ought to be reſponſible for the exerciſe of their authority; and their accounts ſubject to the inſpection of thoſe who never themſelves handle the public money. The office of collecting and applying the revenue ought never, therefore, to belong to the ſame perſons who adminiſter juſtice, and puniſh crimes; leſt the financial adminiſtrator ſhould abuſe his authority to the baſe purpoſes of extortion or vengeance. "The law is above the judge; and the judge, as organ of the law, above all other magiſtrates. But the office of judge is incompatible with every function, that might pervert his judgment or twiſt his deciſions; for a judge is a ruler, and how can a ruler give ſtraightneſs to other things if itſelf be crooked [c]?"

Theſe

[a] The executive is called by him the appointing or electing power, for a reaſon above aſſigned, p. 275.

[b] But to reduce it to this dependence is not an eaſy matter, as will be experienced by a great modern republic. Yet unleſs this be done, the commonwealth is a camp, and its liberty an empty boaſt.

[c] Rhetor. l. i. p. 512.

Thefe great political principles afford the neareft approximation which the wifdom of antiquity ever made to the improvements and perfection which the events of time and chance, co-operating with the virtues of our anceftors, gradually introduced into the Britifh conftitution. But the grand fecret in policy, of a government, carried on by kings who can do no wrong, and whofe perfons are facred, through the inftrumentality of accountable advifers and refponfible minifters, was totally unknown to the free ftates of antiquity; on which account chiefly, none of them could lay claim to that ftability and perpetuity at which, Cicero maintains [d], all wife government ought ever to aim. As this is a point which deferves the greateft attention, I fhall not be blamed for making an unneceffary circuit, when I take the beft, or the only, road to eftablifh fo important a truth on authority which demands refpect, and by arguments which admit not of anfwer.

The learned and judicious Polybius, who was not merely a *fpeculative* politician, but one converfant from his youth with courts and camps, and the management of great affairs, of unbounded curiofity, and with extraordinary opportunities, explains as the main refult of his reading and experience, what he calls the theory of political revolutions: revolutions fo neceffary in their event, and fo immutable in their order, that they may be eafily forefeen, and boldly predicted. The difcourfe is contained in the fixth book of his Hiftory, and applied to the commonwealth of Rome in the beginning of the feventh century from the foundation of the city, the firmeft and moft flourifhing period of the republic; when external victory confpired with internal arrangement to render the public fecurity

[d] Fragm. de Repub. l. iii.

fecurity as ftable, as the policy of the ftate was profound, and its renown was illuftrious.

In that invaluable fragment the hiftorian finds fault with the ufual divifion of governments into monarchies, ariftocracies, and democracies; obferving that thefe are neither the beft, nor the only, kinds of civil polity. Monarchies are the firft governments in their origin, and the work of Nature herfelf; but they have never yet been fo fkilfully moulded by art, that they had not a ftrong and palpable tendency to degenerate into tyrannies. It is the nature of power to corrupt thofe invefted with the exercife of it; and the exercife of hereditary power is, in this refpect, ftill more dangerous than that of any other. When princes, therefore, begin to abufe their prerogatives and authority for the unbridled indulgence of their rapacity, luft, and luxury, their proceedings cannot fail to provoke indignation and anger among the more dignified claffes of their fubjects, whofe temper is the leaft likely tamely to brook difgrace. The people at large will fympathize with their refentment, and affift in deftroying the monarchy, which had degenerated into a tyranny. An ariftocracy will naturally rife on its ruins; fince the gratitude of the public will cheerfully accept for rulers thofe by whom the country was delivered from oppreffion. The new magiftrates will continue for a while to conduct themfelves with propriety and patriotifm; adminiftering juftly and wifely the affairs both of the citizens individually, and of the public collectively. But when the exercife of their power devolves on their defcendants, who have not the merit of their fathers, nor enjoy like them the advantage of having been trained in the fchool of adverfity, thefe unworthy fucceffors will begin grofsly to abufe their pre-eminent functions; giving loofe reins to the moft

odious and moft difgraceful paffions. The ariftocracy is thus transformed into an oligarchy; which, finking under the weight of its own inherent vices, will be fpeedily overturned by the firft leader of the multitude who has courage to affail it; fince the whole body of the people, exafperated by an accumulation of indignities, will be prepared to abet his meafures and to fecond his efforts. The people at large, now taking the commonwealth into their own hands, will eftablifh a democracy; and while the greater part of thofe continue to live, who have experienced the evils refulting from governments of arbitrary will, the community will flourifh under the bleffings of law and liberty. But when the adminiftration of the democracy is delivered down from father to fon through fucceffive generations, the reftleffnefs of man will begin to fpurn advantages with which he is fatiated; ambition will naufeate equality, and figh for pre-eminence; thofe who have accumulated great wealth, will covet a proportional fhare of political power; and to attain this much envied object, will not hefitate to deftroy their own fortunes by profufion, and to corrupt the public morals by bribery, until the whole mafs of the community be fo deeply tainted with the impatience of rapacity, that the populace will no longer wait for the precarious or tardy dole, but putting themfelves under the command of the firft daring and unprincipled chief, whofe boldnefs equals his wickednefs, will invade the conftitution; fubvert the government; confifcate, banifh, murder, and plunder, until having filled up the meafure of their favage ferocity, the folly of their own paffions delivers them enflaved and bound, into the hands of a fingle defpot [d].

Such

[d] The fame doctrine is maintained by Ariftotle, b. vii. c. v.; and by Plato in the following paffage: ἡ γαρ αγαν ελευθερια ἐοικεν ουκ εις αλλο τι η εις αγαν δουλειαν μεταβαλλειν : : : εικοτως

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Such is the perpetual round, which, according to Polybius, all unmixed governments are found by experience to run; from monarchy to tyranny; from ariftocracy to oligarchy; from democracy to the tyranny of the multitude; for every multitude, he affirms, merely as fuch, is filled with levity and inconftancy, lawlefs in its purfuits, headftrong in is paffions, unjuft in its proceedings [e]. In none of the fimple forms of government, therefore, is there any conftitutional firmnefs; their ftability depends on manners which are tranfient, and on circumftances which are accidental. They may be kept afloat by a tide of external profperity; while the atchievement and partition of foreign conquefts, conceal the inherent evils of the conftitutions under which they are made. But the flame of difcord, the longer it is fuppreffed by the mere accumulation of fuel, will finally break out with the greater violence; which has always been experienced by ftates whofe inftitutions were well adapted to the contentious activity of war, but which had never been taught to enjoy the ineftimable gifts of peaceful leifure and unambitious fecurity.

Having rejected and reprobated all fimple forms of polity, Polybius proceeds to examine thofe that are complex; governments of reciprocal controul; of which, he maintains, the moft perfect model was to be found in the conftitution of Rome, as it ftood in the beginning of the feventh century of the republic. In that conftitution, monarchic, ariftocratic, and popular elements

εικοτως τοινυν ουκ εξ αλλης πολιτειας τυραννις καθισταται η εκ δημοκρατιας. Εξ της ακροτατης ελευθεριας, δουλεια πλειστη και αγριωτατη. "Exceffive liberty is not likely to change into any thing elfe but exceffive flavery. Tyranny, therefore, more naturally refults from democracy than from any other form of government; the higheft liberty being converted into the completeft and cruelleft fervitude." Plato de Republ. l. ix.

[e] Polybius, l. vi. c. 56. p. 594. edit. Schweigh.

ments were fo fkilfully combined and fo equally balanced, that the Romans themfelves could not pofitively afcertain with which of the three fpecies of governments their own ought to be claffed [f]. When they contemplated the fplendid functions of the confuls, *their* authority feemed equal to that of kings. In the fenate they beheld and felt the full ftrength of an ariftocracy. The people at large, headed by their tribunes, appeared imperioufly to exercife the plenitude of democratic power. The confuls, our author obferves, even before leading their refpective armies into the field, carry on within Rome itfelf the chief adminiftration of affairs. To them all magiftrates, except the tribunes, are fubject. They affemble the fenate, propofe matters of urgency for its deliberation, and carry its decrees into execution. They likewife convoke the popular affembly, report to the people the refolutions of the fenate, collect and declare the votes, and give efficacy to the will of the majority. When the confuls are at Rome, the ambaffadors of foreign ftates can, through them only, be admitted to an audience in the fenate. In military matters their authority is fupreme. They appoint the military tribunes, enrol the legions, felect the

[f] The whole of Polybius's obfervations on this fubject feems to have efcaped the notice of our great law commentator Blackftone. "Thus thefe three fpecies of government have all of them their feveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are ufually the beft calculated to direct the ends of a law; ariftocracies, to invent the means by which that end fhall be attained; and monarchies, to carry thofe means into execution. And the ancients, as was obferved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government, but thefe three; for though Cicero * declares himfelf of opinion "effe optimam conftitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali optimo & populari, fit modice confufa;" yet Tacitus † treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a vifionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lafting or fecure ‡.

* Fragm. de Repub. l. ii. † Annal. l. iv. c. 33. ‡ Blackftone's Commen. Intro. fect. ii.

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the men fitteft for each kind of fervice [g], and impofe their undifputed commands on the allies. All who ferve under their ftandards, are alike liable to their coercion and chaftifement; and the queftors attend them in the field, merely to difburfe whatever fums they may think fit to demand. Such, Polybius obferves, are the royal and monarchic powers [h] of the confuls.

The fenate is not, however, deftitute of its due weight in the ftate. Firft of all, this refpected council governs the exchequer, into which no fums are received, and from which none are iffued, but by the exprefs orders of the fenate. By the fenate's command only, the queftors difburfe all monies for the public fervice, except thofe fums with which they fupply the confuls in the field. Even that heavy expenditure which is incurred by the ftate at the end of every period of five years, for the repairs or extenfion of public works, is made by the cenfors under the authority of the fenate; which body alfo takes cognizance of all public delinquences committed in any part of Italy; fuch as treafons, confpiracies, poifonings, and affaffinations. To the fenate it belongs to fettle all difputes which arife in Italy, whether between individuals or communities; as well as to difpatch all embaffies to foreign parts, either to treat of peace, or to denounce war; either to offer its advice and protection, or to interpofe with its authority and commands. When foreign ambaffadors arrive at Rome, the fenate receives them

[g] Compar. Polyb. l. vi. c. 12. p. 481. & l. vi. c. 20. p. 496. The military inftitutions of the Romans called forth the whole energy of the ftate. With them, the public was every thing; the citizens, nothing. According to their age, ftrength, and ftature, they were draughted into the feveral legions, and divifions of legions; *cohorts* and *maniples*; without the fmalleft regard to their partialities and prejudices. Vid. Polyb. ubi fupra.

[h] L. vi. c. 12. p. 481.

them in the manner it may judge moft fit; and anfwers their demands as it may deem moft expedient. Thence, to ftrangers who come to Rome in the abfence of the confuls, the commonwealth appears in no other light than that of a fimple ariftocracy [1].

It may very naturally be inquired, what political functions, then, remain for the exercife of the people at large? the greateft and moft important of all; for the people are the difpenfers of rewards and punifhments. They elect the magiftrates, they

[1] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiii. p. 482. I abridge the author's narrative as much as attention to perfpicuity will admit; yet I am fearful left his analyfis of the Roman government prove tirefome to thofe, who befide confidering the importance of the fubject itfelf, do not continually keep in view the important confequence that I would deduce from his elaborate difcuffion. Of all mixed governments, Polybius thinks the Roman, as it ftood in his time, the beft model of a well-balanced commonwealth. He obferves, however, that emergencies muft occur, that would infallibly deftroy its equipoife. His prediction was fulfilled; as all fimilar predictions had been fulfilled concerning governments fimilarly conftituted. I prefume not to maintain, that he chofe for his example, the beft model of mixed government that could poffibly have been felected. Perhaps the ancient government of the Cretans, whofe inftitutions, as well as manners, had fadly degenerated in his time, might have anfwered his purpofe better; and the equipoife in the conftitutions both of Carthage and of Sparta was maintained during a period of longer duration, though of lefs fplendour. But the refult of his reafoning, confirmed by that of all the great writers of antiquity, is, that every one of thofe mixed governments, in many of which there was a nice balance of political powers, and in fome of which the people (as above proved) acted by their reprefentatives, yet I fay that every one of them contained in itfelf the feeds of its diffolution. Their radical infirmity originated not in thofe caufes to which it is univerfally afcribed, the want of reprefentation and a balance; but it confifted principally in this, that their firft magiftrates, by whatever title they might be diftinguifhed, confuls, archons, or kings, were incapable of performing what Ariftotle confiders as the main function of royalty, the defending the poor from infult and the rich from injury, and thus keeping the component parts of a ftate in their proper places, and thereby giving to the conftitution inalterable ftability.

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they impofe fines on thofe guilty of malverfation in office; they alone can inflict the punifhment of death. The laws propofed by the fenate are either confirmed or rejected by the people; and the people may either ratify or annul all tranfactions between the fenate and foreign ftates [k].

In this complex form of the Roman conftitution, the moving powers are, according to Polybius, admirably adapted to the purpofes of harmonious co-operation, and of feafonable counteraction; fince the parts reciprocally control each other, linked in a nice chain of mutual dependence. The confuls, at the head of their armies, depend both on the fenate and on the people; on the fenate, without whofe authority their foldiers cannot be provided with corn, or clothing, or pay; which can either prorogue their command, or appoint new generals; which can aggrandize and emblazon their tranfactions, or depreciate, vilify, and obfcure them; and without whofe willingnefs to furnifh the requifite expence, they cannot be gratified with the honour of a triumph. The confuls are dependent, alfo, on the people, to whom, at the year's end, they are refponfible for their behaviour in command; and to whom it belongs, either to ratify or to annul their tranfactions with foreign powers [l].

The fenate and the people are held in a connection not lefs intimate, which compels them mutually to refpect each other. The people alone can inflict the moft tremendous of all punifhments. They can diminifh the collective honours of the fenate; they can abridge the fortunes of its members; and the *veto* of a fingle tribune, who is naturally the creature and the organ of the people, can ftop all proceedings in the fenate, and even prevent the affembling of that council. But the people, in return, muft

[k] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiv. p. 484, & feq. [l] Ibid. c. xv. p. 486, & feq.

muft refpect the will of the fenators, both collectively and individually; for the fenators are their employers, paymafters, and judges. In every part of Italy there are innumerable works, confifting in buildings and repairs; the culture of lands and gardens; the management of mines, rivers, and harbours, all which objects are let to farm by the cenfors, and undertaken by the people. There is fcarcely a fingle Roman who is not involved in thefe contracts; fome farming under the cenfors at a certain price; others being partners with the farmers; a third clafs being fureties for them; and a fourth, in fupport of thefe fureties, pledging their own fortunes to the ftate. But in enforcing or modifying all fuch bargains, the power of the fenate is fupreme. This council can extend the time limited for performance; can lighten the conditions of the contract; and when any infeparable obftacle occurs, altogether releafe the contractors. Befides this, in moft other civil caufes of magnitude, judges are felected from the fenate. The people at large, therefore, will be careful how they provoke a body, from whofe members they have fo much to hope, as well as fo much to fear [m]. Nor is there reafon to apprehend that they fhould wantonly thwart the inclinations of the confuls, to whofe authority all the citizens both collectively and individually are amenable in the field. From this fkilful adaptation and intimate dependence of the parts, that harmony of action refults by which the political machine is impelled regularly and rapidly towards its propofed goal [n]; refifting all attacks, furmounting every

[m] Polybius, l. vi. c. xvi. & xvii. p. 488, & feq.

[n] There is a difference between mechanical and moral powers, afterwards hinted at by Polybius. The former, acting neceffarily and invariably, will, when equal and contrary, deftroy each other. But in politics two contrary powers may exift fimultaneoufly;

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every enemy, and continually extending the dominion of the republic. When the terrors of danger are exchanged for the joys of victory, and the minds of men might be elated and intoxicated through excefs of profperity, the benefit of a government of reciprocal control is eminently confpicuous; fince thofe branches of the ftate that would tower too high, and expand too widely, are checked in their movements, and even anticipated in their tendencies, by the continual preffure of the powers to which they are obnoxious [o].

This is a glorious panegyric of the republic, as then conftituted, and then circumftanced. But Polybius reluctantly acknowledges that the complement would foon ceafe to be applicable;

taneoufly; and the movement of government, inftead of being weakened or ftopped, may be fometimes thereby ftrengthened and accelerated. In the Roman conftitution, befides the *Comitia Curiata*, which was chiefly ufeful in arming military commanders with the fanctions and authority of religion, there exifted in Rome, from the time of the Publilian law enacted in the 414th year of the city, two legiflative powers, the *Comitia Tributa* and the *Comitia Centuriata*; the former founded on the balance of numbers; and the latter, on the balance of property. A dictator might be legally named by the confuls, neither controlable in his exercife of power, nor accountable for his adminiftration in office; which, though limited to the fpace of fix months, afforded time fufficient for the fubverfion of a government. The power of the dictator was occafional and extraordinary; but at all times the veto of a tribune was alike formidable. He might ftop all meafures and all deliberations; and, as the tribunes were the creatures of the multitude from which they derived their authority, they would often be inclined through intereft and vanity, to flatter popular paffions, and to blow up every guft of difcontent into a ftorm of fedition. Yet notwithftanding thefe feeming incongruities, the body politic was held together by the charms of victory and glory, and the neceffity of acting continually againft innumerable enemies *, in defence of a country in which the great enjoyed pre-eminences and honours, and the people at large more freedom and more advantages than any other nation in the ancient world. Such was the ftate of Rome until that combination of circumftances was produced, which, as Polybius hints, the commonwealth would be unable to furmount.

° Polybius, l. vi. c. xviii. p. 492.

* Externus metus, maximum concordiæ vinculum. Tit. Liv.

cable; for the component parts of the ftate would be kept in their proper places through reciprocal counteraction and control, only while the minds of men were neither inflamed by the luft of power, nor loofened from the reftraint of principle; and while the commonwealth, continuing in a progreffive ftate of profperity, could difcharge in its colonizations and conquefts, thofe noxious humours which, unlefs drained by fuch outlets, muft prove deftructive to its vitals. But as the meafure of national profperity was filled up [p], the objects of individual ambition would be expanded and magnified; and, while the affailing temptations augmented beyond bounds, the virtues to refift them would continually diminifh. The extortion of rapacity would keep pace with the profufion of vanity; and the unworthy proceedings of the Great would finally terminate in their own ruin, and that of the republic; for the people, provoked by the ambition and avarice of one party, and intoxicated by the perfidious adulation of another, would begin to defpife law, to fpurn authority; and, fubjecting the concerns of their country to their own furious paffions, would eftablifh under the fpecious names of liberty and equality, the worft and cruelleft of all tyrannies. This political prophecy begun to be verified a few years after it was made, in the feditions of the Gracchi; and was completely accomplifhed in the future misfortunes of the republic. But it is worthy of remark, that Polybius concludes his difcourfe, after he has fhipwrecked the Romans on democracy; leaving them to infer from his general theory

[p] εις ὑπεροχην και δυναστειαν αδηριτον αφικηται, p. 576. I have paraphrafed this paffage of Polybius by comparing it with what Ariftotle predicts concerning the deftiny of Carthage. We learn from the Roman hiftorians in general, that the complete colonization of Italy had the effect afcribed to it in the text.

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theory of political revolutions, that this tyrannical democracy muſt neceſſarily terminate in the exaltation of a ſingle deſpot [q].

The want of conſtitutional firmneſs in the beſt regulated ſtates of antiquity, produced a very general opinion, that nations, as well as individuals, had their youth and old age; their maturity, decline, and conſequent diſſolution. This opinion is warmly patronized by Plato [r]; it is maintained likewiſe by Polybius; it was firſt refuted by Ariſtotle; and it is alſo rejected by Cicero [s]. But it remained for modern times to ſhew, how the vigour of monarchy, acting by reſponſible inſtruments only, could retain the component parts of a ſtate unalterably in their proper ſpheres; and how the merely executive part of government, though clearly diſtinct from the ſovereignty, might be armed with ſufficient power to uphold law, but without either the power or the will to ſubvert liberty. Had this political arrangement been eſtabliſhed in the free ſtates of antiquity,

[q] According to Ariſtotle's principles, the republic of Rome enjoyed one advantage in common with the great republic of modern growth; viz. its greatneſs: for the parties which neceſſarily prevail in all popular governments, rendering them peculiarly liable to the pernicious interference of foreign powers, the ſtability of a great republic conſidered in relation to external cauſes of deſtruction, whether by force or fraud, muſt be much firmer than that of a ſmall one. But the modern commonwealth is deſtitute of two advantages which had a tendency to preſerve the ancient. Firſt, a permanent ſenate, which gave the ſtate continuity of exiſtence, and tranſmitted from one generation to another the ſame plans and purpoſes; and ſecondly, the dictatorial and tribunicial powers, which, however liable to abuſe, ſeem indiſpenſably neceſſary in every populous community governed on the republican plan, for ſeaſonably ſuſpending the adverſe exertion of exaſperated factions; and thereby preventing contrarieties of intereſt from continually degenerating into ſources of ſedition.

[r] Plato de Republic. l. viii. p. 712, & ſeq. edit. Ficin.

[s] Debit enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas, ut æterna ſit. Itaque nullus interitus eſt reipublicæ naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo neceſſaria eſt, verum etiam optanda perſæpe. Fragment de Repub. l. iii.

tiquity, they would not have been liable to thofe perpetual abufes of power, which, as Polybius fays, are by *a natural neceffity* [t], fubverfive of ariftocracies and democracies; nor would there have been room for that unbounded ambition, which, in all great and profperous ftates, tends, by a *neceffity equally* inevitable, to the deftruction of mixed governments, how nicely foever in other refpects their texture may be combined, and their elements may be balanced. Enterprifing demagogues and fortunate generals would not merely have been refifted in their exertions by the counteraction of equals and rivals, until the bloody conflict ended in the ruin of public liberty; but they would have been repreffed in their tendencies, and overawed in their hopes, by a power far mightier to fave than they were to deftroy; but a power, whofe ftrength would be changed into weaknefs, whenever it attempted to violate liberty, and infringe the laws [u].

[t] The natural neceffity of political revolutions is maintained by Machiavel. Hiftory of Florence, l. i. fub initio; whofe opinions on the fubject, and even turn of expreffion, are copied by Hume. Hiftory of England, vol. ii. p. 441. Edit. 1767.

[u] Is it neceffary to obferve as a corollary to this difcourfe, that a neighbouring nation, if fhe confulted her fuppofed intereft and the fafety of her republican government, would inftantly relinquifh the career of ambition, and difband her armies more eagerly and more cheerfully than ever fhe collected them? The ftability of her democratical conftitution can refult only from giving to her national guards or militia a decided fuperiority over foldiers by profeffion. But how many ftubborn difficulties will prefent themfelves in attempting to realife this project! Should many of the requifition men be defirous to return to their families, and fhould the numerous bodies of foreigners in the fervice be difcharged without danger, and without tumult, yet who will be able to perfuade the French veterans to forfake their arms, their generals, and their military habits of life; and prevail on the greater part of them to mix with the peaceful mafs of citizens, while the remainder is difperfed over an extenfive frontier? Yet unlefs this is done, it is morally impoffible that France fhould long enjoy even the name or appearance of a republic. I leave this note as it ftood before the recent revolution of the fourth of September.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Of republics of husbandmen—Of manufacturers and merchants.—Imperfections of democracy.—Oligarchy.—Military and naval force.—Branches of executive magistracy.—Magistrates for protecting commerce and contracts—Of police—Of revenue.—Courts of record.—Controllers of public accounts.—Different orders of priests.—Superintendants of education and morals.

BOOK VIII. Chap. 1.

Of the elements of governments, and their different combinations.

IN former books, we analysed and examined the complex structure of government, and explained the nature and the differences of the deliberative, the judicial, and the executive, powers. The deliberative power properly constitutes the sovereignty, since the proper office of magistrates and judges consists in obeying its will, and in executing its orders [1]. We shewed, also, what are the political arrangements, which in the appointment of magistrates, and in the constitution of councils and tribunals, are best adapted to each form of government; and described what are the active powers by which every political fabric may be shaken and subverted, as well as what are the resisting forces by which it may be upheld and perpetuated. But as governments, included under the same specific name, differ from each other, in consequence of the different materials of which they are composed, and of the various modes in which those

[1] βουλευτικου και κυριου. Compare above, p. 275 & seq.

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those materials are arranged, it is neceffary further [y] to examine thofe materials and that arrangement; to confider whether, for inftance, a democracy or an oligarchy contains all the conftituent elements, which are commonly deemed effential to democracies or oligarchies; or whether they contain only a certain proportion of thofe elements mixed with others of a different kind [z]; what is the effect of this compofition on good government in general, and what combinations are beft adapted to each country or nation in particular. We begin by treating of democracy [a].

Chap. 2.

Of the nature and end of democracy.

Liberty is the foundation and fcope of democracy; and it is not unufual to hear that in this government alone, the charms of liberty are difplayed. Liberty itfelf is allowed to be founded on juftice; but the juftice of democracies, being meafured by arithmetical [b] equality, requires that each individual citizen fhould enjoy the fame political advantages with every other citizen, and that the will as well as the intereft of the greater number fhould always be preferred to the will and the intereft of the leffer. It is the nature, therefore, of democracy, that offices of executive magiftracy fhould be held by rotation; and that in the deliberative affembly, the poor fhould always prevail over the rich, becaufe the clafs of the poor is every where the more

[y] Ariftotle having ftated the contents of the preceding Books, goes on to confider the different kinds of governments diftinguifhed by the fame fpecific name, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τι λοιπόν, "and at the fame time to examine any remaining particulars which bear a reference to the fubject of his prefent work;" which is fufficient to fhew that this Book, as I have obferved in the Introduction, is chiefly fupplemental.

[z] Ariftotle fays that the refult of the συνδυασμοὶ, "the conjunctions of elements," was not fufficiently attended to in his own times.

[a] I omit fome parts of this chapter, becaufe the obfervations contained in them are afterwards more clearly expreffed.

[b] See vol. i. b. v. c. 4. p. 266.

more numerous. This laſt circumſtance is conſidered as the beſt proof, or moſt evident ſign of liberty; and the ſecond is, that each individual may live as he liſts; for to live agreeably to the will of another is, according to the maxim of democrats, to be a ſlave. On the baſis, therefore, of theſe principles, the following democratical laws may be erected. That every citizen ſhould be capable of holding offices; and where election prevails, that every citizen ſhould be an elector. That the general will ſhould govern each individual; but that each individual, in his turn, ſhould be appointed to declare and execute this will. That offices ſhould be diſtributed by lot, if not all offices, at leaſt all ſuch as do not require the peculiar advantages of ſkill and experience. That a qualification in point of fortune be not requiſite for holding any employment; at leaſt, that this qualification be exceedingly ſmall. That the ſame office (military offices excepted) be not held twice ſucceſſively by the ſame perſon; and that all offices ſhould be of as ſhort duration as circumſtances will admit. That all the citizens be capable of being appointed judges of the law as well as of the fact in all ſorts of cauſes, and reſpecting all ſorts of perſons; or, if this be thought too general, in all important cauſes, and reſpecting all diſtinguiſhed perſons; for example, in all political queſtions, in impeachments, and even in private contracts, where the object is conſiderable. That the ſovereignty reſide in the national aſſembly, and be as ſparingly imparted as poſſible to particular magiſtrates. Of all magiſtracies, that leaſt repugnant to the genius of democracy is the ſenate; but when ſalaries and fees are granted for the diſcharge of public duties, the authority even of the ſenate muſt ſoon vaniſh; for the rapacity of the people will ſpeedily bring all public buſineſs

Laws therefrom reſulting.

The evils reſulting from the form of a ſimple democracy, prove that form to be imperfect.

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before the national aſſembly, and draw all law-ſuits and trials before their own tribunals [c]. Salaries and fees, therefore, are eſſential to the completion of democracy; magiſtrates, whoſe uninterrupted functions require that they ſhould meſs together [d], muſt live at the public expence; and ſhould occaſional meetings paſs unrewarded, yet the people at large muſt be paid for attending thoſe ſtated and periodical aſſemblies, the returns of which are regulated by law for the neceſſary diſcharge of public buſineſs. Birth, wealth, education, morals are the elements of ariſtocracies; the elements of democracies, therefore, muſt be of a contrary kind; baſeneſs of extraction, groſs ignorance, poverty, and profligacy [e]. No hereditary, no perpetual magiſtracy can exiſt under ſuch a government; and if any thing of that nature had formerly found place in the country, the power of ſuch a magiſtrate muſt be aboliſhed; or if his title be allowed to remain, the honour of bearing it muſt not be conferred by election, but committed to the blind deciſion of chance. Such are the common properties reſulting from the form

[c] Ariſtotle ſubjoins, that this had been obſerved in the preceding Book; an obſervation which might have led his editors to a better arrangement of his treatiſe of politics, than that hitherto given.

[d] Ariſtotle here enumerates τας αρχας και τα δικαστηρια και βουλην; that is, magiſtrates reſpectively entruſted with executive, judiciary, and deliberative powers; who, as well as the citizens at large convened in the εκκλησιαι κυριαι, or ſtated aſſemblies, ought according to the principles of ſimple democracy to be paid for political labours. But if the public revenues cannot ſuffice for this profuſion of expence, then thoſe magiſtrates at leaſt muſt be renumerated, whoſe uninterrupted functions require that they ſhould meſs together; and with them it appears from B. vi. c. xiii. that he means to claſs, as to this particular, the citizens convened in the ſtated and periodical aſſemblies.

[e] The word βαναυσια denotes mean ſordid labour; but Ariſtotle, by ſaying that the elements of democracy are directly the reverſe of thoſe which conſtitute ariſtocracy, ſhews that he here intends the manners and morals reſulting from that degrading ſpecies of labour; and what theſe manners and morals are, he explains below in chapter iv. of this Book.

form of a ſimple democracy, and deducible from the definitions given by the partiſans of that government of juſtice, equality, and liberty.

Chap. 3.

How the right of the majority is to be reconciled with the due influence of property.

The imperfection of theſe definitions appears in the miſchief of their conſequences [f]. Yet the number of inhabitants, or populouſneſs, is, doubtleſs, the firſt element in the compoſition of ſtates; and to the intereſt of the people at large, due regard, therefore, ought to be had in the diſtribution of advantages and honours. But populouſneſs, though the firſt and principal, is not the only element eſſential to the end and purpoſe of every political aſſociation; the well-being, comfort, or happineſs of the aſſociated members. Towards the producing and ſecuring of this comfortable ſubſiſtence of the community, other powers muſt co-operate; property, education, morals; without which it is impoſſible that any civil partnerſhip or commonwealth can anſwer the purpoſe of the partners [g]. How then are we to combine the other elements or cauſes of political advantage with mere numbers? How, for inſtance, is the regard due to property, a thing eſſential to the exiſtence of ſtates, to be reconciled with the intereſt of the people at large, and the rights of the majority. Shall we divide the ſtate into the two claſſes of

[f] I have here inſerted this obſervation, which occurs below, for the ſake of perſpicuity. The ſame inducement has made me tranſpoſe ſome other ſentences, and alſo expand the author's brevity by uſing the ſame words which he himſelf employs on other occaſions when treating ſimilar ſubjects.

[g] Cicero frequently borrows and adorns this ſentiment: Reſpublica eſt res populi. Populus autem non omnes cœtus multitudinis, ſed cœtus juris conſenſu, et utilitatis communione ſociatus. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people; but the people are not a mere collection or multitude of human beings; but a multitude aſſociated according to the principles of juſtice, and for the ſake of utility." Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

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of the rich and poor, and reckon the votes of five hundred of the former, equal to the votes of a thoufand of the latter? Or retaining this divifion, fhall an equal number of deputies be chofen from the clafs of the poor and from the clafs of the rich; and fhall thefe deputies, united in one affembly, appoint by the majority of voices, the magiftrates and judges? According to the partifans of democracy, the political fcales ought to be balanced by the mere weight of numbers; according to the partifans of oligarchy, the greateft weight of property ought always to prevail. How can thofe contrarieties be harmonifed into fyftem, but by confidering wealth and numbers as elements of equal importance, or mere units, of which the greater number of fractional parts [h] muft always prevail over the leffer? Suppofe, for inftance, twenty poor and ten rich, and that fifteen of the poor and four of the rich are of the fame opinion: it is plain, that in this cafe there is a greater acceffion of wealth to the fide of numbers, than of numbers to the fide of wealth. Numbers, therefore, muft prevail; but the contrary would happen if the fix rich, exceeding half the reprefentation of wealth, had been joined by ten of the poor, which is half the reprefentative of numbers. When the oppofite fides are equally balanced, it will be neceffary to caft lots, or to have recourfe to the expedients employed in doubtful cafes by tribunals and affemblies. Difficult as it certainly is, nicely to adjuft contrarieties, and to difcover the true theory of political arrangements, it is far more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper places, and to reftrain the injuftice of domineering factions. The inferior party are great

[h] The Greeks, it is known, employed proportion for anfwering the purpofe of fractions; but in explaining Ariftotle's fenfe, I have preferred a language familiar to the modern reader.

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great fticklers for juftice; but thofe that are uppermoft fet its maxims at defiance [1].

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Chap. 4.

Of the different kinds of democracies, and of that which is the beft.

We have fhewn that there are different kinds of democracies, neceffarily refulting from the variety of materials of which they are compofed, and the various diftribution of thofe materials in the political ftructure. Every democracy is a government of the majority; but this government may be more or lefs tempered in proportion as wealth, birth, morals, and other circumftances, befides the mere ftrength of numbers, are refpected by the fundamental laws of the conftitution, and preferred in the diftribution of offices and honours. The principal differences of democracies refult, however, from the different qualities of the people that enter into their compofition; and communities are thus marked with characteriftic diftinctions by their various modes of procuring the neceffaries of life; or, according to the various occupations of agriculture, pafturage, manufactures, and commerce. Agreeably to this divifion, the beft kind of democracy, and likewife the moft ancient on record, is that in which the people fubfift by agriculture; becaufe the beft clafs of working people are thofe employed in the rural labours of agriculture and pafturage, efpecially the former; and the manners and habits of hufbandmen are alfo the beft adapted to counteract the evil tendency of democratic inftitutions. From their poverty mixed with fimplicity, thofe claffes

Of the character of men fubfifting chiefly by agriculture.

[1] This lamentation is often made by the hiftorians of Rome, even during the ages moft diftinguifhed for political moderation. "Sed alter femper ordo gravis alterius modeftiæ erat." The reafon is fubjoined. "Adeo moderatio tuendæ libertatis, dum æquari velle fimulando ita fe quifque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili eft: cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro fe efficiunt: et injuriam a nobis repulfam, tanquam aut facere aut pati neceffe fit, injungimus aliis." Tit. Liv. l. iii. c. lxv. In the introduction to this book, I have endeavoured to point out the means by which the evil may be cured.

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classes of men are less inclined than any others, to assemble frequently or tumultuously; and summoned to daily labour by the voice of Nature herself, they learn to prefer the certain profits of industry to the precarious acquisitions of rapine. When allowed to retain their own, they covet not the property of others. To them it is a more agreeable task, to cultivate their fields, than to compose laws; and they do not much care to attend the national assembly, unless they be well rewarded for their political labours. The greater part of mankind are, in fact, more desirous of gain, than ambitious of honour. As a proof of this observation, we may allege the husbandmen or peasants of old, who patiently brooked absolute monarchy; and also the peasants of our own times, who quietly endure oligarchy, provided they are not stripped of their property, nor disturbed in their labours; by which some of them acquire opulence, and all of them avoid indigence. The alteration of the government will not alter their propensities and habits, which they will carry with them into democracy itself; where those of them who have any seeds of ambition, will find themselves sufficiently gratified by the right of electing their magistrates, and of exacting an account of their administration. In some democracies, the people at large are seldom convened in the deliberative or elective assemblies. At Mantinæa, the usual magistrates were named by deputies previously appointed, and the nation continued well satisfied with this arrangement; because each individual might become a deputy in his turn, and thus enjoy the advantage of deciding the public resolutions, and of appointing, approving, and judging those invested with executive power. This form of democracy prevailed among the shepherds and husbandmen of Arcadia. But it is usual, and

and highly uſeful, in the beſt ſort of democracies, though they entruſt to the people at large the election and judgment of magiſtrates, to enact, however, that the principal offices of government ſhould be held by men of a certain cenſus, or, without ſpecifying any fixed cenſus, to enjoin that ſuch great offices ſhould be conferred on thoſe rich enough to diſcharge them diſintereſtedly and honourably. Such a conſtitution is well regulated, for power will be adminiſtered by the fitteſt perſons, whoſe talents are the objects of public approbation; and whoſe honours, not bringing with them any profit, will not be the objects of popular envy. The ſuperior ranks of men will be contented with an arrangement which liberates them from the hard condition of being occaſionally governed by their inferiors; and they will themſelves govern uprightly, becauſe they are reſponſible to the people at large for their behaviour in office: magiſtrates not reſponſible are incompatible with any kind of good government, ſince power uncontrolled ſuits not the frailty of human nature.

How agriculture is to be encouraged, and the beſt kind of democracy to be eſtabliſhed.

This then is the beſt kind of democracy, becauſe reſulting from the beſt quality of the people, the beſt daily occupations, and the beſt conſequent habits. An important queſtion, therefore, ariſes, how are we to mould the people into this moſt uſeful form? The anſwer will be found in the legiſlation of ancient and moſt flouriſhing ſtates, whoſe inſtitutions encouraged agriculture in preference to all other employments. In ſome countries it was a law, that no individual ſhould poſſeſs above a certain meaſure of ground; in others, this regulation was confined to lands within a limited diſtance from the capital. Some commonwealths have enacted that no family ſhould be allowed to part with its original lot of land, or ancient inherit-

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ance; and a law of Oxylus[k] forbids any man to mortgage beyond a certain proportion of his eftate. The Aphytæi[l] are a populous community with a diminitive territory, yet are all of them cultivators of the ground; becaufe, though a qualification in land is neceffary for holding offices and honours, yet is this qualification fo fmall in value or extent, that even the pooreft inhabitants may eafily acquire it. It is impoffible to miftake the fpirit of fuch regulations, which, while they prevent one clafs of men from occupying more lands than they can themfelves cultivate, call forth the induftry of the other clafs by affigning to them lands of their own, and thereby giving them a fubject on which that induftry is always moft cheerfully exercifed.

Of democracies of fhepherds, manufacturers, failors, and merchants.

Next to a community of hufbandmen, a nation fubfifting by pafturage is the fitteft for being formed into a democracy. There is much fimilarity in thofe two modes of life; and as a preparative for war, the daily occupations and confequent habits of the fhepherd are admirably calculated. He is accuftomed to fleep in the open air, to march regularly, to encamp cautioufly; while his body is hardened by exercife, his mind is fharpened by vigilance. All other democracies are of a far inferior ftamp; for their materials are not capable of receiving any elegant or lafting impreffion. They are compofed of wretched labourers and mean mechanics, of manufacturers condemned to unwholefome air and diftorting poftures, of rapacious failors and greedy merchants, who navigate and trade for no other

Why the latter democracies are greatly inferior to the former.

[k] King of the Elians. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. & v.

[l] In fome editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch in Lyfand. p. 444, calls them Aphygæi. They inhabited the peninfula Pallene in the region of Chalcis on the coaft of Thrace or Macedon. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xv. p. 196, & feq. and Strabo Excerpt. l. viii. p. 330.

other purpofe than that of gain ; a purpofe mean in itfelf, and meanly or wickedly attained, fometimes by fraud, and fometimes by rapine. Men fubfifting by continual deceit and mutual depredation, muft live together in crowds, tumbling over each other in populous cities, and ready at the beck of every feditious demagogue to affemble tumultuoufly, and to act outrageoufly. But in a commonwealth of hufbandmen, families are fcattered at due diftances by the neceffity of their daily labours. The citizens juftle not with each other ; and their circumftances neither require nor admit the frequency of popular conventions. It is for this reafon that a country of great extent, and which eafily afforded room for the continual diffufion of colonies at wide diftances from the capital, might be improved, fortified, and embellifhed by agriculture alone and its fubfervient arts, and might enjoy, under nearly a fimple democratic form, the benefits refulting from mixed policy [m].

That the city tribes ought not to affemble feparately from thofe of the country.

The properties and habits of hufbandmen, as diftinguifhed from mercenary labourers on the one hand, and from manufacturers, merchants, and tradefmen on the other, are fo eminently confpicuous and fo incomparably better adapted to the peaceful enjoyment of every fpecies of freedom [n], that even in countries where a great proportion of the inhabitants fubfifts by arts and commerce, the city tribes ought never to affemble feparately ; every convention, to be lawful, ought to be attended

[m] Ariftotle fays, that fuch people may eftablifh an ufeful democracy, and a πολιτεια ; which he has before explained to be a mixed government, and the beft form of republicanifm. But the fpirit of his obfervation would evaporate in a literal verfion.

[n] How much does a great modern democracy miftake its true intereft, when it is inflamed by the jealoufy of trade, and is ready to begin or carry on war in order to attain commercial fuperiority, or even commercial equality!

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tended by deputies from the country; ſo that the noxious humours engendered in market-places and courts of juſtice, may be ſweetened and purified by a due mixture of more wholeſome materials [o].

How the inferior kinds of democracy are to be eſtabliſhed.

Such then is the conſtitution of the beſt kind of democracy. The other kinds are more or leſs praiſeworthy, in proportion as every ſpecies of venality is more or leſs completely extirpated; for public functions, gratuitouſly diſcharged, are neither the objects of jealouſy nor the ſources of faction; they are not ſcrambled for by unprincipled indigence as inſtruments of profit or pleaſure. They are not received as a gift, but undertaken as a taſk by men of property and integrity, who are covetous of nothing but public gratitude. The laſt and worſt ſpecies of democracy, by its political arrangements, admits, and, by the allurement of fees and ſalaries, attracts and entices all conditions of men to the exerciſe of every department of executive as well as deliberative authority. It is not every city or commonwealth that is at all ſuſceptible of ſuch a conſtitution; and to render it permanent in any country, ſalutary laws and habitual diſcipline muſt counteract and control the vicious principle of the government. In order to introduce this form of policy, demagogues think they can never too much ſtrengthen the popular party. Baſtards, children deſcended from the intermarriages of citizens and ſtrangers, all ſorts of materials, howſoever impure and corrupt, are conſidered as proper aliment for ſuch a conſtitution. Yet it is certain that this progreſſion in degeneracy has its limit. For when the promiſcuous rabble too much overpower the rich and noble,

[o] How wonderfully are our author's remarks illuſtrated by a hiſtory, which he could not know, I mean the Roman! See Livy, b. ix. c. xlvi.

noble, these latter classes of men resume courage from despair, and, as happened at Cyrené[p], destroy their oppressors. The regulations once adopted by that African republic, and afterwards employed by Clisthenes at Athens, are useful in establishing democracies. Ancient distinctions are to be done away; ancient associations, civil and sacred, are to be abolished; new tribes are to be created; new and common solemnities to be instituted; and every expedient to be employed that may have a tendency to stamp the people with one uniform character, and reduce them all to the same level. Democracy may also borrow useful hints from tyranny. The unbridled licence of women, boys, and slaves is conformable to the nature and principle of democracies and tyrannies. Above all, demagogues must never cease to convince the people that under their favourite democracy, they will be at liberty to live as they list; this will procure for them the assistance of the majority; for the greater part of mankind will always be better pleased to live licentiously, than to submit to the restraints of salutary discipline.

Chap. 5.

How they are to be preserved.

It is, therefore, an easy matter to establish a democracy; but the difficulty lies in rendering it permanent. Laws, therefore, of every kind, written and unwritten, must continually be shaped and fitted to those ends and purposes, which, when attained, give stability to the popular constitution; and of laws, those are to be reckoned the best and the most democratical, which tend to uphold the power, not those which flatter the passions of the majority. It is usual with the demagogues of the

[p] History of Ancient Greece, v. i. c. viii. p. 347. This country, whose history I shall have occasion fully to relate, flourished as a kingdom or aristocracy, and decayed as a democracy. Vid. Plutarch in Lucull.

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the prefent age to gratify the rapacity of the multitude by unjuft impeachments and corrupt judgments. But men fincerely attached to popular government, ought to counteract thofe dangerous and difgraceful meafures by getting it eftablifhed as a law, that confifcated property fhall not be divided among the people, but confecrated to the gods; a law by which private peculation might be punifhed without provoking public rapacity, fince the multitude would no longer accufe wantonly, or wickedly condemn, thofe of whofe forfeitures they would not expect to reap the fpoils. All groundlefs impeachments ought alfo to be repreffed by fevere penalties; and every method employed to convince the rich and noble, that thofe invefted with power are not their enemies.

How they are to be rendered more moderate and lefs expenfive.

Democracies of the laft and worft kind are fometimes fo populous, that the public revenues are infufficient to defray the ordinary expences of government, without the dangerous aid of fines and confifcations. When this happens to be the cafe, no unneceffary affemblies ought ever to be held; and bufinefs muft be difpatched in the courts of juftice with all poffible expedition. In confequence of thefe arrangements, the expences of government will be lefs oppreffive to men of property; and although the attendance only of the poorer claffes be rewarded by fees, yet the higher ranks alfo will for the moft part attend both the affembly and the tribunals, becaufe fhort and unfrequent abfences from their private affairs will not prove ruinous to their fortunes; and under the control of the beft citizens, deliberations will be more moderate, and decifions more equitable. When revenues, on the other hand, fuperabound, it is now ufual with demagogues to divide the furplus among the poor; but this is pouring water into a fieve. A good ftatefman, inftead

ftead of being contented with occafionally relieving the wants of the poor, will continually ftrive to better their condition; and when he gives them property, will ufe the beft means for rendering that property permanent and productive. The public favings ought not be fquandered away in temporary and fruitlefs donatives, but accumulated to fuch an amount, that when diftributed to the induftrious and deferving poor, they will enable them to purchafe and cultivate a few acres of land of their own, (which is incomparably the beft ufe of public bounty,) or to acquire the materials and inftruments neceffary for carrying on manufactures and commerce. When the national favings are too fcanty to admit of ufeful diftribution to individuals, they muft then be divided among the moft deferving diftricts; and the rich, who defray the neceffary expences of government, muft be liberated from the burden of ufelefs entertainments and frivolous but expenfive exhibitions. By fuch political arrangements, the Carthaginian nobles acquired the affection of the people, whofe induftry they encouraged in cultivating the circumjacent territory. It belongs, furely, to the good fenfe as well as to the liberality of the higher ranks of men, to excite, by every means in their power, the productive labour of their inferiors. The example of the wealthy Tarentines is worthy of imitation; who, by communicating many ufes of their eftates to the people at large, obtained univerfal good-will, and greatly improved their poffeffions. At Tarentum, indeed, the populace were farther foothed by the law which enacted that fome public offices fhould be diftributed by lot, while others were conferred by fuffrage. When the fame magiftracy confifts of feveral members, this inftitution may be ufefully varied by appointing fome members by lot, and others

BOOK VIII. Chap. 6.

Of the different kinds of oligarchies:

others by ſuffrage. Such are the arrangements which ought to prevail in democracies.

As to oligarchies, it is plain that they muſt be conſtituted on principles totally different; ſince the higheſt intenſion of oligarchy is diametrically oppoſite to the higheſt intenſion of democracy. In proportion as oligarchies and democracies recede from their higheſt intenſion, that is, from the worſt conſtitution of each, a tumultuary populace on one hand, and a tyrannical cabal on the other, the diſtance between them is gradually diminiſhed; each preſerving, however, its diſtinctive character, till, by continual approximations, they finally run into each other, and blend harmoniouſly in a well-conſtituted republic.

how they are to be eſtabliſhed and preſerved.

In that ſpecies of oligarchy which we call the firſt and beſt, becauſe it moſt reſembles a mixed government, retaining nothing of oligarchy but its undue preference of wealth to other political elements, there ought to be a double cenſus, or two ſorts of qualifications, of which the loweſt ought to entitle thoſe poſſeſſed of it to hold all the inferior magiſtracies. By this means, the beſt portion of the citizens would have a direct and perſonal intereſt in ſupporting the authority of government, and in defending the honours of that privileged order, which, by enjoying the higheſt cenſus would be excluſively entitled to form the ſupreme council, and to adminiſter the great offices of ſtate. Between this ſpecies of oligarchy and that which is the laſt and worſt, there are ſeveral intermediate kinds; each requiring additional props to preſerve it, in proportion to the narrowneſs of its baſe. The laſt and worſt kind of all is the moſt difficultly upheld, requiring the utmoſt delicacy of management. Bodies well conſtituted, and hardily diſciplined, reſiſt and ſurmount the viciſſitudes and ſhocks of life; a ſhip well

conftituted, and well manned, defies the affailing tempeft; but a puny habit and a leaky veffel are expofed to the danger of finking under the leaft adverfe accident. A narrow oligarchy, therefore, can only be fupported by the political wifdom of its magiftrates, counteracting by moderation and good difcipline that tumult of paffion and intereft which is always ready to affail its fecurity.

Chap. 7.

That forms of government depend on the compofition of the military and naval force, and that this depends on local circumftances.

Forms of government, we have faid, are relative to local circumftances, by which they are often modified, upheld, or fubverted. For local circumftances powerfully influence the compofition of armies, and the compofition of armies often decides the nature of the conftitution. As communities are compofed chiefly of four claffes of men, hufbandmen, manufacturers, merchants, and mechanics [p], fo there are chiefly four elements that compofe national ftrength; cavalry, heavy-armed infantry, light infantry, and feamen. A champaign country, by its fitnefs for rearing and maintaining cavalry, is the beft adapted for the eftablifhing and fupporting an oligarchy, becaufe men of wealth only are capable of rearing and maintaining any confiderable number of horfes. The next kind of oligarchy may be defended by heavy-armed troops, fince to purchafe and keep in repair complete and well-tempered armour, only falls within the reach of perfons poffeffed of no mean fhare of opulence. But light infantry and feamen are, on the contrary, inftruments entirely adapted to the eftablifhment or fupport of democracy; and where the national ftrength is chiefly compofed of fuch elements, it will be difficult for an oligarchy to fubfift.

The

[p] τὸ θητικόν, including journeymen or day-labourers, and flaves.

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How oligarchies are to be upheld under unfavourable local circumſtances.

The beſt expedient which can, in that caſe, be employed for propping an edifice always ready to fall in pieces, is to imitate the conduct of good generals, who, by mixing a due proportion of light troops with the heavy-armed men and the cavalry, often ſupply by arrangement the defect of numbers. This proportion of light troops muſt be raiſed from the youth of moſt honourable deſcent, and eſpecially the ſons of the magiſtrates, carefully ſelected and diligently exerciſed, whoſe zeal and merit will render them the fitteſt champions of the oligarchy. But the diſeaſe of ſuch a conſtitution is too dangerous to admit of hope from the application of one ſingle remedy. It will be prudent, therefore, gradually to impart a ſhare of the government to perſons choſen from the people at large, either, as before-mentioned, to thoſe who have acquired a certain cenſus; or, as was eſtabliſhed at Thebes, to thoſe who have ceaſed cultivating for a certain number of years all mean and mercenary employments; or thirdly, in imitation of Marſeilles, we may aſſociate to government abilities and virtues, in whatever claſs of citizens they may be found. For the ſafety of oligarchies, it is neceſſary that the great offices of ſtate ſhould be burdenſome. The people at large will be inclined to tolerate excluſive honours that are dearly purchaſed, and to pardon generous ambition, that is rewarded by nothing but an expenſive pre-eminence. At entering upon office, oligarchic magiſtrates ought to be ſumptuous in their entertainments, and magnificent in their preſents. Architectural embelliſhments of the city, coſtly dedications in the temples, ought to diſplay and perpetuate their patriotic munificence. But inſtead of following theſe ſalutary maxims, which can alone give permanence to their

their order, the nobles of the prefent day are equally covetous of wealth and ambitious of honour; and uniting infolent pride with greedy rapacity, the oligarchies, in which they bear fway, are nothing better than little democracies.

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Chap. 8.

Of the divifions of the executive power, and the different kinds of magiftrates.

Having thus examined the general diftribution of the powers of government, relatively to the principal elements of which communities are effentially compofed, it remains to confider the neceffary divifions of the executive authority, and to explain how many and what kinds of magiftrates ought to be eftablifhed in every well-regulated commonwealth. In fmall ftates, it is plain, there cannot be fo many perfons fpared from employments of productive induftry, for exercifing ufeful but unproductive offices, as in ftates that are larger and more populous. Yet every commonwealth, that completely anfwers the end of its inftitution, muft contain nearly the fame varieties of executive magiftracy; fince, without fome offices, a community could not fubfift at all; and without others it could not fubfift happily. It is neceffary, therefore, to know what are thofe offices that admit of accumulation, and what are thofe that require partition; what are thofe offices that may be eafily and fafely exercifed by the fame perfon, and what are thofe that cannot prudently be intrufted to the fame hands. The folution of this queftion muft be derived from confidering the number and nature of thofe offices that refult from the great purpofes of political fociety; the fubfiftence, accommodation, fecurity, and comfort of its conftituent members.

Magiftrates for protecting commerce and contracts;

The general end of the political partnerfhip is the well-being of the partners. Men affociate together and unite their efforts, that the operations of the whole community may terminate as nearly as poffible in the happinefs of each individual citizen.

 But

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But in order to attain, by continual approximations, to this moſt deſirable end, it is neceſſary that the citizens ſhould enjoy eaſy and regular means of communicating mutual aſſiſtance, and ſupplying mutual wants [q]. That ſpecies of exchange, therefore, which is directed to the purpoſes of accommodation and comfort, not to the ſenſeleſs, becauſe inſatiable purſuit of accumulation or gain, is the moſt direct and immediate reſult of political ſociety; and the firſt and moſt uſeful magiſtrates are thoſe appointed to protect internal commerce, and to ſee that it be carried on freely, regularly, and honeſtly.

for maintaining police both in the city and country;

Another concern analogous to the former, and which requires the immediate attention of every ſtate, is to take care that boundaries be accurately adjuſted; and that ſtreets and buildings, whether private or public, be regularly diſpoſed and ſolidly conſtructed; ſo as neither to incommode nor endanger the inhabitants; and that roads be well ſtraightened, and kept in conſtant repair. Theſe and ſuch objects are comprehended under the name of police, which in large ſtates is divided into a variety of branches, entruſted to particular magiſtrates, who are, ſome of them, inſpectors of the harbours, others of the fountains, and others of the fortifications; and when their offices bear a reference to the country, they are called keepers of the foreſts, and ſuperintendents of diſtricts.

for collecting and managing the revenues.

Men in their corporate capacity have occaſion to effectuate public purpoſes, and therefore muſt poſſeſs a common fund. Revenues and contributions thus become neceſſary; and there muſt of courſe be treaſurers to receive and take charge of theſe contributions and revenues, and to diſtribute them through the various channels of the public expenditure.

How

[q] See Ethics, b. v. c. vi. p. 271, & ſeq.

Courts of record.

How regularly foever matters may originally be adjufted, diforders muft foon take place, unlefs there be in every country courts of record. Contracts and judicial decifions, as well as actions, fuits, and accufations, muft all of them, when liable to be mifreprefented or difputed, be committed to the faithful regiftry of writing; and this duty of perpetuating the memory of civil acts is plainly the function of one and the fame magiftracy, though the bufinefs is often divided among notaries, recorders, remembrancers, and other functionaries; whofe names have, all of them, a relation to the fame important concern.

Magiftrates for fuperintending the execution of the fentence of courts of juftice.

Next to this is a function of government of all the moft neceffary, and alfo the moft troublefome. The fentences of courts are nugatory, unlefs they be regularly carried into execution. A magiftrate, therefore, muft be appointed for exacting fines, for inflicting punifhments, and for taking charge of thofe anfwerable to the laws in their bodies or eftates. It is not eafy to find men well qualified, and at the fame time willing, to difcharge this moft important function; for the odium attending it makes prudence and humanity decline it, and it cannot be fafely intrufted to infenfibility or knavery. Knaves or fools require to be continually watched themfelves, inftead of being appointed to watch and take charge of others. Much attention is neceffary in regulating this department of office, which will be beft conftituted when divided among a variety of perfons called to exercife it by rotation, or to the different companies of young men employed to guard the city [r]. The odium attending their employment will thus be diminifhed; and the lefs is the odium that attends thofe appointed to execute the laws, the more eafily and the more completely will the laws be executed. If the fame fet of men were perpetually employed in

[r] See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. iii. c. xxvii. p. 253, & feq.

in conducting all matters of this kind, thefe men, how proper foever might be their behaviour, would foon come to be regarded as public enemies. The Athenians, therefore, wifely feparated the functions of fuperintending the cuftody, and fuperintending the execution, of perfons condemned by public juftice; and the magiftrates of one court may very properly be intrufted with carrying into effect the fentences pronounced by another.

Command of the national force.

Moft of the offices hitherto enumerated and explained, may be fitly difcharged without any other requifites than thofe of common fenfe and common honefty. But there are other employments requiring more than ordinary fkill and more than ordinary integrity. To be the general or admiral of the commonwealth; to have the charge of equipping the fleet and marfhalling the army; and to be intrufted, either in peace or war, with troops, garrifons, fhips, and harbours; all thefe are branches of one and the fame function, the command of the national force; an office that cannot be fafely committed except to men of pre-eminent fkill and diftinguifhed fidelity.

Comptrollers of public accounts.

Almoft all magiftrates and officers, civil as well as military, muft be perpetually or occafionally intrufted with the receipt and expenditure of public money. In every well-regulated ftate there ought, therefore, to be a particular board for the fpecific purpofe of examining and controlling the public accounts; and this board confifting of men who never handle money themfelves, but who have a right to be fatisfied in the name of the public, as to the precife amount of the revenues that are raifed, and the exact manner in which they are employed.

The moft dignified of all magiftracies is that with which important national concerns begin and terminate; which affem-

bles the people; propofes matters for their deliberation; and, by its refpected authority, either confirms or annuls their decrees. This magiftracy, in which the wifdom and majefty of the ftate are concentrated, is called in ariftocracies the college of cenfors [s]; in oligarchies, the council of pre-advifers [t]; in democracies, the fenate.

BOOK VIII.

Different orders of priefts.

Religious concerns require alfo their proper magiftrates to take charge of the temples, facred treafures, and facrifices; of which fome are performed by priefts of particular diftricts, the minifters of particular divinities; and others by thofe called kings or archons on behalf of the public at large, and in honour of the guardian gods of the commonwealth.

Superintendants of education, morals, and public fhows.

In well-regulated and flourifhing ftates, there are alfo many offices (all departments of the fame function) which have for their objects the education of youth, as well as the morals of every age and of either fex, together with the decency and fplendour of dramatic entertainments, and other fhows and folemnities. In democracies, there is not any room for feveral of thofe magiftrates. Infpectors of education and of morals would be altogether ufelefs under fuch governments; where the wives and children of thofe dignified with the name of citizens are often, through poverty, employed by them as flaves [u]. Such is the general fketch of the neceffary branches of executive government [x].

[s] νομοφύλακες, guardians of the laws.

[t] Refembling the lords of articles in the old Scottifh conftitution.

[u] See above, b. iv. c. xv. p. 310.

[x] In fome parts of this Chapter, the order of the fentences is changed for the fake of perfpicuity; and fome imperfect fentences are omitted, the obfervations contained in them being repetitions of what is faid in Book VI.

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THE END.

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